

HITLER'S SPEECHES

*An English translation of representative
passages arranged under subjects and
edited by*

NORMAN H. BAYNES

VOLUME II



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO

Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs

THESE VOLUMES were planned and the printing of them begun in the early months of the war, but the completion and publication of the work have inevitably been slow, owing to the magnitude of the task. The aim of the volumes is to render accessible to English readers the substance of Hitler's published speeches delivered between April 1922 and August 1939. From a mass of repetition and verbiage Professor Baynes has selected the passages which contain the most characteristic statement of Hitler's views, and of those passages he has given us a close, accurate, and at the same time eminently readable translation. The volumes bear the stamp of objectivity, and should become a standard work for students of the policy which led to the second World War, and should remain of service to those who hope to avoid a third World War through the elimination of the moral poison which Hitler has injected into the minds of the German people

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The SPEECHES *of*
ADOLF HITLER

April 1922–August 1939

AN
ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF
REPRESENTATIVE PASSAGES ARRANGED
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27. FOREIGN POLICY

[*The extracts from Hitler's Speeches included in this section are arranged chronologically.*]

Since Hitler's racial theory forms the basis of the earlier formulations of his foreign policy it may not be out of place to preface it with some characteristic passages on the significance of race.

In the course of Hitler's conversation with Otto Strasser on 21 May 1930 Strasser objected that the main reason why Hitler was playing false to revolutionary socialism was that he wanted to throttle it in the interests of legality and of co-operation with the bourgeoisie of the Right. Hitler replied:

"What you understand by socialism is sheer Marxism. Now look: the great mass of working men want only bread and circuses: they have no understanding for ideals of any sort whatever, and we can never hope to win the workers to any large extent by an appeal to ideals. We want to make a selection from the new dominating caste which is not moved, as you are, by any ethic of pity, but is quite clear in its own mind that it has the right to dominate others because it represents a better race: this caste ruthlessly maintains and assures its dominance over the masses." . . .

"There are no revolutions except racial revolutions: there cannot be a political, economic, or social revolution—always and only it is the struggle of the lower stratum of inferior race against the dominant higher race, and if this higher race has forgotten the law of its existence, then it loses the day. All revolutions in world-history—and I have studied them in detail—are nothing save racial struggles. If you would only read Rosen-

berg's new book—the most tremendous achievement of its kind, even greater than Chamberlain's—then you would understand these things.” . . .

“You have spoken in favour of the so-called Indian ‘Freedom Movement’, but it is clear that this is a rebellion of the lower Indian race against the superior (*hochwertige*) English-Nordic race. The Nordic race has a right to rule the world and we must take this racial right as the guiding star of our foreign policy. It is for this reason that for us any co-operation with Russia is out of the question for there on a Slav-Tartar body is set a Jewish head. I know the Slavs from my home-country! Formerly when on this Slav body there was set a German head, then one could co-operate with Russia, as Bismarck did. But to-day it would be simply a crime.”¹ . . .

“The interest of Germany demands co-operation with England since it is a question of establishing a Nordic-Germanic supremacy over Europe and, in conjunction with Nordic-Germanic America, over the world.”²

Hitler's criticism of the Second Reich is summarized in the charge that “men were seeking to mould the history of a State without having even a suspicion of the ‘volkic’ and racial foundations of human life as it is lived in a community. The German people itself is a conglomerate composed of basic elements of differing races. The corresponding natural capacities, which in individual cases differ very widely, give to the intellectual and cultural life of our people its own peculiar stamp. There is hardly a people on this earth which has capacities of wider range than has the German people. In this many-sidedness of the German spirit and therefore of German

¹ Otto Strasser, *Ministersessel oder Revolution?*, pp. 12–14. Dr. Olden lent me a copy of this pamphlet.

² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

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life lie both our international strength and also unfortunately our national weakness. This variety in the formation of our people while it awakes our love and devotion is at the same time the source of great anxieties." . . . In the Bismarckian period the entire *bourgeois* world failed to notice the beginnings of a process which threatened to dissolve the German people once more into its basic elements. "For the Marxist watchword 'Proletarians of all lands unite!' is nothing else than the attempt to discover within each individual State and its people those racial elements in its composition which may well have been fused together for millennia, but whose demarcations are still to-day clearly visible to the eye which looks below the surface. Only the superficial observer can believe that he can in the main discern these elements by external characteristics. It is important to understand that one cannot from externals infer the inner endowment, but that one can from the inner endowment of a man infer his essential character as a whole and his origin."

"Although the master-race with its capacity for forming a State may through thousands of years have so fused itself with its subjects as to create a new people, yet in detail the process is not always so complete that a relapse into the original elements can simply be regarded as an impossibility. This awakening of the earlier racial cores need not by any means be the result of a conscious sorting out of peoples by their external characteristics, that is by their special visible physical peculiarities, it may well be rather the effect of a definite spiritual appeal to the racial cells which react to that appeal because of an analogous natural endowment. The Marxist doctrine is just one single appeal to an element which is racially more or less clearly defined and which is found in almost all peoples. The more these elements appear amongst

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themselves to be derived from a common root, the more does the international character of this doctrine and of its effects seem naturally to fit the given conditions. The heart and the significance of the Communistic process are to be found in the attempt to split up peoples composed of different racial cores and to replace that part of the people which previously provided the political and *weltanschaulich* leadership by a new and in this case a Jewish master-class (*Herrenschicht*). . . . That the mobilization of slumbering primal instincts directed against the present existence of peoples and States, some of which have millennial histories, cannot but produce the profoundest shocks is natural; these shocks affect the lives of all. But the greatness of the results produced by this work of destruction can be measured by the fact that the centrifugal primal instincts of a people's racial cells so soon as they are awakened in a short time far outweigh the tendencies and the strength which support the community. Thus the watchword of the international common interests of like racial cells actually displays a greater attractive force than does the will to maintain the former common body of the people which has now become alien to their thought. In this way it could come about that while Bismarck did in fact achieve the constitutional union of the German tribes and the German States, at the same time the mass-decline, say rather the race-decline, of our people had its beginning. With the proclamation of the two great collective ideas of 'Proletariat' and 'Bourgeoisie' the intellectual leaders in Marxist teaching sought to produce in our people precisely the same division into its great essential component elements as they had done with other peoples." The result of this process was obvious when in 1918 millions of Germans had no more interest in the defence of the Reich.

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If this effort were finally successful, it would mean not only the end of Germany's millennial civilization, but a growing complete lack of understanding for the values which this civilization had fostered.¹

"The realization of the fundamental conception of a national policy which finds its expression in the doctrine of 'Blood and Soil'—a conception which has been re-awakened by National Socialism—will mean the most profound revolutionary transformation that there has ever been. Our fundamental demand for the strengthening of the racial bases of our people's life which is represented by these words and which at the same time includes every possible safeguarding of our existence as a people determines also the aims of National Socialism alike in its domestic and foreign policy."

"The inner regeneration, the Constitution of a people determined by that people's system of values and anchored in its blood,² conditions also in the last resort the unity of its will—that unity which alone puts it into a position in which it can with success conduct the fight for its existence". . . .

"When alike in our domestic and foreign policy we bring to realization the fundamental principle of Blood and Soil, then in the future for the first time we shall be no longer tossed hither and thither by events: we ourselves shall then be the master of circumstances."³

When giving evidence at the trial of Reichswehr officers in Leipzig in September 1930 Hitler said: "Germany is

¹ Address to students in Berlin on 7 Feb. 1934. *F.Z.*, 8 Feb. 1934.

² German: *die innere Regeneration, die wertmäßige und im Blut verankerte Verfassung eines Volkes*. Such phrases as these do not lend themselves readily to translation into English.

³ In a speech at Munich delivered at the fifth *Tagung des agrarpolitischen Apparates der Reichsleitung der NSDAP. V.B.*, 3 Jan. 1933.

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bound hand and foot¹ by Peace Treaties. The whole of German legislation to-day is nothing else than the attempt to anchor the Peace Treaties in the German people. The National Socialists do not regard these treaties as a law, but as something imposed upon Germany by constraint. We do not admit that future generations who are completely innocent should be burdened by them. If we protest against them with every means in our power then we find ourselves on the path of revolution."

President of the Court: With illegal means, too?

Hitler: "I presuppose for the moment that we have won the day: then we shall fight against the treaties with every means, even from the point of view of the world, with illegal means."²

In an interview with Mr. Rothay Reynolds, correspondent of the "Daily Mail", after the great National Socialist victory at the election of September 1930 when 107 National Socialists were elected to the Reichstag, Hitler said in speaking of the Treaty of Versailles:

"If Europe decides to make Germany serve a life sentence, then she must face the danger of having an embittered nation, desperate to the verge of crime, in her midst. What that would mean a child can guess—Bolshevism."

"The English and Germans cannot remain enemies for ever just because they fought against each other for four and a half years. To have a strong party in Germany which will form a bulwark against Bolshevism is in the interests not only of England but also of all nations. You may have difficulties before you and the time may come when German friendship will not be without its value."³

¹ German: *geknebelt*.

² *F.Z.*, 26 Sept. 1930.

³ *Daily Mail*, 27 Sept. 1930.

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In September 1930 Hitler contributed an article to the "Sunday Express"; this is, so far as I know, the only article written by Hitler which has ever appeared in an English newspaper. A few sentences may be quoted:

"If you proletarianize a people economically, their proletarianization politically is bound to follow. That is what is taking place in Germany to-day. The German election of September 14 was a warning. It tore away the veil and partly revealed the soul of Germany. . . . The election was a signal of the approaching revolt of the German soul." . . .

"The election, so to speak, took the temperature of the German people. The world was shocked to discover Germany in a fever—a high fever. That fever is bound to continue—to rise against existing conditions and unbearable burdens." . . .

"Germany may still be saved by reopening the Versailles Treaty and the Young Plan. When delirium sets in it will be too late." . . .

"No people, I do not care who they are, can endure such conditions, carry such burdens, be conscious that they, their children and their children's children are foreign tribute slaves and yet retain their self-respect. It is impossible."

"Even a camel will lie down and refuse to move, even a horse will balk when cruelly overloaded. Why should not a people revolt against burdens they know they cannot carry, after having given the world the sincerest proof of their loyal efforts to do so?" . . .

"Instead of proving to the world that Germany cannot carry the enormous burdens and live decently, the German political parties have been endeavouring to keep up the impression abroad that she can and will pay what is demanded."

"We, the National Socialists, demand the revision of the Versailles Treaty."

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"We demand the revision of the Young Plan."

"We demand the return to us of the Polish Corridor, which is like a strip of flesh cut from our body. It cuts Germany into two. It is a national wound that bleeds continuously, and will continue to bleed till the land is returned to us."

"All this is founded on the hypocritical basis that Germany was guilty of causing the world war. The National Socialists reject that accusation. It is untrue. It has been thoroughly exploded, but all Germany is suffering from the Versailles Treaty and the Young Plan, which are based on that accusation."

"The National Socialist Movement proposes to rouse all Germans against this injustice, to rouse them to say unitedly that there shall be 'No more'."

"President Wilson solemnly promised the German people that if they laid down their arms and overthrew the Imperial régime they would not be held responsible for the War, and no indemnities would be laid on them. That promise and others were broken in the most contemptuous manner."

"'Indemnities' were renamed 'reparations'."

"If the German people must suffer as they are suffering to-day and will be suffering to-morrow, then let us have suffering that may come from saying 'No' rather than that laid on us by our 'Yes'."¹

In an interview with the correspondent of "The Times" in Munich on 2 October 1930 Hitler was asked "Whether a National Socialist Foreign Minister would insist on complete repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles or would be satisfied with pursuing a policy of revision." He replied:

"That is a question which cannot be answered with a simple negative or affirmative. The decisive factor in

¹ *Sunday Express*, 28 Sept. 1930.

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our attitude towards foreign obligations is not what we want to do, but what we can do. Just as it is a dishonest act for a merchant to put his name to a bill which he knows he cannot meet, so it is equally dishonourable for a statesman to sign on behalf of a nation an international agreement which he knows that nation to be incapable of fulfilling. You may rely on one thing, and that is that we will not undertake anything which we cannot perform."

"I firmly believe that the last vestiges of estrangement between England and Germany will before long disappear completely. Whatever may be England's attitude towards us now, it may well be that at no very remote date England will be glad of the existence of a strong and reawakened Germany. The danger is not yet imminent, but if one day the Bolshevist menace spread in all directions and the Red Flag flew from Vladivostok to the English Channel, what then? The Germany of the present day is too weak to withstand Bolshevist aggression, and therefore our movement is no mere jingoism but a vital necessity to Germany and Europe."

"I cannot conceive how our aims and methods can be taken exception to by any true Englishman."¹

At a National Socialist District Rally in Frankfurt on 4 October 1930 Hitler said (according to a summary of the speech in "The Times"):

Germany must become free and would be free. The Nazis would declare to the whole world that "several things of the past" had never existed and would never exist for them. He repudiated in the strongest terms the theory of Germany's sole responsibility for the War, which, having been acknowledged under compulsion by some Germans, constituted the legal basis for

¹ *The Times*, 4 Oct. 1930.

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the Peace Treaty. If anybody in Germany was to be blamed for the War, it was certainly not the young people gathered around him, most of whom were almost children and took no active part in politics at the time of the outbreak of war. Germany's ex-enemies should state frankly if they intended to ruin Germany, but should not talk of reparations, which were actually nothing less than extortions. The policy of fulfilment was causing the economic collapse of Germany and the gradual expropriation of its inhabitants. In such circumstances the German nation would be driven into a situation based upon the expropriation of the individual—namely Bolshevism. The two alternatives were now liberty and honour or Bolshevism. The Nazis' task was to make as clear a decision on this point as possible.¹

In an interview with "The Times" correspondent in Berlin on 14 October 1930 Hitler said:

If economic developments continued as at present, before the winter was out Germany would be like a powder barrel that a single spark could set off. The Middle parties in the Reichstag would be hopelessly split, and the world would have the choice between a Bolshevik Germany and a National Socialist Germany. A Bolshevik Germany would repudiate everything—reparation debts and private obligations too. Those who, with a helpless shrug of the shoulders, had signed the Treaty of Versailles and the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan had been giving bad cheques. A National Socialist Germany would never sign cheques it could not honour. It would not make the political payments, because it would not honestly be able to; but, like any honest merchant, it would honour all obligations to repay private foreign loans and investments. If the

¹ *The Times*, 6 Oct. 1930.

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world insisted on the political payments being made, then Germany would go under.

The Bolshevization of Russia had already given the whole civilized world a jolt; if Germany became an annex of Bolshevik Russia, Western civilization would get a much worse and probably fatal jolt. Even Oswald Spengler, who had at least given the decline of Western civilisation 300 years to complete itself, would then prove to have been an optimist.¹

Taken from the correspondence of Hitler with Brüning the following sentences illustrate Hitler's attitude towards the Treaty of Versailles in the year 1931:

"I was of the conviction that without a complete abolition of reparations it was not possible to conceive any restoration to economic health."²

"The Peace Treaty of Versailles is no Peace Treaty. On the contrary it belongs to the category of those *Tribute-Diktats* which bear in themselves the seed of later wars."³

"The demand for the abolition of those clauses of the Versailles Treaty which reduce our people both in the sphere of law and of economics to folk of the second class is not only our moral will but our moral duty."⁴

"It would never have come to a Treaty of Versailles, Mr. Chancellor, if the parties supporting you—the Centrum, Social Democracy, and Democracy—had not first undermined, destroyed and betrayed the old Reich, if they had not prepared, carried through, or at least accepted and defended the Revolution."⁵

¹ *The Times*, 15 Oct. 1930.

² Hitler's open letter to Chancellor Brüning, 14 Oct. 1931, in *Hitlers Auseinandersetzung mit Brüning*, Munich, 1932, p. 23.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

In an interview with Press representatives (mainly English and American) in Berlin in December 1931 Hitler, speaking of international relations in general, said that:

Hatred was comprehensible in time of war, but he could not understand its being nourished for years afterwards. It would be foolish, for instance, for Germany to gloat over the prospect of the loss of India by the British Empire, which would be a misfortune for the rest of the world, including Germany. With one exception friendly relations had been restored between Germany and her former enemies, and he claimed that his party had contributed most towards this achievement. For twelve years he had been preaching that the old war-time cry of "Gott strafe England" should be forgotten.

With France it was another matter. *Rapprochement* must proceed from France, and was impossible as long as France could not bring herself to cease trying to treat 65,000,000 Germans as a second-class nation. After 1871 Germany had imposed no political conditions, and the indemnity had been completely cleared off within three years. No conditions had been imposed to prevent France's rearming again immediately. Germany had acted with this magnanimity after winning the 1870 war entirely unaided. France, having "won" the late War in very different circumstances, was still endeavouring to keep her heel on the neck of Germany twelve years after. The Disarmament Conference would be the great test of the common sense of the entire world. If the world allowed France to keep her armaments at their present high level, which was quite unnecessary for her security, it would mean that the world wanted France to continue her system of hegemony by means of blackmail.¹

¹ *The Times*, 5 Dec. 1931.

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France must abandon her policy of extortion and her intention to humiliate Germany: she must cease to treat Germany as a second-class nation and must instead of that for the next sixty or a hundred years pursue a policy which would render possible the stabilization of international economic intercourse.¹

*Hitler in an interview with the Berlin correspondent of the "Corriere della Sera" in December 1931 expressed his sympathy with Italy, which was the first Power to abandon the war-spirit and which through Mussolini had shown the world that it was determined by revision of treaties and disarmament to secure a true peace.*²

In an interview with a correspondent of the Italian newspaper "Tevere" in October 1932 Hitler said:

"Les conditions de l'Italie en 1922 et celles de l'Allemagne d'aujourd'hui ne sont pas les mêmes. Un acte de violence était nécessaire en Italie. En Allemagne, une action légale aura plus d'efficacité, d'autant plus que la légalité est avec nous. Voilà pourquoi notre travail a été commencé par le bas pour atteindre les cimes et des actes de violence aujourd'hui plus que jamais, au lieu de nous aider, nous nuiraient." . . .

"Je sais qu'à l'étranger mes ennemis font imprimer de nombreuses sottises sur mes idées et mes possibilités. Dites cependant aux lecteurs italiens que les miens et moi avons en main toutes les forces matérielles pour gouverner l'Allemagne, que nous en avons le droit moral et légal et que le jour est imminent où, par la force, mais aussi par la volonté unanime du peuple, nous gouvernerons pour le bien du peuple et au nom de Dieu."

¹ Translated from the summary in *F.Z.*, 5 Dec. 1931.

² *F.Z.*, 8 Dec. 1931.

"L'Italie et l'Allemagne ont les mêmes ennemis et leur mission est de travailler unies pour la cause de la civilisation."¹

M. Goering a cité un fait, à savoir qu'au début de 1933, au moment de la transmission des pouvoirs par le général Schleicher au Chancelier Hitler, celui-là expliquait à celui-ci quelle devrait être la politique de l'Allemagne à l'égard de la Pologne. L'idée du général Schleicher consistait en une entente entre l'Allemagne, la France et la Russie. C'est par le moyen de l'entente avec la Russie que devrait être entreprise, par la suite, la suppression de la Pologne. Comme me le raconta M. Goering, pendant tout le temps que le général Schleicher donnait ces explications au Chancelier Hitler, ce dernier ne souffla mot. Ce n'est qu'en quittant le chancelier sortant qu'il dit à M. Goering: "und ich werde das Gegenteil machen".²

In the Proclamation by the Government to the German nation issued on 1 February 1933 the new régime said:

"We are firmly convinced that the German nation entered the fight in 1914 without the slightest feeling of guilt on its part and filled only with the desire to defend its Fatherland which had been attacked and to preserve the freedom, nay, the very existence, of the German people. This being so, we can only see in the disastrous fate which has overtaken us since those November days of 1918 the result of our collapse at home. But the rest of the world, too, has suffered no less since then from overwhelming crises. The balance of power which had evolved in the course of history, and which formerly

¹ *Le Temps*, 5 Oct. 1932.

² "And I shall do the opposite." Cited from a note made by Count Szembek of a conversation with Goering on 31 Jan. 1935. *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la période 1933-1939*, Paris, Flammarion, p. 47.

played no small part in bringing about the understanding of the necessity for an internal solidarity of the nations, with all its advantages for trade and commerce, has been set on one side."

"The insane conception of victors and vanquished destroyed the confidence existing between nations, and, at the same time, the industry of the entire world."¹ . . .

"As regards their foreign policy, the National Government consider their highest mission to be the securing of the right to live and the restoration of freedom to our nation. Their determination to bring to an end the chaotic state of affairs in Germany will assist in restoring to the community of nations a State of equal value and, above all, a State which must have equal rights. They are impressed with the importance of their duty to use this nation of equal rights as an instrument for the securing and maintenance of that peace which the world requires to-day more than ever before."

"May the goodwill of all others assist in the fulfilment of this our earnest wish for the welfare of Europe and of the whole world".

"Great as is our love for our army as the bearer of our arms and the symbol of our great past, we should be happy if the world, by reducing its armaments, would see to it that we need never again increase our own."²

In his speech in the Reichsrat on 2 February 1933 Hitler said:

"We have come to power in what is perhaps the most difficult period of German history. If one is not to

¹ German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935), p. 3; authorized English translation (as above) in *The New Germany desires Work and Peace*, p. 5.

² German text: *Dokumente*, &c., *ibid.*, p. 5; authorized English translation (as above) in *The New Germany desires Work and Peace*, p. 8.

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despair at such an hour, if, on the contrary, one is to look to the future with confidence and hope, one must have a great faith. The grounds for our faith are threefold: firstly, we have confidence in the strength of the German people itself, in its industry; secondly we have confidence in the capacities of this people, in its native genius which time and time again in history has discovered ways to maintain its life; and thirdly in despite of crises, in despite of all catastrophes and difficulties, we see still unaltered the German idea, the German living-space (*Lebensraum*), the German soil. And if it was possible for former generations from these three sources of strength, through all the chances and the changes of destiny, to fashion at the last the great Reich which once we knew, then it must be possible—such is the conviction of this new Government—for us, conscious that behind us lie these high traditions, to draw once more from the same roots a like greatness and once more to fashion it anew.”¹

In an interview with British and American journalists on 2 February 1933 Hitler said:

“I have been represented as having made bloodthirsty and firebrand speeches against foreign countries, and now the world is surprised at my moderation.”² I never delivered firebrand speeches against foreign countries—even my speeches of ten years ago can testify to that. Any one like myself who knows what war is is aware of what a squandering of effort, or rather consumption of strength, is involved.”

As to a possible future war, the result could only be conjectured, and therefore nobody wanted peace and tranquillity more than himself and Germany.

¹ *F.Z.*, 3 Feb. 1934.

² Cf. the following translated extract.

"But like all other nations we insist upon equality, and our proper place in the world, just as much as the Englishman insists upon the same thing for his country."¹

In an interview with Italian journalists of which a report was published by the "Neue Freie Presse" on 3 February 1933 Hitler said that in all the years of his hard preparation for power he had always kept in view the necessity for close and friendly relations between Italy and Germany. "Now as the responsible representative of German policy I am resolutely determined to work for the attainment of this goal which I have set before me and also because it is my conviction that a close and active friendship between the two countries is essential for European peace."

"People are now objecting that as statesman I am employing a totally different language from that of the period when I was but the leader of a Party. In fact I have never made firebrand speeches, I have never preached hatred against any one no matter whom.² I have always only maintained, repeated, and pointed out that those rights must be conceded to the German nation which are her due as a decisive factor in European civilization (*Kultur*). Italy, too, rightly claims that her position as a great Power must be recognized, and that is one of the reasons why the two nations have met on the same ground with their gaze set upon the same goal. That makes all the easier an understanding on those vital questions which interest both peoples."³

According to a French version of the report of this interview printed in the "Giornale d'Italia" (inaccessible to me) Hitler added:

"Permettez-moi, maintenant, non comme homme d'État responsable de la politique allemande, mais

¹ *M.G.*, 3 Feb. 1933.

² Cf. pp. 44, 108 *supra*.

³ *Neue Freie Presse*, 3 Feb. 1933.

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comme homme d'action, de vous prier de transmettre mon salut au peuple italien. Ce salut sort de façon d'autant plus spontanée de mon cœur que je me rends compte que mon passé, mes sentiments politiques, en beaucoup de points, apparaissent voisins de la pensée et des sentiments du peuple italien."¹

In February 1933 Hitler disapproved of the naval war film "Morgenrot" since it put all the chivalry on the German and all the treachery on the British side. Dr. Ernst Hanfstaengl conveyed Hitler's views to the correspondent of "The Times":

He deprecates the unimaginative dishing-up in these days of old war-time propaganda, clichés, and controversies. It is not that he does not look back with pride on the war-time deeds of the naval and military forces, but in his view the controversial side of the film is not representative of the outlook of the new, the coming Germany which he leads. Even the most nationalistic Germany of to-day does not, he is sure, look upon Great Britain in that light, but takes the line that bygones should be bygones.²

On 6 February 1933 Colonel Etherton, as representative of the "Daily Mail", had an interview with Hitler. A report of the interview appeared in the "Sunday Express" for 12 February 1933. This report was officially stated in Germany to be inaccurate: it contained "arbitrary alterations and additions" inserted without the approval of the German authorities concerned. It included, it was stated, extracts from an account of a former interview. I translate here from the official version of the interview.

¹ *Le Temps*, 4 Feb. 1933. For a message sent by Hitler to Germans in Italy see *Le Temps* for 7 Mar. 1933.

² *The Times*, 6 Feb. 1933.

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Asked for his views on the question of disarmament Hitler said that every German Government naturally adopts the standpoint that every effort should be made to secure disarmament but that every such disarmament should be honest and clear and that it should not be hedged about with conditions (*verkläusliert*)."

"The solution of this difficult problem depends mainly upon the attitude adopted towards this question by the Anglo-Saxon peoples, i.e. by the British and the Americans, and what weight they are prepared to throw into the scale in order effectively to carry through a disarmament. So far as concerns Germany, she has made her contribution to the solution of this question not merely in theory but has disarmed the greatest army to such an extent that only a relatively small army remains."

On the subject of the Treaty of Versailles Hitler said that the Treaty was a misfortune not only for Germany but for other peoples also. "It is a misfortune to wish to divide the world for all time into conquerors and conquered. The attempt to maintain such a division undermines the natural confidence of peoples, and this lack of confidence also extends its influence to the economic life which has suffered most severely through this Treaty. And so far as possibilities of improving this mistaken Treaty are concerned in that sphere, we are fighting against those differentiations between the nations created by the Treaty which damage all alike."

"One can certainly after a war distinguish for a time between conquerors and conquered, but never at any time can one build up a world-order on such a basis."

"I believe that one day not only we ourselves but the entire world will call for a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. At least every German Government will demand that the injustice laid down in this Treaty shall once more be made good."

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Asked what he thought would be the attitude of France towards such efforts Hitler replied that at present he still continued to hope that in Paris also it would be recognized that the treaties signed in 1919 could no longer be upheld. On the subject of the continued rearmament of France Hitler said: "I believe that not only in Germany but also in other States folk are wondering at the amount of money which is at the disposal of the French and which they are apparently at a loss to know how to employ. We desire that the existence of every nation should be secured to the extent which is conditioned by the world on her frontiers. We for our part have also the right secured by treaty in the acts of the League of Nations to insist on this, and that we shall do."

"The state of affairs which exists to-day has never yet occurred in history. Even in 1814 the allies of that day when they united against the attempt of an Emperor to force Europe under French dominance did indeed break down the supremacy of Napoleon, but not one of them demanded that France should be regarded for ever as the conquered, and deprived of all rights in every respect."

*Hitler said that in his view the so-called "Polish Corridor" constituted a particularly great injustice which had been imposed upon the German nation. Finally with regard to the problem of Communism he said that in this case he had not to do with a foreign State but with a factor (Erscheinung) of disintegration which concerned him as a problem of domestic German politics. His view was that it was essential that Communism should be overcome and stamped out in Germany in order to render possible a peaceful development and a new prosperity for the German nation."*¹

¹ V.B., 14 Feb. 1933.

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In an interview with the correspondent of the Budapest newspaper "Hirlap" in February 1933 Hitler said:

"The German and the Hungarian peoples have been, through a long history, united in a relation of close friendship and of genuine and warm sympathy. Both peoples long trod a common path. In the World War they fought shoulder to shoulder and were overtaken by a common misfortune. That means that, as regards the future, they have common interests. For this reason I hope that the well-tryed friendship will hold good also in the present difficult times. At least I shall do everything in my power to foster and, if possible, to deepen this friendship. I know Hungary well, I have often stayed in the country, and I have been in Budapest, and perhaps I should be justified in saying that I have always followed with interest the fortunes of the Hungarian people. The heroic struggle of the Hungarian nation in the War and their sufferings after the War have only reinforced these sentiments. That Hungarian delegates in Geneva have more than once fought by the side of the German delegates for our demands and ideals¹ will remain for us an unforgettable service. I am convinced that this mutual friendship lives in the heart of all members of both peoples."

Hitler was asked whether Hungary could count upon this friendship also in economic struggles. He answered: "I can assure you that Hungary in return for her old traditional friendship can count upon the most far-reaching support from Germany in the economic sphere. As far as our forces permit, we shall always regard the wishes of Hungary; it is true that the present economic position compels us to issue many regulations, which must not, however, be judged from a one-sided point of view. Hungary as an agrarian State is in many respects at an advantage."

¹ German: *für unsere idealen Forderungen.*

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Hitler was asked whether he meant that Hungary could hardly exist without an export trade.

*He replied that that had not been his meaning: "My thought rather was that with us the workers live penned up in numberless large towns: over and above the well-known large towns, the Ruhr district in itself constitutes a vast metropolis within whose walls live many millions of unemployed for whose fate we have to care. In Hungary, on the other hand, apart from the one great metropolis, the people lives scattered over wide areas and thus the anxieties of living are naturally much less there. But better times will come so soon as Germany through our measures shall be fully restored; then we shall be able also to do more in support of Hungary."*¹

On 23 February 1933 Louis P. Lochner, Berlin correspondent of the Associated Press, had an interview with Hitler.

The Chancellor said that his attitude (Einstellung) towards the United States was one of genuine friendship: no other attitude was conceivable.

Hitler was asked whether he still maintained the view expressed in an interview with the representative of the Associated Press in December 1931 that private foreign debts must in all circumstances be paid. He said: "On this question I have always adopted the same standpoint and I still take precisely the same standpoint to-day. But I have also never permitted any doubt to exist on my conviction that the question of the payment of debts is not merely a question of the will but also of the capacity of the debtor—above all that a debtor from whom one is to receive money must not before payment be ruined by political or economic measures."

Hitler then spoke of Germany's hopes for the World

¹ Pester Lloyd, 22 Feb. 1933.

Economic Conference: "I would like to hope that the forthcoming World Economic Conference¹ may find effective ways of restoring to health the disordered economic life of the world. I do not desire at this moment to speak of the programme which will be proposed by the German delegation to the Conference. In the past Germany has often been disappointed at World Conferences. So far as the measures taken to protect German agriculture are concerned, though they may lead indirectly to a limitation of exports, yet Germany has not resorted to these measures because she wished in any way to exclude foreign products as such, but solely because the German farmer is simply doomed to destruction if he does not receive effective help."

*Hitler then turned to the question of a militia and the General Labour Service:*² "On this point I wish to express my purely personal view. One cannot talk of a militia and the General Labour Service in the same breath. The compulsory Labour Service which is our aim has nothing to do with a militia: a militia has as its object the country's defence, the compulsory Labour Service in its conception has arisen in consequence of the catastrophic economic distress and the resultant unemployment."

"The compulsory Labour Service is intended primarily to prevent the hundreds of thousands of our young working-men from helplessly drifting into ruin on our streets. But, further, it is intended, through a general

¹ For the World Economic Conference cf. *Survey of International Affairs 1933* (published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs), London, Oxford University Press, 1934, pp. 35-81.

² On the claim that the S.A., the special police, &c., as paramilitary forces should be included in estimating the numbers of Germany's military forces cf. *Survey of International Affairs, 1933*, p. 240. See also Hitler's speech in the Reichstag on 17 May on the purpose of the S.A. and S.S.: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935), pp. 98-9; authorized English translation in *The New Germany desires Work and Peace*, pp. 59-60, reproduced p. 1049 *infra*.

education into labour, to serve as a bridge between opposing classes. Anyone who travels on our highways in summer meets an army of unemployed young persons always on the move, folk who journey aimlessly from place to place, and one can observe how physically and at the same time mentally and morally they are continuously sinking lower and lower. It is precisely these young people whom we wish to safeguard from complete ruin, and as a National Socialist I also see in the compulsory Labour Service a means for producing respect for labour. Our young people will learn that labour ennobles a man."

"As regards the introduction of a militia I would wish to say:"¹

"In the year 1919 there came from Germany the suggestion that we should be permitted to form a militia. At that time the demand was made that we should introduce a professional army with a twelve years period of service."

"In consequence Germany possesses no reserves of men with military training of any importance. Now suddenly there is talk of the abolition of the professional army and of the introduction of the militia. I have the impression that this is only in order to avoid the really essential point of the problem."

"It is not the question of military systems (*Wehrsysteme*) which is decisive, but the question of equality of rights (*Gleichberechtigung*)."

"Once this question has been decided, the world of itself will be able to come to a reasonable general disarmament. For, after all, there is no one who would wish to assert that the world's sufferings are due to the fact that Germany possesses a ludicrously small professional army and no militia. The world is suffering from the fact that through the Peace Treaty of Versailles the idea

¹ Cf. *Survey of International Affairs* 1933, pp. 237 sqq.

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of two kinds of rights is to be perpetuated for all time. This impossible division of nations into 'Conqueror-States', which have therefore the right to live, and conquered nations, which have therefore less right to live, is intolerable: it leads to general mistrust, and again in consequence to excessive military armaments."

"In itself it is quite indifferent to us what military systems other nations propose to introduce. It will not disturb us if they choose professional armies. But it is not a matter of indifference to us that one nation should possess a hundred thousand men without reserves and that another with its allies should in the event of war have more than twelve millions. And it is not a matter of indifference that one nation is technically completely disarmed, while another possessing the most modern weapons of offence holds a position of more than ten-fold superiority."

"In the Peace Treaty of Versailles the obligation to disarm was not imposed upon us in order that thirteen years later there should be held a discussion upon military systems, but in order that the other peoples should be in a position to disarm. For this disarmament we have now been waiting for more than ten years."¹

In a highly rhetorical speech to the Reichstag assembled at Potsdam on 21 March 1933 Hitler said:

"Ever changing has been the lot of our nation for two thousand years; a rise has always been followed by a fall. The causes have always been the same. The German, restless and distraught, at war within himself and ignorant of what he really desires, sinks into a state of coma. He dreams of justice in the stars and loses his contact with reality."

"The more nation and country fall into decay and

¹ V.B. (Beiblatt I), 24 Feb. 1933.

national life grows weaker, the more have men sought in all times to make a virtue of necessity. The theory of the individual value of our tribes hid from view the fact that co-operation was a vital necessity. Ultimately there was only one way left for the German, the way within. As a nation of poets and thinkers, they dreamed then of the better world in which the others lived, and only when need and suffering had rained their heaviest blows upon them did there arise, perhaps out of their art, the longing for a period of revival, for a new Reich and, at the same time, for a new life."

"When Bismarck steered the cultural aspirations of the German nation into the channels of national unity, the long period of misery and internal strife seemed for ever ended. Obedient to the spirit of the proclamation of the Empire, our nation played its part in the revival of prosperity, of culture, and moral standards. Its consciousness of its own strength has always been inseparably bound up with its feeling of responsibility for co-operation among the European nations."

"It was during this time of growing national solidarity of the German peoples that our nation began to lose its sense of political perspective, and under this loss we are suffering to-day."

"This inner decay it was which played once more, as so often before, into the hands of the world around us. The revolution of November 1918 ended a conflict into which the German nation had been drawn in the most sacred conviction that it was but protecting its liberty and its right to live."

"Neither the Kaiser nor the Government nor the nation wanted this war. It was only the collapse of our nation which compelled a weakened race to take upon itself, against its most sacred convictions, the guilt for this war."

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"This collapse, however, was followed by the disintegration of our entire life. Politically, morally, culturally, and economically, our nation sank deeper and deeper into the morass."

"Worst of all was the deliberate annihilation of our faith in our own strength, the soiling of our traditions, and the destruction of the very roots of our belief in ourselves."

"Since then, crisis after crisis has shaken our nation to its very foundations."

"But the rest of the world has not been made any happier or richer by this severing of a politically and economically important limb from the body corporate. Out of the insane theory of a permanent status of victors and vanquished arose the folly of reparations and, as a result, the breakdown of the entire economic system of the world". . . .

"In our relations to the world we wish, having clearly before our eyes the sacrifices of the War, to be the champions of a peace which shall finally heal those wounds from which all are suffering."

. . . "May Providence at the same time grant us that courage and perseverance of which this spot, hallowed for every German, reminds us and give us who stand here at the tomb of our greatest monarch the strength to fight for the freedom and greatness of our people."¹

Herr Kube, National Socialist leader in the Prussian Diet, on 22 March 1933 on behalf of Hitler said:

"As leader of the National Socialists in this House and by order of Herr Hitler I declare that the Prussians are pan-German, that we shall continue to be so, and that we

¹ German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935), pp. 20-4; authorized English translation (as above) in *The New Germany desires Work and Peace*, pp. 11-14.

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*shall have attained our goal only when all Germany, including German Austria, is united with the Fatherland in one great State that can thus serve Germany's world mission."*¹

In his speech to the Reichstag on 23 March 1933 Hitler said:

"In November 1918 Marxist organizations seized the executive power by means of a revolution. The monarchs were dethroned, the authorities of the Reich and of the States removed from office, and thereby a breach of the constitution was committed. The success of the revolution in a material sense protected the guilty parties from the hands of the law. They sought to justify it morally by asserting that Germany or its Government bore the guilt for the outbreak of the War."

"This assertion was deliberately and actually untrue. In consequence, however, these untrue accusations in the interest of our former enemies led to the severest oppression of the entire German nation and to the breach of the assurances given to us in Wilson's fourteen points, and so for Germany, that is to say the working classes of the German people, to a time of infinite misfortune". . . .

*After speaking of the Reichstag Fire*² *Hitler said that the positive task of the new Government was the winning over to the national State of the German workman and the creation of a real national community.*

"The establishment of such a solidarity of views in the German body corporate is all the more important, for it is only thereby that the possibility is provided of maintaining friendly relations with foreign Powers, without regard to the tendencies or general principles by which they are dominated, for the elimination of Communism in Germany is a purely domestic German affair. The rest of the world may well have just as great an interest

¹ Quoted from *M.G.*, 23 Mar. 1933.

² Cf. p. 233 *supra*.

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in it, for the outbreak of communistic chaos in the densely populated German Reich would lead to political and economic consequences of inconceivable extent, especially in the rest of Western Europe". . . .

"The protection of the frontiers of the Reich and thereby of the lives of our people and the existence of our business is now in the hands of the Reichswehr, which, in accordance with the terms imposed upon us by the Treaty of Versailles, is to be regarded as the only really disarmed army in the world. In spite of its enforced smallness and entirely insufficient armament, the German people may regard their Reichswehr with proud satisfaction. This little instrument for our national self-defence has come into being under the most difficult conditions. The spirit imbuing it is that of our best military traditions. The German nation has thus fulfilled with painful conscientiousness the obligations imposed upon it by the Peace Treaty, indeed, even the replacement of ships for our fleet then sanctioned has, I may perhaps be allowed to say, unfortunately, only been carried out to a small extent."

"For years Germany has been waiting in vain for the fulfilment of the promise of disarmament made to her by the others. It is the sincere desire of the National Government to be able to refrain from increasing our army and our weapons, in so far as the rest of the world is now also ready to fulfil its obligations in the matter of radical disarmament. For Germany desires nothing except an equal right to live and equal freedom."

"In any case the National Government will educate the German people in this spirit of a desire for freedom. The national honour, the honour of our army and the ideal of freedom must once more become sacred to the German people!"

"The German nation wishes to live in peace with the

rest of the world. But it is for this very reason that the Government of the Reich will employ every means to obtain the final removal of the division of the nations of the world into two categories. The keeping open of this wound leads to distrust on the one side and hatred on the other, and thus to a general feeling of insecurity. The National Government are ready to extend a hand in sincere understanding to every nation that is ready finally to make an end of the tragic past. The international economic distress can only disappear when the basis has been provided by stable political relations and when the nations have regained confidence in each other."

"For the overcoming of the economic catastrophe three things are necessary:

1. absolutely authoritative leadership in internal affairs, in order to create confidence in the stability of conditions;
2. the securing of peace by the great nations for a long time to come, with a view to restoring the confidence of the nations in each other;
3. the final victory of the principles of common sense in the organization and conduct of business, and also a general release from reparations and impossible liabilities for debts and interest."

"We are unfortunately faced by the fact that the Geneva Conference, in spite of lengthy negotiations, has so far reached no practical result. The decision regarding the securing of a real measure of disarmament has been constantly delayed by the raising of questions of technical detail and by the introduction of problems that have nothing to do with disarmament. This procedure is useless."

"The illegal state of one-sided disarmament and the resulting national insecurity of Germany cannot continue any longer."

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"We recognize it as a sign of the feeling of responsibility and of the goodwill of the British Government that they have endeavoured, by means of their disarmament proposal, to cause the Conference finally to arrive at speedy decisions. The Government of the Reich will support every endeavour aimed at really carrying out generally disarmament and securing the fulfilment of Germany's long overdue claim for disarmament. For fourteen years we have been disarmed, and for fourteen months we have been waiting for the results of the Disarmament Conference. Even more far-reaching is the plan of the head of the Italian Government, which makes a broad-minded and far-seeing attempt to secure a peaceful and consistent development of the whole of European policy. We attach the greatest weight to this plan, and we are ready to co-operate with absolute sincerity on the basis it provides, in order to unite the four Great Powers, England, France, Italy, and Germany, in friendly co-operation in attacking with courage and determination the problems upon the solution of which the fate of Europe depends."¹

"It is for this reason that we are particularly grateful for the appreciative heartiness with which the national renaissance of Germany has been greeted in Italy. We hope and trust that the similarity of our spiritual ideals will be the foundation of a constant strengthening of the friendly relations between the two countries."

"In the same way, the Government of the Reich, who regard Christianity as the unshakable foundation of the morals and moral code of the nation, attach the greatest

¹ For the Four-Power Pact see *Survey of International Affairs* 1933, pp. 209 sqq.; for Mussolini's original draft and comparison with the French and British drafts, together with the final text of the Pact see *Documents on International Affairs* 1933, pp. 240 sqq. For the official German text of the Pact see *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935), pp. 104-6.

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value to friendly relations with the Holy See, and are endeavouring to develop them. We feel sympathy for our brother nation in Austria in its trouble and distress. In all their doings the Government of the Reich are conscious of the connexion between the destiny of all German races. Their attitude towards the other foreign Powers may be gathered from what has already been said. But even in cases where our mutual relations are encumbered with difficulties, we shall endeavour to arrive at a settlement. But in any case the basis for an understanding can never be the distinction between victor and vanquished."

"We are convinced that such a settlement is possible in our relations with France, if the Governments will attack the problems affecting them on both sides in a really broad-minded way. The Government of the Reich are ready to cultivate with the Soviet Union friendly relations profitable to both parties. It is above all the Government of the National Revolution who feel themselves in a position to adopt such a positive policy with regard to Soviet Russia. The fight against Communism in Germany is our internal affair in which we will never permit interference from outside. Our political relations with other Powers to whom we are bound by common interests will not be affected thereby. Our relations with the remaining countries also deserve to receive our most serious attention in future, especially our relations with the great oversea States with whom Germany has long been connected by ties of friendship and economic interests."

"We have particularly at heart the fate of the Germans living beyond the frontiers of Germany who are allied with us in speech, culture, and customs and have to make a hard fight to retain these values. The National Government are resolved to use all the means at their disposal

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to support the rights internationally guaranteed to the German minorities."

"We welcome the plan for a World Economic Conference¹ and approve of its meeting at an early date. The Government of the Reich are ready to take part in this Conference, in order to arrive at positive results at last."

"The most important question is the problem of our private short-term and long-term external indebtedness. The complete change in the conditions in the commodity markets of the world renders an adjustment necessary. It is only by trustful co-operation that a real removal of the general anxiety can be brought about. Ten years of honest peace will be more advantageous to the welfare of all nations than thirty years spent in fruitless discussion of the terms victor and vanquished."²

In his speech on May Day, 1933, Hitler said:

"We wish to reawake in our nation both self-consciousness and self-confidence, and to see to it that they increase from day to day. We know the time which lies behind us and the people who represented that time. They have intentionally inoculated our people with the idea that it was inferior throughout, incapable of great deeds and not worthy of the rights which belong to all others. Inferiority complexes were artificially cultivated, because they corresponded to the inferiority of those parties who led the nation astray during so many years. We want to free the nation from this ban, to fill them with the conviction:"

"Germans! You are not second-rate, even if the world wishes to have it so a thousand times. You are not

¹ See note on p. 1010.

² German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935), pp. 24-36; authorized English translation (as above) in *The New Germany desires Work and Peace*, pp. 15-26. There is an English translation of the speech in *M.G.*, 30 Mar. 1933.

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second-class and inferior. Awake to a realization of your own importance. Remember your past and the achievements of your fathers, yes, and those of your own generation. Forget the fourteen years of decay, and think of the two thousand years of German history." . . .

"Germans! You are a strong nation if you yourselves wish to be strong". . . .

"My German comrades! If the world is so against us we must all the more unite ourselves together, we must all the more firmly proclaim: 'You can do what you like but you will never make us bow our heads, you will never compel us to recognize a yoke. You will never compel our nation to give up its claim to equal rights.' The German people have come to themselves. They will not endure people among them any more who are not for Germany"¹.

GERMANY AND POLAND

Note I

Bibliography

Before the *Machtübernahme* of January 1933 the relations between Germany and Poland could hardly have been worse: in 1928 lecturing in America Professor Hoetzsch of the University of Berlin, who had spent six years as professor at the Academy of Posen, said: "With absolute conviction, unmingled impartiality, and a sincere desire for the preservation of peace, I ardently urge that peace cannot be preserved unless those germs of conflict are removed which lie slumbering in the present delimitation of the frontiers as fixed between Poland on the one hand and

¹ German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935), pp. 147, 150; authorized English translation (as above) in *The New Germany desires Work and Peace*, pp. 34-5, 37.

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Germany, Lithuania, and Russia on the other. . . . It is tragic that the victory of 1918, which rendered possible Poland's resurrection, fulfilled the wishes of the Poles too completely and too well: it is tragic for them that the men at Versailles who fixed the frontiers of the East European countries shot beyond the mark, even beyond the mark on which President Wilson had set his vision. In Poland a tragic complex of problems has been created which is bound to menace the peace of Europe. One of the chief tasks of all influential personages wishing to maintain peace in Europe should be, ere it be too late, to solve this complex of problems."

The feeling in Germany that Poland might attack the Reich is illustrated by such a popular book as that written by Ernst Otto Thiele in 1933, *Polen greift an* (Breslau, Korn, 1933, mit 72 Bildern). For a study of the aggressive temper of Poland cf. René Martel, *The Eastern Frontiers of Germany*. London, Williams & Norgate, 1930 (with a full bibliography). For a brief statement of the position as it was viewed by responsible Germans, reference may be made to Otto Hoetzsch, *Germany's Domestic and Foreign Policies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1929, pp. 99-107, from which (at p. 103) my quotation is taken, and see Ernst R. B. Hansen, *Poland's Westward Trend*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1928. (A translation of *Polens Drang nach dem Westen*. Berlin, Leipzig, Koehler, 1927.)

On the German side there was a very large literature: a guide to that literature can be found in the work of Wilhelm Volz, *Die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft*. Veröffentlichungen des geographischen Seminars der Universität Leipzig, ed. W. Volz (Langensalza, Berlin, Leipzig, Beltz, 1930), which is "eine wirtschaftsgeographische Untersuchung über die natürlichen Grundlagen des deutschen Ostens und seine Stellung in der gesamtdeutschen Wirtschaft" (with maps, diagrams, and tables), and cf. Otto Chr. Fischer, *Der deutsche Osten: Rettung oder Verzicht?* (= *Wirtschaftsprobleme der Gegenwart*, ed. Adolf Weber, Heft 13). Berlin, Junker & Dünhaupt, 1931; Friedrich Heidelck, *Die deutschen Ansiedlungen in Westpreußen und Posen in den ersten zwölf Jahren der polnischen Herrschaft* (published by the Osteuropa Institut in Breslau). Breslau, Priebsch's Buchhandlung, 1934; Gaston Raphaël, *Allemagne et Pologne* (bibliography, pp. 127-36). Paris, Librairie Delagrave, 1932; Axel Schmidt, *Ostpreußen—deutsch in Vergangenheit, Gegen-*

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wart und Zukunft. Berlin and Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1933 (with bibliography); Albert von Mühlenfels, *Ostpreußen, Danzig und der polnische Korridor als Verkehrsproblem* (= *Schriften des Instituts für ostdeutsche Wirtschaft an der Universität Königsberg*, N.F., Band 1). Berlin, Ost-Europa Verlag, 1930. As an example of a more popular statement of the German case cf. the series of essays collected in *Kampf um Preußenland* (Danzig, Ostpreußen im Bild: Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur: Land, Volk, Tat), edd. Friedrich Heiß and A. Hillen Ziegfeld. Berlin, Volk und Reich Verlag, 1931. The work entitled *Deutschlands Ostnot* by * * * (Berlin, Hobbing, 1930—the third edition published in 1931 I have not seen) was adapted for foreign readers and appeared in an English translation with the title *Sufferings of Eastern Germany* (Berlin, Hobbing, 1931), when it was stated to be written by F. Warner, Berlin.

For the German claim for revision of the Treaty see, e.g., Frhr. v. Rheinbaben, "Deutschland und Polen: zwölf Thesen zur Revisionspolitik", *Europäische Gespräche*, ix, Heft 2 (only accessible to me as an offprint).

For a plea for a Central European German-Polish Bloc to include Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and the Baltic States see W. Studnicki, *Polen im politischen System Europas* (edited and translated by J. Maas), Berlin, Mittler & Sohn, 1936, pp. 147 sqq.; and cf. "Die deutsche Volksgruppe in Polen", *Nation und Staat*, xii (1938-9), pp. 629-41.

As representative examples of the statement of the German case against the Corridor there may be mentioned:

ed. Erich Keyser, *Der Kampf um die Weichsel. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des polnischen Korridors* (a collection of papers). Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1926;

Die Korridor-Gefahr. Munich, Verlag der deutschen Monatshefte, 1930 (for an intransigent statement of the German claim);

W. Bernhard, *Der polnische Korridor*. Dissertation of the Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät of the University of Würzburg, 1930-1. Bibliography, pp. 8-10;

Axel Schmidt, *Gegen den Korridor. Polnische Zeugnisse und Tatsachen*, Berlin, Runge, 1932.

edd. Friedrich Heiß and A. Hillen Ziegfeld, *Deutschland und*

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der Korridor. Berlin, Volk und Reich Verlag, 1933. A collection of papers, with photographs, plans, diagrams. A *Korridor-Bibliographie* compiled by Waldemar Wucher, pp. 477-85; Dr. Proeller, *The Polish Corridor, East Prussia and the Peace*. London, Williams & Norgate, 1929.

For criticism of the solution of the Polish problem adopted after the War see the book by Sir Robert Donald, *The Polish Corridor and the Consequences*. London, Thornton Butterworth, no date.

History, geography, and even prehistory played their part in the dispute: cf. e.g. Kazimiera Jeżowa, *Politische Propaganda in der deutschen Geographie*. Danzig, 1933, or B. Frhr. von Richtenhofen, *Gehört Ostdeutschland zur Urheimat der Polen? Kritik der vorgeschichtlichen Forschungsmethode an der Universität Posen* (= *Ostland-Schriften*, Heft 2). Danzig, Ostland Institut, 1929.

The disagreement between Germany and Poland was intensified by the problem of German minorities in Poland and Polish minorities in Germany. For the treaty by which the newly created Poland undertook special obligations towards its German minority see *League of Nations Treaty Series 1921*, pp. 233 sqq. (Protocol relating to the carrying out of the provisions of article 268, paragraph b, of the Treaty of Versailles, as between Germany and Poland signed at Berlin, 10 April 1921); and for the German minority in Poland see G. H. G. Erler, *Das Recht der nationalen Minderheiten* (= *Deutschtum und Ausland*, ed. G. Schreiber, Heft 37/39), Münster, Aschendorff, 1931, pp. 129-36; *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, Auswärtiges Amt 1939; Nr. 2, Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1939, pp. i-v, 3-19, 37-40; on Poland's withdrawal from minorities-control by League of Nations (Sept. 1934), pp. 41-6; for the period Nov. 1934-Oct. 1937, pp. 47-58; negotiation for a German-Polish Declaration on Minorities (1937), pp. 59-73; for Polish action after the Declaration, pp. 74-80; expropriation of German minority (Feb. 1938-Feb. 1939), pp. 100-5; German conversations seeking to improve the treatment of the German minority (Nov. 1937-March 1939), pp. 106-11; and cf. S. Stoliński, *Les Allemands en Pologne*. Warsaw, Institut pour l'Étude des Questions minoritaires, 1927. A work issued by the same Institute in 1935, ed. J. Paprocki, *La Pologne et le problème des minorités*, is inaccessible to me. For a brief sketch of the character of the disputes cf. J. S. Stephens,

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Danger Zones of Europe (= *Merttens Lectures on War and Peace*, No. 3), London, Hogarth Press, 1929, ch. 8: "Minorities in Poland", and see F. Weber, *Der deutsch-polnische Staatsvertrag vom 30. August 1924*. Dissertation of the Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät of the University of Würzburg, Munich, Wegele, 1930; Félix Bergmann, *La Pologne et la protection des minorités*. Thèse of the Faculté de Droit of the University of Paris, Paris, Rodstein, 1935 (pp. 200). Bibliography of works (later than or not included in Jacob Robinson, *Das Minoritätenproblem und seine Litteratur*. Berlin, 1928), pp. 196-8; R. L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe*, London, Cape, 1939, pp. 231-45; J. C. Hesse, "The Germans in Poland", *Slavonic and East European Review*, xvi (1937-8), pp. 93-101. A survey of the development during ten years is given by C. G. Bruns in his *Gesammelte Schriften zur Minderheitsfrage*, Berlin, Heymanns Verlag, 1933, X: *Deutschtumsfragen im abgetretenen Posen und Westpreußen*, pp. 254-82. Fritz Rathenau's *Polonia irritanda?* Berlin, Hobbing, 1932, an answer to a complaint addressed to the League of Nations by *Teilverband I* (Oberschlesien) of the *Bund der Polen* (the representative organization of the Polish minority in Germany), is of considerable interest: it defines the duties of German subjects of Polish descent and should be compared with the claims made later by the National Socialists on behalf of German *Volksangehörige* who were subjects of foreign States.

For German influence in the history of Poland see the collection of essays *Germany and Poland in their Historical Relations*, edited by Albert Brackmann. Translated from the German by S. Miles Bouton (8 maps, 17 illustrations). Munich, Berlin, Oldenbourg, 1934; and compare Axel Schmidt, *The Germans in Poland*. London, Williams & Norgate, 1929; Herbert Ludat, *Polens Stellung in Ostmitteleuropa in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (in *Schriften der Hochschule für Politik*, Series I, *Idee und Gestalt des Nationalsozialismus*, Heft 46). Berlin, Junker & Dünhaupt, 1939, with Joseph Feldman, *Polish-German Antagonism in History*. London, The Baltic Institute, 1935, and see further Josef Halperin, *Deutschland und Polen* (Sonderdruck aus der *Neuen Zürcher Zeitung*, Februar-Juni 1931).

Unfortunately I cannot read Polish and thus, for the Polish case, I can refer only to such books as A. S., *Les Frontières*

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Occidentales de la Pologne. La vérité sur le conflit actuel Polono-Allemand. Toulon, Société nouvelle des imprimeries Toulonnaises, no date [? 1931]; Casimir Smogorzewski's two works: *Poland, Germany and the Corridor.* London, Williams & Norgate, 1930, and his *Poland's Access to the Sea.* London, Allen & Unwin, 1934; Bronislaw Kowalski, *Les Perspectives maritimes de la Pologne en fonction de ses ressources et de ses nécessités économiques.* Paris, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1938 (with a bibliography and two maps); and mention may also be made of the earlier work by Stanislaw Slawski, *Poland's Access to the Sea and the Claims of East Prussia with a preface by Count Alexander Skrzynski* (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Republic). London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1925. Slawski's book was answered by Johann Fürst, *Der Widersinn des polnischen Korridors ethnographisch, geschichtlich und wirtschaftlich dargestellt.* Berlin, Deutsche Rundschau, 1926; and cf. Oswald Schneider, *Die Frage der wirtschaftlichen Unabhängigkeit Polens. Eine wirtschaftspolitische Studie* (= Schriften des Instituts für ostdeutsche Wirtschaft an der Universität Königsberg Pr., N.F., Band 6), Königsberg, Gräfe & Unzer, 1933, pp. 78-98; W. Sobieski, *Der Kampf um die Ostsee von den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart* (Schriften des Baltischen Instituts, Schriftenreihe Balticum, Heft 5). Leipzig, Markert & Petters, 1933 (Bibliography, pp. 242-53); Diplomat, *Poland, Germany and the Sea* (reprinted from *The English Review*, Sept. 1925). London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1925 (with maps). See further the encyclopaedic study by James Donnadieu, *La Lutte des Aigles aux Marches orientales. Allemagne et Pologne.* Paris, Alcan, 1939, and two collections of lectures delivered at the *Bibliothèque polonaise* in Paris: *La Pologne et la Baltique* (= *Problèmes politiques de la Pologne contemporaine*, No. 1). Paris, Gebethner & Wolff, 1931, and *La Pologne et la Prusse orientale* (in the same series, No. iv). *ibid.*, 1933; and cf. Robert Machray, *The Poland of Pilsudski.* [1914-1936]. London, Allen & Unwin, 1936.

For Colonel Beck see H. Koitz: *Männer um Pilsudski. Profile der polnischen Politik*, Breslau, Korn, 1934, pp. 227 sqq., and J. H. Harley, *The Authentic Biography of Colonel Beck based on the Polish by Conrad Wrzos.* London, Hutchinson, no date [1939?].

I have naturally not cited here works published many years before 1933 and have thus made no reference to the large litera-

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ture on the partition of Silesia; but for the general background of German relations with Poland cf. Richard Bahr, *Volk jenseits der Grenzen, Geschichte und Problematik der deutschen Minderheiten*, Hamburg, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1933, ch. v, pp. 125-205, and see the bibliography, pp. 449-55 and I. F. D. Morrow (assisted by L. M. Sieveking), *The Peace Settlement in the German-Polish Borderlands. A Study of Conditions To-day in the pre-War Prussian Provinces of East and West Prussia*. London, Oxford University Press, 1936.

For the relations between Germany and Poland in the period since the War cf. the *Survey of International Affairs*, published by the British (later "Royal") Institute of International Affairs (i) 1920-3 (Oxford University Press, 1925), pp. 248-70; (ii) 1925, volume ii (ibid. 1928), *Relations between Germany and Poland (1924-5)*, pp. 233-41; (iii) 1932 (ibid. 1933), *Relations between Germany and Poland (1926-32)*, pp. 311-70 and cf. pp. 301-11; (iv) 1933 (ibid. 1934), pp. 183-6; (v) 1935, volume i (ibid. 1936), *Relations between Germany and Poland January 1934-May 1936*, pp. 204-10; (vi) 1936 (ibid. 1937), pp. 393-401; (vii) 1937, volume i (ibid. 1938), pp. 382-403, and see further Robert Machray, *Poland 1914-1931*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1932 and R. L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (cited *supra*).

Amongst articles in journals students may find useful a reference to J. Ciechanowski, "The Polish Corridor: Revision or Peace?" *Foreign Affairs*, x (1931-2), pp. 558-71 (July 1932); id., "German-Polish Relations", *International Affairs*, xii (1933), pp. 344-66; I. J. Paderewski, "Poland's so-called Corridor", *Foreign Affairs*, xi (1933), pp. 420-33; A. Schmidt, "Polen und Ostpreußen", *Zeitschrift für Politik*, xxii (1933), pp. 341-6; F. W. Oertzen, "Der Nachbar im Osten. Versuch einer Deutung des neuen Polen", ibid. xxiii (1934), pp. 481-98; M. Gärtner, "Danzig und der Korridor. Stimmen des Auslandes zu einem brennenden politischen Problem", ibid. xxix (1939), pp. 433-54; S. Stone, "German-Polish Disputes. Danzig, the Polish Corridor and East Prussia", *Foreign Policy Reports*, ix (1933-4), pp. 94-104 (July 5, 1933); S. Litauer, "The Rôle of Poland between Germany and Russia", *International Affairs*, xiv (1935), pp. 654-73; C. Smogorzewski, "Poland, Free, Peaceful, Strong", *Foreign Affairs*, xiii (1935), pp. 647-65; R. Dyboski, "Economic and Social Problems of Poland", *International Affairs*, xvi (1937),

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pp. 579-600; Augur, "The Foreign Policy of Poland", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, xv (1936-7), pp. 350-6; K. Smogorzewski, "Poland's Foreign Relations: I. The General Situation, II. Twenty Years of Policy", *ibid.* xvi (1937-8), pp. 558-71; III. "Poland and her big Neighbours", *ibid.* xvii (1938-9), pp. 105-20.

For the creation and constitution of the Polish State: Paul Roth, *Die Entstehung des polnischen Staates. Eine völkerrechtlich-politische Untersuchung* (= Öffentlich-rechtliche Abhandlungen, edd. H. Triepel, E. Kaufmann, and R. Smend, Heft 7). Berlin, Liebmann, 1926; Hans v. Rathje, *Der Aufbau des polnischen Staates* (= Schriften der Albertus-Universität, herausgegeben vom Königsberger Universitätsbund, Geisteswissenschaftliche Reihe, Band 18). Königsberg, Berlin, Ost-Europa Verlag, 1938.

Amongst brief accounts of Poland written in English there may be mentioned: George Slocombe, *A History of Poland*. London, Nelson, 1939 (from the earliest times to 1939); E. J. Patterson, *Poland*, London, Arrowsmith, 1934; W. Alison Phillips, *Poland*. London, Thornton Butterworth, 1929 (in the Home University Library); W. J. Rose, *Poland* (a "Penguin Special"). Harmondsworth, 1939; Roman Górecki, *Poland and her economic development*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1935; and cf. Roman Dybowski, *Outlines of Polish History*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1925 (a course of lectures); *id.*, *Poland old and new*. London, Milford, 1926 (three lectures); Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Undeclared War*. London, Constable, 1939, ch. iv.

For conditions in Poland under German and Russian occupation see G. M. Godden, *Poland Yesterday, To-day, To-morrow*. London, Burns & Oates, 1940.

Note II

Relations between Germany and Poland

See République de Pologne. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la période 1933-1939. Recueil des documents officiels*. Paris, Flammarion, 1940. Page references are to the edition in large format 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ × 7. [Of this there is an English translation with title: *Republic of Poland. Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Official*

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Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations 1933-1939. The Polish White Book. Published by Authority of the Polish Government by Hutchinson & Co., London and Melbourne, no date.] Cited below: *Relations. Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, Auswärtiges Amt 1939 Nr. 2. Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1939; cited below: *Dokumente*. James Donnadieu, *La Lutte des Aigles aux Marches orientales. Allemagne et Pologne*, Paris, Alcan, 1939; cited below: Donnadieu. *Survey of International Affairs 1935*, (issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs); volume i, London, Oxford University Press, 1936; cited below: *Survey*.

It may be of service to add here a brief chronological record:

1933. 7 Feb. Interview with Colonel Etherton (appeared in the *Sunday Express*, 12 Feb.): Hitler demands revision of the Treaty of Versailles: the so-called "Polish Corridor" constituted a particularly great injustice, which had been imposed upon the German nation (see p. 1005).¹
- 15 Feb. Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs (since 1932), replies: "Our attitude towards Germany and German problems will always be the same as the attitude of the Reich towards Poland."²
- Mar. Dispute at Danzig over the Polish munitions depot on the Westerplatte.³
- 2 May. Pilsudski through Beck directs the Polish Minister in Berlin, Wysocki, to ask of Hitler what are his intentions towards Poland. Wysocki is received in audience by Hitler and von Neurath (see p. 1039).⁴
- 3 May. The Wolff Agency issues a communiqué on the result of the interview (see p. 1041).⁵
- 4 May. Beck in Warsaw receives the German Minister, von Moltke, and a similar communiqué is issued by the Pat Agency.⁶

¹ Donnadieu, pp. 195, 306, 308.

² Donnadieu, p. 195.

³ *Survey*, pp. 215-18; *Dokumente*, Nos. 21-4, pp. 24-8; cf. *ibid.* p. II; and cf. *ibid.* No. 12 (dated 2 Mar. 1933), pp. 18-19.

⁴ *Relations*, pp. 31-3; *Dokumente*, p. 30.

⁵ *Relations*, p. 34; *Dokumente*, *ibid.*

⁶ *Dokumente*, p. 31; Donnadieu, p. 196.

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- 13 July. Wysocki has an interview with Hitler in Berlin lasting three-quarters of an hour (see p. 1081).¹
- [On the lessening of tension between Germany and Poland and the effect of the Four-Power Pact on Poland's policy cf. Donnadieu, pp. 196-7, and see, on the German side, *Dokumente*, Nos. 30 and 31, pp. 31-2.]
- 26 Sept. At Geneva von Neurath and Goebbels meet Beck.² The Iskra Agency announces that the Ministers of the two Powers "had examined a series of Polish-German problems and had sought for the best means of creating a better atmosphere in the relations of the two States".
- 17 Oct. von Neurath receives in audience the new Polish representative at Berlin, Lipski.³
- 15 Nov. Hitler and von Neurath meet Lipski in Berlin (see p. 1143).⁴ The Wolff Agency issues a communiqué on the result of the interview.⁵
- 24 Nov. Hitler approves the draft of the Declaration of 26 Jan. 1934 (see p. 1151). von Neurath writes to the German representative in Warsaw: "For your information I might point out that the form of the Declaration proposed by us does not in any way involve the recognition of the present German frontiers on the East (*Ostgrenzen*), but on the contrary expresses that with this Declaration a basis should be created for the solution of all problems, including, therefore, the territorial problems."⁶
- 28 Nov. Interview of the German representative in Warsaw with Pilsudski and Beck.⁷
1934. 26 Jan. Germany and Poland sign a Declaration in Berlin whereby the two Powers undertake for a period of ten years that they will not resort to force in the settlement of disputes

¹ *Relations*, pp. 36-7.

² Donnadieu, p. 197.

³ *Relations*, p. 37.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-40.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 40; *Dokumente*, pp. 32-3.

⁶ *Dokumente*, p. 33. Cf. *ibid.*, No. 34, p. 34, with Pilsudski's remark that "great difficulties would be caused by the thousand-year-old hostility of the Polish people towards Germany". For the discussion of the wording of the Declaration cf. *ibid.*, Nos. 35 and 36 (of 9 and 22 Jan. 1934), pp. 34-5.

⁷ *Dokumente*, p. 34.

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arising between them.¹ Beck writes to all Polish Diplomatic Missions abroad giving his view of the Declaration.²

30 Jan. Hitler's speech in the Reichstag (see p. 1161).³

22 Feb. Conference between the heads of the German and Polish Press Bureaux aiming at the establishment of a better atmosphere in Polish-German relations in Press, cinema, wireless, and theatre. An agreement is reached "to work in continuous co-operation in all matters relating to the formation of public opinion in the two countries".⁴

7 Mar. Trade agreement signed which ends the "customs war" between Germany and Poland.⁵

13 June. Goebbels goes to Warsaw (first visit of a German Minister to Poland); he is received by Pilsudski, and lectures on "National Socialism as a factor of European peace". There are hostile demonstrations in Warsaw by Socialists, Jews, and Roman Catholics.

¹ German text: *Dokumente*, pp. 35-6, or in *Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart in Dokumenten 1934/35*, Teil I. *Internationale Politik*, ed. Michael Freund, Essen, Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1936, pp. 160-1; French translation: Donnadieu, pp. 198-9, *Relations*, pp. 41-2 (or in the English translation of this pp. 20-1). "Der deutsch-polnische Vertrag ruht auf dem Grundsatz der unmittelbaren Regelung von Gegensätzlichkeiten und der Friedenssicherung durch direkte Verständigung (ohne die Fesseln und Fallstricke eines kollektiven Mechanismus). Er ist die große historische Alternative gegen das 'Ostlokarno' und bildet den Hintergrund, auf dem sich das dramatische Ringen um den Ostpakt vollzieht."—*Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart*, &c. (as above), loc. cit., p. 159. "By this move Germany made the first dent in the French alliance system, removed the danger of an attack from Poland, secured a shield against Russian attack, and was able to concentrate its forces against Austria. The German-Polish non-aggression pact ended the isolation into which Nazi Germany had been plunged."—R. L. Buell; see his *Poland: Key to Europe*, London, Cape, 1939, pp. 318-20. The declaration was, it appears, not accompanied by any secret treaty (Donnadieu, p. 199, n. 2). It was ratified on 24 Feb. 1934.

² *Relations*, pp. 42-3. Cf. *Dokumente*, No. 38, p. 36.

³ For the Polish and German Press on the new policy cf. Donnadieu, p. 200.

⁴ *Survey*, p. 204. For other agreements concluded at this time see *ibid.*, pp. 204-5. But on the other side cf. *Dokumente*, pp. 37 sqq.

⁵ Donnadieu, p. 414.

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- 3 Sept. Poland refuses to be bound by the obligations towards minorities imposed upon her by the treaty of 28 June 1919.¹ Beck before the League of Nations states that the Polish Government found itself obliged "de se refuser à toute collaboration avec les organes internationaux en ce qui concerne le contrôle de l'application par la Pologne du système de protection des minorités".²
- 1 Nov. Both Germany and Poland raise their respective legations to the rank of embassies (see p. 1190).
1935. 26 Jan. Hitler grants an interview to the representative of the *Gazeta Polska* (see p. 1202).³
- 27-31 Jan. Goering visits Poland to hunt the aurochs in the forest of Bialowieza: he is received by Beck and by Pilsudski, to whom "il remet un message d'Adolf Hitler réaffirmant la volonté du Chancelier à régler, dans un esprit de conciliation, toutes les difficultés qui pourraient se produire".⁴
- 31 Jan. Interview of Count Szembek with Goering.⁵
- 1 Feb. Speech of Beck before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm raising objection to an Eastern Pact.⁶
- 23 Mar. The Polish Ambassador at Berlin protests against the reintroduction of conscription within the Reich.
- 17 Apr. At Geneva Beck supports the French resolution condemning Germany's violation of the Treaty of Versailles.
- 22 Apr. Louis Barthou, as French Minister for Foreign Affairs, visits Warsaw.⁷
- 25 Apr. Lipski visits Goering at Schorfheide,⁸ who reports Hitler's views on German policy towards Poland.

¹ Donnadieu, pp. 161-4, 421-3. For the repercussion of this step—"c'était une dénonciation, sinon formelle, du moins pratique du traité de 1919"—in Germany see *Dokumente*, pp. 41-6.

² Donnadieu, p. 162.

³ *Relations*, pp. 46-7: German text: *Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart*, &c. (see p. 1031 n. 1), 1934-5, Teil I, pp. 230-1.

⁴ Donnadieu, p. 202. But at this time agents of the Reich were stirring up opposition to Poland amongst the German minority in Pomerania and Posen, *ibid.*, p. 405.

⁵ *Relations*, p. 47, and on this interview cf. *ibid.*, p. 48.

⁶ German translation: *Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart*, &c., loc. cit., pp. 231-5.

⁷ On this visit see *ibid.*, pp. 165-9.

⁸ *Relations*, p. 48.

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- 17 May. Goering visits Poland for Pilsudski's funeral.¹
- 21 May. Hitler's speech on foreign policy (see p. 1232). "Hitler still refrained, however, from committing himself to any explicit renunciation of territorial claims in the East, similar to that which he had repeatedly made when referring to Germany's relations with France, and this omission was duly noted in Poland."²
- 22 May. Lipski has an interview with Hitler.³
- 7-10 June. Congress of the *Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland* is held at Königsberg.⁴
- 3-4 July. Beck in Berlin. (The first official visit of a Polish Minister to Germany.)
- 4 July. Beck has an interview with Hitler.
- The official communiqué stated: "on a pu constater avec satisfaction que la déclaration polono-allemande du 26 janvier 1934 avait démontré à tous les points de vue toute sa valeur opérante, ceci non seulement dans les relations réciproques entre les deux États, mais aussi en tant qu'élément constructif en vue de la sauvegarde de la paix en Europe."⁵
- 4 Nov. Economic Treaty between Germany and Poland signed. "The relations between Germany and Poland were placed on a most-favoured-nation basis and a system of quotas was arranged which opened the Polish market to German industrial goods in return for an increase in Polish agricultural exports to Germany."⁶
- 18 Dec. Interview of Lipski with Hitler (see p. 1256).⁷
1936. Jan. Schacht condemns the partition of Upper Silesia on economic grounds.
- Feb. Crisis over German transit traffic across the Polish Corridor.⁸
- 12 Feb. Dr. Frank visits Warsaw and meets Count Szembek.
- ¹ R. Machray, *The Poland of Pilsudski*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1936, pp. 399-401.
- ² *Survey*, p. 206.
- ³ *Relations*, p. 51.
- ⁴ On this Congress cf. Donnadiou, pp. 399-400.
- ⁵ *Relations*, p. 53. Cf. Donnadiou, p. 203; *Survey*, pp. 206-7.
- For the attitude of the Polish and German Press about this time cf. Donnadiou, pp. 203-4.
- ⁶ *Survey*, p. 205 and see pp. 207 s.f.-208; Donnadiou, pp. 414-15.
- ⁷ *Relations*, pp. 53-4. ⁸ *Survey*, pp. 208-9.

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Frank says: "La collaboration polono-franco-allemande est la seule voie à suivre en vue d'une lutte efficace contre la barbarie venant de l'Est."¹

- 7 Mar. Hitler denounces the Locarno Pact, and the military occupation of the Rhineland zone begins. The Socialist journal *Robotnik* writes: "The denunciation of the Locarno pact is a sentence of death against the Polish-German agreement."²

[12-17 Aug. General Gamelin visits Poland.³

30 Aug.-6 Sept. General Smigly-Rydz visits France.⁴]

12 Aug. Count Szembek has an interview with Hitler (see p. 1325).⁵

14 Aug. Count Szembek has an interview with von Ribbentrop, who says: "Pour ce qui est de la Russie, le Chancelier Hitler ne saurait s'accommoder d'aucun compromis; la plus légère déviation de sa politique à l'égard des Soviets frayerait inmanquablement la voie au bolchevisme en Allemagne."⁶

18 Nov. Beck has a conversation with von Moltke.⁷

1937. 11 Jan. Lipski talks with Hitler, who says: "que le renforcement du national-socialisme à Dantzig sera une garantie de paix et de bonnes relations avec la Pologne." The Polish-German Agreement he defined "comme une base de la paix dans cette partie de l'Europe, ce qui sera universellement compris à l'avenir"(see p. 1334).⁸

16 Feb. Conversation between Smigly-Rydz and Goering at Warsaw.⁹

15 July. The Convention on Upper Silesia of 1922 expires and a temporary agreement is reached to take its place (dated 14th July 1937).¹⁰

¹ *Relations*, p. 54.

² Donnadieu, p. 205. A sentence in the speech is quoted in *Relations*, p. 55: "nous n'avons en Europe aucune revendication territoriale à poser."

³ Donnadieu, p. 276.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 276-7; *Documents on International Affairs*, 1936, Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 405.

⁵ *Relations*, pp. 55-6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-9.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-63.

¹⁰ German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, v (1938), pp. 178-9; English translation: *Documents on International Affairs* 1937

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- 5 Nov. Declaration on the relations of German and Polish minorities.¹ Lipski has an interview with Hitler and von Neurath.² For Hitler's speech to the representatives of the Association of Poles in Germany see p. 1368.³
1938. 13-15 Jan. Beck in Berlin: interviews with Hitler, von Neurath, Goering, and Goebbels.⁴
- 4 Feb. The army crisis in Germany.
The *Robotnik* writes: "The victory of Hitlerism over the army may precipitate in foreign policy the execution of aggressive plans, for the army played in general, within the Reich, the part of a brake."⁵
- 20 Feb. Hitler's speech in the Reichstag (see p. 1406). Germany desires a *détente* and this desire is reflected in Danzig.⁶ See on this the conversation of Smigly-Rydz with Goering on
- 23 Feb. Goering gives Hitler's message referring to the speech of 20 Feb. The relations of Germany with Poland, the Chancellor said, "s'expriment en une politique claire et raisonnable". Hitler was glad "que les relations polono-dantzikoises commencent à s'améliorer et il a tenu à préciser que les droits de la Pologne dans la Ville Libre ne seront en rien lésés. . . . Il était fermement décidé de continuer cette politique."⁷
- 13 Mar. The *Anschluss*.
- 14 Mar. Interview of Ward Price with Hitler. (Cf. p. 1424 for

(London, Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 197-9. Cf. Donnadiu, pp. 166-7, 444-5.

¹ *V.B.*, 6 Nov. 1937; English translation: *Documents on International Affairs 1937* (see p. 1034, n. 10), pp. 199-200. Cf. W. H., "Die gemeinsame Erklärung Deutschland-Polen über Minderheitenrechte", *Nation and Staat*, xi (1937-8), pp. 156-62.

² *Relations*, pp. 65-6.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-7.

⁴ For Beck's interview with Hitler on 14 Jan. 1938 see *ibid.*, p. 67.

⁵ Donnadiu, p. 207.

⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 368-9.

⁷ *Relations*, pp. 68-9. At this interview Goering stated that Hitler had received the letters of credence of Jureniev, the recently appointed Russian ambassador, at Berchtesgaden and not at Berlin "pour la seule raison qu'il avait voulu éviter que les honneurs militaires lui fussent rendus. Le Chancelier ne veut pas qu'un soldat allemand présente les armes à un ambassadeur soviétique." He has given orders that members of the Russian embassy are not to be invited to official receptions (p. 69).

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Hitler's view on the Polish Corridor and Poland's access to the sea.)

Poland claims the return of Teschen:

20 Sept. Hitler receives the Polish Ambassador at Berchtesgaden and promises to Poland his full support.¹

26 Sept. Hitler's speech in the Sportpalast at Berlin (seep. 1513): After the return of the Sudeten Germans he will have no further territorial claims to make in Europe since he had assured to all the neighbours of Germany the integrity of their frontiers.²

2 Oct. The Poles seize Teschen.

24 Oct. Interview of Lipski with von Ribbentrop, who proposes "la réunion de Dantzig au Reich avec la garantie de facilités économiques et ferroviaires à Dantzig pour la Pologne et l'acceptation par la Pologne d'une autostrade et d'une voie ferrée exterritoriales à travers la Poméranie". In return von Ribbentrop suggested an extension of the German-Polish Pact for twenty-five years and a guarantee of the Polish-German frontiers. At a further interview von Ribbentrop suggested in return for the acceptance of the German proposal the reunion with Hungary of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.³

28 Oct. Germany orders the expulsion of 20,000 Polish Jews.

19 Nov. Lipski has an interview with von Ribbentrop and states that any attempt to incorporate Danzig in the Reich would infallibly end in a conflict which would compromise all Polish-German relations; he quoted Pilsudski's view that "le problème de Dantzig constituera le critère permettant de juger des véritables intentions de l'Allemagne à l'égard de la Pologne" (cf. *Relations*, p. 91). von Ribbentrop said: "que la façon d'agir du Reich à l'égard de la Pologne ne serait pas ce qu'elle fut à l'égard de M. Benès."⁴

6 Dec. Germany and France sign an agreement by which the territorial *status quo* is recognized; they pledge themselves to

¹ Donnadiou, p. 209.

² "Mais cette affirmation était fausse . . . le Reich n'a jamais reconnu [les frontières] de la Pologne." Donnadiou, p. 307.

³ *Relations*, pp. 71-2.

⁴ *Relations*, pp. 75-7. On this interview see the note of Beck on his later (22 Nov. 1938) interview with von Moltke, *ibid.*, pp. 77-8.

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mutual consultation "sous réserve de leurs relations particulières avec des puissances tierces" if the future development of the questions interesting both countries should lead to international difficulties.¹

1939. 5 Jan. Beck has an interview with Hitler at Berchtesgaden² (see p. 1561).

6 Jan. At Munich Beck has an interview with von Ribbentrop: for the first time in his relations with Germany he feels himself "envahi par le pessimisme". On the questions concerning Danzig he does not see the possibility of agreement. von Ribbentrop once more insists "que l'Allemagne ne cherchait aucune solution violente".³

25 Jan. von Ribbentrop visits Warsaw and speaks at a dinner given in his honour by Beck.⁴ For translations of the communiqué issued on 28 Jan. see Donnadieu, p. 210; *Relations*, pp. 82-3. More significant is the extract from a note on the conversations of 25-7 Jan. published in *Relations*, p. 81: Beck rejects the suggestion of an extraterritorial "autostrade" across Pomerania: on the question of Danzig "les deux Ministres en sont arrivés uniquement à une sorte de 'gentlemen agreement'".⁵ Should the League of Nations withdraw from Danzig, this withdrawal would be immediately followed by a Polish-German declaration stating that the *status quo* at Danzig would be maintained until an agreement had been reached between Poland and Germany. "M. de Ribbentrop a donné l'assurance qu'il ne serait procédé à aucun fait accompli sur le territoire de la Ville Libre."⁶

30 Jan. Hitler's speech in the Reichstag (see p. 1577).

¹ Donnadieu, p. 282; German text: *Dokumente*, p. 222. The German text of § 3 runs as follows: "Beide Regierungen sind entschlossen, vorbehaltlich ihrer besonderen Beziehungen zu dritten Mächten, in allen ihre beiden Länder angehenden Fragen in Fühlung miteinander zu bleiben und in eine Beratung einzutreten, wenn die künftige Entwicklung dieser Fragen zu internationalen Schwierigkeiten führen sollte." And see *ibid.*, Nr. 330, 331, 332, pp. 223-4.

² *Relations*, pp. 78-9.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁴ Text of the speech: *ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 84.

⁶ On this see the note of Count Szembek on an interview with Beck on 1 Feb. 1939, *ibid.*, pp. 81-2.

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- 20 Mar. von Ribbentrop has an interview with Hitler on the Polish situation. Hitler desires von Ribbentrop to enter into conversations with Beck.¹
- 21 Mar. Interview of Lipski with von Ribbentrop in Berlin.²
- 26 Mar. At an interview with von Ribbentrop in Berlin Lipski presents an *aide-mémoire* in accordance with instructions from Beck: Beck rejects the suggestion of an extraterritorial "autostrade", and proposes a common Polish-German guarantee on the situation in Danzig: all questions pendent between Poland and Germany might be considered as a whole in order to find for the future "une base de consolidation du bon voisinage" between the two countries.³ At the interview both the questions of "a corridor within the corridor" and of Danzig were discussed.⁴
- 28 Mar. Beck has a conversation with the German minister in Warsaw, von Moltke: each states that aggression against Danzig would be regarded as an act of aggression respectively against Poland or Germany. von Moltke: "Vous voulez négocier au bout des baïonnettes." Beck: "C'est d'après votre système."⁵
- 31 Mar. Chamberlain's declaration in the House of Commons that England and France will support Poland if the latter is attacked.
- 1 Apr. Hitler speaks at Wilhelmshaven.
- 28 Apr. Hitler in his speech in the Reichstag denounces the Declaration of 26 Jan. 1934.

Since this chronological table is intended only to provide a framework within which Hitler's utterances on German-Polish relations can be set, it is unnecessary to carry it further. For the later negotiations see, for the German case, *Dokumente*; for the Polish case, *Relations*; for France, *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Documents Diplomatiques 1938-1939. Pièces relatives aux Événements et aux Négociations qui ont précédé l'ouverture des hostilités entre l'Allemagne d'une part, la Pologne, la Grande-Bretagne et la France d'autre part*. Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1939; and for England, *Miscellaneous No. 9 (1939). Documents*

¹ *Relations*, p. 87.

² For this important interview see the interesting report reproduced *ibid.*, pp. 86 sqq.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 90-2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 92-5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

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concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939. Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Parliament by Command of his Majesty. London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1939 (Cmd. 6106), and see pp. 1675 sqq. infra.

On 2 May 1933, at an interview with Hitler, Wysocki, the representative of Poland in Berlin, regretted the continuing hostility between the two countries and asked the Chancellor for a declaration "que ni lui-même ni le Gouvernement du Reich n'ont l'intention de porter atteinte aux droits et intérêts de la Pologne dans la Ville Libre de Dantzig". In his report of the interview, Wysocki stated that:

"Le Chancelier Hitler répondit par une longue déclaration dont les passages essentiels peuvent être formulés comme suit:"

Le Chancelier ne comprend pas les raisons de l'inquiétude manifestée par l'opinion publique en Pologne.

Ni lui-même ni aucun membre de son Gouvernement n'ont fait ni dit quoi que ce soit qui serait de nature à justifier une telle inquiétude. Le Gouvernement du Reich, présidé par le Chancelier, n'a nulle intention de porter atteinte aux traités existants et les considère comme obligatoires pour lui.

Il en résulte que ce Gouvernement respecte les engagements que lesdits traités imposent au Reich. Par contre l'Allemagne ne reconnaît à la Pologne aucun autre droit sur Dantzig qui outrepasserait les limites prévues par les traités existants. Le Chancelier est pacifiste et demeure convaincu que quiconque a vu de près, non à travers des romans, les horreurs de la guerre, la considérera toujours comme la dernière extrémité qu'il faut éviter. D'ailleurs on ne saurait jamais prévoir les résultats d'une guerre, même en cas de victoire. La dernière guerre européenne n'a procuré à nul pays la satisfaction de ses revendications et de ses intérêts. La France,

l'Italie, l'Angleterre, les États-Unis ne sont pas satisfaits des résultats de la guerre dont le Reich est sorti vaincu. Les conséquences de cette guerre se font encore plus douloureusement sentir que les dommages que celle-ci a directement causés. L'inquiétude constante et le souci de ce que sera la politique de demain, voilà, entre autres, ce qui fait que sept millions d'Allemands sont privés de travail et de pouvoir d'achat. N'était ce chômage, les Allemands absorberaient facilement, dans les conditions politiques normales, cet excédent de production agricole que la Pologne a à céder. Alors les rapports entre les deux Pays seraient étayés sur des bases plus raisonnables, parce que naturelles.

De leur côté les Allemands vendraient à la Pologne leurs produits manufacturés, en achetant en échange des produits agricoles.

Le Chancelier est un nationaliste à ce point fervent qu'il comprend également le nationalisme polonais. Jamais il ne se fera le complice d'une action qui aurait pour effet de priver quiconque de la faculté de parler et d'apprendre en sa langue maternelle. Les fautes commises dans cet ordre d'idées se vengent toujours, sinon au moment même, en tous les cas plus tard, même après cent cinquante ans, comme en témoigne entre autres l'histoire de l'Allemagne.

Le Chancelier n'admet pas qu'on s'arroge le droit de contraindre qui que ce soit à abandonner sa propre nationalité. Il désirerait toutefois que ces principes fussent observés ailleurs.

Le Chancelier ne partage pas le point de vue de ceux qui mettent en doute le droit de la Pologne à son existence. Au contraire, ce droit, il le reconnaît et le comprend.

De son côté la Pologne devrait tâcher de comprendre les droits et les intérêts de l'Allemagne.

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Une appréciation réciproque plus modérée fera apparaître de multiples intérêts communs aux deux États.

Le Chancelier a pris connaissance, dernièrement, des statistiques relatives au nombre des naissances en Russie. L'extraordinaire fécondité de ce peuple l'a fait sérieusement réfléchir au danger qui pourrait en résulter pour l'Europe et, partant, pour la Pologne. Si le Chancelier me parle de cela, c'est pour me donner une preuve à quel point il n'est animé, à l'égard de l'État polonais, d'aucun parti pris.¹

On 3 May 1933 the Wolff Agency issued a communiqué on the result of the interview in which it was stated that the Chancellor emphasized the firm intention of the German Government to keep its attitude and its action most strictly within the framework of the existing treaties.² He expressed the wish that both countries might on both sides dispassionately reconsider and discuss their common interests.³

On 17 May 1933 in the Reichstag Hitler delivered his famous Friedensrede—the speech on Peace. He said:

... "All the problems which are causing such unrest to-day lie in the deficiencies of the Treaty of Peace which did not succeed in solving in a clear and reasonable way the questions of the most decisive importance for the future. Neither national nor economic—to say nothing

¹ *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la période 1933-1939*, Paris, Flammarion, pp. 32-3.

² Note the phrasing which is of interest in view of Polish fears that the Four-Power Pact might lead to a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Cf. an article in *F.Z.*, 5 May 1933.

³ German text: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1939, p. 30; and of official Polish communiqué of 4 May, *ibid.*, p. 31; French translation of the communiqué of 3 May in *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la période 1933-1939*, Paris, Flammarion, p. 34.

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of legal—problems and demands of the nations were settled by this treaty in such a way as to stand the criticism of reason in the future. It is therefore natural that the idea of revision is not only one of the constant accompaniments of the effects of this treaty, but that it was actually foreseen as necessary by the authors of the Treaty and therefore given a legal foundation in the Treaty itself."

"If I deal briefly with the problems which the Versailles Treaty ought to have settled, I do so because its failure in this respect has inevitably given rise to the later situations under which the political and economic relations of States have since then been suffering."

"For many centuries European States and their frontiers developed from conceptions which were only concerned with the State as such. With the triumph of the national conception and of the principle of nationality in the course of the last century, the seed of many conflicts was sown by the failure of States, which had come into existence under other conditions, to take into account these new ideas and ideals. At the end of the World War there could have been no nobler task for a real peace conference than to undertake—in the clear recognition of this fact—a territorial and political reorganization of the European States which should in the highest degree possible do justice to this principle. The more such a settlement succeeded in making the frontiers between peoples coincide with the frontiers between States, the more it would have eliminated a whole series of future possibilities of conflict. Indeed, this territorial reorganization of Europe, taking account of the real and historical frontiers between peoples, would have been a far-sighted solution which would perhaps have made the sacrifice of life during the Great War appear to conquerors and conquered alike not to have been made in vain, because

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it would have given the world a basis for a real and lasting peace."

"As it was, through ignorance, passion and hatred, decisions were taken which, in their injustice and lack of logic, bore the seeds of fresh conflicts."

"The main characteristics of the present economic situation of Europe are the overcrowding of the west of Europe and the poverty of its soil in certain raw materials which are essential to the standard of life which has grown up in those territories with their ancient culture. If the statesmen at Versailles wanted to bring lasting peace to Europe, they should have recognized and followed, instead of the dangerous and sterile conceptions of expiation, punishment and reparation, the profound truth that the lack of the necessities of life has always been a source of conflict between peoples. Instead of preaching the idea of extermination, they should have embarked upon a reorganization of international political and economic relationships, so as to do justice, to the fullest possible extent, to the vital needs of each nation."

"It is not wise to deprive a people of the economic resources necessary for its existence without taking into consideration the fact that the population dependent on them are bound to the soil and will have to be fed. The idea that the economic extermination of a nation of sixty-five millions would be of service to other nations is absurd. Any people inclined to follow such a line of thought would, under the law of cause and effect, soon experience that the doom which they were preparing for another nation would swiftly overtake them. The very idea of reparations and the way in which they were enforced will become a classic example in the history of the nations of how seriously international welfare can be damaged by hasty and unconsidered action."

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"As a matter of fact, the policy of reparations could only be financed by German exports. To the same extent as Germany, for the sake of reparations, was regarded in the light of an international exporting concern, the export of the creditor nations was bound to suffer. The economic benefit accruing from the reparation payments could therefore never make good the damage which the system of reparations inflicted upon the individual economic systems."

"The attempt to prevent such a development by compensating for a limitation of German exports by the grant of credits, in order to render payments possible, was no less short-sighted and mistaken in the end. For the conversion of political debts into private obligations led to an interest service which was bound to have the same results. The worst feature, however, was that the development of internal economic life was artificially hindered and ruined. The struggle to gain the world markets by constant underselling led to excessive rationalization measures in the economic field."

"The millions of German unemployed are the final result of this development. If it was desired, however, to restrict reparation obligations to deliveries in kind, this must naturally cause equally serious damage to the internal production of the nations receiving them. For deliveries in kind to the amount involved are unthinkable without most seriously endangering the production of the individual nations."

"The Treaty of Versailles is to blame for having inaugurated a period in which financial calculations appear to destroy economic reason."

"Germany has faithfully fulfilled the obligations imposed upon her, in spite of their intrinsic lack of reason and the obviously suicidal consequences of this fulfillment."

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"The international economic crisis is the indisputable proof of the correctness of this statement."

"The chances of restoring a general international legal sentiment have also been no less destroyed by the Treaty."

"For, in order to justify all the measures of this edict, Germany had to be branded as the guilty party. This procedure is, indeed, just as simple as it is, however, inadmissible. In any future cases of conflict the vanquished will always be the guilty party, because the victor can establish this fact in the easiest manner possible."

"This procedure therefore assumes a terrible significance, because it gave at the same time an excuse for the conversion of the power ratio existing at the end of the war into a permanent legal status. The conception of conqueror and conquered thus literally became the foundation of a new international legal and social order."

"The degradation of a great people to a second-class nation was proclaimed at the same moment as a League of Nations came into being."

"This treatment of Germany could not lead to the pacification of the world. The disarmed state and defencelessness of the conquered parties which was thus considered necessary—an unheard of procedure in the history of the European nations—was still less calculated to diminish the general dangers and conflicts, but merely led to that condition of constant menaces, demands, and sanctions which, by the unrest and insecurity which they give rise to, threaten to undermine the entire economic structure of the world. If no consideration is given by the nations to the danger of certain actions, reason may easily be overcome by unreason. At any rate up to the present, the League of Nations has been unable to grant any appreciable assistance to the weak and unarmed in such cases. Treaties concluded for the pacification of the

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nations only possess an inner meaning when they are based on real and honest equality of rights for all. This is the main reason for the state of unrest which has been weighing on the world for a number of years."

"It is, however, in the interests of all that present-day problems should be solved in a reasonable and final manner. No new European war could improve the unsatisfactory conditions of the present day."

"On the contrary, the application of violence of any kind in Europe could have no favourable effect upon the political or economic position which exists to-day. Even if a fresh European act of violence had a decisive result, the ultimate effect would be to increase the disturbance of European equilibrium and thus, in one manner or another, to sow the seed of further conflicts and complications."

"The result would be fresh wars, fresh uncertainty, and fresh economic distress. The outbreak of such infinite madness, however, would necessarily cause the collapse of the present social and political order. A Europe sinking into Communistic chaos would bring about a crisis, the extent and duration of which could not be foreseen."

"It is the earnest desire of the National Government of the German Reich to prevent such a disturbing development by means of its honest and active co-operation."

One of the aims of the German Revolution was "to re-establish a stable and authoritative government supported by the will and confidence of the nation which should make our great people an acceptable partner of the other States of the world".

"Speaking deliberately as a German National Socialist, I desire to declare in the name of the National Government, and of the whole movement of national regeneration, that we in this new Germany are filled with deep understanding for the same feelings and opin-

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ions and for the rightful claims to life of the other nations. The present generation of this new Germany, which, so far, has only known in its life the poverty, misery, and distress of its own people, has suffered too deeply from the madness of our time to be able to contemplate treating others in the same way."

"Our boundless love for and loyalty to our own national traditions makes us respect the national claims of others and makes us desire from the bottom of our hearts to live with them in peace and friendship."

"We therefore have no use for the idea of Germanization.¹ The mentality of the past century which made people believe that they could make Germans out of Poles and Frenchmen is completely foreign to us; the more so as we are passionately opposed to any attempt on the part of others to alienate us from our German tradition. We look at the European nations objectively. The French, the Poles, &c., are our neighbours, and we know that through no possible development of history can this reality be altered."

"It would have been better for the world if in Germany's case these realities had been appreciated in the Treaty of Versailles. For the object of a really lasting treaty should be not to cause new wounds and keep old ones open, but to close wounds and heal them. A thoughtful treatment of European problems at that time could certainly have found a settlement in the East which would have met both the reasonable claims of Poland and the natural rights of Germany. The Treaty of Versailles did not provide this solution. Nevertheless no German Government will of its own accord break an agreement which cannot be removed without being replaced by a better one."

"But the legal character of such a Treaty must

¹ See Index *sub. voc.* Germanization.

be acknowledged by *all*. Not only the conqueror but also the conquered party can claim the rights accorded in the Treaty. And the right to demand a revision of the Treaty finds its foundation in the Treaty itself. The German Government, in stating the reasons for and the extent of its claims, wishes for nothing more than the existing results of previous experience and the incontestable consequences of critical and logical reasoning show to be necessary and just. The experience of the last fourteen years, however, is unambiguous from a political and economic point of view."

"The misery of the nations has not been relieved but has increased. The deepest roots of this misery, however, lie in the division of the world into conquerors and conquered, which seems to be intended to form a permanent basis of all treaties and all future order. The worst effect of this order lies in the compulsory defencelessness of one nation as against the excessive armaments of the others. If Germany has continued for years to demand the disarmament of all, it is for the following reasons:

"(1) The demand for equality of rights expressed in actual facts is a demand of morality, right and reason; it is a demand which is recognised in the Peace Treaty itself and the fulfilment of which is indissolubly bound up with the demand for German disarmament, as the prelude to world disarmament."

"(2) On the other hand, the disqualification of a great people cannot be permanently maintained, but must at some time be brought to an end. How long is it thought possible that such an injustice can be imposed on a great nation? What is the advantage of a moment as compared with the permanent development through centuries? The German nation will continue to exist exactly in the same way as the French nation and, as history has proved, the Polish nation."

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"Of what value is the temporary oppression of a nation of 65 millions as compared with the force of this incontrovertible fact? No State can possess a greater understanding for the young, newly created European national States than the new Germany which has risen out of the national revolution which was inspired by the same impulses. Germany wants nothing for herself which she is not prepared to give to others."

"Germany, in demanding at present actual equality of rights such as can only be achieved by the disarmament of other nations, has a moral right to do so since she has herself carried out the provisions of the treaties. For Germany has disarmed and has carried out this disarmament under the strictest international supervision. Six million rifles and carbines were surrendered or destroyed; the German people were compelled to destroy or surrender 130,000 machine-guns, huge quantities of machine-gun barrels, 91,000 guns, 38,750,000 projectiles and enormous quantities of other arms and ammunition."

"The Rhineland was demilitarized, the German fortresses were dismantled, our ships surrendered, our airplanes destroyed, our system of military service abandoned and the training of reserves thus prevented. Even the most indispensable weapons of defence were denied us."

"If, in the face of these indisputable facts, anyone should attempt to come forward and declare with truly wretched excuses and pretexts that Germany has not fulfilled the treaties or has even rearmed, as German Chancellor speaking in the Reichstag, I must repudiate such views which are as untrue as they are unfair."

"Equally untrue are the statements that Germany has not complied with the provisions of the Treaty in respect of personnel. The statement that the SA. and SS. of the

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National Socialist Party are connected in any way with the Reichswehr, in the sense that they represent formations with military training or army reserves, is untrue!"

"The irresponsible frivolity with which such assertions are made may be seen from the following example: Last year there was a case before the courts in Brünn against members of the National Socialist Party in Czecho-Slovakia. Military experts of the Czecho-Slovak army declared on oath that the defendants were in contact with the German National Socialist Party, that they were dependent on it, and that, as members of a popular sports association, they were to be reckoned as equal to members of the storm sections and storm troops of the National Socialistic Party in Germany who formed a reserve army organized and trained by the German Reichswehr."

"During that period, however, neither the storm sections and storm troops nor the National Socialist Party itself had any connexion at all with the Reichswehr. On the contrary they were persecuted, prohibited and finally suppressed as organizations dangerous to the State. Indeed, members of the National Socialist Party, of the storm sections and storm troops were not only excluded from all official positions, but might not even be employed as workmen in works connected with the Reichswehr. But the National Socialists in Czecho-Slovakia were condemned to a long term of hard labour on the strength of this false evidence!"

"In actual fact, the storm sections [SA.] and storm troops [SS.] of the National Socialist Party came into being without any help or financial support from the governments of the Federal States, the Reich, or from the army, without any military training or equipment, but purely out of the political needs and considerations of the times. Their object was and is exclusively the

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removal of the Communist danger; their development took place without any connexion with the army, purely for purposes of propaganda and national enlightenment, psychological mass effect and the breaking down of the Communist terror. They form an institution for creating a true team spirit, for overcoming former class differences and for removing economic distress."

"The Stahlhelm arose out of memories of the great period of common experiences at the front, in order to keep alive the old traditions and the spirit of true comradeship and, lastly, to protect the German people against the danger of a Communist revolution which had been threatening since November 1918; this is a danger which cannot be estimated by countries which have not, like us, millions of organized Communists, and have not, like Germany, suffered from their terrorism. The real object of these national organizations is best characterized by the actual nature of their struggle and by their sacrifices. As a result of Communist murderous assaults and acts of terrorism, the storm sections [SA.] and storm troops [SS.] of the National Socialist Party have lost more than 350 killed and about 40,000 wounded within a few years. If attempts are now made at Geneva to rank these organizations, which serve exclusively internal purposes, as military effectives, there would be an equally good reason for including the fire brigades, the athletic associations, the watch and ward companies, rowing clubs, sports associations and others in the military forces."¹

"When, however, at the same time the trained annual contingents of the other armies of the world, in contradistinction to these men who are entirely without military training, are not included, when the armed reserves of other countries are deliberately overlooked, while the unarmed members of the political associations are in

¹ Cf. p. 1010, n. 2.

our case included, this constitutes a procedure against which I must categorically protest."

"If the world wishes to destroy confidence in right and justice, these are the best means for the purpose."

"On behalf of the German people and the German Government, I have to make the following statement: Germany has disarmed. She has complied with all obligations imposed upon her in the Peace Treaty to an extent far beyond the limits of equity and reason. Her army consists of 100,000 men. The strength and the character of her police are internationally regulated."

"The auxiliary police established in the days of the revolution have an exclusively political character. In the critical days of the revolution they had to replace that part of the regular police force which at first was considered by the new régime to be unreliable; now, after the success of the revolution, they are already being reduced and will be completely disbanded before the end of the year."

"Germany has thus a fully justified moral claim to the fulfilment by the other Powers of their obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. The equality of status accorded to Germany in December has not yet been given practical expression.¹ With regard to the contention, repeated by France again and again, that the safety of France must

¹ For Germany's claim to equal rights raised at the Disarmament Conference by Herr Nadolny on 22 July 1932 see *Survey of International Affairs 1932*, pp. 255-6; for the German *aide-mémoire* of 29 Aug. 1932 handed to the French Ambassador in Berlin see *ibid.*, pp. 260-1, and the English translation in *Documents on International Affairs 1932*, pp. 185-8; for the reply of the French Government dated 11 Sept. 1932 see the English translation, *ibid.*, pp. 189-94. For the joint declaration recognizing Germany's equality of status of 11 Dec. 1932 see an English version, *ibid.*, pp. 233-4 and see *Survey of International Affairs 1932*, pp. 288-9. For a German version of the declaration see *Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart in Dokumenten 1934/5*, Teil i. *Internationale Politik*, ed. M. Freund, Essen, Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1936, p. 12.

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be secured to the same extent as the equality of Germany, I would like to ask two questions:

"(1) Germany has so far accepted all the obligations with regard to security arising from the signing of the Versailles Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, the Treaties of Arbitration, the Pact of Non-Aggression, &c. What other concrete assurances are left for Germany to give?"

"(2) On the other hand, how much security has Germany? According to the figures published by the League, France alone has 3,046 aeroplanes in service, Belgium 350, Poland 700, Czecho-Slovakia 670. In addition to these numbers there are innumerable reserve aeroplanes, thousands of tanks, thousands of heavy guns and all the necessary technical equipment for chemical warfare. Has not Germany, in her state of defencelessness and disarmament, greater justification in demanding security than the over-armed States bound together in military alliances?"

"Nevertheless Germany is at any time willing to undertake further obligations in regard to international security, if all the other nations are ready on their side to do the same, and if this security is also to benefit Germany. Germany would also be perfectly ready to disband her entire military establishment and destroy the small amount of arms remaining to her, if the neighbouring countries will do the same thing with equal thoroughness. But if these countries are not willing to carry out the disarmament measures to which they are also bound by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany must at least maintain her demand for equality."

"The German Government sees in the British plan¹

¹ For the British Draft Convention presented in Mar. 1933 see *Survey of International Affairs* 1933, pp. 251 sqq., and for an interesting criticism of the draft cf. A. L. Kennedy, *Britain faces Germany*, London, Cape, 1937, pp. 83-8.

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a possible basis for the solution of this question, but they must demand that the defence force existing in Germany shall not be abolished unless at least qualitative equality be accorded to Germany. She must further demand that any change in her present defence force organization, which was not chosen by her but imposed on her from abroad, shall follow step by step in the same degree as the actual disarmament of the other States."

"Germany agrees in principle to a transitional period of five years during which to build up her national security, in the expectation that at the end of this period she will really be put on a footing of equality with the other States. She is also entirely ready to renounce all offensive weapons of every sort if the armed nations, on their side, will destroy their offensive weapons within a specified period, and if their use is forbidden by an international convention. Germany has only one desire, to be able to preserve her independence and defend her frontiers."

"According to a statement made by the French Minister of War in February 1932, a large portion of the French coloured troops can be immediately used on the French mainland. He therefore expressly includes them in the forces of the home country."

"It is therefore only just that the coloured troops should also be considered by the Disarmament Conference as forming part of the French army. While this is not being done, it is proposed that associations and organizations of a purely educational or sporting character which have no military training whatsoever should be reckoned as forming part of the army in the case of Germany. In the case of other countries, however, there is no question of such organizations being counted as military effectives. Such a procedure is, of course, quite impossible. Germany would declare herself willing at any time, in the event of a mutual international super-

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vision of armaments and of equal readiness on the part of other States, to subject these associations to such supervision in order to prove beyond doubt to the whole world that they are of an entirely unmilitary character."

"Moreover the German Government will not reject *any* prohibition of arms as being too drastic if it is applied in the same manner to all other States. As long as armaments are allowed to other Powers, Germany cannot be permanently deprived of all weapons of defence. We are fully prepared only to make use of an equal status to an extent to be settled by negotiation."

"These demands do not imply rearmament but only a desire for the disarmament of the other States. In this connexion I again welcome on behalf of the German Government the apt and far-sighted plan of the head of the Italian Government to create, by means of a special pact, close relations of confidence and co-operation between the four great European Powers, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany.¹ The German Government is in whole-hearted agreement with Mussolini's view that this would facilitate a permanent understanding, and will show the greatest good-will, provided the other nations are prepared really to overcome any difficulties which may arise."

"The proposal made by President Roosevelt,² of which I learned last night, has therefore earned the warmest thanks of the German Government. They are prepared to agree to this method of overcoming the international crisis, for they are also of the opinion that no

¹ Cf. p. 1018, n. 1.

² On the appeal, sent by President Roosevelt on 16 May 1933, addressed to the sovereigns or Presidents of the other fifty-four nations which were represented at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva see *Survey of International Affairs 1933*, pp. 267-9; the text of the Message is given in *Documents on International Affairs 1933*, pp. 194-6.

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permanent economic reconstruction is possible unless the disarmament question is solved. They are prepared to take part unselfishly in this work of bringing order into the political and economic conditions of the world. As I stated at the outset, they are also convinced that there is to-day only one great task: to safeguard the peace of the world."

"I am obliged to state that the reason for the present armaments of France or Poland can under no circumstances be the fear of those nations of a German invasion, for such fear would be only justified by the possession by Germany of modern offensive weapons. Germany, however, does not possess such modern offensive weapons at all; she has neither heavy artillery nor tanks nor bombing aeroplanes nor poisonous gases."

"The only nation therefore which might justifiably fear invasion is the German nation, which not only may not possess offensive weapons but is also restricted in its right to defensive weapons and is even forbidden to erect frontier fortifications."

"Germany is at all times prepared to renounce offensive weapons if the rest of the world does the same. Germany is prepared to agree to any solemn pact of non-aggression because she does not think of attacking but only of acquiring security."

"She would welcome the possibility suggested in President Roosevelt's proposal of bringing the United States into European relations as a guarantor of peace. The President's proposal is a ray of comfort for all who wish to co-operate sincerely in the maintenance of peace. We have no more earnest desire than to contribute to the final healing of the wounds caused by the war and the Treaty of Versailles. Germany does not wish to take any other path than that recognized as justified by the treaties themselves. The German Government wishes to come to a peaceful agreement with other nations on all

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difficult questions. They know that in any military action in Europe, even if completely successful, the sacrifice would be out of all proportion to any possible gains."

"The German Government and the German people will under no circumstances allow themselves to be forced to sign what would mean a perpetuation of the degradation of Germany. The attempt to work on Government and people by threats will make no impression. It is conceivable that Germany might be violated in defiance of justice and morality, but it is inconceivable and out of the question that such an act should be given legal validity by our own signature."

"The attempt has been made in newspaper articles and in regrettable speeches to threaten Germany with sanctions, but such a monstrous step could only be considered as a punishment meted out to Germany for having pressed for the carrying out of the treaties by her demand for disarmament. Such a measure could only lead to the definite moral and effective invalidation of the treaties. Germany, however, even in this case, would never renounce her peaceful claims. The political and economic consequences, the chaos which such an attempt would bring on Europe would be the responsibility of those who used such means against a people which is doing the world no harm."

"Any such attempt or any attempt to do violence to Germany by means of a simple majority vote, contrary to the clear meaning of the treaties, could only be dictated by the intention of excluding us from the conferences. The German people, however, to-day possesses sufficient character in such a case not to impose its co-operation on other nations but, though with a heavy heart, to draw the only possible consequence."

"It would be difficult for us as a constantly defamed nation to continue to belong to the League of Nations."

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"The German Government and the German nation are only too fully aware of the crisis of the present time. For many years Germany has given warnings regarding the methods which would and did inevitably lead to these political and economic results. If the present direction and the present methods are continued, there can be no doubt as to the ultimate result. After apparent political successes of individual nations, the resultant economic and political disasters for all will be all the more severe. We regard it as our first and most important task to avoid these results."

"Hitherto no effective measures have been taken. When we are told by the rest of the world that certain sympathies were felt for the former Germany, we have indeed experienced the results and effects of these 'sympathies' in and for Germany."

"Millions of destroyed existences, the ruin of entire professions, and an enormous army of unemployed—all these facts reflect a state of wretchedness the extent of which I should like to impress on the rest of the world by a single figure:

"Since the signature of this Treaty, which was to form the foundation stone of a new and better world for all nations, 224,900 people, men, women, old people and children, have taken their own lives, almost exclusively out of distress and misery."

"These unbribable witnesses condemn the spirit and fulfilment of a Treaty from which not only the rest of the world but also millions of people in Germany expected salvation and peace."

"May the other nations realize the resolute will of Germany to put an end to a period of blundering and to find the way to a final understanding between all, on the basis of equal rights."¹

¹ German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935),

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GERMANY, POLAND, AND DANZIG

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For the National Socialists' policy in Danzig the essential book is *Das nationalsozialistische Gewissen in Danzig. Aus sechs Jahren Kampf für Hitler. Nach Reden und Niederschriften des Gauleiters von Danzig Albert Forster, bearbeitet und herausgegeben von W. Löbsack*. Danzig, Kasemann, 1936 (mit 64 Abbildungen), and cf. H. Rauschning, *Gespräche mit Hitler*, New York, Europa Verlag, 1940, pp. 30-4. (English translation: *Hitler Speaks*, London, Thornton Butterworth, 1939, pp. 34-8.) See also W. Löbsack, *Albert Forster, Gauleiter von Danzig. Mit 36 Bildern, vielen Dokumenten und Aufrufen*. Hamburg, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1934; M. S. Wertheimer, "The Nazification of Danzig", *Foreign Policy Reports*, xii (1936-7), pp. 66-76; J. A. Wilder, "The Danzig Problem from within", *Slavonic and East European Review*, xv (1936-7), pp. 357-67.

For the German case cf. F. Steffen, *4000 Jahre bezeugen Danzigs Deutschtum. Geschichte der ethnographischen, geschichtlichen, kulturellen, geistigen und künstlerischen Verbundenheit Danzigs mit Deutschland von den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart*. Danzig, Westpreußischer Verlag, 1932 (with 58 illustrations and a map), and cf. *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1939, pp. ii, v-vii, 20-9, 112-23, Danzig and the Corridor, pp. 124-43, Polish measures against Danzig in 1939, pp. 269-78.

In his wireless message to Danzig before the election in that city Hitler on 27 May 1933 said that there had been brought about in the German people a new formation of its political will; "the deeper the strength of that will, the more unlimited becomes its effect. Just as within Germany itself the frontiers of tribes and States, the

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barriers between parties, classes and professions have been surmounted, so through the profound inner working of the power of this idea will be overcome the frontiers which externally sunder the German people. Just as former Governments in Germany have found it impossible by means of their external force to break down the spiritual strength, the internal bond uniting National Socialists, so any foreign force will equally fail."

"Since National Socialism is returning to the roots of our people's life (*Volkstums*), it is far removed from the unhappy jingoism (*Hurrah-Patriotismus*) of a *bourgeois* age which thought that the expression and the evidence of a people's life were to be traced only in language."

"Our own task, as we see and understand it, lies in the maintenance, the care, and the betterment of our people; but, strongly as we feel this, we are in a like degree filled with respect for the same outlook amongst folk of other nations. As National Socialists, we reject any desire to turn foreign peoples into Germans; at the same time we oppose with fanaticism any attempt to tear the German from his people. Just as we are firmly convinced that war brings suffering and misfortune upon men, so love for our homeland lays upon us with no less force the duty to champion its cause. National Socialism knows no policy of correcting frontiers at the expense of foreign peoples. We want no war waged only with the object of bringing over perhaps some millions of folk to Germany who have no wish whatever to be Germans and who cannot be Germans. We shall never attempt to subject folk who in their hearts only hate us at the price of sacrificing on the field of battle millions of those who are dear to us and whom we love. But for this very reason we cling only the more closely to those

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who belong to our people, who are of our blood and who speak our language."

The struggle to win the German for this Movement will continue. "It matters not where to-day these Germans live, they will ever more and more make their own this doctrine of the conquest of classes and castes and will thereby strengthen themselves in the consciousness of this bond which nothing can sever." As in the past of the Party, so now: there must be "no hesitation and no wavering. Above all I would that those Germans who live beyond the frontiers of the Reich of to-day, who may even be exposed to severe oppression, should also strive to form a part of this inner community of soul and spirit. Then they will more easily withstand all attacks and persecutions; thus armed they can be strong. The impressions and influences of the moment thus lose their weight. The faith in the indestructible life-force of the German nation springs from the knowledge of the value of our people. But this value in all its greatness only he can understand who has found the way which leads out of the limitations of his class, his profession, his descent, his external position in life to those external fundamental values of our people which we, to our good fortune, discover not in the members of a single class but in millions of comrades of all walks of life, of all professions. Only he who has first found the way to this source of our greatness can then see also clear before him the way to the final freedom of Germany."¹

As a result of the election in Danzig on 28 May 1933 the National Socialists obtained thirty-eight seats in the Volkstag compared with the thirteen which they held before the dissolution. In a Volkstag of seventy-two members

¹ V.B., 30 May 1933.

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*the National Socialists thus had an absolute majority of four votes, but although this result gave them control of the Government, it did not give them the two-thirds majority which was required for the amendment of the constitution of the Free City.*¹

After this, Hitler's first direct appeal to Germans beyond the frontiers of the Reich it may be of service to insert a note on the activities and propaganda of the German Reich in foreign territories.

Note on Auslandsdeutschtum

The Germans in Foreign Countries

There are two principal organizations concerned with Germans living beyond the frontiers of the Reich—one was founded under the Second Reich, the other was the creation of the National Socialist Party.

(i) The *Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland* was founded in 1881; its concern was the cultural relations of Germans living abroad with the Reich, especially with literature and the schools. Under Gessler in the last years of the Weimar Republic it became a strongly nationalist organization (*großdeutsch*). After the "Machtübernahme" it was "co-ordinated" (*gleichgeschaltet*) with the National Socialist régime and Gessler was superseded by the "Reichsführer" Hans Steinacher (who had been an Austrian citizen), previously an intimate of Severing, who had sought before 1933 to oust Gessler from his position.² The "Verein" changes its name; it becomes the *Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland* (VDA.). The *Tagung* for 1933 was to have been held in Klagenfurt, but owing to the opposition of Austria it was transferred to Passau on the German side of the frontier: it became *Die Klagenfurter Tagung in Passau*.³ Here the new aims of the VDA. are formulated by Steinacher and are expressly approved in a telegram from Hess. At this gathering it was declared that Germany had

¹ See *Survey of International Affairs* 1935, vol. 1, pp. 214-15.

² For the resolutions effecting this change see *F.Z.*, 2 May 1933.

³ *F.Z.*, 4 June 1933.

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once more become "the Mother of the entire German world"—*die Mutter des Gesamtdeutschtums*.¹ Schemm, Kultusminister in Bavaria, declared that "if the heart of the world, Germany, should cease to beat, then every 'Kultur' and every hope of revival would fail. If it should ever be possible to destroy the love for German 'Kultur', for the German race, and for Christianity, whose roots were entwined with the life of Germans,² then, too, the love of Germans abroad for their Fatherland would come to an end." In the same speech he said that "the Government with unsurpassable brutality³ would crush any attempt to destroy the unity of the German people".

While at this *Tagung* violent attacks were made on Czechoslovakia, it was said that the tragedy of Austria lay in the fact that at this time, in contradiction with the course of history, it should be sought to erect a dominance of the State (*Etatismus*) which was contrary to nature and that, in reliance on that Western conception of the State which was now collapsing, an attempt should be made to form an Austrian nation in a manner which was little short of blasphemy.⁴ All imperialistic aims were categorically denied: the purpose of the Volksbund was the *volksdeutsche Formung des Gesamtvolkes*.⁵

It is to be noted that despite "co-ordination" it was stated that "the VDA. must, as in the past, so in the future keep itself free from every Party-political tie".

Tagungen of the VDA. were held at Trier in 1934 and at Königsberg in 1935, but in 1936 the *Tagung* announced to be held at Bremen at Whitsuntide never met: there were rumours of disagreement between Steinacher and Bohle, the leader of the Party's organization for Germans abroad (see below); the business

¹ *F.Z.*, 4 June 1933.

² German: *der Liebe . . . zu dem mit dem Deutschtum verwurzelten Christentum*.

³ German: *mit nicht zu überbietender Brutalität*. For the speech see *V.B.*, 4-5-6 June 1933.

⁴ *F.Z.*, 4 June 1933; for the final words in this citation, which do not appear in the German report, I rely on the *New York Times* of 5 June 1933 and *Le Temps* of 6 June 1933.

⁵ On the assertion made at this *Tagung* that "one-third of the German people still lives beyond the frontiers of the Reich" see an article on "Racisme et Pangermanisme" in *Le Temps* of 6 June 1933 and the reply in *F.Z.*, 7 June 1933.

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offices of the VDA. were searched. Early in September the report of Steinacher's arrest was denied. It was thought that the VDA. would be absorbed into the Party's organization.¹

In the end Steinacher's attempt to give to the VDA. a less obviously National Socialist attitude failed, and in October 1937 he was forced to retire.²

From the first the VDA. had been specially interested in German propaganda in the schools, and thus it founded the annual "Festival of the German School". Under National Socialism this was renamed the *Tag des Volkstums*, and in 1934 Steinacher said that he hoped that this would become a "true, great, popular Celebration" (*eine wahre große Volksfeier*) to show that there is a "deep organic connexion between 'Volkstum' and school, and that it would be observed by all Germans both within and without the frontiers of the Reich".³

The VDA. includes in its membership both the German citizens of the Reich and those of German descent who are citizens of other countries (*Volksdeutsche*). The protestations that the *Volksbund* has no imperialist aims must not be interpreted in too narrow a sense: in February 1934 Steinacher issued an appeal to the Germans of Austria, of Alsace, and the Saar in which he said: "Les Allemands d'Autriche et du monde entier, séparés de nous, sont cependant unis dans une grande communauté, communauté du combat pour leur germanisme et communauté de la souffrance d'être séparés de leur pays et de ne pas être protégés par l'État. . . . Notre devoir est de leur certifier qu'ils constituent une partie inséparable de la grande mère-patrie qui, par l'esprit, combat toujours à leurs côtés. Ils vaincront et créeront une Allemagne plus grande si nous faisons tout notre devoir d'Allemands."⁴

(ii) The organization created by the National Socialist Party is the AO., the *Auslands-Organisation*. It was founded at Hamburg in 1931 as the *Auslandsabteilung der Reichsleitung der NSDAP.*; after the *Machtübernahme* some doubts were felt whether such a Foreign Section should continue to exist;⁵ for a time it became

¹ See *M.G.*, 23 Sept. 1936; *Prager Presse*, 24 Sept. 1936.

² Cf. *Prager Presse*, 22 Oct. 1937. ³ *F.Z.*, 16 Sept. 1934.

⁴ Of this I have no German text; I cite from *Le Temps*, 25 Feb. 1934.

⁵ Emil Ehrlich, *Die Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP.* (= *Schriften der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik*, ed. P. Meier-

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the *Abteilung für Deutsche im Ausland bei der Obersten Leitung der PO.* (= *Politische Organisation*). On 8 May 1933 Bohle (see below) was appointed head of the section. On 3 October 1933 the section was immediately subordinated to Hess, the Führer's deputy, and its original name was restored. Bohle became a member of Hess's staff with the rank of Gauleiter. Under an order issued by Hess on 17 February 1934 the Foreign Section became the "Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP." (AO).¹ The members of the Party abroad form, together with German sailors and pilots (see the supplementary order issued by Hess on 16 March 1934), a *Gau*, and Party members living abroad cannot be members of any *Gau* situated within the Reich. By this order the Auslands-Organisation was constituted the sole authority for all Party formations abroad (save for those in Austria, Danzig, and Memel). Bohle was appointed Gauleiter. The AO. was transferred from Hamburg to Berlin in March 1935.

Ernst Wilhelm Bohle at the time of this appointment was thirty years of age. Born at Bradford in England (28 July 1903) he left early (1906) for South Africa, where his father was appointed to a post in the Engineering Faculty of Cape Town University. During the War he was at school in South Africa; in 1920 he went to Germany, where he was educated in the Economic Faculties of Berlin and Cologne; he later engaged in commerce in Hamburg and in 1931 entered the newly formed Foreign Department of the Party.² In 1936 Bohle said that "the goal of the AO. would be reached only when every single German in foreign countries would be in his heart so convinced of the National Socialist Weltanschauung that he could never forget his 'Deutschum'".³ The AO. was a Party organization from its foundation and was originally concerned only with members of the National Socialist Party living in foreign countries who were

Benneckenstein, II. *Der organisatorische Aufbau des Dritten Reiches*, Heft 13), Berlin, Junker u. Dünnhaupt, 1937, p. 9.

¹ Op. cit., *ibid.* and see *F.Z.*, 21 Feb. 1934.

² *M.G.*, 3 Feb. 1937.

³ *F.Z.*, 4 Sept. 1936. Cf. the statement of aim in *V.B.*, 8 Sept. 1934: "Unsere planmäßige Arbeit wird das Feuer der Kameradschaft und der Gefolgschaftstreue in den fern der Heimat lebenden jungen Deutschen entfachen, damit sie dereinst in Zeiten der Not wissen, wo ihr Platz im Kampf um Deutschland ist."

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citizens of the German Reich. The situation was altered by an order signed by Hitler and von Neurath issued on 30 January 1937 whereby "in order to unify the care (*Betreuung*) of German citizens living abroad there is created the post of Head of the AO. in the Foreign Office to whom at the same time the conduct and administration of all matters affecting German citizens living abroad falling within the competence of the Foreign Office are entrusted". To this office of Head (*Chef*) of the AO. in the Foreign Office Bohle was appointed, and he was placed personally and directly under the Minister for Foreign Affairs. His competence as head of the AO. of the NSDAP. was not affected by the order and in this capacity he remained responsible to Hess as Deputy for the Führer. Bohle became a member of the Cabinet of the Reich so far as matters touching his sphere of competence were concerned.¹ In explanation of this order a circular of the Minister for Foreign Affairs issued in December 1937 stated that "decisions of the Head of the AO. in the Foreign Office made by him as representing the Reichsminister are in every case ministerial decisions"; this statement apparently makes the Head of the AO. independent of the Minister within his own sphere of competence.² Thus Bohle's hand was strengthened, and friction which had developed as a result of complaints from the Party that the Foreign Office had taken up with insufficient vigour grievances of Germans living abroad would be obviated.³ But the order meant more than that: under it the Party invaded the Foreign Office, the least "Nazified" of all the ministries:⁴ it was a further step in the control of the State by the Party.⁵

¹ Text of the order in *V.B., F.Z., or Berliner Tageblatt* for 3 Feb. 1937 or in W. Hoche, *Die Gesetzgebung Adolf Hitlers*, Berlin, Vahlen, 1937, Heft 22, pp. 60-1.

² For German text: *Berliner Tageblatt*, 23 Dec. 1937.

³ See *The Times*, 3 Feb. 1937.

⁴ Cf. *M.G.*, 3 Feb. 1937; cf. *V.B.*, 1 Dec. 1937, which reports that the higher and middle officials of the Foreign Office had been formed into an *Ortsgruppe* of the *Ausland-Gau* of the NSDAP.; it was hoped that thus "der nationalsozialistische Geist im Auswärtigen Amt sich rücksichtslos durchsetzen werde".

⁵ The effect of the order was, however, expressed somewhat differently by von Neurath: the order was "nicht nur ein sichtbares Zeichen für die Einheit von Partei und Staat, sondern auch eine Gewähr dafür, daß die von den verantwortlichen innerdeutschen

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And again as a result of this order the competence of the AO. was extended: it embraced not merely members of the Party but all German citizens of the Reich living abroad. Thus it was stated in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*: "Herr Bohle's sphere of activity will now include not only Party members but every person of German nationality living abroad. Henceforth no German diplomat or consul can be employed who has not given proof of his National Socialist attitude in the closest co-operation with the Foreign Organisation."¹ On the other hand, it has frequently been stated that the AO. is concerned only with *Auslandsreichsdeutsche*—with citizens of the Reich living abroad and not with those of German descent who have become citizens of a foreign country, the "*Volksdeutsche*".² In an article on "Politisches Auslandsdeutschum" in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* for 30 August 1938 it is stated that "the National Socialist organization and activation (*Aktivierung*) of Germans on the part of the Reich find a limit at the point where Germans through their own free decision, through fate or even through compulsion, have become citizens of another State". With this may be compared a sentence from an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* for 3 January 1936: "The profession of loyalty to German Volkstum—one must never grow tired of repeating—is no profession of belief in Irredentism."³ "Never", said Bohle in 1934, "will the AO. try to inculcate into other peoples the National Socialist idea, but we National Socialists—we demand from the world that it should recognise our sacred right to model our life and our State as we think well."⁴ "National

Stellen für die Pflege des Auslandsdeutschums aufgestellten Grundsätze und Richtlinien sich in den von mir soeben angegebenen Grenzen halten und von den auslandsdeutschen Organisationen selbst genau respektiert werden. Ich hoffe deshalb auf das bestimmteste, daß die Schwierigkeiten, die in dieser Beziehung hier und da im Ausland entstanden sind, nun bald für immer verschwinden." *V.B.*, 30 Aug. 1937.

¹ *M.G.*, 5 Feb. 1937.

² Cf. the statement of Konrad Henlein, *Die Zeit*, 15 Aug. 1937; of Bohle, *Reichspost*, 1 Sept. 1937, and see *F.Z.*, 14 Oct. 1937.

³ German: *kein Bekenntnis zum Gedanken der Irredenta*.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 10 Sept. 1934. With this compare a later speech made by Bohle in 1937: "Mit reinem Gewissen können wir die Erklärung abgeben: Wir wollen den Nationalsozialismus nicht anderen Völkern als Gift einträufeln. Wir wollen ihn ebensowenig anderen Völkern aufzwingen. Wir wollen ihn nicht einmal an andere

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Socialism", said Rust to Exchange Students (*Austauschstuden*ten) leaving for foreign countries, "is no international political idea": it should never be pressed upon foreigners.¹

But for the AO. *Deutschtum*—loyalty to the life of the mother-country—is unequivocally identified with belief in National Socialism. "Conscious German groups abroad must feel with the National Socialist ideology and eventually accept it wholeheartedly. National Socialism radiates a magnetic fluid to the world. Without racial decrees and even contrary to the desires of foreign States, race is drawn to race, culture to culture, people to people. The parable of the Prodigal Son has become the faith of the German race in the twentieth century."² Or as Bohle said in 1937, the AO. is concerned with those German citizens who are true to the Reich. "There are still a few Germans abroad who have no desire to be National Socialists and yet still wrongly call themselves Germans. For these we have only one word: Traitors. We Germans who live abroad reject the conception of the universal German";³ or as he said at the sixth congress of the AO. in Stuttgart in 1938: "To-day no one can claim to be counted a German who is not as a National Socialist an unquestioning follower of Adolf Hitler."⁴ "Those who are not National Social-

Völker verschenken. Im Gegenteil, wir sind eifersüchtig darauf bedacht, den Nationalsozialismus für uns zu behalten." *V.B.*, 30 Aug. 1937.

¹ *V.B.*, 3 Sept. 1936. Cf. E. Ehrlich, op. cit. (see p. 1065, n. 5), p. 14, "Die Legalität der AO. liegt in dem innersten Gesetz der nationalsozialistischen Weltanschauung, die nur für das deutsche Volk da sein will. Sie anzuerkennen und die Kräfte des Auslandsdeutschums wirksam werden zu lassen, bedeutet für den fremden Staat, eine geschlossene Gemeinschaft disziplinierter und loyaler Gäste in seinen Grenzen zu wissen"; Frick in Stuttgart at the *Tagung* of 1937: "Die deutschen Volksgruppen Europas sind — das zeigt ihre Geschichte und ihre Leistung — von jeher Faktoren der Ordnung, des Aufbaues, der Treue gewesen." *V.B.*, 15 Aug. 1937; for the "Ten Rules for Germans Abroad" see *M.G.*, 31 May 1938.

² Cited from an article by Richard Csaki published in Goering's official organ *The Four Years Plan*. I quote from the *New York Times* of 26 Oct. 1937.

³ *Reichspost*, 1 Sept. 1937. German: *wir . . . lehnen den Begriff des universalen Deutschen ab*.

⁴ Quoted in an article in *F.Z.*, 30 Aug. 1938.

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ists are no longer Germans for us and we readily surrender any claim to them."¹ "Germanism and National Socialism are identical."²

Bohle had succeeded in forcing an entry into the Foreign Office; he desired to go farther and to introduce members of the AO. as "cultural attachés" into German legations abroad so that they might enjoy a diplomatic status. "This development", he is reported to have said, "is particularly important because it demonstrates that no other State has the means to forbid National Socialist groups. Through the absorption of the National Socialist Party's foreign section into the Foreign Office the unity of Party and State is made clear to the world abroad and is established beyond contradiction. German Party organizations in other countries therefore have a character resembling that of diplomatic legations."³ The proposal was not well received abroad.⁴ The German claim was made in an article published in the *Berliner Tageblatt*: later it was asserted that the writer of the article had misunderstood a remark by Bohle who had in fact made it clear that the AO. is the only competent organization for taking care of Reich Germans abroad and accordingly it is desirable that the local leaders of the Party who with the official German representatives occupy the leading positions in the German colony should be taken to an increasing extent to social and official functions outside the German colony.⁵ The suggestion was dropped and Goebbels at the *Tagung* of the AO. pronounced its funeral oration. "The members of the Party living abroad are the leaven amongst the Germans of the Reich in the world. But this has nothing to do with espionage, much less with an export of National Socialism. Since National Socialism makes a people strong there can be no inducement to spread it abroad in foreign countries and thus to make other peoples still stronger when compared with Germany than they would otherwise be. There is just

¹ Cf. *Le Temps*, 30 Aug. 1938.

² *New York Times*, 23 Aug. 1937.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Cf. *The Times*, 1 Sept. 1937; *F.Z.*, 2, 3 Sept. 1937; article in the *Daily Telegraph* on "An unwelcome Nazi scheme", 4 Sept. 1937; the issue is confiscated in Germany: see *Daily Telegraph*, 7 Sept. 1937.

⁵ See *The Times*, 27 Aug. 1937.

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as little inducement to send 'cultural attachés' abroad. You are our 'cultural attachés', my comrades from abroad."¹

Unfortunately for the champions of the AO., in 1936 its offices in Barcelona had been searched and the documents and letter-files of its representatives in Spain had been confiscated and published.² Thus the political and economic machinations of the AO. had been disclosed, and suspicions reinforced. At the secret sessions of delegates to the *Tagung* of the AO. held at Erlangen in September 1926, it was reported, Bohle had explained "que la section 'Étranger' était 'la main du Mouvement à l'étranger'. L'office de la section 'Étranger' concentre les rapports sur le développement politique et économique de tous les pays. S'il faut déclarer officiellement que cette organisation ne s'occupe que de questions de politique intérieure de l'Allemagne, les nationaux-socialistes, eux, savent très bien que leur mission est de vouer toutes leurs forces à l'œuvre de politique mondiale du Führer. Le mieux est, conseilla M. Bohle, de faire passer le travail de nationaux-socialistes à l'étranger, travail qui a une mission mondiale, comme un travail civilisateur. Les services compétents de la section 'Étranger' ont publié des directives déterminant de quelle manière les nationaux-socialistes à l'étranger doivent chercher à influencer, en soignant les 'rapports civilisatoires', les organisations de tendance politique sympathique du fascisme en faveur de la politique étrangère de l'Allemagne. Bohle s'exprima littéralement ainsi: 'La notion de "propagande culturelle" devient ainsi un auxiliaire de la politique étrangère du Troisième Reich.'"

This report continues: "Le chef du groupe espagnol, Hellermann,³ fut accablé de reproches parce qu'il n'avait pas réussi à sauver la correspondance compromettante (of Barcelona)." An order was given by Bohle "que désormais tous les services importants de l'organisation à l'étranger devront s'installer dans les

¹ *F.Z.*, 7 Sept. 1937.

² See *The Nazi Conspiracy in Spain*. By the Editor of *The Brown Book of the Hitler Terror*. Translated from the German Manuscript by Emile Burns. London, Gollancz, 1937 (with photographic reproductions of documents). Speech of Bohle at Stuttgart, *V.B.*, 30 Aug. 1937. The suspicions of the AO. published abroad "selbst für den Dummsten den Stempel der Lüge tragen und sich daher selbst widerlegen". Against the attitude of *The Times* see *V.B.*, 1 Sept. 1937, and the *Berliner Tageblatt* of the same date.

³ For Hellermann see *The Nazi Conspiracy in Spain*, pp. 77 sqq.

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missions allemandes ainsi que dans les consulats pour jouir du privilège d'extraterritorialité".¹ Thus the *Tagung* of the organization held at Stuttgart in 1937 acquired a special significance and speeches were delivered not only by Bohle but by von Neurath, Goering, Hess, Frick, Frank, Ley, and Goebbels in which the complete legality and innocence of the AO. were proclaimed.² Frank in his speech declared that the profession of loyalty to the Führer and to the National Socialist programme had to-day become the content of the consciousness of Germans and therefore could not be regarded as a crime by the legal system of any country. It was a matter of course that National Socialism pursued no imperialistic aims and had no thought of splitting off parts from other States. The AO. was within its rights; nowhere did it give any ground for attack; never and in no way had it acted unconstitutionally.³ Goebbels said: "The world must at length come to understand that there is no group and no organization in Germany with the aid of which it can pursue a policy hostile to Germany. Within the Reich our Movement watches over the security of the State, on the frontier our army watches over the security of the Reich. We Germans help ourselves in our own way. We envy no people its internal structure, we do not interfere in its domestic affairs. We wish, however, that for their part other peoples would leave us in peace."⁴

"Foreign nations and foreign statesmen", wrote Richard Csaki (in Goering's official organ *The Four Years Plan*), "must recognise that in the future fruitful relationships between Germany and other world-peoples can take place only on the basis of the organized activity of foreign Germans as natural agents of German culture and commerce."⁵

¹ *Journal des Nations*, 1 Oct. 1936.

² See also the speech delivered by Bohle in Budapest, during an official visit to Hungary, on 23 Jan. 1938; for the text: *Pester Lloyd*, 25 Jan. 1938 (and article). Cf. *F.Z.*, 25 Jan. 1938 and article "Eine sehr wichtige Rede" in *F.Z.*, 26 Jan. 1938. A large part of the speech is translated in the *New York Times*, 24 Jan. 1938.

³ *F.Z.*, 2 Sept. 1937.

⁴ *F.Z.*, 7 Sept. 1937. Cf. further the report of the speech in the *Daily Telegraph*, 6 Sept. 1937.

⁵ I have not the German text of this quotation. I cite from the *New York Times* of 26 Oct. 1937. Cf. in an article on the AO. in the *National-Zeitung* of Essen to which I have not access—I quote

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But it may yet be doubted whether these massed protestations had any great effect upon the world beyond the frontiers of the Reich. Even within the speeches themselves a curious inconsistency might at times be traced. Thus Hess in a speech at the *Tagung* of the AO. in August 1938 said: "In the AO. the NSDAP. has brought you together to foster your 'Deutschtum', to be good National-Socialists. Your *Deutschtum*, your National Socialism, is peculiarly your own affair. You do not work for any 'pénétration pacifique'; you do not seek peacefully to penetrate with your National Socialism the peoples amongst whom you live. . . . And that remains true even though here and there you are suspected of shady purposes and aims, even though men think that they can rob you of your National Socialism by arbitrarily forbidding the external forms of your association. The heart in you, the spirit in your midst, cannot constitute any danger to the State which receives you whether you are united in local groups (*Ortsgruppen*) or not. . . . We and our Germans abroad do not meddle in the affairs of other countries: we would wish them to find their blessedness after their own fashion." And then in the same speech Hess went on to say that "we of our own free motion have brought back from Austria the 6½ millions of Germans in that country".—"We do not meddle in the affairs of other countries!"¹

Hitler in August 1936 announced through the Statthalter of Württemberg that Stuttgart should in future be known as "The City of Germans abroad".² In Stuttgart is situated the *Auslands-*

from the *Journal des Nations* of 1 Sept. 1937: "À la longue, la politique allemande officielle ne peut ignorer aucune discrimination à l'égard de cette institution du parti national-socialiste et il faudra, une fois pour toutes, accepter l'Organisation des Allemands à l'étranger avec ses groupes nationaux et locaux et ses bases (*Stützpunkte*). L'atmosphère générale ne sera qu'épurée lorsque les autres s'habitueront à considérer l'activité de ces organismes peut-être comme un peu contraire à leurs opinions, mais comme légale et irréprochable."

¹ *F.Z.*, or *V.B.*, for 29 Aug. 1938. And note the theatrical glorification at this *Tagung* of the murderers of Dollfuss, and of the eleven members of the Party concerned in the abortive rising against the Austrian Government in 1934. See *The Times*, 30 Aug. 1938.

² *Le Temps*, 29 Aug. 1936. Cf. *ibid.*, 11 Feb. 1937. Stuttgart for the year 1937 contributed 200,000 marks for the cultivation of Germanism abroad. *Le Temps*, 6 Apr. 1937.

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institut.¹ The Institute has shared in the suspicions which have attached to the AO. In June 1938 its President, Dr. Strölin, protested against the mistrust felt by foreigners: the Institute was not a centre for political espionage but a scientific institution with a purpose which served all Germans living abroad whether they were citizens of the Reich or *Volksdeutsche*. Its principal task was its care for the twenty millions of *Volksdeutsche*: it did not seek to act as their political guardian but to look after them in the sphere of culture.² The Institute has set itself the task of registering some 30,000,000 Germans³—this Migration Register is regarded as serving the National Socialist *Weltanschauung*. *Sippenkunde*—the tracing of family relationship—is thus no private hobby, since association through the tie of blood and race (*die rassenmäßige Blutverbundenheit*) is one of the essential conditions for the creation of a community of the people.⁴ With the Institute is associated the *Volksbund der deutschen sippenkundlichen Vereine* which was founded in 1935 and holds an annual conference.⁵ For a list of centres for *Sippenforschung*—research in family relationships—cf. *Berliner Tageblatt*, 9 November 1938.

In many different ways the Third Reich seeks to encourage interest in Germans living abroad. A new University lectureship has been founded in Tübingen for *weltpolitische Auslandskunde und Deutschtum in Übersee*.⁶ In Munich an Institute for South-East Europe has been founded and publishes *Südostdeutsche Forschungen* since 1936.⁷ An order issued by the Ministry of Labour addressed to local communes directed that street names should be chosen which might constantly remind Germans of their "unredeemed" German brothers.⁸ Every higher leader of the Hitler Youth must have spent six months abroad.⁹ In Stuttgart the first *Deutsche Burse*—hall for students—at a German technical college has been founded, and here, too, is the *Auslands-*

¹ For the activities of the Institute see *Reichspost*, 24 June 1938.

² *F.Z.*, 18 June 1938.

³ *Berliner Tageblatt*, 17 July 1936. Cf. *New York Times*, 22 June 1938.

⁴ *Berliner Tageblatt*, 25 Aug. 1936. Cf. *F.Z.*, 30 Aug. 1936.

⁵ *F.Z.*, 26 Aug. 1936.

⁶ *F.Z.*, 23 Nov. 1938.

⁷ *Berliner Tageblatt*, 23 Feb. 1938.

⁸ *Journal des Nations*, 27-8 Feb. 1938.

⁹ *Berliner Tageblatt*, 3 Sept. 1937. Speech of von Schirach.

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deutsches Mädchenheim—for daughters of Germans living abroad, the *Auslandsdeutsches Frauenheim* (under the *Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft*), and the *Heim für deutsche Rückwanderer*—for Germans returning from abroad.¹ The State in order the more closely to control Germans living abroad has made it compulsory for any German staying more than three months in a foreign country to report himself to the German authorities there.²

For the work of the AO. cf. E. W. Bohle, "Germans abroad" in *Germany Speaks*, London, Thornton Butterworth, 1938, pp. 326-42. There is a valuable general work on the subject of Germans beyond the frontiers of the Reich: Paul Lévy, *Le Germanisme à l'étranger*. Comité alsacien d'Études et d'Information, 1933; and an instructive paper by O. D. Tolischus, *New York Times*, 21 Nov. 1937. See further: Wilhelm Classen, *Außenpolitik des Reiches* (Arbeiten zur auswärtigen Kulturpolitik, Heidelberger Akten der von Portheim-Stiftung No. 24). Heidelberg, Winter, 1938; H. Scuria, *Die Grundgedanken des Nationalsozialismus und das Ausland* (=Schriften der Hochschule für Politik, Series I, Idee und Gestalt des Nationalsozialismus, Heft 37). Berlin, Junker & Dünhaupt, 1938; Friedrich Burgdoerfer, *Volksdeutsche Zukunft: eine biologisch-statistische Betrachtung der gesamtdeutschen Bevölkerungsfrage* (=Schriften der Hochschule für Politik Series I, Idee und Gestalt des Nationalsozialismus, Heft 34), Berlin, Junker & Dünhaupt, 1938 (especially for Austria: with list of Burgdoerfer's works); ed. Erwin Barth von Wehrenalp, *Deutsche in Übersee*, Leipzig, Lühe, 1938; B. von Tiesenhausen, *Deutsche in Australien*, F. Krome, *Deutsche in Südamerika*, H. von Lieben, *Deutsche in Afrika*, F. Kuck, *Deutsche in Fern-Ost*, K. Utermann, *Deutsche in Nordamerika* (each about 45 pp.); H. Emmerich and J. Rothschild, *Die Rechtslage deutscher Staatsangehöriger im Ausland*. Haarlem, Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1937 (pp. 356). For the organization and branches of the work of the AO. it may suffice to refer to the pamphlet of E. Ehrich, *Die*

¹ *V.B.*, 11 Aug. 1937.

² Text: *Reichspost*, 19 Mar. 1938. For the *Katholische Auslandsdeutsche Mission* which gave its pledge to Hitler "to devote itself fully and without reserve to the service of Germany" see *F.Z.*, 30 Aug. 1936.

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Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP. (see p. 1065, n. 5). For the more questionable activities of the AO. cf. *The Nazi International* (= *Friends of Europe Publications* No. 69), reprinted from the *Quarterly Review*, vol. cclxxi, No. 538 (Oct. 1938); *The Brown Network* (by the author of *The Brown Book of the Hitler Terror*). *The Activities of the Nazis in Foreign Countries*. Introduction by William Francis Hare, Earl of Listowel. Translated from the German; Documented and Illustrated. New York, Knight Publications Inc., 1936. *Le Petit Parisien* of 16, 17, and 22 Nov. 1933 partially published a secret document dating from September 1933 stated to be issued for the instruction of German agents abroad: this document was subsequently published *in extenso* together with another dating from October 1933 (German text and French translation) in a pamphlet under the title *Le Vrai Visage des Maîtres du III^e Reich. Les Instructions secrètes de la propagande allemande. Texte complet des documents confidentiels* [? 1933]. See the Preface by Albert Jullien, pp. 3-5. The German text of these documents together with an English translation was published by Robert Dell in his book *Germany Unmasked*, London, Hopkinson, 1934, pp. 153-271.—For activities abroad on behalf of Germany see J. Joesten, "The Nazis in Scandinavia", *Foreign Affairs*, xv (1936-7), pp. 720-8 (July 1937); P. B. Taylor, "Problems of German-American Relations", *Foreign Policy Reports*, xiv (1938-9), pp. 98-108 (July 15 1938) the latter part of the article; for German economic and political pressure in South-Eastern Europe see in particular Gerhard Schacher, *Germany pushes South-East*, London, Hurst & Blackett [1937], pp. 173-222; N. P. Macdonald, *Hitler over Latin America*. London, Jarrold, 1940, and for action in U.S.A. during the early period of National Socialist government cf. K. G. W. Ludecke, *I knew Hitler*. London, Jarrold, 1938. Mention may also be made of Hans W. Thost, *Als Nationalsozialist in England*. Munich, Eher, 1939.

The martyr of *Auslandsdeutschtum* is Gustloff, murdered by David Frankfurter at Davos; see Emil Ludwig, *The Davos Murder*, English translation by Eden and Cedar Paul. London, Methuen, 1937. This book contains a study of political assassination, on which cf. *MK.*, p. 609 and see p. 166, *supra*. The bibliography of *Auslandsdeutschtum* is enormous: for earlier literature see the lists of works given at the end of the sections in Georg Schreiber, *Das Auslandsdeutschtum als Kulturfrage*

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(= *Deutschtum und Ausland*, ed. Georg Schreiber, Heft 17/18). Münster, Aschendorff, 1929: for more recent work see the list in Hugo Grothe's *Erläuterungsheft zur Wandkarte des Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschums*, Halle, Berlin, Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1935, pp. 17-18, and in Hans Steinacher, *Volkstum jenseits der Grenze* (in the series *Wir in unserer Zeit: Kleine Schriften zur Gegenwart*), Stuttgart, Franckh'sche Verlagshandlung, 1934, pp. 27-9. See further: R. Mai, *Auslandsdeutsche Quellenkunde 1924-1933*, in Verbindung mit dem Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland herausgegeben von E. C. Scherer, Leiter des Reichsverbandes für die katholischen Auslandsdeutschen. Berlin, Weidmann, 1936 (an encyclopaedic work of pp. 504); *Deutschtum in Übersee. Ein Schrifttumsverzeichnis*. Herausgegeben von der Bücherei des Deutschums in Ausland im Deutschen Ausland-Institut. Stuttgart, Berlin, Volk und Reich Verlag, 1939; and cf. ed. Hugo Grothe, *Kleines Handwörterbuch des Grenz- und Auslands-Deutschums*, mit 22 Kartenskizzen. Munich, Berlin, Oldenbourg, 1932; *Handwörterbuch des Grenz- und Auslands-Deutschums* unter Mitwirkung von 800 Mitarbeitern in Verbindung mit 40 Teilredaktoren herausgegeben von Carl Petersen, Paul Hermann Ruth, Hans Schwalm. Breslau, Hirt, 1933; vol. 3 in progress in 1939. Reference may also be made to R. von Schumacher, *Volk vor den Grenzen. Schicksal und Sinn des Außendeutschums in der gesamtdeutschen Verflechtung*. Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig, Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft (no date), and, as an instructive example of "Auslandsdeutschum" propaganda, J. E. Seidel, *Wie ich das neue Deutschland sehe. Von einem Sudetendeutschen*. Berlin, Dresden, Limpert, 1936.

The speeches delivered by National Socialists so far as they have been reported in the Press are singularly repetitious and uninteresting. In my judgement by far the most interesting speech is that delivered by Goering at the *Tagung* of the AO. in 1937 reported in *V.B.*, 4 September 1937. Other speeches have been referred to in the course of this note.

It may be of interest to refer to a few articles published in the journal *Nation und Staat*, *Deutsche Zeitschrift für das europäische Minoritätenproblem*: E. Koch-Weser, "Volkstum und Reich im deutschen Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz", v (1931-2), pp. 526-31

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(importance of the use of the word "Reichsdeutsch" rather than "Deutsch" to avoid charges of hostility towards the *Gaststaat*); with the later demands raised by the National Socialists cf. E. Ammende, "Richtlinien zur Begründung der Volksgemeinschaft", *ibid.*, pp. 464-9; S. Wilfan, "Die Organisierung der Volksgemeinschaft", *ibid.*, pp. 445-64; N. Gürke, "Der Nationalsozialismus, das Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschum und das Nationalitätenrecht", vi (1932-3), pp. 7-30; K. Giannoni, "Die Funktion der Heimat in Volk und Staat", vii (1933-4), pp. 146-51; R. Lorenz, "Nationsidee und Geschichtswissenschaft", *ibid.*, pp. 307-23 (the new range given to historical study by the conception of *Auslandsdeutschum*); Arpad Török, "Volksgemeinschaft als Rechtsidee", *ibid.*, pp. 418-28 (a foreign State has no right to proscribe the Movement itself, it can only act against those who "ihre Rechtssphäre überschreiten"); H. Raschhofer, "Minderheitenrecht im Umbruch", ix (1935-6), pp. 148-59 (the right of minorities "volkspolitisch in ihrer Fassung zu leben"); E. Neugeboren, "Die überstaatliche Volksgemeinschaft", *ibid.*, pp. 87-92 (must not be identified with irredentism: it is indeed the one escape from irredentism, if whole populations are not to be moved into other States); Max Richter, "Der Kampf der deutschen Volksgruppen um ihre Rechte", *ibid.*, pp. 513-15 ("Kulturautonomie — das ist das Zielwort" at p. 514), and cf. E. Besednjak, "Die Nationalitäten im autoritären Staat", *ibid.*, pp. 216-22 (on the rights of national "Volksgruppen"); H. Kohnert, "Sicherung der Nationalitätenrechte — Grundlage des Zusammenlebens der Völker", x (1936-7), pp. 715-21 (the claim "in einer anerkannt rechtlichen Körperschaft die kulturelle Autonomie zu erhalten"); the demands: pp. 718-20 [with which cf. K. O. Rabl, "Zur Frage eines mitteleuropäischen Volksgruppenrechts", *Zeitschrift für Politik*, xxviii (1938), pp. 371-92]. For further statements of the demands to be made on behalf of a national group in a foreign country see E. Kundt, "Volkstumsrecht in der völkerrechtlichen Entwicklung", x (1936-7), pp. 78-95 (summary of demands at p. 94); H. Rutha, "Gemeinschaftsrecht und Selbstverwaltung der Volksgruppen" (= Report at the 13th European Congress on Nationalities, London, 15 July 1937), *ibid.*, pp. 710-14 (demands for a national group at p. 714); H. Stegmann, "Rechtliche Sicherung zwischenvölkischer Beziehungen durch nationale Selbstverwaltung", *ibid.*, xii (1938),

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pp. 25-32 (Grundrechte der Volksgruppen are stated at p. 31). And see an interesting statement of the significance of a particular type of landscape for the maintenance of national sentiment by F. Fabritius—"Volkstum und Boden", *ibid.*, pp. 124-7. For the "Bekennnisprinzip", the spontaneous confession of national allegiance, as the basis of Volkstum see W. von Wrangell, "Volkstum und Volkszugehörigkeit", *ibid.*, pp. 105-12, and with this cf. Paul Lévy, *Le Germanisme à l'étranger* (cited above), pp. 37 sqq., and Karl Mehrmann, "Zwischen Staats- und Volkspolitik", *Nation und Staat*, xii (1938), pp. 149-57 (the conflict between the "völkisch" and territorial conceptions, particularly in relation to contemporary English views). On the "außerstaatliche nationbildende Kräfte" see Eugen Lemberg, "Volksbegriff und nationbildende Kräfte im Westen und im Osten Europas", *ibid.*, ix (1935-6), pp. 92-101.

In May 1933 Hitler spent two days in Kiel where almost the whole German war fleet was assembled. In answer to Vice-Admiral Albrecht's speech of greeting Hitler said: In the new community which had been formed as a result of the national uprising "there lies no threat against the rest of the world. We desire peace perhaps more than all others, since we need it in order to create bread for the millions of our unemployed fellow-countrymen. But peace will always be given only to him who is worthy of peace. And only that people is worthy which maintains a consciousness of the necessity for honour and freedom. It is in this sense that this German uprising proclaims its struggle for German freedom and equality of rights in the world. Soldiers of the navy of the Reich, you yourselves have great traditions to safeguard. The old Germany had but a few decades in which to build up its forces (Wehr), but these decades were so used that the whole German people could look with pride upon its bluejackets. Then came the period of humiliation. And now Germany has once more found herself in order to open up the way to freedom for German labour. It

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is with this in mind that I greet our German fleet. Though this fleet is small, yet all Germany looks upon it with joy, for it is the most visible representation of the German conception of honour and of German prestige in the world without. Never forget when you are away from home that the fleet is a bit of Germany, just as Germany for her part does not forget you. The Government of the German Reich has come to Kiel to greet this German fleet of ours. But this visit is also a profession of faith: however great our longing for peace, no less great is our determination to recover for the German people its freedom and equality of rights. Thus resolved, we greet our German people with the pledge that we will wage this battle to the end—this legacy left to our generation—until there shall arise once more a Germany of honour and of freedom.”¹

Hitler when welcoming British airmen on the occasion of their visit to Berlin (8 June 1933) said that as a German soldier during the war in Flanders he personally had had an opportunity of admiring the achievements of the English airmen. He was convinced that those English guests, who had at that time been at the front, for their part had felt a similar respect for the chivalry of their German foes. The genuine consciousness of this mutual respect formed in his judgement the surest foundation for the political relations of the two great German nations in the coming years. It was only thus in the spirit of this young generation that a new beginning could also be made towards removing the economic evils which were now dominant amongst the peoples.

¹ *Berliner Tageblatt*, 23 May 1933. With this cf. the speech delivered in Berlin on 25 Feb. 1934, *F.Z.*, 27 Feb. 1934, and the speech on the Bückeberg at the Harvest Thanksgiving Festival of 1934 (30 Sept. 1934), *V.B.*, 1 Oct. 1934.

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From the German side everything would be done to realize this end.¹

On 13 July 1933 Wysocki, the Polish representative, had an interview with Hitler in Berlin; in his report of the interview Wysocki states that:—

Le Chancelier a commencé par me remercier de la confiance témoignée jusqu'à un certain point à son parti et aussi au Gouvernement. Celui-ci, dit-il, aussi longtemps qu'il en sera le chef, ne saurait avoir aucune intention agressive à l'égard d'aucun État, et, partant, à l'égard de la Pologne. Le Chancelier a reconnu ensuite les droits historiques de la Pologne à son existence et à son essor ultérieur, en exprimant l'espoir que, pour ce qui est de nous, nous reconnaissons les mêmes droits à l'Allemagne. Le temps n'est plus, précisa le Chancelier, lorsque, par la force, on obligeait des provinces entières à adopter telle ou autre nationalité. Cette tactique s'est avérée absolument impuissante, aussi bien à l'égard de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine que de la Pologne, au cours de la période de cent cinquante ans qui a suivi les partages. Le Chancelier ne croit pas que la guerre soit le moyen propre à régler des différends auxquels la vie se charge généralement d'apporter une solution. Il est également convaincu que les auteurs du Traité de Versailles ont institué ce qu'on appelle le corridor, afin de creuser, pour de longues années, un abîme entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne, États qui ont de multiples raisons pour vivre en bonne intelligence et en paix, comme il sied à des voisins.

Le Chancelier m'a déclaré également qu'il a pris des dispositions afin que fussent évitées à Dantzig toutes discordes avec la Pologne: il est fondé à croire que l'atmosphère qui y sera créée produira les meilleurs résultats.

¹ *F.Z.*, 9 June 1933.

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De plus le Chancelier a parlé assez longuement de la situation en Russie, de la nécessité d'une coopération de tous les États du continent européen en vue de réagir contre la crise économique et les conséquences sérieuses qui s'en faisaient sentir en Allemagne. Si, dit-il en conclusion, plus de cinq millions d'ouvriers allemands obtiennent à nouveau du travail, par quoi leur pouvoir d'achat sera accru, l'Allemagne se verra obligée, comme par le passé, de se procurer des produits alimentaires là où ceux-ci seront le meilleur marché, notamment chez ses plus proches voisins, c'est-à-dire également en Pologne.¹

In his speech to the leaders of the SA. and SS. and the Stahlhelm at Bad Godesberg on 19 August 1933 Hitler said: "Neither SA. nor army is an end in itself: both do but serve the single purpose of the maintenance of our people. From this conception of our people's life (Volkstums) I also reject the idea of the Germanization by our people of foreign folk and peoples,² since this could never mean a reinforcement and strengthening but at most only a weakening of the racial core of our people."³

THE SAAR

Bibliographical Note

It would be irrelevant in this place to insert any general bibliography of the Saar Problem: indeed, it was precisely the advent to power of the National Socialists which transformed the

¹ *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la période 1933-1939*, Paris, Flammarion, p. 36.

² The report of the speech in *F.Z. has fremden Menschen und Völkern*: read *fremder Menschen und Völker*.

³ *F.Z.*, 21 Aug. 1933.

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character of the Saar Plebiscite. "The problem of the Saar", it has been said, "did not exist until after January 30th 1933." For the earlier literature it will thus be sufficient to refer to the encyclopaedic bibliography to be found in the *Sondernummer* of the *Zeitschrift für Politik: Die Grundlagen des Saarkampfes, Handbuch zur Volksabstimmung*, edd. A. Grabowsky and G. W. Sante, Berlin, Heymanns Verlag, 1934, pp. 339-59. For the plebiscite on its constitutional side cf. J. M. Görgen, *Die Volksabstimmung im Saargebiet. Eine historisch-politische Studie*. Munich, Oldenbourg, 1927, and V. Bruns, *Die Volksabstimmung im Saargebiet* (= Schriften der Akademie für Deutsches Recht. Gruppe Völkerrecht). Berlin, Heymanns Verlag, 1934. The case for autonomy (as being the solution most favourable alike for the Saar, for France, and even for the true interests of Germany) is stated in Jean de Pange, *Ce qu'il faut savoir de la Sarre*. Paris, Éditions des Portiques, 1934; for representative German propaganda literature of the year 1934 cf. J. M. Goergen, *Das Saar-experiment des Völkerbundes*. Strasbourg, Société d'édition de la Basse-Alsace (Preface dated October 1934); H. Röchlin, *Wir halten die Saar!*. Berlin, Volk und Reich Verlag, 1934; F. Grimm, *Frankreich an der Saar*. Hamburg, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1934; F. C. Roegels, *Deutsches Schicksal an der Saar*. Breslau, Korn, 1934 (Preface by von Papen); J. von Puttkamer, *Wahr bleibt wahr, Deutsch die Saar*. Oldenburg, Stalling, 1934 (mit 93 Bilddokumenten)—note the chronological table of acts of the Saar Commission to prove the partiality of Mr. Knox, pp. 52-8. For a propaganda picture-book of the Saar cf. *Volk und Reich*, Beiheft 3/4, 1934: *Das Saarbuch. Schicksal einer deutschen Landschaft*, ed. F. Heiss. Berlin, Volk und Reich Verlag, 1934. After the Plebiscite: R. R. Rehaneč and H. König, *Sieg an der Saar. Die Saarabstimmung in Wort und Bild*. Saarbrücken, Saarbrücker Druckerei, 1935.

Of general works published in English at this time may be mentioned T. Balk, *The Saar at first hand*. London, John Lane, 1934; M. T. Florinsky, *The Saar Struggle*. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1934; M. Lambert, *The Saar*, London, Faber & Faber, 1934; B. T. Reynolds, *The Saar and the Franco-German Problem*. London, Arnold, 1934. And see R. von Kühle-mann; "The Future of the Saar", *Foreign Affairs*, xii (1934-5), pp. 426-35 (April 1934). For a general review of the relations of

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France and Germany over the Saar see *Survey of International Affairs* 1934, pp. 578-627, and for an elaborate study of the Saar Plebiscite see S. Wambaugh, *The Saar Plebiscite, with a collection of official documents*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1940 (pp. 489).

On 28 August 1933 at the Niederwald Monument Hitler addressed the Germans of the Saar. He said that he brought to them the greetings of the Province of East Prussia;¹ there two million Germans were standing, separated from the homeland, loyally keeping guard that the bridge to the Reich might be maintained. . . . The sacred memories of the past and the rights of the present must be preserved, and amongst those rights of the present there was included the return of the Saar to the Reich. . . . We are determined to build up once more that inner unity of the nation which was lost in November 1918 . . . the Germany which people from the Saar now saw before them was a new, another Germany. "It may be true that there are still many who are not prepared to understand that Socialism and Nationalism have become united in National Socialism. In the Reich itself the millions perhaps would never have realized this if the scourge of the Lord had not smitten us for fifteen years. All those who to-day as renegades from our national life calumniate Germany in the world without may rest assured that never again, so long as we live and these standards wave, will divisions break in upon the German people; . . . the German has never yet been defeated save when in madness he defeated himself." Hitler said that he was ready at any time to appeal once more to the German people and submit himself to its judgement, for he knew that to-day more than five-sixths of the people would give him their unconditional

¹ For East Prussia see the bibliographical note on p. 1022 *supra*.

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support. "That is not the result of violence, as newspapers published beyond our frontiers falsely assert; that is the inner voice of a people which once more finds itself. We are happy that the strength of the inner national revival stretches far beyond the frontiers of the Reich and that in especial it inspires those who by origin, birth, descent, language and history belong to us". . . .

"There are three different versions for the future of the Saar: some say the Saar must go over to France (Shame! Never!), others—our enemies—say that it must be autonomous, but only the third solution is possible and that solution will be championed by everyone who believes in the sanctity of the Fatherland and in the greatness of the nation. That solution is: back to Germany!"

"We have declared a hundred times that we wish for peace. None of us wishes for the property of others, none of us wishes to incorporate an alien people into our State, but what God has made into a people belongs to that people, and if treaties are to be sacred, then they must be sacred not only for us but for our opponents. The treaties give to the people of the Saar the clear right to choose its own destiny. We would gladly come to an understanding with France, but on one point there can be no understanding: neither can the Reich abandon its claim to the territories of the Saar nor can these abandon Germany."

Those who came from the Saar could give to their fellow-countrymen at home a picture of the new Germany. If they could fly over the face of Germany they would see that those who stood before them to-day were one with all Germans from Tannenberg to the Rhine, from Hamburg to the most southerly frontiers of the Reich. "It is one and the same spirit which dominates

everything and which makes it worth while to live amongst this people." . . .

"For this new Germany there will be no happier hour than that on which we can open wide the gates and see once more the people of the Saar in Germany."¹

*In the Proclamation read at the opening of the Parteitag in Nuremberg on 1 September 1933 Hitler said: "The National Socialist Movement has become the German Reich, the German State. Not only the recovery of external freedom demands the ready co-operation of the mass of the nation, economic problems also cannot be solved unless we are successful in securing for the measures of the Government the support and confidence of the entire people. At the beginning of this year there were weeks when only by a hair's breadth did we escape Bolshevist chaos. The rapid downfall last winter threatened to expand into complete ruin. If Fascism by an historical act which stands as an example to other Powers achieved the salvation of the Italian people, National Socialism has undertaken to fulfil the same mission for the German people."*²

With this compare what Hitler said when on 8 September 1935 he received the newly appointed Italian ambassador, Signor Bernardo Attolice:

"I trust that the community of many ideals which binds Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany will work out more and more for the good of our countries and that the advantages arising therefrom will also benefit the rest of the world."³

¹ V.B., 29 Aug. 1933.

² F.Z., 2 Sept. 1933.

³ Cited from *The Times*, 9 Sept. 1935; see pp. 1000; 1018, *supra*, 1251 *infra*.

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GERMANY RETIRES FROM THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AND GIVES NOTICE OF HER WITHDRAWAL FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Bibliographical Note

For the whole crisis caused by Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference see *Survey of International Affairs 1933*, London, Oxford University Press, 1934, pp. 291-317; *Documents on International Affairs 1933*, *ibid.*, 1934, pp. 277-324; *Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart in Dokumenten 1934/35*, Teil I, *Internationale Politik*, ed. Michael Freund, Essen, Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1936, pp. xiii-xx, 3-15. The literature on the subject is copious: it will suffice here to refer to W. T. Stone, "The Disarmament Crisis—1933", *Foreign Policy Reports* (25 October 1933), ix (1933-4), pp. 186-96; A. L. Kennedy, *Britain faces Germany*. London, Cape, 1937; Viktor Bruns, *Germany's Equality of Rights as Legal Problem* (= Schriften der Akademie für Deutsches Recht, ed. Hans Frank, Gruppe Völkerrecht). Berlin, Heymanns Verlag, 1935 (with a select bibliography p. 28); *Deutschland fordert Gleichberechtigung: Eine Sammlung von Aufsätzen und Rundfunkreden über die Fragen der Gleichberechtigung, Sicherheit und Abrüstung*, ed. H. Weberstedt. Leipzig, Armanen-Verlag, 1933; F. Grimm, *Wir sind im Recht! Deutschlands Kampf um Wehrfreiheit und Gleichberechtigung* (= Schriften der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik, Series I, Idee und Gestalt des Nationalsozialismus, Heft 13. Preface dated May 1935). Berlin, Junker & Dünnhaupt, 1935; Otto Kriegk, *Das Ende von Versailles. Die Außenpolitik des Dritten Reiches*, Oldenburg, Stalling, 1934, pp. 31 sqq.; Axel Frh. von Freytagh-Loringhoven, *Deutschlands Außenpolitik 1933-1939*, Berlin, Stollberg, 1939, pp. 26 sqq., and see H. Rogge, *Hitlers Friedenspolitik und das Völkerrecht*. Berlin, Schlieffen Verlag, 1935, which summarizes the views maintained in his earlier enormous work on *Nationale Friedenspolitik*. Berlin, Junker & Dünnhaupt, 1934 (pp. 708).

For the intimate National Socialist view of the policy of withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the secret instructions to National Socialist agents on the presentation of that policy see the document (German text with English translation) *Sonderinformation zur Lage nach Deutschlands Rücktritt von der allge-*

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meinen Abrüstungskonferenz und vom Völkerbund, printed in R. Dell, *Germany Unmasked*, London, Martin Hopkinson, 1934, pp. 244-71, or (German text with French translation) in *Le Vrai Visage des Maîtres du III^e Reich. Les Instructions secrètes de la Propagande allemande*, Paris, *Le Petit Parisien* [1933], pp. 51-64. If the document here reproduced is authentic, it is of high interest.

For the form of the question on the voting paper in the referendum of 12 November 1933: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935), p. 140, and see J. K. Pollock, *German Election Administration*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1934 (in the Series Aspects of German Political Institutions, ed. Lindsay Rogers); for the official return of the voting: *ibid.*; 92.2 per cent. of the valid votes were in favour of the National Socialist candidates and 95.1 of the votes cast were in favour of the Government's foreign policy.

I have translated the speeches made by Hitler before the poll at some length, as I have sought to give some impression of what must have been the cumulative effect of National Socialist propaganda as day-by-day reports of these speeches appeared in the German Press.

On 14 October 1933 Hitler issued a Proclamation addressed to the German people:

"Filled with the sincere desire to carry through the work of the peaceful internal reconstruction of our people and of its political and economic life, former German Governments, trusting that a just equality of rights would be granted them, declared their willingness to enter the League of Nations and to take part in the Disarmament Conference."

"But in so doing Germany suffered a bitter disillusionment."

"In spite of our willingness at any time, if necessary, to continue to its utmost limits the German disarmament which had already been effected, other Governments could not make up their minds to fulfil the

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promises made under their signature in the Peace Treaty."

"Through the resolute refusal to Germany of a real moral and material equality of rights the German people and its Governments have been again and again profoundly humiliated."

"After the German Government, on the basis of the express recognition of German equality of rights laid down on 11 December 1932,¹ had recently declared itself willing to resume its participation in the deliberations of the Disarmament Conference, it was later communicated to the Foreign Minister of the Reich and to our delegates through the official representatives of the other States in public speeches and direct declarations that this equality of rights could no longer be granted at the present time to Germany."

"Since the German Government regards this action as a discrimination against the German people which is as unjust as it is degrading, under such conditions, as a second-class nation, deprived of its rights, it feels itself no longer able to take any further part in deliberations which could lead only to further 'Diktats'."

"Therefore while the German Government asserts afresh its unalterable will for peace, in the face of these humiliating and dishonouring suggestions, to its profound regret it declares that it is forced to leave the Disarmament Conference. And in consequence it must also give notice of its retirement from the League of Nations."

"The Government places this its decision, together with a new profession of loyalty to a policy of sincere love for peace and readiness to reach an understanding, before the German people for its judgement, and expects

¹ Cf. *Survey of International Affairs 1932*, London, Oxford University Press, 1933, pp. 288-9.

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from the German people that it will make known that while it has the same love for peace, the same readiness for peace, it also holds the same view of national honour and is as resolute as is the Government."

"I have therefore, as Chancellor of the German Reich, proposed to the President of the Reich, as a visible expression of the unanimous will of Government and people, to submit this policy of the Government of the nation to the vote of the people, and to dissolve the German Reichstag in order thus to give to the German people the opportunity of electing those deputies who, as sworn representatives of this policy of peace and honour,¹ may be able to give to the people a guarantee for a resolute defence of its interests in this sense."

"As Chancellor of the German people and Leader of the National Socialist Movement, I am convinced that the entire nation, united as one man, will take its stand in support of a profession of faith and a decision which spring as much from love towards our people and respect for its honour as from the conviction that the final pacification of the world, which is so necessary for all, can be attained only if the ideas of Conqueror and Conquered give place to the nobler conception of equal rights to life enjoyed by all."²

On the same day, 14 October 1933, the Government issued a Proclamation to the German people:

"The German Government and the German people are unanimous in their will to pursue a policy of peace, of conciliation and understanding, as a basis of all decisions and of every action."

"The German Government and the German people

¹ German: *Ehrenhaftigkeit*.

² German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935), pp. 106-7.

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therefore reject force as an unserviceable means for the removal of existing differences within the community of European States."

"The German Government and the German people renew their profession that they will gladly concur in every actual disarmament of the world together with the assurance of their willingness to destroy the last German machine-gun and to discharge the last man from the army in so far as the other peoples decide to do the same."

"The German Government and the German people are united in the sincere wish to consider and to solve dispassionately by way of negotiation all outstanding questions together with the other nations, including all our former enemies, with the aim of mastering the war-psychosis and of finally re-establishing a relation of mutual sincerity."

"The German Government and the German people therefore further declare that they are willing at any time through the conclusion of pacts of non-aggression, entered into for the longest periods, to secure the peace of Europe, to serve its economic welfare, and to take part in the general cultural reconstruction."

"The German Government and the German people are both inspired by the same conception of national honour: they believe that the recognition of Germany's equality of rights is the essential moral and material precondition for any participation by our people and its Government in international institutions and treaties."

"The German Government and the German people are therefore united in the determination to leave the Disarmament Conference and to withdraw from the League of Nations until the time when this actual equality of rights shall no longer be withheld from our people."

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"The German Government and the German people are determined rather to endure every distress, every persecution, and every hardship than in the future to sign treaties which must be intolerable for every honourable man and for every people which cherishes its honour and which in their consequences would lead only to perpetuation of the distress and misery of the conditions produced by the Treaty of Versailles and therewith to the collapse of the civilized community of States."

"The German Government and the German people have no intention of sharing in any armament-race of other nations; they demand only that degree of security which guarantees to the nation calm and freedom for peaceful work. The German Government and the German people desire to secure these just demands of the German nation through negotiation and through treaties."

"The German Government addresses to the German people the question:

"Does the German people approve the policy of its Government as here set forth, and is it willing to declare this policy to be the expression of its own views and of its own will and solemnly to pledge itself thereto?"¹

On the same day, 14 October 1933, Hitler spoke over the wireless; he said:

"When in November 1918 in trustful reliance upon the assurances defined in President Wilson's Fourteen Points the German people laid down its arms, a disastrous struggle reached its close: for that struggle indi-

¹ German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935), pp. 107-8. Order of the President of the Reich dissolving the Reichstag, *ibid.*, p. 109. There is an English translation of the Proclamation of the Government in *Documents on International Affairs 1933* (London, Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 286-7.

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vidual statesmen, but assuredly not the peoples, could be held responsible. The German people had fought with such heroism solely because it had the sacred conviction that it had been unjustly attacked and was thus justly at war. Of the greatness of the sacrifices which at that time—when it was compelled to rely almost entirely on its own resources—it was forced to make the other nations had hardly any conception. If in those months after the War the world had loyally given its hand to the prostrate foe, mankind would have been spared much suffering and many a disillusionment."

"The profoundest disillusionment of all was suffered by the German people. Never yet has the conquered so honestly striven to co-operate in healing the wounds of its foes as did the German people in the long years of the fulfilment of the 'Diktats' which were imposed upon it. If all these sacrifices did not avail to lead to any true pacification of the peoples, that was due solely to the character of a Treaty which through the attempt to perpetuate the concepts of Conqueror and Conquered was bound to perpetuate hatred and enmity. The peoples might rightly have expected that from this greatest war in the history of the world the lesson would have been drawn how little, especially for the European nations, the greatness of the sacrifices corresponds with the greatness of any possible gain. When therefore in this Treaty the obligation of destroying its armaments was imposed upon the German people in order to render possible a general world-disarmament, countless numbers believed that in this there was to be seen nothing but a sign that there was spreading abroad an understanding which might prove a redemptive force."

The German people destroyed its armaments "in fanatical loyalty": a small professional army quite inadequately armed took the place of an army millions strong.

"But at this time the political leadership of the nation lay in the hands of men who in their mental outlook were rooted only in the world of the victorious States." The German people might thus reasonably expect that the rest of the world would similarly keep its promises. "No war can become humanity's permanent state; no peace can be the perpetuation of war. One day Conquerors and Conquered must find their way back into the community of mutual understanding and confidence."

"For a decade and a half the German people has hoped and waited for the time when at last the end of the War should also become the end of hate and enmity. But the aim of the Treaty of Versailles seemed not to be to give peace to humanity at the last, but rather to keep humanity in a state of everlasting hatred."

"The consequences of this were bound to follow. If Right finally yields to Force, then a continuous uncertainty will disturb and check the course of normal functions in the life of peoples. At the conclusion of this Treaty men forgot that the reconstruction of the world cannot be effected through the slave-labour of an oppressed nation but only through the trustful co-operation of all alike, and that for such co-operation the first of all conditions is the mastering of the war-psychosis. They forgot, further, that the problematical question of war-guilt is not, in the view of history, cleared up if the Conqueror causes the Conquered to sign a confession of guilt as preface to a treaty of peace: rather the final war-guilt can best be established by considering the content of such a 'Diktat'." . . .

Hitler then dealt with the economic consequences of the Treaty: the armies of the unemployed began to form a new social class: they numbered a third of those normally in employment. Those who were thus disinherited

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in the economic sphere threatened to become an army of fanatics, politically and socially alienated from the world about them.

One of the oldest civilized countries of present-day humanity with over six million Communists stood on the verge of a catastrophe. If the Red fire had blazed throughout Germany, then in the civilized countries of Western Europe folk would have come to recognize that "it is no matter for unconcern whether on Rhine and on the North Sea the outposts of an Asiatic world-empire which is inspired by conceptions of revolutionary expansion keep their guard or whether peaceful German peasants and workers in sincere alliance with the other peoples of our European civilization are content to earn their bread in honest work. Since the National Socialist Movement snatched Germany back from the menace of this catastrophe, it saved not merely the German people but at the same time it won for itself the right to claim from the rest of Europe the recognition of a historic service."

"And this National Socialist Revolution pursues a single purpose: restoration of order in our own people, creation of bread and work for our hungry masses, proclamation of the ideas of honour, loyalty, and decency as elements of a moral ethic which can inflict no injury on other peoples, which can but be for the profit of all. If the National Socialist Movement had not stood for ideals of value, it could never have saved our people from the final catastrophe." To these ideals the Movement has remained true consistently during the fight for power and since the acquisition of power. . . . "It has devoted itself, without respect of persons, to the task of restoring to their rights loyalty, faith, and decency."

Hitler then spoke of the heroic fight of National

Socialism against Communism: "to the denial of God, to abuse of religion we have put an end. We are bound to render our humble gratitude to Providence that it has not permitted our fight against the distress of unemployment and for the deliverance of the German farmer to remain without success." . . .

"For this immense achievement of ours the best evidence is the German people itself. It will prove to the world how strongly it takes its stand in defence of a régime which knows no other aim than to co-operate, through the works of peaceful labour and the refinements of civilization,¹ in the reconstruction of a world which to-day has little happiness."

This world, of which we ask only to be allowed to work in peace, pursues us for months past with a flood of lies and slanders. *Hitler returned to his favourite theme of the model revolution* during which "not a window was broken, not a shop was plundered, not a house was damaged". "In no country in the world are there greater calm and order than in the Germany of to-day: in no country of the world can person and property be more highly respected than in Germany." *There followed an attack upon the "emigrants"*. "What", *Hitler asked*, "would this world beyond our frontiers say of Germany if here we allowed folk to stage the comedy of an inquiry in favour of a creature who had sought to set on fire the British House of Parliament—an inquiry whose only object could be to set British justice and Britain's judges beneath the value placed upon such a blackguard? As a German and a National Socialist, I should not be interested to champion in Germany the cause of a foreigner who had sought in England to undermine the State or the laws in force there, or who had gone so far

¹ German: *mit Werken . . . gesitteter Kultur*. I do not know how to render this satisfactorily in English.

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as to attack with fire the building which stands as symbol of the English Constitution. And even if this creature were a German—and may God spare us that shame!—we would not hide the fact, but only profoundly regret that such a misfortune had to befall us: we should have only one wish—that British justice should without pity free humanity from such a curse.”

“But on the other hand we possess a sufficiently keen sense of honour to feel outraged at a spectacle which, inspired by obscure personages, was intended to put to shame and dishonour the highest German Court. And we are profoundly grieved at the thought that through such methods peoples are incited and alienated of which we know that inwardly they stand towering high above these personages, peoples which we desire to respect and with which we would fain live together in sincere friendship.”

“These pernicious and debased creatures have succeeded in creating in the world a psychosis whose inner, diseased, hysterical disharmony can be demonstrated by a positively classical proof, for it is the same personages who on the one hand lament over the ‘oppression’, the ‘tyrannization’ of the poor German people through the National Socialist authorities while on the other they declare with imperturbable unconcern that asseverations of love for peace made in Germany simply do not count because they are expressed only by a few National Socialist Ministers or by the Chancellor of the Reich while amongst the people the wild war-spirit is rampant. The result is that, as the need of the moment suggests, the German people is represented to the world now as piteously unfortunate, and now as brutal and madly aggressive.”

“I regard it as the sign of a nobler sense of justice that the French Premier, Daladier, in his most recent

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speech¹ found words which displayed a spirit of conciliatory understanding for which countless millions of Germans in their hearts are grateful to him. National Socialist Germany has no other wish than to guide the rivalry of the peoples of Europe once more to those spheres in which they have given to humanity in the noblest of mutual rivalries those supreme² gifts of civilization, of culture, and of art which to-day enrich and beautify the picture of the world."

"Similarly it is with an emotion of hope that we have learned of the assurance that the French Government under its present head does not intend to insult or to humiliate the German people. We have been deeply moved by the reference to the unfortunately all too melancholy truth that these two great peoples have so often on the battle-field sacrificed the blood of their best youth and manhood. I speak in the name of the entire German people when I assert that we are all filled with the sincere wish to root out an enmity which has caused sacrifices which stand in no relation to any profit which could possibly be gained therefrom."

"The German people is convinced that the honour of its arms has remained clear and unsullied in a thousand battles, just as similarly we see in the French soldier only our old but glorious adversary. We and the whole German people would all be happy in the thought that we might spare the children and the children's children of our people what we ourselves, as men of honour, through the cruelly long years had to look upon in suffering and torture and had in our own persons to endure. The history of the last one hundred and fifty

¹ For Daladier's speech at the Radical Party Congress at Vichy on 8 October 1933 cf. *Survey of International Affairs 1933* (London, Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 299-300.

² German: *unerhörten*.

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years through all its changing course should have taught both peoples the one lesson—that important changes which are to endure are no longer possible, however much blood be shed. As a National Socialist, together with all my supporters and at the same time on the ground of our national principles, I refuse to gain men of an alien people, who will after all not love us, at the cost of the blood and the lives of those who to us are near and dear. It would be an event of immense significance for humanity as a whole if the two peoples once and for all were willing to banish force from their common life. For this the German people is ready.”

“While with frankness we assert the rights which are given us by the terms of the treaties themselves, I desire just as frankly to declare further that for Germany there do not exist any longer any territorial disagreements between the two countries. After the return of the Saar territory to the Reich it is only a madman who could conceive of the possibility of a war between the two States; as we see it, for such a war there is no ground which could be supported either in morals or in reason. For no one could require that in order to effect a correction of present frontiers—a correction of problematic extent and of problematic value—a million lives of men in the flower of their age should be destroyed!”

“But when the French Premier proceeds to ask why then does German youth appear on the march, why does it take its stand in rank and file—that is not to demonstrate against France, but to declare and document that formation of the will which was necessary for the overthrow of Communism and which will be necessary if we are to keep down Communism. There is in Germany only a single bearer of arms and that is the army; and, on the other hand, for the National Socialist organizations there is only one foe, and that is Communism.

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And the world must accept the fact that for its internal organization, in order to preserve our people from this danger, the German people chooses those forms which alone can guarantee success. If the rest of the world entrenches itself in indestructible fortresses, builds vast squadrons of aeroplanes, constructs giant tanks, forges enormous guns, it cannot talk of a threat because German National Socialists march completely unarmed in columns four abreast and thereby give visible expression and effective protection to the community of the German people."

"But when, further, the French Premier raises the question: why then does Germany demand arms which yet must later be destroyed? this is a misapprehension. The German people and the German Government have not demanded arms at all; what they have demanded is equality of rights. If the world decides that all arms down to the last machine-gun shall be destroyed, we are willing at once to join in such an agreement. If the world decides that certain types of arms are to be done away with, we are willing from that moment to renounce their use. But if the world permits to every people certain types of arms, we are not prepared, as though we were a people with less rights than others, to allow ourselves on principle to be excluded from their possession."

"If in accordance with our conviction we honourably act on this view, then for the other peoples we are more reputable¹ partners than if we were ready to act against this conviction and accept humiliating and dishonouring conditions. For with our signature we give in pledge a whole people, while the negotiator who has neither honour nor character will be disowned by his own people. If we wish to conclude treaties with Englishmen,

¹ German: *anständigere*.

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Frenchmen, or Poles, from the outset our desire is to conclude such treaties only with men who themselves think a hundred per cent. as Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Poles and who act for their nation. For we have no wish to conclude pacts with intermediaries: our wish is to conclude treaties with peoples. And if to-day we oppose a conscienceless agitation, that is but because it is not the agitators, but, unfortunately, it is the peoples which have to atone with their blood for the sins of these poisoners of the world."

"Former German Governments in the past entered the League of Nations in the hope and confidence that in the League they would find a forum for a just settlement of the interests of peoples, above all for a sincere reconciliation with their former foes. But this presupposed the recognition of the ultimate restoration of the German people to equality of rights. And participation in the Disarmament Conference was also based upon the same presupposition. To be written down as a member of such an institution or conference possessing no such equality of rights is for an honour-loving nation of sixty-five million folk and for a Government which loves honour no less an intolerable humiliation!"

"The German people has fulfilled its obligations even to excess in the matter of disarmament. It is now the turn for the fully armed States to fulfil as loyally their analogous obligations. The German Government does not take part in this Conference in order to win by bargaining a few cannons or machine-guns for the German people, but as a member with equal rights to co-operate in the general pacification of the world. The security of Germany is no less a right than the security of the other nations. If the English Minister, Baldwin, can represent it as a matter of course that England under the term 'Disarmament' can understand only the disarmament of

the more highly armed States while parallel with this England is rearming up to a common level, then it would be unfair to heap reproaches on Germany if finally, as a member of the Conference possessing an equality of rights, she should claim to assert for herself the same view. But this demand of Germany cannot in any way constitute a threat to the other Powers. For the defence-works of the other peoples are in fact built against the heaviest offensive arms, while Germany does not demand any offensive arms but only those defensive arms which even in the future are not forbidden, but are permitted to all nations. Here, too, Germany from the start, so far as numbers are concerned, is prepared to be content with a minimum that does not stand in any relation to the gigantic armament, both offensive and defensive, of our former enemies. But deliberately to degrade our people by according to every other people in the world a right which is regarded as a matter of course while withholding it from us alone, that in our view is to perpetuate a differentiation which is for us intolerable. Already in my speech on Peace in May¹ I stated that under such conditions we should to our regret no longer be in a position to continue as a member of the League of Nations or to take part in international conferences."

Hitler then reverted to his constant contention that Germany was not responsible for the War: the Germans had but done their duty as honourable men. Germany is no longer ruled by the hireling traitors of 1918: the world can only welcome the fact that it will now negotiate with men of honour; but if that is so, the world for its part must respect the sentiment of honour which inspires the present régime. "And that is the more necessary as it is only from such an atmosphere that the measures can

¹ For the speech of 17 May see p. 1041, *supra*.

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be devised which may lead to a real pacification of the peoples. For the spirit of such a Conference can be only that of a sincere understanding, otherwise all these efforts are bound to end in failure. Since from the statements of the official representatives of a series of Great States we have gathered that at present they have no idea of according to Germany any effective equality of rights, it is not at present possible for this Germany on her side to force herself any longer upon other peoples while occupying so unworthy a position."

"The threats of force can in their realization be only violations of rights."

Hitler closed the speech by saying that the dissolution of the Reichstag and the ensuing election would afford the German people an opportunity of giving expression to an historical profession of belief: no mere approval of the political principles of the Government, but an unconditional allegiance to those principles.

"From this profession may the world draw the conviction that in this fight for its equality of rights and for its honour the German people declares itself to be completely at one with its Government, but that both Government and people in the depths of their hearts are filled with no other wish than to co-operate in bringing to an end an epoch in human history of tragic errors, of lamentable strife and discord between those who, as inhabitants of the continent which is of the highest consequence for civilization, have in future to fulfil a common mission towards the whole of mankind. May this mighty demonstration of our people for peace and honour succeed in giving to the spirit which governs the mutual relations of the European States that pre-condition which is essential not only for the ending of a century of strife and discord but also for the reconstruction of a better community: and that pre-condition is

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the recognition of a higher common obligation springing from common equal rights!"¹

On 17 October 1933 Hitler addressed a meeting of the leaders of the Party in Berlin. He said that in the field of foreign policy the struggle for equality of rights which was now entering on its decisive stage was inseparably bound up with the fight for economic revival, with the fight for bread which the German people had now been consistently waging for the last eight months. The political pacification of the world was the condition of any economic recovery. Until equality of rights was granted, it was from the outset purposeless for Germany to take part in any international conferences. His predecessors in the Government had suffered to some extent from the "Geneva sickness": that had made them pessimists concerning the nation, optimists concerning the League. "I am an optimist concerning my people but a pessimist concerning Geneva and the League of Nations. . . . Germany wants peace and nothing but peace, but Germany is determined in future to enter no conference, no league, no agreement, determined to sign nothing, until she is treated as a Power with equal rights. Somewhere or other there must be a limit below which one cannot go—otherwise one is not worthy to lead a people." National Socialist Germany, perhaps more than any other people, desired peace, since the National Socialist idea was directed inwards towards the "volkic" conception of a leadership which was bound by the tie of common blood and consequently did not know of any imperialistic policy of conquest directed against the world without.

The propaganda of the Party must be viewed in this framework and avoiding inessentials must concentrate

¹ *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, I (1935), pp. 109-17.

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on these great questions: a deep, a holy seriousness must mark the people in these weeks: there must be no superficial jingoism, but a profound inner realization of the consciousness of its right. . . . Our former political opponents within Germany, in view of this struggle of the whole nation, we would meet half-way and would extend to them the hand if they prove that they are prepared to defend German honour and share the people's love of peace.¹

On 18 October 1933 Hitler granted an interview to Mr. G. Ward Price and gave a considered reply to questions which had been previously presented to him: the Chancellor's answers were given in a tone of "devout earnestness". Hitler began with an expression of his good feeling towards England:

"I feel it to be a great misfortune that on 4 August 1914 these two great Germanic nations which, through all the fluctuations of human history, had lived in peace for hundreds of years, were plunged into war. I should be very happy if this unnatural state of things came to an end and our two kindred peoples found their way back to their old relations of friendship."

"Nobody here desires a repetition of war. Almost all we leaders of the National Socialist Movement were actual combatants. I have yet to meet the combatant who desires a renewal of the horrors of those four and a half years."

"We Germans are intensely patriotic, just as all decent Englishmen are. We are teaching the German youth to fight, but to fight against internal evils, and particularly against the Communist danger, of whose formidable

¹ *V.B.*, 19 Oct. 1933. Cf. on the last quoted sentence the comment of *The Times* of 19 Oct. 1933.

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proportions people in Great Britain have never had and have not yet any idea."

"The songs of the National Socialist Revolution are not directed against other nations. They are songs of fraternity at home, denouncing class war and selfish pretensions, aspiring to work and daily bread and exalting the national honour."

Ward Price: *"It is, however, believed abroad that the German nation has been taught by the Nazi régime that it has deep grievances against France which can only be repaired by a victory of German arms."*

Hitler: "Our Movement teaches no such thing. All we do is to try to inspire a spirit of national devotion and the ideals of honour and self-respect."

"Our youth constitutes our sole hope for the future. Do you imagine that we are bringing it up only to be shot down on the battle-field? We have no reason to be ashamed of Germany's military record."

"We have no failures in the field to make good. The only thing that causes us to blush is the fact that there were men who left their Fatherland in the lurch in its days of greatest need."

"I am glad that German youth has recovered its sense of national honour. I cannot see how this threatens any other nation or how so fair-minded a people as the British can resent it."

"I am convinced that if Great Britain had had the same misfortunes as Germany there would have been even more National Socialists in England than there are here."

"We want no 'grievances' with France, but a thorough-going understanding on a basis which a self-respecting nation can accept. And we demand the right to live."

Ward Price: *"Does this not represent rather a change in your attitude towards France?"*

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Hitler: "Germany's attitude towards France has always depended on France's attitude towards Germany."

Ward Price: *"Is Germany's avowed intention some day to recover the Polish Corridor compatible with European peace?"*

Hitler: "No sane person considers the Corridor is one of the greatest achievements of the Peace Conference. Such an arrangement could only have the effect of creating enmity between Germany and Poland."

"But even the Peace Treaty gives us the right to ask for revision. No one in Germany thinks of going to war with Poland over the Corridor, but we all hope that the two nations can get together and discuss it dispassionately."

"The future will show whether it is not possible for Germany and Poland to find a solution to this question which will be acceptable to both."

Ward Price: *"Your Excellency has several times described the Germans as an overcrowded nation. In what direction do you see expansion as possible, and does the German Government aim at getting back its colonies?"*

Hitler: "Germany contains too many people for her size, and it is to the interest of the world that a great nation should not be deprived of the conditions of existence. But we shall never go to war to get colonies."

"We are convinced that we are as capable as any other nation of administering and developing colonial territories. But we regard this as a matter for negotiation."

Ward Price: *"Are there any conditions under which Germany might return to the League of Nations?"*

Hitler: "In my view, the League has no future if it continues to represent the interests of a certain group of States as opposed to the interests of other States."

"In any case Germany will never again take part in

any international convention in which her absolute equality is not recognised."

"We know well enough that we lost the war, but we also know that we fought well, that we defended ourselves courageously and valiantly as long as possible."

"We are manly enough to recognise that when one has lost a war, whether one was responsible for it or not, one has to bear the consequences."

"We have borne them, but it is intolerable for us as a nation of 65,000,000 that we should continually and repeatedly be dishonoured and humiliated."

"We will put up with no more of this persistent discrimination against Germany. So long as I live I will never put my signature as a statesman to any contract which I could not sign with self-respect in private life."

"I will maintain this resolution even if it means my ruin! For I will sign no document with a mental reservation not to fulfil it."

"What I sign I will stand by. What I cannot stand by I will not sign."

Ward Price: *"Does Germany then regard herself as liberated from her existing international obligations on the ground that she has not been accorded equality of treatment?"*

Hitler: "Whatever we have signed we will fulfil to the best of our ability."¹

On 22 October 1933 Hitler spoke to members of the SA. at Kelheim, near Regensburg, in the Befreiungshalle—the memorial to those who had fought for the freedom of Germany. He said that those who had fought in the Great War were most able to distinguish superficial jingoism from a true inward sense of being bound up with one's own people, its history, its life, and its rights: they were

¹ *Daily Mail*, 19 Oct. 1933.

best qualified to champion their people's right to live. Through fifteen years the representation of the vital interests of the people had been such a sorry affair that the world had grown accustomed to view the German people in a false light. Weak Governments had been identified with the German people, so that irresolution, half-heartedness, and indecision appeared to be its characteristics. It was no easy task to destroy that false picture. "The German people is not bellicose: on the contrary just because it loves peace, it fights for its right to live and for those preconditions which are essential for the existence of our people of 65 millions. . . . You, my comrades of the SA., in particular are the living witnesses of this will for peace, for it is your free will which unites you to this community in which, not theoretically but practically, the community of the people finds its expression, a great community of mutual help, of mutual support. You are the guarantors not merely of the present but also of the future of Germany, and no one therefore has a greater right than yours to come before this shrine. If the spirits of those who died in the fights for German liberty could come alive again, they would not hesitate for a second, but to-day would immediately take their place in our midst. The vision which floated before their eyes is ours, too: we would fain realise their desire: a single people and a single German Reich."

"There had to come someone in Germany who would say: Peace is our wish, but dishonour we repudiate. Unequivocally we declare to the world: if you wish to see us in your international conferences, if you wish to have us in your League of Nations, that can be only if you recognise us as a people. We are ready at any time to sign treaties if only they are such as we can fulfil and if they are compatible with our sense of right. Treaties

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that cannot be fulfilled, that are not honourable, we will not sign. We will have no part in 'Diktats'. That we have no cause to be ashamed of our history this place here is a living witness. We wish for peace: true, but the world must also know that we will not tolerate in perpetuity this everlasting discrimination against our people, this dishonouring of our people."

And behind this decision the entire German people is ranged: "the world must not fancy that to-day in Germany there remains a single organisation, a single party which are allies of those who believe that they can simply ride roughshod over the vital rights of Germany and over German honour. The world shall see that the time is past when foreign Powers could count on defeating Germans with the aid of Germans: that time will never return. This Movement is an eternal guarantee of that, for it will endure through the centuries."

"To-day the German people closes its ranks to form a unity. It is our life-task to create an organisation which shall ensure that this unity shall never be lost. . . . There is no better guarantee of peace than the fanatical unity of the German nation."¹

The Electoral Campaign was opened by Hitler's speech in the Sportpalast, Berlin, on 24 October 1933. Here the arguments of previous speeches are repeated and thus for much of the speech a brief analysis will suffice: Hitler began with a retrospect "in order to demonstrate why we had to act as we have done and could not act otherwise, unless we were prepared to sacrifice altogether our justification for our existence on the earth as a great people, and with that to sacrifice our claim to live. We have learned from history that in the long run life is only given to those peoples who possess the will to champion

¹ V.B., 24 Oct. 1933.

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their life and honour before the world." In 1914 the German people did not wish for war: "if the German people and its Governments had wished for war, the war would have come at another time and under other conditions." The German people, like other peoples, did but do its duty and fought bravely to the last minute. "We surrendered on the basis of promises made to us only when we saw that in consequence of revolution at home all resistance was vain. We knew well enough that in world-history the conqueror is ever granted as a matter of course the right to determine the terms of peace", but victory gives no right to the conqueror to stigmatize a people for all time as a second-class nation and therefore as possessing only second-class rights. The German people laid down its arms when there was a danger that all Europe might possibly slide into Bolshevism. A military disaster may lead to a national catastrophe, and a people may fall into chaos: it may then be infected by bacilli which may spread to other countries. That danger of infection has not grown less: it has only increased. "If in a territory within which there are but 18 townsmen to 82 peasants the distress can be so great that millions have no longer anything to eat, what do you suppose would happen in a territory where for every 25 peasants there are 75 townsmen? The catastrophe would be unimaginable." But the victor Powers failed to take any account of this danger: "a peace was concluded which paid no regard to actualities, not even to the most primitive reason. It was a peace whose only godparent was a single thought: how can one best oppress the vanquished, how rob him of all honour, how can one nail him down for all time as the guilty party? A peace which was no peace but which was bound to lead to a perpetuation of hate amongst the peoples." This Treaty of 440 clauses has no parallel in

history: *with it Hitler contrasted the peace after the war of 1870* in which not a single clause prejudiced a people's honour, in which there was nothing which could in any way oppress a people's future, a peace after which in three years France was completely free. "The Treaty of Versailles was based upon the cardinal error that the economic misfortune of one must be the economic good fortune of another." The motto "Harm your former enemy as much as you can" has proved fatal for all; it has been fatal in economic life, while in international life the world is not pacified. Reparations were imposed and at the same time the German people was robbed of all possibility of paying them. Reparations-payments were converted into interest-payments: for fifteen years there was waged a hard struggle for the world-market. Then rationalisation followed and consequent unemployment: then finally the currency war begins and the nations mutually ruin each other in pursuit of a phantom. The misery which ensued was the vengeance of a Higher Justice upon a Peace of Unreason, and that vengeance fell on conquerors and conquered alike. "One cannot in the long run construct a world-order upon the idea of hatred; one cannot in the long run construct in Europe a community of life between nations if these nations have not equal rights. That is in the long run intolerable and must lead to the destruction of any such community. It cannot be denied that after more than thirteen years this Peace Treaty has brought to Europe no peace but perpetual disquiet, unrest, mistrust, hatred, insecurity, despair."

"And just as in the economic sphere action was senseless, so also political action was senseless too. To take a single example: between Poland and Germany the Corridor was set up. At that time another solution might have been found. In Europe there are Germans,

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in Europe there are Poles. Both must grow accustomed to live side by side and with each other and to agree together. Neither can the Poles think away the German people from the map of European countries, nor are we so unintelligent as, for instance, to wish to think away the Poles. We know that both are there, that both must live together. Why then should an apple of discord be thrown into their lives? At that time the Powers could do what they would. Why must they do *that*? Only in order to perpetuate hatred, only to hurl into discord peoples which otherwise would live in peace with each other."

"It would in fact have been possible easily to find another way by which justice could be done to both countries. But that is just what was not wanted. Throughout, one thought dominates this Peace: how can one artificially continue to maintain discord¹ for the future?" And the consequence of that is not disarmament but an unceasing increase in armaments.

The victor Powers had had thirteen years in which to disarm while a parliamentary Government—a Government after their own heart—was established in Germany, a Government of Democrats and world-pacifists, and yet the promise of the Treaty had not been kept.

"They will hardly wish to contend that from the Germany of those days there could have been a threat of danger for the world. They will hardly wish to maintain that the Governments of Germany, beginning with Ebert and going down to the most recent time, could, from the standpoint of their democratic *Weltanschauung*, constitute a danger for the other democracies. One can charge former Governments with anything you will, there is one charge that you cannot bring against them—that they were bellicose. No! An unreasonable Treaty

¹ German: *Unfrieden*: "unpeace".

had been made, and then its makers had the feeling that for the protection of this monstrous Treaty vast armies are a necessity."

"It is not the case that all these States were in such dread of Germany—that were too much honour for us. No, between themselves they did not disarm. But it is pleasant to say: if it were not for this Germany, we would all disarm." . . .

"The question comes down to this: What sense have demands when he who undertakes to fulfil them knows quite well: I cannot possibly fulfil them, and when even the opponents say: We do not believe that they will fulfil that? What is the meaning of all that?"

"It can have only one meaning: the desire to throw the world into everlasting and continuous unrest, to block the way to any tranquillization, to bring the peoples into ceaseless conflict with each other, to fill them with hatred and with hopes on the one side which must be doomed to disappointment on the other. In the long run no community of the peoples can be founded on principles such as these, and in the long run, and especially in Europe, the peoples can live only if they return once more to such a community. It will come to be seen that the idea that the one part can in perpetuity live its life without the other is a false idea."

"And the consequences of all this for our people have been twofold: on the one hand an appalling material distress, and on the other a moral despair and distress which is not less great. The world unfortunately, for the most part, has had no realization of this. In the main our conditions have been judged only very superficially. For once folk should have taken the trouble to go into the quarters where the masses, the proletarians, live, into the towns of the proletariat, into the distressed areas of Central Germany and Saxony, and then they would

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have gained another picture of the blessings and the effects of their so-called Peace Treaty. We know these 'blessings'!"

"The economic life of an entire nation was destroyed: millions have lost the last penny of their savings, hundreds of thousands lost their livelihood. A whole peasantry was slowly given over to ruin: the middle classes were reduced to proletarian conditions, and even the working men were impoverished and their standard of life permanently lowered. And at last there we were with six to seven million unemployed; that is one-third of the sum-total of all our wage-earners." And the same evil spread to other countries, while in Germany there was added the destruction of loyalty and faith, the annihilation of our sound finances. The whole German people and the German Reich were thus gradually undermined and brought to the verge of collapse. "Does the world, do the people who write about Germany, think that these conditions could result in anything but collapse? They act almost as if it had been a pleasure to us to undertake the struggle against such conditions. We have undertaken the struggle in order to stay complete ruin. That is why!"

"The way which Europe went was the straight path to Bolshevism, and what this Bolshevism would have meant for Europe, that I need not paint in detail."

And in Germany we in undertaking this struggle have acted precisely as, before us, a similar Movement had already done in Italy. We have sought to snatch back the German people from this abyss.

Hitler then dealt at length with the National Socialist programme, with "the new system which the German people had chosen in order to win the mastery over its distress".

We have set before us a programme which runs: Now

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we must work and create in order slowly to reconstitute what has been destroyed. Our first aim is the fight against Marxism, the fight against Communism—a fight fought not for 100,000 members of the *bourgeoisie*—their ruin did not cause us concern—but for the whole German people, for its productive members and for the workmen first of all. The second point in our programme was the fight against our latent political downfall: we know only a single unity; he who opposes that is our enemy and we will fight him. The third point was Fight against the Class-War, and that was not, as some have objected, an attack against one side alone. We have destroyed all those who relied upon their class and sought on a class-basis to form a political army. We have said to the workman: Comrade, you must come back to your people, you cannot separate yourself off as a class from those who belong to you, with whom you must live, without whom you too are ruined. But just in the same way we went to our so-called Intellectuals, and to them we said just as to the others: Leave your caste-pride! Leave your party of isolation! Do not imagine that you are the superior people! And we have broken their parties just as we had broken the others.

But above all we have restored confidence to the German people, confidence in their own strength. Another spirit has come into this people: once more the German people believes in a tolerable life.

"We have begun the fight for a new justice: we wanted to restore confidence in our law-courts. With this end in view we proclaimed the principle that every one is equal before the law and before justice": even a member of the Cabinet must pay for his misdeeds.

We wanted just as earnestly to fight for a better moral life: here, too, we have not been content with theories. We have in these months carried through an unheard-of

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cleansing-process, and this cleansing-process is still proceeding.

We have begun the fight against the disintegration of our religion¹ and against unemployment. We count as our greatest achievement that "we have recovered for the worker his place in the nation, that we have been able to demonstrate to him: The Nation is not just an idea in which you have no part: you yourself support the nation: to it you belong: you cannot separate yourself from it; your life is bound up with the life of your whole people; the nation is not merely the root of your strength, it is the root of your very life." We have opened up the nation to millions who had looked with envy or with hatred upon those who called themselves "Nationalists", and have united them with all those who see in the nation the supreme good which all must protect, since it contains within itself for all alike the pre-condition for their life.

Hitler then went on to speak of the fight in the economic sphere—lowering of taxes, the building of new roads, betterment of State finance, liberation from debts; further, of the fight against corruption in the administration of the State. "It is a gigantic programme: history at least will admit that we have not been idlers or cowards."

"And we have stabilized the Government: we are resolved not to capitulate: the time will come when men will no longer ask 'Have you had the agreement of all?' No: they will say 'Thank God that you have acted thus: for to you in truth we owe the resurrection of the nation.' We look to the future, we can make long-term plans; so long as the good God leaves us here, men will not easily overthrow us."

And during these eight months the world has abused us: they complain of atrocities; the greatest atrocities in

¹ For this passage see p. 378.

Germany were wrought in the name of the Treaty of Versailles: the Treaty was the cause of some 20,000 suicides annually, 20,000 decent men who had been robbed by the Treaty of their prospects, of their means of livelihood.

When has there ever been a revolution so free of atrocities as ours? . . . "I go amongst the people at any time without a cordon of police: people can always know where I am and where I go. I do not in the least fear an attack from the people. My only fear is lest a small child should be run down by my motor-car." . . .

And England—the home of the oppressed—demands £1,000 before it lets a refugee into the country! If we had demanded such a sum from immigrants, Germany would to-day have no Jewish question. Certainly together with the rights of the chosen people we champion also the rights of the oppressed people—the German people: for that in the last resort is why we are here! But that is no atrocity.—Really this talk of atrocities should cease: our people goes to its work in peace: in our towns there is greater calm and peace than ever before. Men are happier than in recent years. Our sole misfortune lies outside Germany—it is the hatred of our enemies!

It is true that the "*Émigrés*" do not share this view. "It is no doubt very fine to be able to go abroad and to pose with the nimbus and the halo of one threatened with death, while in reality it is only the Public Prosecutor from whom one has fled. And the fraction of these emigrants who are in fact abroad on political grounds? I must confess that we are glad to be rid of them. We do not say 'Send them back to us'. On the contrary we say 'Keep them, and the longer the better'."

It has not in the past been usual that the public opinion of great nations should be influenced by such

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scum as these; unfortunately that has now become possible. What would Germany say if the statement were made in this country that an English minister had set fire to the English House of Parliament? The answer would be "That we do not permit". We have the same feeling for our honour, and we do not wish to be insulted by these scoundrels. We would only ask other peoples not to lend credence to elements whose sole mission it is to set one nation against another. And what does it mean when a boycott can with impunity be organised against us? What economic madness! A successful boycott would mean only that then we should be able to buy less than we could otherwise. We are glad to see that the decent peoples are beginning to free themselves from these influences: that the agitation for a boycott against Germany is proving fruitless both in England and in the United States. But how long is the discrimination against Germany to last? One or other: either we are granted equality of rights or not: there must be no juggling with words: that we will not tolerate.

We have now waited for fifteen years: it is not our fault that we can no longer have any confidence in promises. Once we trusted the assurances of President Wilson; the world will not maintain that those assurances were kept. Then we trusted the promises in the Peace Treaty. The world will not maintain that they were kept. Once again on our entry into the League of Nations we trusted that we should be accorded equal rights. And the world again cannot maintain that that promise has been kept—at least never in act.

Hitler here repeated his complaint of the inconsistency of those who opposed German claims (see p. 1097, supra).

"When we declare for peace then some one says 'We cannot trust your declarations, we want proofs'. And when we ask about proofs, then they say 'France feels

herself threatened'. Good! Before the whole people I declare 'We are ready to offer to the French people our hand in reconciliation.' But now the Press writes 'You want to separate us from England'; next it writes: 'A fresh intrigue is afoot'. Well, what are we to do then? I know what we must do: stand up for our honour, stand up for it with resolution, and never yield a step from this honour."

"The Disarmament Commission proposes to put into effect a draft according to the terms of which the highly armed States remain armed, an unarmed Germany is to disarm yet further, and after some years the pre-conditions necessary for a contemplated real disarmament are to be considered. To this proposal we have one thing only to say: we will not co-operate in such methods."

"We have the will to peace: we do not see even any possibilities of conflict. We wish to live in peace with England, we wish to live in peace with France, we wish to live in peace with Poland. For a long time past we have peaceful relations with Italy. We admire the great Italian statesman, admire his mission, and are grateful for the support which in bad days the Italian people has always given us. We desire peace with all. But we wish also that from that fact others should draw the consequences—quite definite consequences."

"We will neither be treated as second class nor will we ever put our signature to anything that we ought not to sign because it violates our honour. And never will we through any threats allow ourselves to be forced to surrender this principle. We cannot act otherwise."

"And if ever any people had the right to appeal to the gracious Lord God as the leader of its decisions, it is the German people". . . .

"I, for myself, declare that I would at any time rather

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die than put my signature to anything which according to my most sacred conviction is intolerable for the German people."

"I appeal to the whole German people: if in this I ever make a mistake or if the time should ever come that the people should believe that it cannot support my actions, then it can put me to death: I will calmly stand my ground. But never will I do anything to violate my own honour and the honour of the nation." Let the people judge: let them vote 'Yes' for equality of rights, for honour and true peace, for a new Reichstag which will guarantee this policy. For in the long run there is not even any economic salvation for a people if it is ruined politically and morally. We know only one aim in the world: not hatred for other peoples, but love for our German nation.¹

There followed the speeches of the electoral campaign in different cities of the Reich: they naturally repeat the arguments of the speech in the Sportpalast (see p. 1110) and the Party Press gave only summaries and not the full text. In Hanover on 25 October 1933 Hitler said that the world refused to believe that "the will to fight for our right, for our honour, for our freedom, and in consequence for our daily bread is the will of the whole German people". The whole German people supported his demands. The customary criticism of the Treaty of Versailles followed: "Where would the world be if the peoples had deduced from victory their right to nail down for all time the conquered as peoples of second class, second rank, with second-class rights and even with a second-class right to live—and then to hold them in that condition?" The consequence, if such a precedent were adopted, must be that undying hatred would destroy

¹ *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935), pp. 118-31.

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peoples, that no peace could return, that no balance of powers could be created. The effort of the last eight months was aimed solely at restoring the unity of the German people, which in its turn wanted only to be allowed to work in peace. They had not attacked or slandered foreign Powers: they had not injured them in any way. "We are but bound to wish that the world should once for all remember that it is not only *its* honour which is in question, that it is not only the honour of England or France, but that we have our honour too." . . . Formerly when the brave soldier capitulated, he was granted military honours: to-day the world has other views. "I have never in my whole life thrust myself into any illustrious society if I could think that I was not wanted there and that the society would not trust me as possessing equal rights with those of other members, and I should be sorry that the German people should choose any other view as expressing its political character."¹ . . . I would rather incur hatred than shame. I have more than once solemnly assured the world that we honestly desire understanding, that we honestly wish to go together with the other peoples. In this assurance there will be no change; I hold every war to be madness for Europe: war leads only to the mutual laceration of peoples: it cannot any longer produce any essential change." If you, my fellow-countrymen, ask me what can be done to prove our love of peace I have but one answer: "We must stand up for our right, we must protect our honour, be hard² and not give ground. That is what we must do." . . . *Hitler once more referred to his speech of 17 May 1933 and continued:* "We will not allow every one to talk of security while

¹ Repeated in the speech of 10 Nov. 1933, *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935), p. 138.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 136 and see p. 1141 *infra*.

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one people alone, our people, must be without any security. If the world thinks that it can impose that upon us by a mere 'Diktat', then, my honoured sirs, that will be without my signature and without the signature of the German people. Then you will have to confess that you have compelled Right to yield to Force." We must not be confused with those who formerly ruled in Germany: with them one could hope through methods of violence always in the end to enforce surrender: I can promise that with us that is impossible. I have, until this day, never submitted, until this day I have never capitulated, and so long as I live I have no intention of capitulating. *The speech closed with an appeal to the electors:* "For my own protection and for my own shelter I need no vote of the people; this time I appeal to you to do your duty in your own interest, on behalf of your children and with them for the future . . . for our people, for Germany."¹

On 26 October 1933 Hitler spoke in Cologne: "the Treaty of Versailles which was to have been an instrument of peace and understanding had become an instrument of discord and a source of perpetual strife. Its results were not peace but insecurity, not disarmament but an armament race of the other Powers, each with the other, not trust but mistrust and doubt wherever we look." . . . When anyone asked him why he had founded the National Socialist Movement, who had commissioned him or given him the right to do so his reply was: "I have given this commission to myself. I have assumed the right from my knowledge of the coming distress." The programme of the Movement had been to abolish those weaknesses which threatened to bring the German people to ruin. "In defence of this programme we have

¹ V.B., 27 Oct. 1933.

pursued a way which has not always been lit by sunshine—a steep way—until it led us to the possession of power. One does not become Chancellor in order to win the parchment certifying one's appointment but in order to attain the end which one has promised." In eight months Germany had been freed from a war waged between brothers: that war between the parties would never return. "The parties were not merely defeated, they were superseded." The Government had more than kept its promises: the six million unemployed had already sunk to 3·8 millions. *Hitler spoke of the Government's fight against the decay of religion (see p. 379).* Is the reduction of unemployment, is the restoration of internal unity, the new vigour imparted to economic life, is all this a threat to the world? In view of the campaign of slander which has been waged against Germany in the foreign Press, in view of the attacks levelled for fourteen years against the National Socialist Movement, would it have been possible that in any other country a Movement should, after its victory, have shown such moderation as we have done? There was such a thing as an international duty of mutual respect amongst peoples. Since it was said abroad that, though the German Government might perhaps wish for peace, the German people had no such wish, he had determined once more to appeal to the people. I have not done this on my own behalf, for the Government is in the saddle. "I have never feared my enemies when I had no power: I do not fear them to-day. The world must know that, when I declare that we wish for peace, for reconciliation even with our former enemies, the whole German people is willing and ready to call this policy of peace its own policy. . . . But the world must also know that when I say that I will have no unworthy treaties forced upon me, that I will not subscribe my name to them, that I

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will not permit myself and the German people to be treated unworthily, then the German people, too, shares that conviction. . . . On 12 November you will profess your faith: for Germany, for our honour, for equality of rights and at the same time in the end for a true and lasting peace in the world."¹

On 28 October 1933 Hitler spoke in Stuttgart, employing the same line of argument: the Treaty of Versailles was the real cause of the economic and political difficulties of the peoples of Europe: he rejected the lie of war-guilt: unemployment in Germany was the necessary consequence of this Treaty of unreason. "The scourge of unemployment was the fruitful soil for the growth of Bolshevism, which, as a doctrine of madness, would only complete the catastrophe and would infect not merely Germany but the whole world. Between two possibilities—madness or reason—Germany at the last moment had chosen Reason. We have not fought during fourteen years for office, but in order to renew the German people from its foundations upward. Struggle and work for the German people can alone satisfy us. What we cannot bring to completion German youth will achieve. Before thirty years have passed, in Germany the memory of the State of the Parties as it was in the past will have vanished like a mere phantom." The miracle had happened: extremes which thought that they could never unite had been united and fused together. Every force which imagined that it could turn against the unity of the Reich had been bent and broken. . . . "We have an indomitable will: we shall attack again and again until we have attained our goal. For fourteen years we fought for political power, and at last we gained it: if necessary we will fight another fourteen years for

¹ *V.B.*, 28 Oct. 1933.

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the economic happiness of the German people, and in the end we shall attain to that too."

*There followed an attack upon the exiles from Germany, and Hitler repeated his assertion that abroad they acted as though the bloody fist of National Socialism was behind them; in fact it was but the Public Prosecutor seeking to punish their crimes. "We know war: we want no war: we want to work and to enjoy our rest. Our fellow-countrymen are to us far too valuable for us ever to wish to drive them on some warlike adventure to the battle-field. We do not wish to subjugate any foreign peoples, but we wish to champion our home-land which we refuse to see dishonoured and insulted." The honour of the nation must be respected, for the honour of the nation was the honour of every individual citizen, and the honour of every individual could be none other than the honour of their leaders. "What we sign will be kept: what we believe we cannot keep that we will not sign. If this people of 65 millions unitedly pledges itself to love peace and with the same passion to defend its honour, then the world will not be able to ignore this profession, and then we shall do more for the pacification of the world than those who continually talk of peace and surround themselves with metal and with arms."*¹

On 30 October 1933 Hitler spoke at Frankfurt: "As on 5 March 1933 the German people had to decide upon domestic policy, so on 12 November it must decide on foreign policy. It must make a clear decision whether it is its will that the honour of the nation and its equality of rights shall in future be championed freely and openly before the world. It must decide for a way which in the first moment may perhaps be difficult but which, we are convinced, will alone be able in the long run to

¹ *F.Z.*, 30 Oct. 1933.

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maintain a great nation in its greatness." Germany had disarmed: the foreign Commission of Control had been long enough in Germany to satisfy themselves of that! But the others had not merely not disarmed, they had rearmed. Against whom?—against the 100,000 men whom we had in arms? These phrases—that we are the cause of all their action—must be swept away: thirteen years, when we National Socialists were not in power—surely that was time enough for disarmament! If they had kept their promises, National Socialism might not be in power to-day.—*Hitler returned to the theme of the defence against Bolshevism*: if the territory of Central Europe had not withstood Bolshevism, then Europe to-day would be lost. The aim of the Party had been to put an end to German disunion and internal ruin: it sought to establish *one* symbol and a single authority: in nine months much was already accomplished fact: the parties had been swept away, the misuse of religion checked, the swastika waved to-day over the whole of Germany, two and a half million unemployed were again at work, corruption had been rooted out, the national education of youth had been taken in hand and "under our education this youth will complete what we have begun". "Our attack against Germany's distress will have no end until at the end Germany's distress has been done away with."—The world is very sensitive for the honour of other peoples: we understand this defence of national honour, but we would ask that our honour, too, should not be attacked. Are we to have less honour only because formerly it was possible for twenty-six States to defeat us? It is impossible to make the issue of a war the eternal basis on which right is determined in international relations. . . . *Hitler expressed his surprise* that abroad the exiles from Germany were allowed to inflame peoples one against the other: Germany wished

only that the War psychosis might at last be banished from the world. . . . "We have a feeling for the honour of the nation, because personally we have our own honour. I have not become Chancellor of the Reich in order now to maintain other moral principles than those which I have previously maintained. In my eyes the honour of a nation is composed of the honour, the feeling for honour, the claim to honour of its individual citizens. I believe that the honour of a Government is the honour of a people and that a people's honour must be the honour of the Government." We want no war, but the right for our people to fashion its own life: and that is no concern of the rest of the world. If all talk of security, although they are not threatened, then to us, who can rightly feel threatened, they must at least grant the same security. If they do not wish to disarm, let them say so; if they do not wish to give us equality of rights, again, let them say so. But there is only one thing to be said, and said once more: never will we take part in any agreements¹ where we are not on a footing of completely equal rights: We may be isolated, but dishonoured, never! I would prefer not to enter into agreements which I must purchase at the price of my honour: and when they say "But then you will be isolated", then I declare I would rather be isolated with honour, than be tolerated without honour. I believe that the German people has too much character to think otherwise than its Government: I believe that in this hour, this historic hour, it cannot decide otherwise than with the word "Yes". There remains no other way. I have no cannons. I have only you, my fellow-countrymen. With you I must fight for this right for Germany. You must stand behind me. We must hold together. We can wage this struggle only if we are a single army (*Mannschaft*).²

¹ German: *Konventionen*.

² *V.B.*, 31 Oct. 1933.

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On 1 November 1933 Hitler spoke in Weimar: he was appealing, *he said*, to the people because he was convinced that the fate of the nation could only be fashioned to their good if the German people took a living interest in the way in which it was fashioned. Never was the necessity greater than at this election.—*Then Versailles again*: “We cannot often enough declare before the world that the statement of Germany’s war-guilt was untrue, that that statement was signed only from fear and against the better knowledge of those who signed it. For us it is a warning that we should not in our present anxieties have recourse to any similar lie.”—The day when the Movement became the master of the State in Germany, the day of the *Machtübernahme*, was, of course, not the end of the struggle, it could be only the beginning of what they were pledged to achieve. Their mighty programme—for which in German history men through the centuries had striven, and failed—had in nine months been largely realized: the miracle of the coming into being of a people (*Volkwerdung*) in Germany, was accomplished; they had on the one hand established the unconditional authority of the Government and on the other the blind trust of the people. . . . The sovereignty of the Reich could not be shaken, the authority of the States had been bent under the will of the Reich. . . . “If there are people in Germany to-day who say ‘We do not fit into your society but we shall be there as we were before’ I answer you will pass, but after you there will come a youth who no longer knows anything but National Socialism. From those who even to-day still think that they can refuse to recognize this historical development we will protect the nation, but our youth we will educate for this new State.¹ A people which is not convinced of its own value can never achieve

¹ Cf. p. 1135, *infra*. These are significant statements.

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anything. The German people has regained its self-consciousness and is on the way towards salvation. Confidence has returned. . . . What other wish can we have than that the world should leave us in peace, that it should not disturb us in our work, that it should realize that we have a right to find our blessedness after our own fashion?¹ The others can find their blessedness in their own way. . . . Let the world concern itself with its own problems! . . . The *émigrés* (*Emigranten*) are the poisoners of the wells amongst the nations. The disappearance of these elements from Germany is a great relief for Germany, and probably in a few months they will teach the world a great lesson. . . . Never will I yield before a threat: I have never done so during the fourteen years of our fight for power: I will not do so to-day. . . . This appeal will show the world who has the greater right to speak in a people's name: those who think that they must rob our people of its honour or we who champion and protect the honour, the right, and the freedom of our people. . . . The time will come when men will place alongside of the fatal day of November 1918 another day of destiny, the 12th of November 1933: on the November-day of Germany's shame shall follow a second November-day of Germany's honour."²

This speech was followed by one at Essen on 2 November 1933. Once more there recurred the theme of the confession of war-guilt "extorted by an unexampled pressure" and the criticism of the Treaty of Versailles on the same lines as in the other speeches of the electoral campaign. It should have been the task of this Peace Treaty to have given at last to the peoples the feeling of security founded upon a higher justice instead of making the world more rest-

¹ German: *nach unserer Fassung selig zu werden.*

² *V.B.*, 3 Nov. 1933.

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less, more insecure, more mistrustful than ever before. Even the League of Nations had not availed by its veto to stay this development. On the contrary the struggle had become ever more obstinate. . . . At Conferences disunity had found only one point of union—to make the German people responsible for the general insecurity. *The rest of the speech is an almost verbal repetition of earlier speeches and presents no new arguments.*¹

In his speech at Breslau on 4 November 1933 Hitler said that the Treaty of Versailles had not brought about any change of spirit: the peoples had not become more peaceful: Governments operated with the same conceptions as before. The League of Nations was no League of Nations, but an Association of other interests. Treaties must not be sacred for one party only, but must be equally sacred for both. The Powers say they cannot disarm because the National Socialist Movement is the Government in Germany: the National Socialist Movement is the Government in Germany precisely because the other parties to the Treaty have not yet fulfilled their promises. . . . Hitler spoke of the Programme and the achievement of the Government. It needed a gigantic effort to rescue the German people from catastrophe: all the energies of the people must be concentrated on one aim: it could not enter upon the new period burdened with the evil traditions of the past: there must be a re-fusing of a people. with pride we can say that the achievement of these few months suffices to place our name on record in the book of German history. We have always been inspired by the single great determination—to seize the hands of our whole great people, to join them together into a mighty community, to loosen the clenched fists and unite them in an alliance of brother-

¹ F.Z., 4 Nov. 1933.

hood, an alliance which knows only a single purpose—to enter the lists as champion of this people which we love and for which we are ready to sacrifice everything. Have we by this work of ours sinned against the spirit of a true community of peoples, of understanding between the peoples? We are ready at any time to learn from others: there is also an opportunity perhaps for foreign statesmen to learn no small lesson in Germany. When I read to-day that the American President is succeeding in lessening unemployment, in conquering the distress of the farmers, have I regarded that as an injustice done to Germany? I am happy to know that in other places of the world besides Germany work is being done and—this I can safely say—if I see that what they are doing can be usefully applied in Germany, I shall at once apply it for the advantage of our people, in the conviction that the statesmen of to-day have the duty to learn their lesson alike from the misery and from the good fortune which they see in the world about them, that above all they have the duty, not of sowing mistrust and hatred between the peoples, but rather of drawing the attention of peoples to those great common tasks which must be solved. It is a melancholy thought that a quite small international clique of a few hundred thousand men can succeed in inciting peoples of hundreds of millions one against the other.—*Hitler once more spoke of the question of the émigrés*: “we should never venture to judge, say, the Bulgarian people by the Dimitroffs, the Popoffs, or the Taneffs. We know the Bulgarian people much better: a decent, an honest and honourable people. . . . We do not want to interfere with the work of other peoples. They can also, so far as we are concerned, form their constitution as it pleases them. But we in our turn must say ‘Hands off from our constitution! That is no concern of yours!’ . . . I desire to

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summon the entire German people to bear witness that what I have stated before the whole world as its spokesman is also the wish and the will of the entire German people." 12 November will show that the German people stands by our programme, "one for all and all for one". "I would wish to put myself on the side of those who in our German history, too, have declared that injustice and untruth could never in the long run bring blessing for a people, but that what one gains by bargaining for a momentary profit one has to pay for bitterly in the future. And I believe that the German people is at the core too decent to be able to shake itself free from such a way of thinking."

"Do not forget that this coming week is decisive for the distant future of Germany. I appeal to you, my folk of Silesia: bethink you of the great past, remember our sacrifices which none can number, and do not forget that one historic refusal can rob a people of much, if not all, of the achievements and sacrifices of the past. See you to it that this day shall later be recorded in the history of our people as a day of salvation: that the record shall run: on an eleventh of November the German people formerly lost its honour: fifteen years later came a twelfth of November and then the German people restored to itself its honour."¹

At Elbing on 5 November 1933 Hitler spoke in the great Machinery Hall in which he had often before appealed to an East Prussian audience: "We oppose the spirit of the Treaty of Versailles—that Treaty which drove the German people into lethargy and despair—not because we want discord (Unfrieden), no! but because we are convinced that this Treaty is the foe of every true peace,

¹ *F.Z.*, 6 Nov. 1933.

of every understanding, of every reconciliation, nay more, it is the foe of all human reason."—The problem of unemployment, *Hitler said*, must be solved: we have not an unlimited time for the task, and on the solution of this problem everything depends, not only for a State but for everyone. Here all must help, and for that reason the whole German nation must once more be brought to a unity of spirit and of will. The pre-condition for relieving the distress in Germany is the restoration of the consciousness of belonging together (*Zusammengehörigkeitsempfindens*). In order to bring men gradually nearer to each other they must be thrown into the great melting-pot, the nation, that they may be purified and welded one to another. The organisations of disunion and disintegration must therefore be uprooted and, without respect of persons, all those must be ruthlessly eliminated who disturb this community. The old motto "One hangs the little thief and lets the big escape" must be cast overboard. It was necessary in Germany to sweep out of the way the notion that every small State and every Government in these small States had the right to play the game of obstruction. There is only one institution and that is the institution of the whole people and not that of a single State. That which moves me is not the thought that I am contented, now that the present has given me the proudest position I could ever claim, but rather it is the feeling that now we wish to win from posterity the assurance that we have rightfully taken this position. . . . Our work is not ended, but make no mistake: what has been overthrown will never rise again. It is for that that we are here. The parties have had their day: they come back never again. The German people will possess a new organization for forming its political will; this organization will be built up from base to summit on the conception of authority,

of leadership¹ and it will guarantee the unification of German strength. . . . "When our opponent says 'I am not going to join you and you will never gain my allegiance' then I answer quite calmly 'Your child belongs to us already to-day'. A people lives for ever. What are you? You pass, but your descendants are even now in the new camp. In a short time they will no longer know anything save this new community."² People and leadership will be ever more closely united. We shall not have bureaucracy (*Staatsverwaltung*) but leadership of the people (*Volksführung*): that is our aim and we shall secure it. At the end of our days history will be able to state that we have left behind us *one* Reich, *one* People. And for such a programme we need peace, for peace alone can construct. "I know well what war means: I have seen it with my own eyes: and many a statesman has not done that! It is not as a traitor to my country that I repudiate war: I repudiate war as a decent German, who, even as a soldier, remained decent, and who is determined to be decent in the future. For that reason I will not sacrifice the German people's right to live or the German honour."

The internal affairs of a country are its own concern and the concern of it alone. *Referring to the treatment of the Reichstag Fire Trial abroad he said that* in England an attempt had once been made upon the House of Parliament: "at that time not only were all the dynamitards shortened by a head, but the festival of the destruction of these criminals is even to-day still celebrated."

Either equality of rights must be granted at confer-

¹ German: *auf den Gedanken der Autorität, der Führung von unten bis oben*. I am not sure how this should be translated.

² Cf. Hitler's speech of 10 Nov. 1933, *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935), pp. 135-6, and see p. 1129 *supra*.

ences or, if it was refused, then Germany had nothing to look for there. This is an election not to support a Government: this time with your vote you are fighting for the position of the German nation before the world! "The shame of 9 November 1918 must be washed away: that no statesman, no Government can do: that only the people can do: that you must do yourself!"¹

On 6 November 1933 Hitler spoke in Kiel: "We fight not for theories and dogmas, we fight for the existence of the German people."—*He recurred to the theme of war-guilt:* "To-day we all know: it would have been well for the German nation if in 1918 she had possessed men with the courage to step before the world and to declare: 'We are ready for any peace, but never are we ready for all time and against our better knowledge to put our signature to a lie and thus to sacrifice our honour. You can do what you will: we will not sign.' . . . Those elements which drove our people into a war of brother against brother are to-day inciting the peoples of the world against each other. I can give my hand to a Communist at the moment when I see that he recognizes the madness of his former ideology: I can give my hand to the most narrow-minded of reactionaries in the moment when he sees that his former standpoint is untenable. There is only one to whom I can never give my hand—he who has never known what it is to have a political conviction, but who could be bought for money. . . . When our enemies, faced with the achievements of the last nine months, say 'Ah yes! but there may yet be a reverse', then I answer 'My life up to now has been a fight, but I have never capitulated and I have reached my goal.' I would remind you of 6 November 1932."²

¹ *F.Z.*, 7 Nov. 1933.

² For the election of 6 Nov. 1932 when Hitler lost over two

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Then these same false prophets came and foretold our end. But for me and for us all reverses are nothing but strokes of the whip, and it is precisely these which we needed to drive us forward. Never have we capitulated because of a reverse. . . . The world must take the German people as it is: the world must come to terms with the fact that the German nation has become a single people.¹ . . . By this election I wish to show to the other Governments that we are a true democracy and that we are not afraid to appeal to the people. I do not believe that other Governments, had they received a four years' mandate, would be prepared to appeal to the nation afresh within seven months. . . . You, German people, must stand up and face the whole world that it may understand that a true German people has come into being!"²

On 8 November 1933 at the Anniversary celebration of the "Putsch" of 9 November 1923 Hitler addressed the "Old Guard" of the Party. After a retrospect of the early days of the Party he said that once more they were faced with a hard struggle. "I want to make it impossible for the world to maintain that it is only a statesman who possesses the courage once for all to say No, that only a statesman has the will for peace: I want to show the world that the whole German people thinks thus. . . . It is not possible in the long run for any Government (Staatsführung) to obtain great political successes unless the people itself stands behind its will. The people itself must give its own witness (dokumentieren) before the world; the statesman can be only the spokesman, the leader of the people; strength must be anchored in the million votes cf. K. Heiden, A History of National Socialism, London, Methuen, 1934, p. 190.

¹ German: *Die Welt muß sich mit der Volkwerdung der deutschen Nation abfinden.*

² V.B., 8 Nov. 1933.

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people itself and to this strength of the German people, which has never failed through the millennia, the leader must appeal. . . . In 1923 Germany could be degraded to become the world's whipping-boy, the world's culprit: to-day that cannot be. . . . They will no longer succeed in forcing us to sign a 'Diktat'. For the future the German Government will always take one standpoint and that alone: under the word 'Conferences' we understand assemblies of nations with equal rights; under the word 'Resolutions' of Conferences we understand the resolutions of free nations which have equal rights. The League of Nations sees us no more until the last vestige of discrimination against our people is done away with. . . . I know that, if these dead¹ were to-day in our midst, they would avow that their testament has been fulfilled. By that testament we stand, we dare not desert it. We dare not desert it because we know that it is through this loyalty to principle that our Movement grew. Peoples without character have no justification for their existence upon the earth. . . . I believe that we can already see in the world that the anger of all those who wish us ill is greater, but that the respect for Germany amongst those who desire a true peace, a true understanding, has been strengthened through our action. When we recall the past ten years we would wish to carry away with us the hope that as through our action in those years there did at last come a reconciliation between those who within Germany faced each other as foes, so in the next ten years there will come a reconciliation between the peoples who still to-day are incited one against the other by slanderous tongues. If we believe that peoples will one day recognize in common their higher and greater interests, then you must remember: honourable peoples

¹ i.e. those who died in the "Putsch" of 9 Nov. 1923.

will never ally themselves with dishonourable peoples. If we want this alliance, then we ourselves must become an honourable people. That may mean great hardship for the individual, but only thus does the road lead to a real equality of rights, to a community of interests between great nations and great peoples."¹

*The electoral campaign was closed by a speech, delivered in Siemensstadt, Berlin, on 10 November 1933, when Hitler addressed an audience of German workmen. He claimed a greater right to address them than that possessed by any other. "I have grown up from amongst yourselves; once I myself was a workman; for four and a half years I served amongst you in the War; I speak now to you to whom I belong, with whom I still feel myself to be united and for whom in the last resort I fight. . . . I wage that fight for the millions of our honest, industrious, working, creative people. . . . I was in my youth a worker as you are; through industry, through learning, and, I may say, also through hunger I slowly worked my way up. But in my innermost being I have always remained that which I once was."*²

The speech began, as usual, with the criticism of the

¹ *V.B.*, 10 Nov. 1933. The speech in Munich (9 Nov. 1933) delivered at the unveiling of the Monument erected to the memory of the dead does not add to the arguments employed in the electoral speeches. *V.B.*, 10 Nov. 1933.

² A remarkable reconstruction of the past if one remembers *Mein Kampf*. Later in this same speech Hitler said "You can well understand, my workmen, that when a man in your position begins to found a Movement, successes do not fly to him. To begin such a work at all needs great persistence and an extraordinary power of will (*ein unerhörter Wille*) and to-day I wish to say to you: If I had this faith, it was only because I knew the people and because I never had any doubts of the quality of the German people. It was not the intellectual classes which gave me the courage to undertake this gigantic work: I gained that courage only because I myself knew the German workman and the German peasant."

Treaty of Versailles: Hitler spoke of the distinction between Conqueror and Conquered raised into a foundation for a permanent discrimination against Germany and of the theory that in the economic sphere one people must suffer in order that another may prosper. This theory of the struggle between peoples is the precise parallel to the theory of the class-struggle: they are identical. "The organizations defending class interests naturally resisted their own dissolution: but one cannot let a people go to ruin because these organizations wish to live. For a people does not live for theories, for programmes or for organizations, but all these have to serve a nation's life. Similarly to-day we see that the struggle between peoples is fostered by folk with definite interests to promote. It is an uprooted international clique which incites the peoples one against another. They are folk who are at home everywhere and nowhere: they have no soil of their own on which they have grown up: to-day they are living in Berlin, to-morrow they may be in Brussels, the day after in Paris, and then again in Prague or Vienna or London—everywhere they feel themselves at home."

"Everywhere they can carry on their business, but the people cannot follow them: the people is chained to its soil, is tied to its homeland, tied to the possibilities of life of its State, its nation. The peasant cannot leave his soil, the workman depends upon his factory. If his factory is ruined, where will he find help? What is to-day the meaning of international class-solidarity? That is mere theory at a time in which on every hand distress cries aloud and peoples have to fight hard for their existence. The strength of all of us lies, not in this international phantom, it lies in our homeland. My aim has always been to arouse and to reinforce this strength."
 . . . Status, descent, birth, position in life, property—they do not mean much. "All that is transitory and of

little significance, when compared with the length of life of a people. The people as such, that is the eternal source, the eternal well-spring which ever and again gives fresh life, and that source must be kept wholesome."

All class organizations—not merely the Trade Unions—had been destroyed. The unemployment figures had already sunk from 6.2 millions to 3,710,000; if it is objected that the standard of living has not risen I answer: the first thing was to get men back to work. The next thing will be to raise the power of consumption. The more the worker gains in his power of consumption the better it will be for the member of the *bourgeoisie*. It is not true that one man's misfortune is another's gain: the strength of a people as a whole is being raised, and all immediately benefit thereby. But economic progress needs peace: it ought not to be suggested that I am so mad as to wish for war.—*Hitler then re-asserted the German will for peace*: but if people will not believe our word, then we must be very hard, we must not yield one centimetre in the defence of our rights.¹

"I believe that all problems in life, when more than one party is concerned, can be solved only when the parties are on a footing of equality. It is exactly the same in the economic sphere: when one party, be he employer or workman, has all the law and all the power on his side and the other has no rights, you know yourselves that no tolerable contract, no tolerable conditions are possible. The same is true in the life of peoples: there, too, it should not be that one people should have all the rights and another none at all. . . . I should be a liar to the German people if I were to promise it an improvement in its economic position without at the same time demanding for it a recognition of its equal rights in the world. The one is impossible without the other."

¹ Cf. p. 1122, *supra*.

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I represent the right of the German nation: equality of rights means the possibility of representing those rights before the others.

"If the world wishes to issue its 'Diktat', it will do so without my signature. If the world says we are compelled to act thus, because we cannot trust you, how so? Has the German people ever broken its word? It has unfortunately generally kept its word only too resolutely, all too loyally! If we had not stood by our allies so obstinately, so loyally in the World War, then perhaps Germany might have fared better." . . .

"For many centuries foreign countries have always reckoned on having allies in Germany. First it was princes—men without character who, cold as ice, betrayed their peoples; then it was parties, *Weltanschauungen*. Always they have had their allies. Now I want to show our opponents that they have no longer any allies in Germany. That which feels itself allied is the German people—allied with itself. For centuries the people has made trial of its destiny in disunion and it has reaped a dire harvest. Now I intend that we should make trial of our destiny in unity: that we should now attempt to fashion our destiny in a community of the people which nothing shall break. I am the guarantor in Germany that this community shall not result in the favouring of one section of our people. You can look upon me as the man who does not belong to any class who belongs to no rank (*Stand*) who stands above all that. I have nothing but the ties which bind me to the German people. Here for me every German is on a complete equality. What interest have I in the intellectuals, in the *bourgeoisie*, in the proletariat? I am interested only in the German people. To the people alone I belong and for the people I spend my energies."

The speech closed with an appeal to the electors: the

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Germans are no mere shoe-blacks, they are not second-class. No!—either equal rights or the world sees us no more at any Conference! *Once again Hitler stated that he had no need of a vote of confidence: I possess full powers for another three and a half years. I stand firm. It is yourselves, you, the German people, who need this vote to demonstrate to the world that henceforth it must deal with us on a different footing; that it can no longer count upon our division and disunion, that the world must face the fact that now there does indeed exist a German people.*¹

RESULT OF THE REFERENDUM, ON 12 NOVEMBER 1933.

<i>Entitled to Vote</i>	<i>Votes cast</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Invalid Votes</i>
45,176,713	43,491,575	96.3	40,632,628	95.1	2,101,191	4.9	750,27

Election to the Reichstag

<i>Entitled to Vote</i>	<i>Votes cast</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>NSDAP</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Invalid Votes</i>	<i>%</i>
45,176,713	43,053,616	95.2	39,655,212	92.2	3,398,404	7.8

*In an interview with Karl von Wiegand as representative of the American Press Hitler stated that he had most strictly forbidden members of the Party abroad to carry on National Socialist propaganda. The necessary consequence of such propaganda would be to endanger the friendly relations of foreign Powers with Germany; on the maintenance of these friendly relations the German Government sets the highest value. He would never hesitate to punish ruthlessly any contraventions of his orders by exclusion from the Party.*²

At his interview with Hitler and von Neurath on 15 November 1933 Lipski reported Pilsudski's disquietude at

¹ *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, i (1935), pp. 131-8. For von Papen's effort to secure the votes of the Catholics see his speech, with the appeal to the Pope's allocution of 29 Oct. 1933, *F.Z.*, 11 Nov. 1933.

² *V.B.*, 2 Nov. 1933.

the loss of security for Poland entailed by Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and asked whether Hitler "ne voit pas la possibilité de compenser, dans des relations directes polono-allemandes, la perte de cet élément de sécurité".

En réponse, le Chancelier a déclaré ce qui suit :

"Je tiens avant tout à vous préciser quelle est mon attitude de principe à l'égard de votre Pays. Je tiens compte de la Pologne comme d'une réalité que rien ne saurait ni changer ni faire disparaître. Ce fut peut-être l'erreur des Gouvernements précédents de ne pas avoir suffisamment compris cette réalité. La Pologne est une réalité pour l'Allemagne, tout comme l'Allemagne l'est pour la Pologne. Les deux nations sont obligées de vivre côte à côte. La vie des nations n'est pas échelonnée sur dix ou quinze ans, mais pour des centaines et des milliers d'années."

"Nos relations n'ont pas été établies d'une façon idéale, en particulier par le Traité de Versailles, qui s'est efforcé de les rendre difficiles." *Le Chancelier affirme néanmoins, avec une ferme résolution*, qu'il ne songe nullement à quelque changement que ce soit par le moyen de la guerre. Le Chancelier tient à de bonnes relations avec la Pologne et à une atmosphère favorable, de manière que la vie commune des deux nations affectât un caractère normal.

Toute guerre ne pourrait qu'amener le communisme en Europe, ce communisme qui est un terrible danger, et contre lequel le Chancelier ne cesse de lutter. La Pologne est un bastion (*Vorposten*) du côté de l'Asie. La destruction de la Pologne serait un malheur pour les États qui, de cette façon, deviendraient voisins de l'Asie. Les autres États devraient comprendre ce rôle de bastion de la Pologne.

Le Chancelier, en tant que nationaliste, ne veut

dénationaliser personne. Ce qu'il exige pour son Pays, c'est qu'on cesse de le traiter comme un État de seconde zone. Sur ce point, il est intransigeant. La dénationalisation est sans but. Le meilleur témoignage en est la Pologne qui est ressuscitée malgré les méthodes de dénationalisation appliquées contre elle par les puissances copartageantes.

Que pourrait donner une guerre polono-allemande? Même au cas d'une guerre victorieuse pour l'Allemagne, il en résulterait un brandon de nouvelle guerre de revanche de la part de la Pologne. Les guerres n'ont jamais rien donné sinon des destructions. Lui, Chancelier, a été lui-même à la guerre. Il n'était pas de ceux qui étaient poltrons. Il en a vu les horreurs et les conséquences. Quel profit l'Angleterre a-t-elle tiré de la guerre? Aucun, elle n'en est sortie qu'affaiblie. Il en est de même de tous les autres États, sauf peut-être de ceux qui ont recouvré leur indépendance. La guerre serait une barbarie pour notre civilisation.

Le Chancelier et son Gouvernement n'ont d'intention agressive envers aucun État. Ceci se rapporte également à la France. Il est vrai que des Allemands habitent l'Alsace; mais cela vaut-il la peine de sacrifier pour eux un million d'hommes? D'ailleurs, reprendre l'Alsace équivaldrait à provoquer un irrédentisme en Allemagne et des germes de nouveaux conflits. Seul le bassin de la Sarre nécessite un règlement. Pour ce qui est de cette question, il existe des fondements aux exigences allemandes qui ressortent des traités. C'est sur cette base que le Chancelier réclamera la solution de ce problème.

Le Chancelier constate que, de même qu'en ce qui concerne la France, il n'a aucune intention agressive à l'égard de la Pologne. Il désire que les relations entre ces États s'établissent de façon amicale et pacifique. *Le Chancelier parla ensuite* des immenses problèmes de

politique intérieure qui devaient être réglés. *Il a mentionné* le chômage — problème qui ne saurait être réglé même en l'espace de plusieurs années. En effet, la solution de ce problème exige beaucoup de calme et demande la collaboration entre États. *Le Chancelier fait observer que* la révolution en Allemagne s'est passée sans effusion de sang, à quelques exceptions près. Seul, peut-être, le fascisme a réussi également à prendre le pouvoir sans verser le sang. Il ne veut pas que la politique extérieure de son Gouvernement soit jamais entachée de sang. Ceci serait contraire à toute son idéologie.

Le Chancelier parle vite et remue une foule d'idées où perçe constamment son désir d'établir de bonnes relations avec la Pologne; il explique que tout ce qui est agression est contraire à sa politique, et qu'une guerre serait une catastrophe pour tous; *il parle de* la crainte du communisme et *passe enfin à la déclaration que* je venais de lui faire au nom du Maréchal Pilsudski.

Il remercie le Maréchal pour son initiative visant le renforcement de la sécurité dans les relations polono-allemandes, sécurité affaiblie par suite du retrait de l'Allemagne de la S.D.N. Il fait observer qu'à son avis il faudrait avant tout exclure des relations polono-allemandes l'idée même de la possibilité d'une guerre. *Après cette première déclaration, le Chancelier se remet à parler des effets désastreux de la guerre. Il démontre à quel point elle est nuisible et n'atteint jamais son but et reprend l'idée que toute éventualité de guerre doit être exclue dans les relations polono-allemandes, faisant observer qu'il pourrait être donné à cette idée la forme d'un traité. Le Chancelier me demande de faire connaître au Maréchal, en réponse à la question par lui posée, cette suggestion qu'il vient d'émettre devant moi.*

Le Chancelier continue: "la Pologne peut être heureuse d'être gouvernée par une aussi grande person-

nalité qu'est le Maréchal Pilsudski. Mais que peut-on savoir de l'avenir? Tous les hommes sont mortels. Ceci peut se rapporter aussi bien à la Pologne qu'au Reich, au cas où sa personne viendrait à disparaître. Spéculer sur des dissensions intestines qui, dans ce cas, pourraient se produire dans les deux Pays, à un tel moment, serait commettre la plus grande erreur." *Le Chancelier reprend une fois de plus son idée que l'éventualité même de la guerre doit être exclue dans les relations polono-allemandes, en faisant observer que ceci contribuerait inmanquablement à une détente dans les relations réciproques.*¹

In an interview with M. Fernand de Brinon in November 1933 Hitler said:

"J'ai la conviction que la question de la Sarre, qui est terre allemande, une fois réglée, il n'y a rien, absolument rien, qui puisse opposer l'Allemagne à la France. L'Alsace-Lorraine? J'ai dit assez souvent que nous y avons renoncé définitivement pour pouvoir penser que j'étais entendu. Mais combien de temps faudra-t-il répéter que nous ne voulons ni absorber ce qui n'est pas nôtre, ni nous faire aimer de qui ne nous aime pas!"

"Pas un litige en Europe ne justifie la guerre." . . .

"De quelle manière réaliser l'entente entre pays voisins et égaux en droit? Ma patrie n'est pas une nation de second rang. Elle est une grande nation à laquelle on a imposé un traitement insupportable. Si la France entend fonder sa sécurité sur l'impossibilité matérielle pour l'Allemagne de se défendre, il n'y a rien à faire car le temps où ces choses étaient possibles est terminé. Mais si elle admet de trouver sa sécurité dans un accord

¹ *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la période 1933-1939*, Paris, Flammarion, pp. 38-40. For the communiqué published after this interview cf. *ibid.*, p. 40.

librement discuté, je suis prêt à tout entendre, à tout comprendre, à tout entreprendre." . . .

"Je décide seul de la politique de l'Allemagne, et quand je donne ma parole, j'ai l'habitude de la tenir."

"Si, rencontrant par hasard un ministre français, je lui avais dit en tête à tête: 'La question de la Sarre étant résolue, j'estime qu'il n'y a pas un différend qui puisse nous opposer', je pourrais comprendre qu'on dise: 'Hitler a des arrière-pensées. Nous aurons des surprises.' Mais, devant mon peuple auquel je demandais son approbation solennelle, j'ai dit les mêmes choses. J'ai répété maintes fois que le sort de l'Alsace-Lorraine est réglé. Le peuple a donné sa réponse. Que faut-il de plus?"

"Moi je n'ai pas hérité un trône. J'ai une doctrine à maintenir. Je suis un homme qui agit, qui engage sa responsabilité. Je réponds de moi-même devant le peuple que je conduis et qui me donne la force."

"Mais, parlons de la sécurité française. Si l'on me disait ce que je peux accomplir pour elle, je le ferais volontiers s'il ne s'agissait pas d'un déshonneur ou d'une menace pour mon pays. Ainsi un journaliste anglais a écrit que, pour apaiser l'Europe, il faut accorder l'Allemagne et la France et donner à la France la sécurité supplémentaire d'une alliance défensive avec l'Angleterre. S'il s'agit d'une telle alliance, j'y souscris volontiers car je n'ai pas l'intention d'attaquer mes voisins. La Pologne le comprend maintenant. Mais parce que la Pologne est plus proche de l'Asie que vous, elle nous connaît mieux!"

"En quittant Genève, j'ai accompli un acte nécessaire et je crois avoir rendu un service de clarté. Nous ne retournerons pas à Genève. La Société des nations est un Parlement international dans lequel des groupes de puissances s'opposent et s'agitent. Les malentendus sont

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aggravés au lieu d'être résolus. Je suis toujours prêt, et je viens d'en donner l'exemple, à entamer des négociations avec ceux qui veulent bien causer avec moi."¹

*On 28 November 1933 von Moltke, German representative in Warsaw, in an interview with Pilsudski and Beck conveyed Hitler's wish for the establishment of normal relations between Poland and Germany in the economic as well as in the political sphere.*²

1934

*In his New-Year Proclamation of 1934 Hitler said: "And so the aim of our struggle on behalf of the German nation in its foreign relations is nothing else than to give to our people honour and equality of rights and honestly to co-operate in avoiding bloodshed in the future: for in such bloodshed we former soldiers of the World War could see only a new catastrophe for the peoples of a Europe that had become insane."*³

In his speech at Lemgo (Lippe-Detmold) on 14 January 1934 at the commemoration of the electoral success of January 1933 Hitler surveyed the achievement of the National Socialist Government during the past year. Having described the domestic situation he said: "In the sphere of foreign policy also we stand to-day in a different position from that of the time when I took over the Government. As I look back on this year then I can say: slowly we are once more winning for ourselves international respect. Certainly it must be admitted that

¹ *Le Matin*, 22 Nov. 1933, and see Fernand de Brinon, *France-Allemagne 1918-1934*. Paris, Grasset, 1934.

² *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1939, p. 34.

³ *V.B.*, 2 Jan. 1934.

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that respect is not accompanied by any too much love for us, but in human life one must often deny oneself love for the sake of respect. At least that is so in the life of peoples. It is at any rate more profitable to be respected as a strong people than to be loved as weaklings. If we wish to raise our people once more to a high position, then we can do that only if we secure for it in the world equality of rights. Equality of rights, equality in honour, these are the two objects which since 30 January 1933 I have fanatically pursued. I am convinced that this is the only basis on which a true peace amongst the peoples can be founded—never will that peace be won so long as one set of peoples is branded as helots and slaves while others are given rights which are not duly theirs. We do not want to attack any people's rights, we do not wish to set limits to any people's possibilities of life: we do not wish to oppress, subdue or subjugate any people. But on its side the world must cease to oppress us. The world must learn that the time is past when the German people could be oppressed, subjugated, and dishonoured, and, further, that that time will never return. Thereby we can come nearer to a real world-peace than by talking and negotiating, while failing to pay respect to the other party. But I have great hopes that the other peoples will gradually come to understand that a true friendship can arise only between States which have equal rights; it will never arise on a basis of oppression. The German people can truly to-day profess with pride that it has understood this policy. The 12th of November will be a red-letter-day in the history of the German people; on that day it took its stand, united in defence of its honour, of its equality of rights and therefore for the future of its life, for an extraordinary development in its foreign policy."¹

¹ *F.Z.*, 16 Jan. 1934.

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On 26 January 1934 Germany and Poland signed a Declaration (Pact of Non-Aggression) whereby the two Powers agreed to settle all differences between them by direct negotiation and for a period of ten years not to employ force for the settlement of such problems.¹

One of the best general pictures of Hitler's view of recent German history is given in his speech to the Reichstag delivered on 30 January 1934, in which he said:

"As the strains of the revolutionary Marseillaise died away a period of apparent prosperity set in and, up to the beginning of the present century, contentment and comfort seemed to be the rule. But even during this period there were constant portents of an inner nervousness, a restless seeking after a satisfaction of the profoundest desires of men and of nations. Centuries of revolutionary change had, apart from the religious conflicts, displayed nothing but a constant struggle for the outward forms of power, a fight for the reins of government within the State or for the extension of its power abroad. But then came a time when even the religious conflicts lost their fascination, a time when the really vital and progressive forces of the various Confessions began to run dry, and the search began for a new spiritual ideal which should meet the desires of modern humanity."

¹ Cf. pp. 1030-1, *supra*. For the text see *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges* (Auswärtiges Amt, 1939, No. 2), Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1939, pp. 35-6; French translation in *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la Période 1933-1939. Recueil de documents officiels*, Paris, Flammarion, 1940, pp. 41-2; and see the note sent by Beck "à tous les postes diplomatiques", *ibid.*, pp. 42-3. The German text of the Declaration can also be found in *Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart in Dokumenten 1934/35*, Teil I. *Internationale Politik*, ed. M. Freund, Essen, Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1936, pp. 160-1. For the report of the German representative in Warsaw (dated 27 Jan. 1934) to the Foreign Office in Berlin see *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, p. 36.

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"While the contented burgher dreamed of the economic system as the be-all and end-all of life, the source of all human happiness, there were others who were filled with a divine discontent, who sought a deeper meaning in life. The smug and well-fed citizen was awakened from his sleep by the sounds of battle on a spiritual plane which passed his comprehension."

"The inevitable corollary of the inconsequential economic and political ideals of *bourgeois* democracy was the emergence of the consequential theories of Marxism. And thus it came about that while the nations were nourishing themselves on the fruits of *bourgeois* and liberalistic individualism the apostles of the new creed were proclaiming the equality of all values as a political doctrine. Ultimately parliamentary democracy must lead to indifference and enmity to individual excellence even in purely economic spheres."

"It could only be a matter of time until the forward rush of the Marxist teachings of equality would have thrown down the bulwark which *bourgeois* politics had erected to protect the economic system, and that would have meant the end of the political and economic ideology of the age of *bourgeoisie*."

"There can be no doubt that the World War hastened the trend of events."

"To understand what has taken place in Germany in the past year two things must be kept in mind."

"Firstly, the war had undermined the authority of the then rulers of Germany and gradually led to a complete collapse. The active partner in this process was Marxism, but *bourgeois* democracy was equally responsible as the passive partner."

"Secondly, the dictates of Versailles destroyed the independence and freedom of the Reich through the sapping of all its powers of resistance. The result was

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the endless series of political and economic acts of blackmail which assisted in the development of complete chaos in Germany."

"The final result was as follows:

"At home: The November Revolution of 1918 swept away the so-called State-authority which was based on a *bourgeois*-legitimistic compromise."

"The wretched capitulation of the responsible leaders of the State before the *Putsch* of the international Marxist deserters shattered the devotion of the nation both to the old system and to its representatives, a devotion which, until then, had characterized more than 90 per cent. of the people. The nation had been accustomed to obedience from time immemorial and, after it had recovered from this terrific blow, settled down to at least passive toleration of its new masters."

"The innumerable and inevitable weaknesses of the new régime led to a unique alliance of Marxist theoreticians and capitalist practitioners; as a result, political and economic life were stamped with the traits of this misalliance."

"A *bourgeois* democracy tinged with nationalism and a confessedly international Marxism, the two perilously balanced on the Centre party, formed the constituents of those parliamentary governments which succeeded one another at ever decreasing intervals and bartered away the remnants of the nation's political and economic capital."

"For fourteen years Germany suffered under a process of decay which is unparalleled in history."

"All values were overturned. 'Evil be thou my good' was the password. The hero was despised and the coward honoured, the upright were punished and the corrupt rewarded. The decent man could expect nothing but mockery, while the abandoned were lauded to the skies. Strength was condemned and weakness praised.

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Quality lost its value and was supplanted by quantity, goodness, which is rare, by evil, which is ubiquitous. The nation's past was scoffed at and its future denied."

"Those who had faith in the nation and its rights were attacked, scoffed at and reviled. Love of the beautiful gave way to a cult of all that was ugly and rotten. What was healthy was no longer the aim of human striving, and decadents and monstrosities became the heroes of a so-called new culture."

"The very existence of the nation was threatened by the undermining of all sound principles. While millions of peasants and middle-class people were being ruined, a well-meaning and stultified *bourgeoisie* zealously assisted to bring about the final downfall."

"Can anyone seriously believe that a nation can be kept in such a state of decay without eventually having to suffer the last consequences of complete collapse? No! Communistic chaos could be the only result."

"So long as the leaders of the nation consciously departed from all that reason and experience show to be right, and payed homage to the insane ideas of Marxism, the only result could be the continued disintegration of the national community. The positive forces of preservation began to give way and the negative forces of destruction waxed together into one destroying unity in their final attack on all that was left."

"The disruption of political and cultural life, the increasingly rapid falling to pieces of the organic structure of the nation, the paralysis which was overcoming the nation destroyed all the people's trust in those who were attempting to act as their leaders. The dissolution of the fundamental principles on which the social and economic contract of the nation is grounded led to a loss of confidence and thus inevitably destroyed all hope of a better future. Under these circumstances political

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and cultural collapse would necessarily have followed the economic collapse."

"It is thanks only to the National Socialist Movement that this economic decay, with all the misery that it brought on the masses, did not result in a political catastrophe but in a coming together of all those who were consciously fighting for a new, creative and positive outlook."

"Since 1930 it could only be a question of either—or. Either the victory fell to Communism as a logical result of the previous developments—and this would have been disastrous not only to Germany but to the whole world—or National Socialism would succeed at the eleventh hour in overcoming its international enemy."

"That the *bourgeois* world was completely in the dark as to the nature of this struggle to the death between two world systems is proved by the fact that a year ago it still believed that it had only passively to watch the struggle to emerge as victor itself at the end."

"The demands which this fight made upon our Movement were enormous. It demanded proud courage and heroism to face the mockery and contempt and the daily attacks and slanders. Ten thousand National Socialist fighters were wounded during this time and many killed. Many were imprisoned and hundreds of thousands were driven from their work and deprived of all means of existence."

"Out of this struggle arose the invincible guard of the National Socialist Revolution, the millions politically organized in the Party, the SA. and the SS."

"To them alone the German people owes its liberation from an attack of madness which, if it had won the day, would not only have kept seven millions without employment but would soon have reduced thirty millions to starvation."

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"Abroad: When, in November 1918, the German people, trusting in the assurances given to them by President Wilson, laid down their arms under the armistice concluded at Compiègne, they were then filled, just as they now are, by the inner and absolutely unshakable conviction that they were guiltless of the outbreak of this war. Even the signature extracted from weak men against their better knowledge to a statement alleging Germany's confession of guilt makes no difference to this fact. Hence the vast majority of the German people then firmly believed that the laying down of their arms meant not only the end of this war but also the prevention of any similar calamity for the future as far as could be humanly foreseen."

"If hatred had not won the day on this occasion, the terrible experiences ought to have been a sound lesson for all to prevent a repetition of such things in future by greater co-operation. Only thus could the untold sacrifices of this, the most frightful war of all times, have brought a blessing at least to future generations."

"The Peace Treaty of Versailles did away with all these hopes thoroughly and brutally."

"Owing to the attempt made in it to lay down for all time the balance of power existing at the end of the war as the basis of the legal position in international life, it perpetuated the hatred on the one side and the exasperated embitterment on the other. Rejecting past human experience and the warnings of the truly wise, the victors believed that the future could be better served by burdening it with the curses of the past. This is the only explanation of how it came about that, even after mankind had received this hardest of lessons, no true peace but only a state of increased unrest was achieved by the peace treaty."

"The senseless political and economic burdens im-

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posed by this treaty have destroyed the confidence of the German people in every court of international justice in the world."

"But in the case of many millions of people it automatically fanned feelings of hatred against a world system under which it is supposed to be possible permanently to defame and exercise discrimination against a great people merely because they had the misfortune, after heroic resistance, to be defeated in a war which was forced upon them."

"The wire-pullers of the Communist revolution at once recognized the unprecedented possibilities for them arising out of this treaty and its practical effects. While the Communist party adopted the fight against the Treaty of Versailles as a plank in its own platform, it succeeded in mobilizing men who, in the depths of their despair, believed that the only way out was to be found in chaos. But the world did not appear to notice that, while it blindly insisted upon the literal fulfilment of unintelligible and indeed absolutely insane impossibilities, a development was taking place in Germany which, as the prelude to the Communist world revolution, was bound within a short time to lead to the so-called victor Powers finding themselves faced not by a profitable treaty-slave but by a pestiferous bacillus carrier."

"Hence the National Socialist Movement has performed a service not only to the German people but also to the rest of Europe and the world at large owing to its successful prevention of a development which would otherwise have administered the fatal blow to the last hopes of curing the ills of our times."

In the same speech he said that the national idea would not merely bridge over class differences which were of no lasting significance when compared with the eternal fundamental racial factor but would also serve to eluci-

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date the National Socialist attitude towards the problems of foreign policy.

"The National Socialist racial idea and the science underlying it do not lead to the underrating or disparagement of other nations but rather to the recognition of the duty to preserve and maintain the life of our own people."

"Hence it leads inevitably to a natural respect for the life and character of other peoples. It thus frees foreign political activities from those attempts to subjugate other peoples in order to rule them or to incorporate them as a mere numerical mass in one's own nation by imposing a foreign language upon them. This new idea entails equally great and fanatical devotion to the life and hence to the honour and freedom of one's own people as it does respect for the honour and freedom of others. This idea can therefore provide an essentially better basis to the effort for a true pacification of the world than the sorting of the nations into groups of victors and vanquished, of those with rights and of those subjugated without rights, from mere considerations of strength."

Later in the same speech he said:

"When the President of the Reich entrusted me on the 30th of January 1933 with the leadership of the new Government, I and, with me, not only the members of the Cabinet but also the entire German people were moved solely by the ardent desire that Almighty God would permit us to win back for the German people its honour and equality of rights in the eyes of the world. As honest adherents of a real policy of reconciliation, we believed that this was the best way in which we could contribute to a genuine peace among the nations. We have adopted this idea as the principle governing the whole of our foreign policy. The German Reich

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solemnly proclaimed to all nations and States that it was animated solely by the wish to live with them in peace and friendship. We were convinced that it must be possible once more in this world to discuss differences in international life without always at once thinking of having recourse to arms."

"It is one of the worst results of the Peace Treaty of Versailles that by perpetuating the expressions victor and vanquished it has inevitably also led to the danger of a perpetuation of the idea that differences of opinion and conflicts of interest in international life must either not be mentioned at all by the weaker side or are to be settled by the stronger side by force of arms. The idea of always being able to inflict fresh injustice on the party that has once been deprived of rights by means of sanctions can cause terrible disruptions in international life. For experience has shown that the humble submissiveness of the vanquished appeases the victors less and less, but rather constantly incites them to fresh acts of aggression."

"For fourteen years the German people have endeavoured by means of a really suicidal policy of fulfilment to propitiate irreconcilable enemies, and to contribute to the establishment of a new European community of States."

"The results were profoundly tragic. A reference to the alleviations in the reparations policy does not prove the contrary. For it was only after the ruin not only of German economy but also to a large extent of world economy that it was decided to put an end by agreement to a procedure which as a matter of fact had in any case already come to an end for lack of any kind of assets in Germany."

"While the new German Government was determined to fight for German equality in the political sphere as

well, they were convinced that it was only thus that they could really provide a contribution to the recovery of world economic relations. For unless the political relations between the nations have been regulated and the political atmosphere thus cleared co-operation, even in economic matters, is impossible."

"But co-operation will be necessary if in the coming years a serious attempt is to be made to master the great problems arising out of the shifting and alteration of the world's markets on the one hand and the fact that certain nations must still maintain their exports on the other."

"In principle, the German Government starts with the assumption that, as regards the form of our relations with other countries, it is obviously a matter of indifference what kind of constitution and form of government the nations may be pleased to adopt for themselves. It is an absolutely private matter for each nation to determine the form of its internal life in accordance with its own estimation of its requirements. Hence the selection of the spiritual content and the constructive form of the organisation and government of Germany according to the German people's own conception is also a private affair which concerns no one except the German people themselves."

"For many months we have been painfully aware that the difference between our philosophy and that of other nations has been seized upon not only as an opportunity of heaping numerous unjustified reproaches on the German people and the German Reich but also as an excuse for regarding it with a mistrust for which there are no grounds whatever."

"We have not done the same. During the last twelve months we made a really honest endeavour to cultivate the relations between the German Reich and all other States in a spirit of reconciliation and readiness to come

to an understanding, even in cases in which there were great and even irreconcilable differences between the ideas of government held in these countries and ours."

"Both in the case of the States with a democratic form of government as well as in that of those with an anti-democratic tendency we aimed at finding ways and means for adjusting differences and for international co-operation."

"This is the only explanation of why, in spite of the great difference of the two prevailing forms of philosophy, the German Reich continued to endeavour in this year to cultivate friendly relations with Russia. As M. Stalin in his last great speech expressed the fear that forces hostile to the Soviet might be active in Germany, I must correct this opinion in so far by stating here that Communistic tendencies or even propaganda would be no more tolerated in Germany than German National Socialistic tendencies would be tolerated in Russia. The more clearly and unambiguously this fact becomes evident and is respected by both parties, the easier will be the cultivation of the interests common to both countries. Hence we greet the effort to stabilize relations in the East of Europe by a system of pacts, if the leading idea of this activity is the strengthening of peace rather than tactical and political aims."

"For this reason and with these intentions the German Government has endeavoured in its first year to secure a new and better relationship with the Polish State."

"When I took over the government on 30 January, the relations between the two countries seemed to me more than unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing differences, which were due to the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the mutual tension resulting therefrom, would gradually crystallize into a state of hostility which if persisted in might only too

easily acquire the character of a dangerous traditional enmity."

"Apart from its latent dangers such a development would constitute a permanent obstacle to the profitable co-operation of the two peoples. Germans and Poles will have to learn to accept the fact of each other's existence. Hence it is more sensible to regulate this state of affairs, which the last thousand years has not been able to remove and the next thousand will not be able to remove either, in such a way that the highest possible profit will accrue from it for both nations."

"It seemed to me further necessary to show from a concrete example that admittedly existing differences cannot be allowed to interfere with a form of mutual intercourse which shall promote the peace and prosperity of both nations, in contrast to the political and economic paralysis which must inevitably result from a permanent state of mutual distrust."

"Further, it seemed to me right in such a case to attempt to deal with the problems affecting both countries by means of a frank and open exchange of views between the two parties rather than to go on entrusting third and fourth parties with this task. Moreover, whatever the differences between the two countries in the future may be, the catastrophic effects of the attempt to remove them through warlike actions would far outweigh any possible advantage gained."

"Thus the German Government was fortunate in finding the same generous attitude in the leader of the present Polish State, Marshal Pilsudski, and in being able to incorporate this mutual recognition of the situation in a treaty which will not only be of equal advantage to the Polish and German peoples, but which also represents an important contribution to the maintenance of world peace."

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"In the spirit of this treaty the German Government is willing and prepared to cultivate economic relations with Poland in such a way that here too the state of unprofitable suspicion can be succeeded by a period of useful co-operation."

"It is a matter of particular satisfaction to us that in this same year the National Socialist Government of Danzig has been enabled to effect a similar clarification of its relations with its Polish neighbour."

"It is on the other hand a matter of great regret to the German Government that the relations of the Reich to the present Austrian Government are by no means satisfactory. The fault does not lie with us. The assertion that it is the intention of the German Reich to coerce the Austrian State is absurd and cannot be substantiated or proved."

"It is, however, a matter of course that an idea which has permeated the whole German nation and moved it to the depths will not pause before the boundary stones of a country, whose people are not only German, but whose history shows it, the Eastern March of Germany, to have been for many centuries an integral part of the German Reich, and whose capital had for half a millennium long the honour of being the seat of the German Emperors, and whose soldiers marched side by side with the German regiments and divisions in the Great War."

"But even apart from this there is nothing peculiar in this fact when one considers that almost all revolutionary ideas in Europe hitherto have penetrated beyond the frontiers of the land of origin. Thus the ideas of the French Revolution permeated the whole of Europe, just as the ideas of National Socialism have been taken up by the Germans in Austria from a natural intellectual and spiritual communion with the entire German people."

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"If the present Austrian Government considers it necessary to suppress this movement with all the means in its power, that is of course its own affair. But in that case it must take over the responsibility for the consequences of its own policy. Not until German citizens living in or visiting Austria were affected by it did the German Government take action against the measures of the Austrian Government against National Socialism."

"It cannot be expected of the German Government that it is going to send its citizens as guests into a country whose Government has made it unmistakably clear that the National Socialist as such is considered an undesirable element."

"Just as we should be unable to count on Americans and Englishmen visiting Germany, if their national emblems and flags were forcibly removed, so the German Government cannot consent to the subjecting of German subjects who travel as visitors in another land, and that a German land, to this ignominious treatment."

"For the national emblems and the swastika flag are symbols of the modern German Reich, and Germans who travel abroad to-day are, apart from the emigrants, always National Socialists."

"The Austrian Government complains that Germany prevents its citizens from travelling to a country whose Government adopts this hostile attitude towards even the individual adherent of the political philosophy which obtains here. But it should reflect that the measures taken by the German Government have prevented a state of affairs which would be frankly intolerable. For since the modern German citizen is too proud and independent to allow his national emblems to be torn from him, we have no alternative but to spare such a country the pleasure of our presence."

"I must emphatically reject the further assertion of

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the Austrian Government that an attack on the part of the Reich against the Austrian State will be undertaken or even planned. If the tens of thousands of political refugees from Austria now in Germany take a warm interest in what happens in their native land, that may be regrettable in some of its effects; but it is all the more difficult for the Reich to prevent this in that the rest of the world has not yet succeeded in suppressing the activities of German emigrants abroad against the developments in Germany."

"If the Austrian Government complains of political propaganda carried on from Germany against Austria, then the German Government could with more justice complain of the political propaganda carried on against Germany by emigrants living in other countries."

"The fact that the German Press appears in the German language and can thus be read by the Austrian Government is perhaps regrettable for the present Austrian Government, but it is not in the power of the German Government to alter it. But when in non-German countries German newspapers with million sales are printed and forwarded to Germany, then the German Government has a real ground for protest; for it is difficult to explain why Berlin papers, for instance, should have to appear in Prague or Paris."

"How difficult it is to suppress the action of emigrants against their mother country is seen most clearly from the fact that even where the League of Nations itself takes charge of a country the activities of these emigrants cannot be stopped. Only a few days ago the German police arrested sixteen Communists on the Saar frontier, who were attempting to smuggle large quantities of treasonable propaganda material from this domain of the League into Germany. But if this is possible under the eyes of the League then it is difficult to reproach

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the German Reich for alleged happenings of a similar nature."

"The German Government makes no further indictment against the neighbouring States on the score of emigrant propaganda against Germany, although this went so far as to permit a judicial farce in contempt of the German Supreme Court of Justice to take place, and even now is finding its last expression in a wild boycott campaign. The German Government can refrain from making this indictment, because it feels itself to be the unshakable representative and warden of the will of the German Nation. It has acquired this inner certainty by appealing for its own satisfaction and the enlightenment of the rest of the world several times in the last twelve months to the German people, thus obtaining by way of the polling booth a confirmation of this trust and confidence without being in any way forced to do so."

"If the Austrian Government would do the same thing the attacks on it would soon lose their *raison d'être*."

"I do not believe that the Swiss Government, for instance, which has under it millions of citizens of German nationality, could complain of any attempt on the part of German circles to interfere in their internal affairs. The reason for that seems to me to be that there exists there a Government which clearly has the confidence of the Swiss people, a Government which does not find it necessary to ascribe internal difficulties to foreign political motives."

"Without wishing to meddle in the slightest degree in the internal affairs of other nations I feel I must say one thing: In the long run no Government can last by force alone. Thus it will always be a first care of the National Socialist Government of the Reich to ascertain anew how far the will of the nation is incorporated in its

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Government. And in this sense we 'savages' are really the better democrats."

"And further, as a proud son of the Austrian brotherland, my home and the home of my fathers, I must protest against the idea that the German temperament of the Austrian people is in need of any stimulus from the Reich."

"I believe I still know my native land and its people well enough to realize that the same enthusiasm which fills 66 million Germans in the Reich moves *their* hearts too."

"May Providence decree that a way out of this unsatisfactory state of affairs may be found to a really conciliatory settlement. The German Reich is always ready to hold out a hand for a real understanding with full respect for the free will of Austrian Germans."

"In this review of foreign policy I cannot refrain from expressing my lively satisfaction at the fact that this year has seen a further and many-sided strengthening of the traditional friendship to Fascist Italy, which has always been cultivated by National Socialism. The great leader of this people has always been held by us in high honour. The German people gratefully recognizes the many proofs of the statesmanlike and objective sense of justice which marked the Italian attitude in its dealings with them in the Geneva negotiations and afterwards."

"The visit of the Italian Secretary of State, Suvich, to Berlin has given us a first opportunity of displaying our feelings for the Italian people—so nearly related to us by its political philosophy—and for its distinguished statesman."

"Just as the National Socialist Government of the Reich has in this year striven to come to an understanding with Poland, so it has been our earnest endeavour to lessen the differences between France and Germany and if possible to find the way to a final

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understanding by means of a general clearing up of the outstanding problems."

"The struggle for German equality of rights, a struggle for the honour of our people which we can never renounce, could in my opinion find no better end than a reconciliation between the two great nations, who have so often shed the blood of their finest sons on the battle-fields of the last centuries, without changing anything essential in the final circumstances."

"Thus I believe that this problem should not be seen exclusively through the spectacles of the cold professional politicians and diplomats, but will only finally be settled by the warm-hearted decision of those who formerly perhaps stood facing each other as foes, but who should be able to find a bridge to the future in the respect based on the gallantry displayed by both sides. For a repetition of our past troubles will have to be avoided in the future if Europe is not to plunge into the abyss."

"France fears for her security. No one in Germany wants to threaten it, and we are ready to do everything to prove that. Germany demands her equality of rights. No one in the world has the right to refuse this to a great nation, and no one will have the strength to withhold it indefinitely."

"But for us who were living witnesses of the horrors of the Great War nothing is further than the thought of bringing these feelings and demands, intelligible on both sides, into any sort of connexion with any wish for a fresh trial of strength on the battle-field between the two peoples, which would inevitably lead to an international catastrophe."

"Guided by such reflections and in the spirit of co-operation so necessary and desirable between the two nations, I have attempted to find a solution for those

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questions which are otherwise only too liable to lead to fresh conflicts."

"My proposal that Germany and France should now settle the Saar question together sprang from the following considerations:

1. This is the only territorial question which is still open between the two countries. After it has been settled the German Government is ready to accept not only the letter but also the spirit of the Locarno Pact, as there will then be no other territorial question at stake between France and Germany.

2. The German Government fears that, although the plebiscite will give an unparalleled majority for Germany, a fresh incitement to national passions—fanned by irresponsible emigrant circles—will take place during the preparations for the plebiscite, which, in view of the certain result, is unnecessary and therefore to be regretted.

3. Whatever the result of the plebiscite it will in either case leave one nation with a sense of defeat. And even though fires of rejoicing would then burn in Germany, from the point of view of reconciliation between the two countries we would prefer that a solution equally satisfactory to both sides should be found beforehand.

4. We are convinced that if France and Germany regulated and decided this question previously in a common treaty, the entire Saar population would joyfully vote for such a regulation by an overwhelming majority. And the result would be that the population would have been enabled to record its vote, without either of the interested nations having to consider the result of the plebiscite as a victory or defeat; thus the possibility of a fresh disturbance of the mutual understanding beginning between the German and French peoples would have been avoided."

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"I still regret that the French Government has not found it possible to act on this suggestion. But I have not given up the hope that the will to a true reconciliation in the two nations and for a final burying of the hatchet will grow ever stronger and finally triumph."

"If this succeeds, Germany's unalterable demand for equality of rights will no longer be felt by France to be an attack on the security of the French nation, but will be regarded as the obvious right of a great people, which has so very many economic interests in common with her, and with whom friendly political relations are maintained."

"We welcome the efforts of the British Government to help to pave the way to this understanding. The outline of the new disarmament proposals handed to me yesterday by the British Ambassador¹ will be examined by us in the friendly spirit which I described in my speech in May² as inspiring German foreign policy."

"The German Government's decision to leave the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations was taken only because the treatment of the question of the granting of our equality of rights in relation to an international scale of armaments, which was a question of vital import to Germany, was no longer compatible with what I declared in May to be the unalterable basic claim not only for the security of the German Reich but also for the national honour of our people."

"I can only once again repeat to the world at this moment that no threat and no force will ever move the German people to give up those rights which cannot be

¹ British White Paper Cmd. 4498 (Miscellaneous No. 2), 1934, reproduced in *Documents on International Affairs 1933*, London, Oxford University Press, 1934, pp. 360-72, and see *Survey of International Affairs 1935*, vol. i, London, Oxford University Press, 1936, pp. 15-18.

² The speech of 17 May 1935.

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denied to a sovereign nation. I can, however, also give the assurance that this sovereign nation has no other wish than eagerly to apply the strength and weight of her political, moral, and economic resources not only to the healing of the wounds which the past has inflicted on humanity, but also towards the co-operation of those cultured and civilized nations which—as an English statesman has justly said—make life in this world really fine and worth having by their labours and spiritual achievements.”

“One year after the National Socialist revolution the German Reich and the German people have grown inwardly and outwardly fitter to take over their share of the responsibility in building up the prosperity and happiness of the world, a share which has been appointed to this great nation by Providence and thus cannot be called in question by men.”

“The readiness for this truly international task could have no more appropriate symbol than the person of the aged Marshal, who as officer and victorious leader fought for the greatness of our people in war and battle and today as President of the Reich is the venerable guarantor for our work in the cause of peace.”¹

In an interview with Mr. G. Ward Price on 16 February 1934, after the suppression by Dollfuss of the Socialists in Vienna, Hitler said:

“Some people believe that we German National Socialists have had something to do with the troubles in Austria. That is entirely false.”

“We sympathize neither with Herr Dollfuss nor with his opponents. Both sides are wrong in their methods.

¹ German text: *V.B.*, 31 Jan. and 1 Feb. 1934; I have cited the authorized English translation (despite its curious English style) as published in pamphlet form in Germany.

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Nothing permanent can be achieved by the violence to which they have resorted."

"It was impossible for the Austrian Socialists to achieve power by what they tried to do. It was equally impossible for Herr Dollfuss to win over opponents to his side by the means he has employed."

"Everyone knows you can smash houses to bits by shell fire, but such practices will not convince an adversary; they will only embitter him."

"The only way to succeed in a revolution is to entice your opponents over by convincing them."

"That is what we have achieved in Germany. Herr Dollfuss, on the other hand, has been trying to carry out a *coup d'état*. He has infringed the Constitution, and his methods were doomed to failure from the first."

"Supposing we in Germany had gone to work on similar lines, what would the result have been? There have been 1,600 killed and between 4,000 and 5,000 wounded in Austria. Germany's population is eleven times as great as hers, so that our casualties would have been 18,000 dead and 50,000 wounded."

"What are the facts? The total of our opponents killed in riots has been 27, and the number of wounded 150. Among them was not a solitary woman or child, nor has any house been destroyed or any shops plundered."

"If you want to realize the contrast between the present régime in Austria and the National Socialist Government in Germany you have only to compare a photograph of Berlin with a photograph of Vienna as it is to-day."

"Our critics will say, 'Oh! yes, but the Austrian Socialists were heavily armed.' So were the German Communists. We found any quantity of arms in their possession. The reason why the German Communists did not use them is because they were won over by conviction of our cause. . . ."

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"I am only expressing my private and personal view, but it is my conviction that the workmen of Austria, especially, will rally to the National Socialist cause, as a natural reaction against the methods of violence that the Austrian Government has exercised on them."

Mr. Ward Price said that some people were seeking to explain the pact with Poland as intended to form the basis of an ultimate joint attack by Germany and Poland with a view to acquiring territory.

Hitler laughed incredulously and replied "What! We take territory from Russia? Ridiculous!"

"All attempts to lay the basis of a lasting peace in Europe have hitherto failed because public opinion believed that Poland and Germany were irreconcilable enemies. I have never held this view. The first thing I did when I came to power was to take steps to start negotiations with the Poles."

"I found the Polish statesmen most magnanimous and just as peacefully minded as I am myself."

"The gulf which was thought unbridgeable has been crossed. The two nations have come close together, and I sincerely hope that our new understanding will mean that Germany and Poland have definitely abandoned all idea of a resort to arms not for ten years only but for ever."¹

In an interview with Mr. Louis Lochner, the Berlin correspondent of the Associated Press, in March 1934 Hitler, speaking of international relations, said:

"The antiquated diplomatic method of exchanging notes finds a telling condemnation in the fact that, despite the efforts of diplomats, the nations in 1914

¹ *Daily Mail*, 17 Feb. 1934. See the bibliographical note on p. 1412 for the suppression of the Socialists in Austria; for Poland see bibliographical note on p. 1021 sqq. and cf. p. 1151 *supra*.

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slipped into the most gigantic war in history; although I am convinced the diplomats themselves were the most surprised when the war broke out."

"I believe heartily in the man-to-man discussions of responsible statesmen. One thing that every representative of a foreign Power will find in dealing with me is that I speak with absolute frankness and never place my demands higher with the idea of compromising for less."

"I declare only just what Germany is prepared to do. When I state we need an army of 300,000 men, I don't propose afterward to come down to 250,000. I want Germany's signature to mean something again."

"And under no circumstances—under no circumstances—will I submit to dictation! When I am convinced that a certain course is the only one and the right one for my nation, I intend to pursue it, come what may."

"I will do what I do openly. I will not, for example, pretend outwardly to accept 150,000 men as a basis for our army, and then secretly arm another 150,000." . . .

"But as one responsible for the welfare of my country, I cannot have Germany exposed to the possibility that some neighbour may invade us or drop bombs over our industrial plants or embark upon a so-called preventive war just to distract attention from troubles at home."

"It is for this purpose, and for this purpose only, that we want an army adequate for self-defence."¹

A somewhat fuller account of this interview is given in the "Frankfurter Zeitung": on the armaments problem and the position created by the refusal of France to make any advance towards the standpoint of England, Italy, and Germany Hitler said: "No one would rejoice more than I if the world would disarm. We would wish to devote

¹ *The New York Times*, 31 Mar. 1934.

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all our energies to productive ends. We want to bring our unemployed back into work."¹

*Hitler on 17 April 1934 addressed the organizers of the Winter-Help Contribution. In the course of his speech he emphasized the importance of this work in its effect on foreign opinion. He said: "It is hard to say how many thousands of foreigners precisely through this scheme of social assistance have been immediately convinced of the value of the new order in Germany. But it is certain that those foreigners who have been in Germany could not escape from the great impression which the WHW.—the Winterhilfswerk—was bound to make upon them. A great part of the change of feeling of the world is to be traced to the successes of the National Socialist Revolution, and in particular of the WHW. For from this there grew the recognition of the supreme social significance of the National Socialist idea in our fatherland."*²

*In his speech in Berlin on May Day, 1934, Hitler said that "he could confess before the German people that we see the essence of our authority not in the effectiveness of cannons and machine-guns but rather in the confidence which has in fact been reposed in us. . . . But we would not let this day pass without asserting in complete agreement before the whole world the common right to life (*Lebensrecht*) of us all. The German people, from the revered President of the Reich down to every working-man and every peasant, has but a single wish—through its work to be happy and blessed in the way it chooses for itself. It knows no thought of revenge, it wishes for no conquests. It would desire to extend the hand to every people to secure understanding and reconciliation. But it will also for all time resolutely*

¹ *F.Z.*, 5 Apr. 1934.

² *F.Z.*, 19 Apr. 1934.

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defend and protect against everyone its own right to life. Above all it will never surrender its claim to be a people with equal rights, while at the same time it is always ready in the cause of the maintenance of peace and prosperity in this world to make no less sacrifices than other nations are for their part prepared to make." . . .

"We would not forget Him Who a whole year through has granted such success to our work, and we would pray Him that in the time to come, too, He would not withhold His blessing from our people. Above all may Providence permit our dearest hope to come to its fulfilment—that our German folk may ever draw more closely together in mutual consideration and in mutual understanding so that at the last they may attain to that goal for which our people has fought for thousands of years, for which many generations have suffered and millions had to die—a free German people in a strong German Reich!"¹

In his speech to the Second Labour Congress in Berlin on 16 May 1934 Hitler criticized the economics of Communism and attacked Russia: Soviet Russia seemed to him like a man wandering through a bog on the arm of a stronger man. This Soviet Russia toiled perpetually along on the arm of capitalist States. She took from them her workers, her engineers, her machines; she drew everything from the capitalist States but went on her way and talked the whole time about Marxist Communism. Soviet Russia should be stood on her own feet—that would be quite possible with a country like Russia—and told, "Now create your Paradise yourself". The results would be interesting. At present as Communists they were living only from the non-Communist institutions of this world. But a *Weltanschauung* must

¹ *F.Z.*, 2, 3 May 1934.

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be capable of standing only on its own feet. The Communist *Weltanschauung* cannot do this, if it tries to do so, it ends in an appalling distress.

At the close of this speech Hitler said: "All of us who have come to know war know that the waging of war cannot be the aim of policy. Our aim will always be to create a happy life for our people. We know, therefore, no other policy than that of peaceful construction. But for that reason we can never permit our people to be humiliated and treated as a slave. We shall never break the peace, but the new Germany for its part will never surrender, never give up its rights, never make any sacrifice of its soil. Fanatically it will defend in this world its vital rights, these it will champion to the last. We will never break the peace, but let no one imagine that he can subdue us peacefully and that we shall not resist."¹

In his speech at Gera on the occasion of the Thuringian Gauparteitag on 17 June 1934 Hitler said:

"We have a great aim before us in the domestic sphere: a great work of reform in ourselves, in our life, in our corporate life, in our economic and cultural life. . . . Let not the rest of the world disturb this work, just as we do not disturb what other peoples do in their internal affairs. We have enough to busy ourselves with in our own house and we would like to think that other peoples, too, ought to find sufficient employment in their own houses. I believe that if other statesmen would only give some of that attention which they give to the affairs of other peoples to the domestic life of their own peoples then much in this world would be improved. At any rate we want to keep ourselves free from these ancient failings of mankind—looking at the splinter in the eyes

¹ *V.B.*, 18 May 1934.

of others and not seeing the beam in their own. We could wish that the others would look after their own beams and leave us to extract our own splinters."

"We National Socialists have a gigantic programme in our domestic life. That places upon us the duty of seeking peace and friendship with the rest of the world, but it places upon us also the duty of seeing to it that the rest of the world leaves us in peace and quiet. For just as little as we have any intention of wronging anyone in this world, so little will we permit anyone to do violence to us in Germany. If anyone asks us: 'What are you ready to contribute towards the pacification of the world?' then we answer: We are a people which loves peace and wishes for peace—a people which does not concern itself with the affairs of other peoples. We have only the wish that the others should take the same path to the pacification of the world. We are of the opinion in especial that the Press of all countries ought to make this contribution to the pacification of the world and not place itself at the service of those who have quite different aims. We National Socialists know these international elements very well. We know who to-day wishes for no peace, who continuously agitates, who continuously incites and poisons the peoples."

"What is one to say when we wish for peace and understanding with a people and then in that country's Press we read that one must not come to an understanding with the German Government, because that would mean a success for this Government? They admit, you see, that the German people would be happy if we did come to an understanding, and in spite of this they dare to spread suspicions regarding this people before the eyes of the world."

"We have only one wish: that in other nations more and more those should prevail who, remembering the

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horrors of the last war, also wish for an honest reconciliation amongst the peoples. For this we know: if this international clique of agitators were to attain their ends, then once more one would find upon the battle-field the peoples—millions of honest and decent men—but presumably not one of these international agitators.”

“We National Socialists cannot but prepare our people beforehand against this danger. We are determined that no one shall dispute our right of self-preservation. If anyone says to us: ‘If you National Socialists wish equality of rights for Germany—then we must arm’: our only reply must be: As far as we are concerned you can do that, for we have no intention of attacking you. But we wish to be so strong that any one else may lose his desire to attack us.”

“The more the world talks about forming *blocs*, the clearer it becomes to us that we must take care to maintain our own strength. We have formed no conspiracies with other peoples, but we have to be on our guard lest the conspiracies of others should one day destroy the German people and rob it of the blessing from its labours in its home-country. There is only one thing of which I can assure the entire world: however unqualified our love of peace, however little Germany wishes for war, we will with the utmost fanaticism defend the freedom of Germany and the honour of our people.”

“The world must know: the period of ‘Diktats’ is past. We have no intention of laying constraint upon any other people, but we shall resist any attempt in the future to place the German people under a continuous constraint. We have not the feeling that we are an inferior race—a worthless rabble on the face of the earth that may or can be trodden under foot by anyone: we have the feeling that we are a great people which only once forgot itself and, seduced by insane fools, robbed

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itself of its own strength and has now awakened again out of its insane dream. No one must think that during the next thousand years this people can be engulfed once more into such a dream-state. This teaching whose effects we in our own persons have experienced in so appalling a way will be for millennia a historic warning for us. What happened once and through our own fault will never be repeated a second time in the history of the German people."¹

*The letter to von Papen of 26 July 1934 on his appointment as German Ambassador in Vienna after the murder of Dollfuss.*²

"In consequence of the events in Vienna I have found myself forced to propose to the President of the Reich that the German Ambassador in Vienna, Dr. Rieth, should be removed from his post, since he at the request of Austrian Federal-Ministers of the Austrian insurgents consented to an agreement arrived at between these two parties granting free conduct and passage of the insurgents into Germany without having consulted the German Government. The Ambassador thereby without any reason has implicated the German Reich in a matter which concerns Austrian domestic policy."

"The attack upon the life of the Austrian Chancellor which is most strongly condemned and regretted by the German Government has through no fault of ours rendered more critical the already unstable political situation in Europe. It is therefore my wish to contribute to a lessening of tension in the situation as a whole and in particular to see our relation to the German-Austrian State which has long been troubled brought back into normal and friendly channels."

¹ *F.Z.*, 19 June 1934.

² See the bibliographical note on p. 1412.

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"For this reason I ask you, dear Sir, to undertake this important task especially in view of the fact that you have had, since we began our co-operation in the Cabinet, and still have my complete and unbounded confidence. . . . In this position you will be directly responsible to me."¹

Mr. G. Ward Price on 5 August 1934 had an interview with Hitler, who said:

"If it rests with Germany war will not come again. This country has a more profound impression than any other of the evil that war causes. Ninety-five per cent. of the members of the National Administration have had personal experience of its horrors."

"They know that it is not a romantic adventure but a ghastly catastrophe. It is the disciplined conviction of the Nazi Movement that war can benefit no one, but only bring general ruin in its train."

"To us war would offer no prizes; 1918 was for us a lesson and a warning."

"In our belief Germany's present-day problems cannot be settled by war. Her claims from the rest of Europe involve no risk of such a disaster, for they are limited to what other nations regard as their most elementary rights."

"We ask only that our present frontiers shall be maintained. Believe me, we shall never fight again except in self-defence."

"I have repeatedly assured the French that when once the Saar question is settled no further territorial difference will exist between us, while on our eastern frontier I have proved our peaceful intentions by making a pact with Poland."

"Mr. Baldwin has said that Britain's defensive

¹ *Berliner Tageblatt*, 27 July 1934.

frontier lies henceforth on the Rhine. It may be that some French statesman will go further and say that France must be defended on the Oder. Or Russia may claim that her line of national defence lies along the Danube."

"Germany can hardly be reproached, therefore, if she seeks to secure national protection within her own frontiers."

"Unless England attacks us, we shall never come into conflict with England on the Rhine or anywhere else. We want nothing from England."

"Not even colonies?" Mr. Ward Price asked. . .

"I would not sacrifice the life of a single German to get any colony in the world. We know that the former German African colonies are costly luxuries even for England."

"The increase in Britain's air fleet does not cause the slightest resentment in Germany. You can double, quadruple, your air force, or expand your fleet to any strength you like. It does not concern us, since we have no intention of attacking you."

"We are building aeroplanes," Mr. Ward Price said, "because we believe that, just as before the Great War, Germany created a huge naval fleet, so now she is creating a huge air fleet."

"You did not feel menaced when France built a great air fleet", *Herr Hitler replied*. "Why should Germany's measures of self-defence alarm you? I assure you that Britain lies right outside our calculations."

"Such steps as we are taking are meant to deal with the fact that we are surrounded on the Continent by a ring of powerful potential foes who may some day make demands of us that we cannot accept."

"It is not the extent of armaments that produces danger of war, but inequality of armaments. This en-

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courages the stronger nation to entertain ambitions which the weaker cannot tolerate". . . .

"We shall not attack Austria, but we cannot prevent Austrians from seeking to restore their ancient connexion with Germany. These States are only separated by a line, on either side of which are people of the same race."

"If one part of England were artificially separated from the rest, who could restrain its inhabitants from wishing to be united to the rest of their country again?". . .

"The question of the Anschluss"—the union of Austria and Germany—"is not a problem of the present day. I am certain that if elections were held in Austria by secret ballot the whole matter would be cleared up. Austrian independence lies outside all discussion, and nobody questions it."

"In the old Austrian Empire the various nationalities manifested leanings towards their neighbours of their own race. It is natural that the Germans of Austria should incline towards union with Germany. We all know that this aim for the time being is impossible, for the opposition to it from the rest of Europe would be too great". . . .

"Three things are requisite for world recovery. They are the

Maintenance of peace;

Existence of strong, well-organized Governments in every country;

Necessary energy to tackle world problems as a whole."

"We in Germany are ready to co-operate with other nations to this end if they will work with us". . . .

"We left the League of Nations on certain well-defined grounds. It was impossible for my Government to continue to take part in negotiations in which it was treated

frontier lies henceforth on the Rhine. It may be that some French statesman will go further and say that France must be defended on the Oder. Or Russia may claim that her line of national defence lies along the Danube."

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"It is not the extent of armaments that produces danger of war, but inequality of armaments. This en-

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people. The Government of the German Reich needs no such successes in the sphere of foreign policy to strengthen its domestic position."

"The vote of 19 August¹ will, I hope, prove to the world afresh the unquestioned stability of the German Reich to-day, that this State can be relied upon just as much as can the love of peace which inspires both the people and its leaders."

"It is thus clear that the period of the German Revolution is now a closed chapter."²

*In the same speech Hitler in answer to the charge that he was sinning against international solidarity said that if the charge was true, he did not act thus on principle; if such solidarity had any practical value for Germany, he would also acknowledge it, "but fifteen years' experience has taught me that one must restrict oneself to that which in the last resort is more practical and more easily realizable, namely the solidarity of one's own people. . . . Foreign Powers must recognize that Germany forms an indivisible block."*²

After the fixing of the date for the plebiscite in the Saar (13 January 1935) Hitler in his speech to the people of the Saar on 26 August 1934 said: "The problem of the Saar still remains the ground of disagreement between France and ourselves. We do not wish to surrender the hope that, if this question is once solved, perhaps on the other side also there may yet grow a readiness to look on problems as they are and to conclude with us a genuine peace. The question of the Saar is the sole territorial question which to-day still separates us from France.

¹ The Plebiscite which was to approve the abolition of the office of President of the Reich and the union of the powers of that office with the Chancellorship in the person of Hitler. ² *F.Z.*, 19 Aug. 1934.

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When that is solved, then there is no visible, reasonable ground that two great nations should eternally and for all time be at enmity with one another. Perhaps then more and more our former foes will come to realize that the tasks which are set before us all are so great that instead of going to war with each other we ought to solve them by our joint action. . . . And thus on 13 January you still have a special great mission to fulfil in the cause of peace. We should be happy if, when on 14 January the bells ring throughout Germany, they should ring in not only the return of our lost territory and of our lost Germans but also the home-coming of peace."¹

In the Proclamation read at the opening of the Nuremberg Parteitag on 5 September 1934 Hitler said:

"In the sphere of foreign policy we have in the most solemn form declared before the entire world the principles on which the German nation, without hatred or desire for vengeance against others, seeks peace and friendship with those who fifteen years ago still faced us as foes. In the profound recognition of the unavoidable consequences of a new war in Europe which could but lead to Communistic chaos we have done everything in our power to improve and to free from venom our relations with these nations which formerly faced us in enmity."

"If our ceaseless appeals so often remained without an answer, yet we know that it is not the peoples who wish for conflict and war but rather small cliques of international agitators whose interest it is to make war, to profit from wars, but never to fight in wars! And so we do not surrender the hope that our appeal will still in the end be met with understanding just as we wish never to leave it in any doubt that the German nation of

¹ *V.B.*, 28 Aug. 1934.

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to-day is determined to preserve by every means its honour, its independence and its freedom. Never will we surrender those rights which for a great nation are inalienable and which could never be peddled away save by a petty generation of the pettiest of politicians. These politicians, however, were ephemeral and Germany is everlasting."

"And just as *we* impute to no people such a defect of character, or would wish to presuppose such a defect as the basis of our relations towards any people, so the world must come to terms with the fact that the German nation is not to be measured by the declarations of a régime which for sixty years was foisted upon it by lies and tricks—a régime of international freebooters and 'politicasters'—but rather by those qualities and those values which history has proved it to possess."

"It was this conviction which forced us to withdraw from institutions which were unwilling to recognize Germany as a Power with equal rights, which imagined that they could conduct negotiations with a people which was not treated as were other peoples."

"That thereby the National Socialist Government did but take a step which the entire German people—apart from its Jewish-international elements—regarded as a matter of course the referendum has proved. Our whole political work was inspired only by the idea of enforcing these principles—love of peace on the one side, and our love of honour on the other."¹

In his address at the reception of foreign diplomats on 12 September 1934 Hitler said: "The unalterable aim of my policy is to make of Germany a sure safeguard of peace. Not power and force must determine international relations but the spirit of equality of rights and

¹ *F.Z.*, 6 Sept. 1934.

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respect for the work and achievement of every other people. Under the protection of this peace I, and with me the Government of the Reich, will devote all our forces to the spiritual restoration of our people which has all but collapsed under the distresses (*Nöten*) of the War and the post-War period, to the internal reorganisation of our Reich, and to the conquest of its economic and social distress (*Not*). If we are able to accomplish these tasks—and accomplish them we shall—then Germany will be performing a service not only to herself but to the whole world, and will thus for her part contribute to the welfare and the progress of mankind.”¹

On 13 September 1934 M. Lucien Lemas had an interview with Hitler, who said:

“Vous savez bien que, dès le jour où j’ai pris la direction du gouvernement, je me suis efforcé de clarifier et de désintoxiquer l’atmosphère entre la France et l’Allemagne. Ainsi, par exemple, j’ai eu, en son temps, l’idée qu’on devait arriver à une entente bilatérale sur la question de la Sarre. Il m’est toujours apparu clairement que, si on ne procédait pas de la sorte, la propagande se mettrait en mouvement des deux côtés et que les relations entre nos deux pays n’en seraient pas améliorées. On m’a bien objecté alors que le traité de Versailles s’y opposait. Mais cette objection ne m’a jamais paru bien convaincante, car si aujourd’hui l’Allemagne et la France déclaraient vouloir s’entendre sur la question de la Sarre, et si la population sarroise se déclarait d’accord, il est bien certain qu’aucune des nations représentées à Genève n’aurait d’objection à faire.”

“Ce n’est pas que nous doutions que la population sarroise aurait voté en bloc pour nous, mais il eût cer-

¹ *F.Z.*, 13 Sept. 1934.

tainement été préférable d'arriver à une entente en faisant preuve de largeur de vues. Car on serait ainsi parvenu, pour la première fois, à un accord entre les deux pays, sur une question importante, ce qui eût été un début très favorable à l'amélioration des relations entre la France et l'Allemagne."

Question: L'Allemagne reviendra-t-elle à la Société des Nations, et à quelles conditions?

Réponse: "Nous avons, à l'époque, quitté la Société des Nations parce qu'on voulait nous traiter comme une nation de deuxième ordre. Les Français, à notre place, n'auraient pas agi autrement. À la question de savoir si nous reviendrons à la Société des Nations, la réponse suivante pourrait être faite: la question sera examinée si l'égalité absolue des droits nous est assurée."

"Il y a certainement lieu de tenir compte du fait que des modifications importantes semblent se produire à l'heure actuelle à Genève, à la Société des Nations. Il serait également nécessaire de suivre le développement de la situation créée par l'admission de nouveaux membres qui poursuivent la réalisation d'un programme particulier, comme par exemple la préparation de la diffusion de l'idéal communiste à travers le monde entier". . . .

"Le peuple allemand a un faible pour la France et il l'apprécie, non seulement pour son attitude chevaleresque, mais aussi parce qu'elle s'est battue vaillamment pendant la guerre mondiale."

"Il serait extrêmement utile que le plus grand nombre possible de Français viennent en Allemagne: ils pourraient alors se rendre compte qu'aucun régime de terreur ne règne et que, par contre, le peuple lui-même gouverne dans le véritable sens du mot."¹

¹ *L'Intransigeant*, 21 Sept. 1934 (note that the interview took place on 13 Sept.).

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In his speech at the Harvest Festival on the Bückeberg (30 September 1934) Hitler said:

"Beginning with the necessity to leave the League of Nations down to the death of the President of the Reich, this year has brought with it countless political labours, and cares also. But in these twelve months Germany has not grown weaker, but stronger."¹

In November 1934 the Polish Legation in Berlin became an embassy and the German representation in Poland also became an embassy. Hitler on the reception of the Polish Ambassador Lipski (14 November 1934) said that "in view of the manifold difficulties of the present political situation this change was of quite special significance. It is calculated not only to serve the advancement of the interests of both countries but also to be an important factor for the safeguarding of general peace. The results already attained can only strengthen us in our determination to advance farther along the path upon which we have entered, continuously to intensify co-operation in the various spheres of our relations, and thus to establish in mutual respect and mutual understanding a relation of friendly neighbourliness between Germany and Poland which shall be secure and permanent. In the economic sphere also Germany will gladly make her contribution towards overcoming the difficulties caused by the present crisis, and will, so far as possible, encourage the mutual exchange of goods."

*Hitler assured the ambassador: "in your work you will always have my support and the support of my Government."*²

In November 1934, Jean Goy, deputy for the Seine, had an interview with Hitler, who said:

"Les combattants allemands et français ont appris à

¹ F.Z., 2 Oct. 1934.

² F.Z., 15 Nov. 1934.

se connaître pendant la guerre. Ils ont, les uns vis-à-vis des autres, une juste notion de leur valeur et de la valeur de chaque nation. Ils sont capables, mieux que tous autres, de respecter cette valeur dans la paix."

"Il ne doit pas y avoir de malentendus entre nos deux pays, les difficultés présentes proviennent du problème sarrois."

"Votre presse a paru laisser supposer que nous préparions un *putsch*! C'est pure folie que de croire que l'Allemagne cherchera par la force à troubler la prochaine consultation et je déclare formellement que nous nous inclinerons devant le résultat du plébiscite quel qu'il soit!"

"J'avais, d'ailleurs, il y a quelques mois, proposé à votre ministre des affaires étrangères d'établir un protocole pour régler toutes les difficultés éventuelles, mais je n'ai pas eu de réponse."

"Il ne peut être question de déplacer un poteau frontière. Vous connaissez mon sentiment à ce qui concerne l'Alsace-Lorraine. J'ai déclaré une fois pour toutes que ce ne serait pas une solution que de faire, tous les 20 ou 30 ans, des guerres pour reprendre des provinces qui ont toujours causé des difficultés à la France, quand elles étaient françaises, et à l'Allemagne, quand elles étaient allemandes."

"Au surplus, l'Allemagne d'aujourd'hui ne pense pas comme l'Allemagne du passé. Nous ne songeons pas aux kilomètres carrés de territoire à conquérir. Nous songeons à assurer la vie de notre peuple. Or, à l'ouest notre densité de population est de 237 habitants au kilomètre carré. Comment concevoir l'idée que nous tenions à reprendre des territoires de densité égale afin d'aggraver notre situation?"

"À l'est, certains problèmes ont, sur nos frontières orientales, un autre caractère. Mais un pacte a été signé

avec la Pologne, et le Reich a marqué par là sa volonté très nette d'entretenir de bonnes relations avec ce grand pays voisin."

"Je ne veux pas de la guerre qui fauche les élites."

"Vous nous reprochez nos armements, mais vous armez vous-mêmes. Et vous justifiez vos armements en déclarant que nous nous refusons à désarmer."

"N'y a-t-il pas, dans des conversations directes, la possibilité de faire cesser cet état de choses?"

"Comme vous, pendant quatre ans, je suis resté sur le front et je sais que vous, comme moi, vous êtes prêts à faire votre devoir, mais, précisément, parce que nous nous sommes battus, nous comprenons mieux l'inutilité et l'horreur d'une guerre."

"Les hommes qui sont hostiles à la paix et qui s'efforcent d'empêcher tout rapprochement entre nous ne seraient pas là où l'on tire, mais là où l'on profite."

"Les millions de Français et d'Allemands tués ne sont pas des quelconques: ce sont les élites de nos deux nations qui ont été détruites et pour des résultats qui n'ont même pas pu sauver de la crise les pays victorieux."

"Ce qui importe maintenant, c'est de travailler afin d'établir un ordre social nouveau."

"On pourra laisser entendre que je ne cherche qu'à gagner du temps pour achever mes préparatifs. À cela je réponds que mon plan de travail est tel que l'homme qui pourra atteindre le but que je poursuis méritera de son peuple reconnaissant un monument beaucoup plus grand que celui que pourrait mériter un chef glorieux après de nombreuses victoires."

"Si la France et l'Allemagne s'entendaient, un grand nombre de nations voisines pousseraient un soupir de soulagement et un cauchemar disparaîtrait. Il en résulterait une détente psychologique immédiate, une

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amélioration des rapports économiques de tous les pays d'Europe. Il dépend de nos deux nations que ce rêve devienne une réalité."

"Je pense que les hommes qui ont fait la guerre et qui sont encore, pour la plupart, en âge d'être à nouveau mobilisés ont une vision plus nette des risques que fait courir l'incompréhension de deux peuples."

"Ils sont plus francs, leur attitude est plus brutale, mais par là ils osent aborder en face les difficultés, ce qui est la seule méthode pour les résoudre plus aisément."

"Faisant fi des habitudes diplomatiques, ils peuvent se dire leurs naturelles inquiétudes et signaler à temps, pour les faire disparaître, les risques de conflits."

"Il n'est pas possible que les anciens combattants n'imposent pas la paix au monde."¹

1935

*Hitler in his New Year Proclamation to the German people on 1 January 1935 expressed "the ardent wish for the return of that German territory which through the voice of its blood on 13 January will declare before all the world its indissoluble community with the German Reich".*²

At the New Year reception of the diplomatic corps in 1935 Hitler said:

"No country can feel the need for peace more profoundly than Germany which after difficult years full of distress and suffering has concentrated all her forces on her internal reconstruction. Germany wishes to complete this reconstruction without disturbance and asks from the other countries only the same recognition and

¹ *Le Matin*, 18 Nov. 1934.

² *F.Z.*, 2 Jan. 1935.

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respect for her vital rights as Germany herself is prepared to grant to them. Her policy rests immovably upon these principles and with this policy Germany will always be a sure guarantee of peace. . . . I see in the relations between the peoples no problem which if treated with understanding cannot be solved by the way of agreement. . . . The German people and its Government are in any event determined to make their contribution towards an ordering of international relations which will secure an honest co-operation upon the basis of equal rights: in such an ordering alone can the welfare and progress of humanity be safeguarded."¹

*In a speech delivered in Berlin on 3 January 1935 with reference to the Saar plebiscite to be held on 13 January Hitler spoke of the flood of lies which had once more appeared in the foreign Press. The motto of these foes of the National Socialist Movement was, he said, "Lies always spread more quickly than the truth: then lie, lie on, and never stop: perhaps something may stick after all." . . . On 13 January when our brothers, after fifteen years of brave resistance, return to the home-land, "they must know that they come back into a home-land which is worthy of them, and the foe must at last clearly understand that every thought of speculating on that hereditary failing which has always laid Germany low—German disunity—is at this time idle. They must not think that it is but one German that they are facing: they must know that in the defence of German honour, in the defence of peace and the vital interests of the nation they have ranged against them the entire German nation and the whole State of to-day united as a sworn community."*²

¹ *F.Z.*, 2 Jan. 1935.

² *F.Z.*, 5 Jan. 1935.

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"*Le Temps*" on 4 January 1935 published extracts from articles written by Hitler during the years 1929 to 1931 to show that his views on France had not changed since the publication of "*Mein Kampf*": "When a Frenchman grasps in friendship the hand of a German that French hand is deadly for Germany. The German people will not recover the world's respect until France shall see in a German statesman the personification of hatred" (*V.B.*, No. 57 of 1929). "Even Bismarck did not succeed in co-operating with France on a basis of friendship. One refuses to lie down under the same roof with an assassin" (*Angriff*, No. 55 of 1930). "France is in fact the Mephistopheles of humanity" (*Angriff*, No. 186 of 1931).

On 13 January 1935 the result of the vote in the Saar Plebiscite was:

For return of the Saar to Germany	477,119
For the status quo	46,513
For France	2,124

After the Saar Plebiscite Hitler said in a speech on the wireless on 15 January 1935: "We all wish to see in this act of 13 January 1935 a first and a decisive step on the way towards a gradual reconciliation between those who twenty years ago through unkind fates and human frailties stumbled into the most fearful¹ and most fruitless struggle of all time. Your decision, German fellow-countrymen of the Saar, gives to me to-day the opportunity of stating that after the completion of your return the German Reich will make no further territorial claims on France. That statement is our historical contribution, entailing, as it does, heavy sacrifices, towards that pacification of Europe which is so sorely needed.

¹ The report in *F.Z.* has *furchtbaren*: I think we must read *furchtbarsten*.

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. . . The wish of us all is that this German ending of so melancholy an injustice may contribute towards a higher pacification of European humanity. For great and unconditional as is our determination to gain and to secure equal rights for Germany we are no less determined not to withdraw ourselves from those tasks which must be faced if in spite of present dangers and distresses we are ever to restore a true solidarity of nations."¹

In an interview with Hitler on 16 January 1935 Pierre Huss, representing the Hearst Press, asked the Chancellor for his opinion on the voting in the Saar. Hitler said:

"The result of the vote fills me and every one of my colleagues with boundless pride in the German people. It is also a condemnation after the event of the Treaty of Versailles—a condemnation of truly historical magnitude. For in this Treaty this territory was torn from Germany on the basis of the assertion that in it were living 150,000 French people. After fifteen years of government by the League of Nations, that is in the last resort government by France, it is now established that there are but 2,000 French people settled in this territory, that is to say that for every thousand inhabitants of the Saar there are not even as many as four who are French. Can one then wonder that a treaty built up on arguments so false as this failed to bring any happiness or blessing to mankind?"

Later in the interview Pierre Huss said: Mr. Chancellor, you have often declared that after the settlement of the Saar question the last obstacle to friendly relations with France would be removed. In view of your tireless and continuous pursuit of this aim, in the interests of world-peace have you any concrete plan in view? Hitler replied:

"I have often stated that after the return of the Saar-

¹ F.Z., 16 Jan. 1935.

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district Germany will not make any further territorial demands on France. I have to-day repeated that statement in binding form before the whole world. In the light of history this is a great renunciation which I announce in the name of the German people. I do it in order, through this heaviest sacrifice, to contribute to the pacification of Europe. More cannot be asked of Germany. It is now for the rest of the world to draw the consequences which follow from such a decision. Never will I or the new German Reich agree to any curtailment of the rights of our people. We wish to be peaceful, but under no circumstances will we lose our honour."

"We are prepared for a very great sacrifice, but never will we renounce our freedom. We refuse to admit any distinction between moral and material equality of rights: there is only one equality of rights and that is the right of a sovereign State and a sovereign nation. If the world will once recognise this, no great plans are needed to stabilize the peace of Europe."

"I have only one request to make of the American people," *Hitler continued*. "For years past and during the last months American citizens have heard and read on the Saar question precisely the opposite to that which has now been proved through this free and public election. I should be happy if people were prepared to recognize this, so that in future they would no longer believe a word of what is said by our *émigrés*, those professional poisoners of the wells and agitators. Just as they have lied over the Saar, so they lie over Germany and with their lies deceive practically the entire world. The American people ought to listen only to what eye-witnesses can tell them about Germany in order to form their picture of a State whose Government is to-day supported by the overwhelming majority of a nation."¹

¹ *V.B.*, 17 Jan. 1935.

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In an interview with Mr. G. Ward Price on 17 January 1935 Hitler said:

"Do you think it possible to preach peace to a people for ten years on end, and then suddenly to launch them into war?"

"When I talk of peace I am doing nothing but giving expression to the profoundest and most sincere wish of the German people."

"I know the horrors of war too well. No possible profits could justify the sacrifices and sufferings that war entails. And the results of another general bout of European slaughter would be even more catastrophic in the future than in the past."

"The only gainers would be the Communists, and I have not fought them for fifteen years, only at the end, by this roundabout means, to set up their mad rule."

"My aim is the well-being of my people. I saw no well-being in the war; on the contrary, I saw only bitter suffering. I will say two things quite plainly:

- (1) Germany for her part will never break the peace.
- (2) If anyone should attack us, they will fall on a hornets' nest—for we love freedom just as much as we love peace."

"Without being under any compulsion, I have given France the assurance, in the name of the whole German people, that we have no more territorial demands to make, and that of our own accord we have abandoned all notions of revenge."

"At the same time, I hereby give the equally solemn assurance that no pressure, need, or force will ever lead us to sacrifice our honour and our right of equality of standing among the nations. . . ."

"Treaties can have no value unless they are concluded between Governments that value and respect their honour."

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"Germany wants to stand on an honourable footing with her neighbours. On her eastern frontier we have achieved this, and I believe that in Warsaw, as well as in Berlin, there is great satisfaction over the mutual cleansing of the atmosphere which has resulted."

"I am furthermore convinced that when this method of reciprocal understanding and consideration is adopted, the results are more fruitful than they can be in the case of more complicated and confused agreements."

"I shall always hesitate very long before I tie up the German nation in pacts whose consequences cannot be unmistakably foreseen."

"As I have told you, we have not the slightest intention of making war for our own ends, so that you may well believe that we shall be even more determined not to do so on behalf of alien interests which do not affect Germany at all."

"We have, however, already made repeated offers to our neighbour States to conclude with them mutual pacts of non-aggression."

... "Neither I nor anyone else in Germany has any idea of making 'conditions' for the possibility of a return to the League. The whole question whether we go back to that organization or not depends on one thing only, and that is whether we can rejoin it as a completely co-equal nation."

"This is not a condition. It is common sense."

"Are we a sovereign State or are we not? If we are not, we have no title to belong to a body of sovereign States."

"So long as the National Socialist Movement holds power in Germany—and this will continue for several centuries, however hard and often our political exiles may swear to the contrary—this attitude will never alter. I laid it down explicitly in the Peace Speech I made on May Day, 1933 [*? Speech of 17 May 1933*]."

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"I want to say here that the distinction which is being made between 'moral' and 'material' equality is regarded by the German people as insulting."

"No one is entitled to decide what the moral rights of a nation of 68,000,000 people are except that nation itself."

"If, as a fact, one has 'material' equality, then it stands to reason that one has 'moral' equality also. On the other hand, if one is 'morally' entitled to equality, it is difficult to see why anybody should oppose or delay the grant of 'material' equality."

"There is one thing more to be said about the League of Nations. So long as it is only a 'Mutual Assurance Society' of Victor-Powers it is not entitled to the name it bears."

"Although its founders doubtless intended it to last for ever, this corporation cannot continue to be coupled with a treaty to whose existence a time-limit is clearly being set by its own internal imperfections and impossibilities."

"This view may perhaps at present be contested by interested parties, but to the eyes of history it will appear as a matter of course". . . .

"For no matter what international agreement or pact, it is an essential condition of German participation that her equality of standing shall be recognized."

"What is the use of asking us to sign such treaties if you decline to recognize our good faith? I am not alone in making this demand. On the contrary, I am in very good company."

"Many countries have lost wars in the past, and if it were the rule that every nation that has had this misfortune is for ever to forfeit its honour and its right to equality of treatment, then the League of Nations itself must be largely made up of second-class, disgraced, and disreputable States."

"Till now the absurd idea that defeat meant dishonour has not taken root in the world, and we are determined to see that Germany shall not be the first instance of such imbecility". . . .

"People base their notions about German affairs on such utterly inadequate and misleading information."

"I, on the other hand, never express any view about the internal politics of Great Britain. Though I have met many Englishmen of all parties who are anxious to bring about an understanding between their country and Germany, I abstain from any attempt to judge British affairs, because I don't want to fall into the mistake that is so common with regard to my own country."¹

On 22 January 1935 at the dinner given in the Chancery of the Reich to the diplomatic representatives of foreign Powers Hitler talked to Lipski and referred to the approaching anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of 26 January 1934—the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Poland. Of that talk Lipski gave an account to Beck, writing on 24 January 1935; in this report he said: Le Chancelier a relevé en termes particulièrement cordiaux l'importance du rapprochement entre les deux nations. En s'étendant sur ce sujet, il dit que la thèse de la haine héréditaire polono-allemande était absolument erronée. Dans notre histoire commune, dit-il, il y eut des périodes de collaboration, au cours desquelles nous luttions contre des dangers communs venant de l'Orient. Nous avons également des liens dynastiques. . . . En poursuivant son idée, le Chancelier a fait observer que dans quelque huit ou neuf années, des relations toutes différentes se seront certainement établies entre les deux États. Ce sera lorsque les deux nations se connaîtront mieux et qu'auront disparu les anciens préjugés.

¹ *Daily Mail*, 18 Jan. 1935.

Il ajouta qu'effectivement, il existait encore en Allemagne des éléments qui agissent contre la Pologne. Ce sont ceux qui ne veulent pas que le gouvernement d'Hitler remporte des succès dans sa politique étrangère. De tels éléments doivent, sans nul doute, exister également en Pologne—a fait observer le Chancelier.

Il s'est étendu ensuite sur le problème russe et le danger qui menaçait du côté de l'Est. Il a fait observer que, suivant les informations des milieux militaires allemands ainsi que de son II^e Bureau, la Russie avait fait de très grands progrès dans le domaine militaire. Le moment pourrait bien venir où nos deux États seront obligés de se défendre contre une invasion venant de l'Est. À son avis, la politique menée par les Gouvernements précédents et en particulier par la Reichswehr, qui consistait en une collusion avec la Russie dirigée contre la Pologne, a été la plus grande absurdité politique. Lui-même eut, une fois, une violente controverse avec le général Schleicher, qui cherchait un rapprochement avec la Russie au détriment de la Pologne. Le Chancelier lui fit alors observer qu'une politique de ce genre aboutirait au renforcement du plus grand danger qui menaçait l'Allemagne, c'est-à-dire du danger soviétique, au cas même où une telle action devrait aboutir à arracher certains territoires à la Pologne. Le Chancelier connaît lui-même fort bien le bolchevisme, qu'il combat dès le début. À cette occasion le Chancelier rappela les luttes menées par lui contre le communisme en Bavière.¹

On 26 January 1935, the anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of 26 January 1934, the Non-Aggression

¹ *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la période 1933-1939. Recueil de documents officiels, Paris, Flammarion, p. 45.*

Pact between Germany and Poland, Hitler granted an interview to the representative of the "Gazeta Polska"; in this interview he said:

"La politique nationale-socialiste est déterminée par le fond idéologique de la doctrine nationale-socialiste. La doctrine raciale de l'idée nationale-socialiste écarte par principe tout ce qui constitue la prétendue dénationalisation. Dans l'annexion violente du patrimoine national étranger, elle voit plutôt un affaiblissement qu'un renforcement de celui qui lui appartient en propre. La politique entreprise par nous et qui consiste à respecter les peuples étrangers vivant à nos frontières répond donc au suprême degré au fond idéologique animant notre mouvement et par cela même à notre plus intime conviction. Nous ne songeons nullement à continuer les erreurs commises dans ce domaine par les siècles passés. L'essai de donner une nouvelle forme aux rapports du peuple allemand avec le peuple polonais est donc l'expression de cette volonté. Le siècle dernier a également fourni la preuve, que la dénationalisation d'éléments possédant une réelle valeur morale, si tant est qu'on puisse l'obtenir, ne pourrait l'être que par un processus extrêmement difficile et extrêmement lent. On ne peut gagner tout au plus que des éléments faibles et par cela même la plupart de peu de valeur. Cependant, leur conquête ne peut être en aucun cas considérée comme un succès, lequel n'est jamais proportionné aux malheurs et aux dangers qu'il entraîne. J'estime donc que tout gouvernement réfléchi doit considérer la protection réciproque des nationalités comme un des buts qu'il devrait avant tout tâcher d'atteindre. Mais il est clair qu'une politique pareille ne peut être réalisée avec succès que dans une compréhension réciproque."

"Je ne puis que répéter toujours: l'Allemagne veut vivre en paix avec tous ses voisins et elle est prête à

concéder généreusement tout ce qui est nécessaire pour atteindre un tel résultat."

"Je suis du reste heureux, après un an où les rapports germano-polonais ont trouvé une nouvelle forme, de pouvoir jeter un regard sur cette période et attirer l'attention sur les résultats si fertiles de ce développement. Nous avons réussi de faire à temps une des plus importantes corrections historiques. Je veux parler d'une erreur qui prétendait que la haine entre les deux peuples était une espèce de tradition héréditaire, qu'elle aurait toujours existé et qu'elle devait durer jusque dans l'avenir le plus lointain. Je crois au contraire, malgré les lourdes difficultés qui existent entre ces deux peuples, qu'il est néanmoins de leur devoir de collaborer sincèrement à la conservation de la civilisation européenne. Le régime national-socialiste en Allemagne n'omettra rien de ce qui pourra contribuer à une pareille collaboration et à une évolution progressive vers une amitié durable. La journée d'aujourd'hui m'autorise plus que jamais à croire à la réalisation d'un pareil désir."¹

On 7 February 1935 Hitler received the new Japanese ambassador; he said:

"The German people brings to the great Japanese nation its unbounded admiration for its time-honoured civilization and its outstanding achievements. I am glad to be able to state that on the basis of a unity of spirit the development of the political and economic relations of our two nations has also been marked by sincere friendship, a friendship which, as you have pointed out, has already become a tradition."

¹ I have not the original text of the report; I cite the translation of the report given in *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la période 1933-1939. Recueil des documents officiels*, Paris, Flammarion, pp. 46-7.

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"I welcome your Excellency's statement that you regard it as your highest task, through an understanding co-operation founded on mutual respect, to devote your energies to the further development of our mutual relations. Rest assured that both I and the Government of the Reich are guided by the same purpose and will do everything in our power to lighten the duties of your high office."¹

In his speech at Munich on the celebration of the 15th anniversary of the Proclamation of the Programme of the Party (24 February 1935) Hitler said:

"To-day I would wish only to repeat what I first proclaimed here fifteen years ago. We are determined to know only one 'Yes' and one 'No'. For peace, always 'Yes', for the denial of German honour, always 'No'."

"And that the world must understand. Our 'Yes' remains 'Yes' and our 'No' remains 'No'. We are no waverers. If we have for fifteen years under circumstances of the greatest difficulty remained true to our programme, we shall not be false to it in the years to come. We are ready for any co-operation so far as this is compatible with the honour of a free and independent nation. We are resolved to stand without a moment's hesitation upon our own feet if the world demands from us anything unworthy. And we regard as a violation of our honour every attempt to measure our rights by any other standard than that by which the rights of other peoples are measured."

"The rest of the world, too, will have to learn to change its ways.² It must take from its memory the fourteen years before we came to power and in their place it must set the memory of the history of the

¹ F.Z., 8 Feb. 1935.

² German: *Auch die andere Welt wird unlernen müssen.*

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thousand years which came before that time, and it will then know that though, through a dishonourable leadership, for fourteen years, this people lost its honour, yet for a thousand years before then it had been brave, strong, and honourable. And it can be assured that the Germany which lives to-day is identical with the eternal Germany."

"The shameful interim-state is past! The nation is united in its efforts towards peace and is determined in its defence of Germany's freedom. We want nothing else than to live decently amongst other peoples. We wish to threaten no people's freedom. But to everyone we say that he who wishes to rob the German people of its freedom can do that only by violence and that against violence we shall defend ourselves—every man of us."

"Never will I or a Government coming after me which derives from the spirit of this Movement set the nation's signature to a document which means the voluntary surrender of Germany's honour or of her equality of rights. But, on the other hand, the world can also be convinced that if we do put our signature to anything, then we hold to it. What we believe we cannot hold to, either because it violates our honour or is beyond our powers, we will never sign. What we have once signed we will—blindly and loyally—fulfil."¹

In his speech to the people of the Saar delivered on 1 March 1935 at Saarbrücken during the celebrations after the return to the Reich of the Saar territory Hitler said:

"This day is not a day of good fortune for Germany alone. I believe that this day is a fortunate day for the whole of Europe. It was a blessed decision to fix the day [for the plebiscite] and to respect its result—to restore

¹ *F.Z.*, 26 Feb. 1935.

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to the German Reich this territory which so easily could have become a permanent apple of discord, this territory which had been torn away against all justice and reason."

"A day of happy fortune for Europe especially, because through this return of the Saar territory there can perhaps be best removed that crisis under which two great nations have had to suffer most. We hope that through this act of conciliatory justice, through this restoration of natural reason, the relations between Germany and France will be finally improved. Just as we wish for peace so must we hope that the great neighbour-people will be ready and willing to seek this peace with us. It must be possible that two great peoples should unite their hands in order that, working together, they may attack those distresses which threaten to bury Europe beneath their weight."

"And this day shall at the same time be a lesson, a lesson for all those who, in ignorance of an eternal historical truth, imagine that through terrorism or violence they can rob a people of its inmost character, a lesson for those who think they can tear away a part of a nation in order to steal from it its soul. Would that all statesmen from this experience might realize one thing—that it is useless to seek to tear asunder peoples by such methods. In the end blood is stronger than all paper documents. What ink wrote will one day be blotted out by blood. This deepest voice will in the end sharply, clearly, drown every other sound. Woe to him who can learn nothing from these facts. He will bring distress and trouble upon men without attaining his purpose. He will for the time being bring suffering and distress upon the peoples, but in the end he will be shamefully defeated."¹

¹ *F.Z.*, 3 Mar. 1935.

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The Proclamation reintroducing conscription for the German army issued on 16 March 1935 was in great part translated in "The Times" of 18 March 1935: it will suffice here to translate the closing paragraphs of the Proclamation.

The Proclamation first details the extent of the measures of disarmament taken by Germany; it then proceeds to recount the various efforts made to reach an agreed plan of disarmament and their failure, and, as a result of this failure, it states:

In these circumstances the German Government was forced "of its own motion to take the necessary measures to bring to an end the unworthy and in the last resort menacing state of powerless defencelessness of a great people and Reich".

"In this the Government was influenced by the same considerations as those which Mr. Baldwin so truly expressed in his last speech: 'A country which shows itself unwilling to make what necessary preparations are requisite for its own defence will never have force, moral or material, in this world.'"¹

"But the Government of the German Reich of to-day desires only a single moral and material power—that is the power to be able to safeguard peace for the Reich and thereby for the whole of Europe."

"It has therefore taken all further steps which lay within its power which might serve to advance the cause of peace:

"1. It has for a long time past offered to all neighbouring States the conclusion of pacts of non-aggression."

"2. With its neighbouring State on the East it has sought and found a treaty arrangement which, thanks to ready understanding on the part of that State, has, the

¹ The passage is quoted from the close of Mr. Baldwin's speech in the House of Commons on 11 Mar. 1935 as reported in *The Times*, 12 Mar. 1935.

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Government hopes¹ for all time, cleared the poisonous and threatening atmosphere which it found in existence when it came into power and which will lead to a permanent understanding and friendship between the two peoples."

"3. Finally it has given to France the solemn assurance that Germany, now that the question of the Saar has been settled, will not make or raise any further territorial claims on France. It believes that thereby in a form which can have but few parallels in history it has created the conditions for the termination of a century-long dispute between two great nations, through a heavy political and material sacrifice."

"The German Government must, however, to its regret, observe that for months past there has been taking place a continuous increase in armaments on the part of the rest of the world. It sees in the creation of a Soviet-Russian army of 101 divisions, i.e. an admitted peace-strength of 960,000 men, an element that could not have been contemplated at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles."

"It sees in the speeding-up of similar measures in other States further proofs of the rejection of the idea of disarmament which had formerly been proclaimed. The German Government has no intention of wishing to level a reproach against any State: but to-day it feels bound to put on record that through the introduction, which has now been decreed, in France of a two-years' period of military service the conceptions which underlay the creation of short-service defensive armies have been abandoned in favour of a long-service organization."

"But the short-service system was one of the arguments on which was based the claim that Germany should sacrifice her Reichswehr."

¹ *Of* in German text in *V.B.* must, I think, be a misprint for *hofft*.

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"The German Government feels that in these circumstances it is impossible any longer to delay the measures which are necessary for the security of the Reich or indeed to fail to disclose those measures to others."

"If therefore the German Government now complies with the wish expressed in the speech of the English Minister Baldwin on 28 November 1934 for information on German intentions it does so

1. In order to give to the German people the conviction and to the other States the knowledge that the safeguarding and security of the German Reich from henceforth will be entrusted to the German nation's own strength. And
2. in order that through fixing the extent of the German measures it may invalidate all insinuations that the German people is seeking to establish a military hegemony in Europe."

"What the German Government, as protector of the honour and interests of the German nation, desires is to secure such a measure of military force as is necessary not merely for maintaining the integrity of the German Reich but also for assuring international respect and esteem for Germany as co-guarantor of general peace."

"For at this hour the German Government renews before the German people and before the entire world the affirmation of its resolve never to go beyond that which the protection of German honour and the freedom of the Reich demand and especially it affirms that it wishes in the national German armament to create no instrument of military aggression, but on the contrary to create exclusively an instrument of defence and therefore an instrument for the maintenance of peace."

"The Government of the German Reich further expresses the confident hope that the German people which thus once more finds its way back to its honour

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may be able in independence and the enjoyment of equal rights to make its contribution to the pacification of the world in free and frank co-operation with the other nations and their Governments."

"It is with this end in view that the Government of the German Reich has to-day decided on the following law":

There followed the text of the law dated 16 March 1935 establishing the general obligation to military service and the fixing of the peace-strength of the German army at 36 divisions.¹

After the introduction of military conscription, in an interview with Mr. G. Ward Price on 17 March 1935 Hitler said:

"The German people wants no war. It wants to be peaceful and happy. It wants, above all, to be able to respect itself."

"Self-respect is what I have given to the German nation. They could not go on living under the humiliating depression of the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles."

"They will never cease to be grateful to me as the man who has freed them from those restrictions."

"Wherever you might go in Germany to-day the people would be ready to embrace me for the rehabilitation that I have given them by the proclamation which I issued on Saturday."

¹ *V.B.*, 17-18 Mar. 1935. There is a translation of the whole Proclamation in the *New York Times* for 17 Mar. 1935 which is reproduced in *Documents on International Affairs 1935*, London, Oxford University Press, 1936, pp. 58-64. Translation of the law of 16 Mar., *ibid.*, p. 64. The text both of the Proclamation and of the law can be found in *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, iii (1937), pp. 58-63. Cf. the article by the Reichswehr-Minister von Blomberg (*V.B.*, 20 Mar. 1935) which is reprinted *ibid.*, pp. 63-5.

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"This is a great nation. It did not deserve the humiliations through which it has passed. Its heart is filled with joy because it has been released from them; but, believe me, that joy implies no feeling of aggression towards any other Power and no possible increase in the danger of war". . . .

"One thing you must know: The German people does not want war. It simply wants equal rights for all—and that is all". . . .

"The restoration of German national authority in matters of armament is a reparation of the violated sovereignty of a great Power."

"It would be absurd to think that a State which has recovered its sovereignty is less disposed to enter into negotiations than a State which possesses only a diminished sovereignty."

"On the contrary, the fact that we are a fully sovereign State makes us the more ready to treat with other sovereign States."

Hitler was asked whether Germany regarded herself as pledged to the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

"The restoration of German sovereignty in military matters", *answered the Chancellor*, "affects the Versailles Treaty only in that respect in which the refusal of other Powers to fulfil their corresponding engagements to disarm had, in point of fact, already—quite apart from this—destroyed its validity."

"The German Government is quite clear that a revision of the territorial dispositions of international treaties can never be effected by unilateral measures". . . .

"There is no difference anywhere in Germany. What this may convey to you is that the German people regard yesterday's act on the part of the German Government as being of a moral rather than a military character."

"For fifteen years the German nation has suffered

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under clauses of the Peace Treaty which it felt to be an infringement of the indisputable individual rights of every people."

"If the world as a whole had disarmed, the German people would have been only too content."

"It was, however, felt to be a monstrous and humiliating outrage that the rest of the world should be arming while it disputed any right on the part of Germany to assure her own self-defence."

"What made Germany's defenceless position still more intolerable, however, was that it led to an uninterrupted series of indignities. You can well realize, therefore, the proud happiness that the restoration of its honour has brought to the German nation". . . .

It was thus "possible for me in the proclamation by which I re-established German sovereignty in military matters to plead the cause of peace plainly and firmly and to offer our co-operation for the preservation of concord between the nations".¹

In his speech on May Day 1935 Hitler said:

"What we want lies clear before us: not war and not strife (*Unfrieden*). Just as we have established peace within our own people, so we want nothing else than peace with the world. For we all know that our great work can succeed only in a time of peace. But just as the leadership of the nation in the domestic sphere has never sacrificed its honour in its relations with the German people, so it can never surrender the honour of the German people in its dealings with the world."

"We know what we owe to the world. May the world come to understand what she can never deny to a proud people, and above all may she comprehend one thing: the Germany of to-day is not the Germany of yesterday

¹ *Daily Mail*, 18 Mar. 1935.

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—just as little as the Germany of yesterday was the Germany of to-day. The German people of the present time is not the German people of the day before yesterday, but the German people of the two thousand years of German history which lie behind us.”¹

*When he received the new Bulgarian Ambassador on 3 May 1935 Hitler stressed the traditional friendship which bound the two countries together and their wish for peace.*²

In an interview with Mr. Edward Price Bell, of which a report was published in the “Literary Digest” in May 1935, Hitler said:

“Nobody in this Germany, nobody in this unified and disciplined State wants war. Moreover, nobody here will take any step to cause war.”

“We are ready, and always have been, to sign any document whose full requirements can be foreseen, and whose clear aim is peace. We will sign non-aggression pacts with all the world, but we will not sign a multi-lateral pact of mutual assistance in the East.”

“In no circumstances would Germany fight for the Bolsheviks. Rather than sign such a pact I would hang myself.”

Herr Hitler emphasized his eagerness for the proposed Western Air Convention. In his view, this would represent a great instrument of reassurance and tranquillity. He declared that there were no territorial questions about which Germany would go to war.

“We have renounced solemnly all such purposes. We have, of course, a deep and constant sympathy with those of our own blood beyond our boundaries, but we

¹ F.Z., 2 May 1935.

² I have no report of Hitler's speech on this occasion: but cf. *Die Reden des Führers nach der Machtübernahme. Eine Bibliographie*, Berlin, Eher, 1939, p. 89.

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cannot make war on their account. What profit would there be in regaining a few hundred thousand souls at the cost of the slaughter of millions?"

"Europe is not big enough for a war under modern conditions."

"War has been speeded up too much, and made too overwhelmingly destructive for our geographical limitations. Within an hour—in some instances within 40 minutes of the outbreak of hostilities—swift bombing machines would wreak ruin upon European capitals."

"The modern armies of Europe remind one of a 100-h.p. motor-boat on a lake three miles long."

"Mankind to-day has one great task—to safeguard the peace of the world. The Germany of National Socialism is no sabre-rattler, and if it has recourse to what I might call power diplomacy, the reason is that it lives in a world of power diplomacy."

"Have we not proved our desire for peace? Towards the West Germany is bound by the Locarno Pacts. Towards the East she has a treaty with Poland not to employ any kind of force for ten years."

"This treaty of peace was not made under any compulsion; it was influenced in no way by the League of Nations."

To a question whether he thought Germany and France would some day be trusting friends, Hitler replied: "Yes. This age-old quarrel will take its place with forgotten follies and bitterness some day. Europe cannot have a peace worthy of the name until it does. France cannot liquidate us; we cannot liquidate France."

"We are fixed for ever in our positions of neighbourhood. The old chapter will eventually be closed. French ideas that we would fight a war of revenge, if we were given the chance, show a misreading both of us and of history."

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"Wars of revenge are out of date. In the old days a deliberate maker of war may have been a patriot; to-day he is a traitor, leading his people in the valley of the shadow of death."

Hitler asked the interviewer to emphasize one fact. It was this: "We are, by conviction and basic tenet, not only non-Imperialistic, but anti-Imperialistic. Just as we wish not to be assimilated, so we do not wish to assimilate others. We have quite enough to do to build up an orderly, just and happy life for our own people."

"Does that mean that you would refuse to take back any former colonies offered to you?" asked the interviewer.

"Those we would accept willingly. Our return to the status of a colonial power would be purely a matter of recognizing the equality of Germany with other great civilized powers."

Questioned about the League of Nations, Hitler declared: "If the principle of true equality were made the basis of the League, we would return to it."¹

MEMEL

Bibliographical Note

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¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 10 May 1935.

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in the *German-Polish Borderlands*, London, Oxford University Press, 1936, pp. 419-56, 484-7, 525. For the history of the Memel territory down to 1926 see Fred-Hermann Deu, *Das Schicksal des deutschen Memelgebietes. Seine wirtschaftliche und politische Entwicklung seit der Revolution*. Berlin-Hessenwinkel, Verlag der Neuen Gesellschaft, 1927 (with photographs); this contains a German translation of the Memel Convention of 8 May 1924 and of the Statute for the Memel Territory, also the text of the German-Lithuanian Optants-Treaty of 10 February 1925. For the text of the Convention of 1924 with its annexes see Société des Nations, *Recueil des Traités*, vol. xxix (1924), pp. 86-115, or *Foreign Office Treaty Series*, No. 48 (1925), Cmd. 2541 (English text). For the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles concerning Memel cf. F. Janz, *Die Entstehung des Memelgebietes, zugleich ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Versailler Vertrags*, Berlin-Lichterfelde, Runge, 1928, with appendix of documents pp. 97-132; and for the study of the Memel Convention cf. J. Hallier, *Die Rechtslage des Memelgebiets. Eine völker- und staatsrechtliche Untersuchung der Memelkonvention* (= Frankfurter Abhandlungen zum modernen Völkerrecht, edd. F. Giese and K. Strupp, Heft 39). Leipzig, Noske, 1933; Stasys Daukša, *Le Régime d'Autonomie du Territoire de Klaipėda. Organisation judiciaire*. Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1937 (with full bibliography, pp. 315-24); T. V. Kalijarvi, *The Memel Statute: its Origin, Legal Nature, and Observation to the Present Day*. London, Robert Hale, 1937 (written 1935), with bibliography pp. 245-56.

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einer deutschen Mehrheit", *ibid.*, pp. 242-54; David Stephens, "The German Problem in Memel", *Slavonic and East European Review*, xiv (1935-6), pp. 321-31.

In the Reichstag on 21 May 1935 Hitler delivered a very long and important speech. Of this speech I have here reproduced from the authorized English translation those parts of the speech dealing with foreign policy which would appear to be of most significance. Hitler said:

"This new Germany cannot be compared with the Germany of the past. Its ideas are just as new as its actions. The spirit of *bourgeois* jingoism as a decisive political factor has been just as much overcome as the tendencies of Marxist internationalism. If the present Germany advocates peace, it does so neither owing to weakness nor to cowardice. It advocates peace from another standpoint regarding people and State, namely the standpoint of National Socialism. For National Socialism regards the forcible amalgamation of one people with another alien people not only as a worthless political aim, but in the long run as a danger to the internal unity and hence the strength of a nation. National Socialism therefore dogmatically rejects the idea of national assimilation. That also disposes of the *bourgeois* belief in a possible 'Germanization'."

"It is therefore neither our wish nor our intention to deprive alien sections of our population of their nationalism, language, or culture, in order to replace these by something German and foreign to them. We issue no directions for the Germanization of non-German names; on the contrary, we do not wish that. Our racial theory therefore regards every war for the subjection and domination of an alien people as a proceeding which sooner or later changes and weakens the victor internally, and eventually brings about his defeat. But we do not

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believe for a moment that in Europe the nations whose nationalism has been completely consolidated could in the era of the principle of nationalities be deprived of their national birthright at all. The last 150 years provide more than enough instructive warnings of this. In no future war will the European national States be able to achieve—apart from the temporary weakening of their opponents—more than petty adjustments of national frontiers, of no consequence in comparison with the sacrifices made.”

“But the permanent state of war that will be established between the various peoples by such intentions may perhaps appear advantageous to various political and economic interests. For the nations, however, it merely means burdens and misfortune. The blood shed on the European continent in the course of the last 300 years bears no proportion to the national result of the events. In the end France has remained France, Germany Germany, Poland Poland, and Italy Italy. What dynastic egoism, political passion and patriotic blindness have attained in the way of apparently far-reaching political changes by shedding rivers of blood has, as regards national feeling, done no more than touched the skin of the nations. It has not substantially altered their fundamental characters. If these States had applied merely a fraction of their sacrifices to wiser purposes the success would certainly have been greater and more permanent.”

“When I, as a National Socialist, advocate this view perfectly frankly, I am also influenced by the following realization. The principal effect of every war is to destroy the flower of the nation. But as there is no longer any unoccupied space in Europe, every victory—without making any difference to the fundamental distress in Europe—can at best result in a quantitative

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increase in the number of the inhabitants of a country. But if the nations attach so much value to that, they can achieve it without tears in a simpler and more natural way. A sound social policy, by increasing the readiness of a nation to have children, can give its own people more children in a few years than the number of aliens that could be conquered and made subject to that nation by war."

"No! National Socialist Germany wants peace because of its fundamental convictions. And it wants peace also owing to the realization of the simple primitive fact that no war would be likely essentially to alter the distress in Europe. It would probably increase it. Present-day Germany is engaged in the tremendous work of making good the damage done to it internally. None of our projects of a practical nature will be completed before a period of from ten to twenty years. None of our tasks of an ideal kind can be completed before fifty or perhaps a hundred years have passed. I started the National Socialist Revolution by bringing the Movement into being, and since then I have directed the Revolution into the path of action. I know that none of us will live to see more than the very beginning of this great revolutionary development. What then could I wish more than peace and tranquillity? But if it is said that this is merely the desire of the leaders, I can reply that if only the leaders and rulers desire peace, the nations themselves will never wish for war."

"Germany needs peace and desires peace. And when I now hear from the lips of a British statesman that such assurances are nothing, and that the only proof of sincerity is the signature appended to collective pacts, I must ask Mr. Eden to be good enough to remember that it is a question of an 'assurance' in any case. It is sometimes much easier to sign treaties with the mental reser-

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vation that one will reconsider one's attitude at the decisive hour than to declare, before an entire nation and with full publicity, one's adherence to a policy which serves the cause of peace because it rejects anything that may lead to war."

"I might have signed ten treaties, but such action would not have been of the same importance as the statement I made to France on the occasion of the Saar plebiscite. When I, as the Führer and representative of the German nation, gave to the world and to my own people the assurance that with the settlement of the Saar question no further territorial demands would be made on France, that was a contribution to peace much greater than many a signature under many a pact. I believe that this solemn declaration really ought to have put an end to a quarrel of long duration between these two nations. We made it in the belief that this conflict and the sacrifices involved were for both nations out of all proportion to the object which has constantly been and would be the cause of so much general suffering and misfortune."

"But if such a declaration only receives the answer that it has been 'taken cognizance of' then there naturally remains for us nothing else to do but to 'take cognizance of' this reply too. But I must protest here against every attempt to interpret statements differently according to requirements. If the German Government gives an assurance in the name of the German people that they wish nothing but peace, then this declaration is either of exactly the same value as their signature under any specially worded pact, or otherwise this signature could not be of more value than the solemn declaration."

"It is peculiar that in the history of nations inflated formulae frequently occur which would hardly withstand exact examination in the light of reason."

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"For some time the world has been suffering, for instance, from a regular mania for collective co-operation, collective security, collective obligations and so on, all of which seem to have a concrete meaning at the first glance, but which, when regarded more closely, at least allow of manifold interpretations."

"What is meant by collective co-operation?"

"Who shall determine what is collective co-operation and what is not?"

"Has the term 'collective co-operation' not been interpreted in the most different ways for the last seventeen years?"

"I believe I am right when I say that besides many other rights the victor States of the Versailles Treaty have also arbitrarily assumed the right to decide, without allowing anyone to contradict them, what 'collective co-operation' is and what it is not."

"In allowing myself to criticize this procedure here, I do so because it is the simplest way in which the essential necessity of the latest decisions of the Government of the Reich can be explained and understanding for our real intentions awakened."

"The present idea of collective co-operation among the nations is in essence and fundamentally the intellectual property of President Wilson. The policy of the pre-War period was determined rather by the idea of separate alliances of the nations brought together by common interests. Rightly or wrongly, this policy was formerly held responsible for the outbreak of the World War. Its termination—at least as far as Germany is concerned—was hastened by the doctrine of Wilson's fourteen points and the three points that supplemented them later. The essential ideas laid down in them to prevent a similar catastrophe happening again to mankind were as follows:"

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"The Peace should not be a Peace of unilateral rights but of general equality and henceforth of universal justice. It should be a peace of reconciliation, of general disarmament, and thereby of general security. From this resulted as crowning achievement the idea of international collective collaboration of all States and nations within a League of Nations."

"I should like at this juncture to reaffirm that no nation greeted these ideas more eagerly at the end of the War than Germany. Her sufferings and sacrifices were far more severe than those of any other nation which had taken part in the War. It was in reliance upon these promises that the German soldiers laid down their arms."

"When in 1919 the Peace of Versailles was dictated to the German people death sentence was thereby pronounced upon collective collaboration of the nations. For where there should have been equality there was division into victors and vanquished. Instead of equal rights there was discrimination between those with rights and those without. Instead of general reconciliation there was punishment of the defeated. Instead of international disarmament, the disarmament of the vanquished. Instead of general security there was security for the victors."

"Yet even in the dictated Peace of Versailles it was expressly provided that the disarmament of Germany should only be carried out first to enable the others to disarm also. Here we are afforded an instance of the extent to which the idea of collective collaboration has been violated by those who are to-day its loudest protagonists."

Hitler then gave details of the extent of German disarmament (authorized English translation, pp. 14-16) and quoted statements of foreign statesmen acknowledging that "the contractual obligation in the Peace Treaty to disarm

is binding not only on Germany but also on the other States.”¹ “Germany had disarmed. The other States really could not assert that any danger threatened them from a State which had become completely helpless from a military point of view.”

“If, on the other hand, the other nations had disarmed this would have given such a tremendous moral strength to the League of Nations that no State could have dared to have had recourse to violence against a partner in this collective system of general disarmament afterwards.”

“Then would have been the best opportunity to convert theoretical doctrines into an actual ‘deed’. And this all the more so because:—”

“From the political point of view also the necessary conditions had been fulfilled. For Germany was then a democracy such as has never before existed. Everything had been exactly copied and dutifully imitated from the existing great models. It was not National Socialism which ruled in Germany. Even *bourgeois* nationalism had almost completely disappeared. The world of party politics stretched from Social Democracy by way of the Centre Party to the Democratic Party, and not only resembled outwardly in its ‘*Weltanschauung*’ the world around it, but felt itself programmatically bound up with it. What then were they waiting for?”

“Could there have been a better opportunity to set up a collective system of co-operation than at the time when in Germany that spirit ruled exclusively which also inspired the world around her? No! The time was ripe, it was there, only the will was not.”

“In demonstrating the breaches of the Treaty of Ver-

¹ Statements of Lord Robert Cecil (in 1924 and on 31 Dec. 1930), Paul Boncour (8 Apr. 1927, 26 Apr. 1930), Arthur Henderson (20 Jan. 1931), Briand (20 Jan. 1931), Vandervelde (27 Feb. 1927 and 29 Dec. 1930).

sailles by the other side I will not refer at all to the fact that they had not disarmed. Even if one believes that at that time there may have been valid objections to excuse the breach of the obligation to disarm, it will be hard to give the reasons which led to an ever increasing rearmament."

"That is the decisive point."

"The other States have not only failed to disarm, but they have on the contrary supplemented their armaments, improved them, and increased them."

"The reply has been made that there have been to some extent limitations of personnel—but this reply is no valid excuse. These limitations of personnel were more than made up for by the technical and planned improvement of the most modern weapons of warfare. Incidentally they could easily be made good."

"And one must pay especial attention to the following:"

"During the course of the disarmament negotiations the attempt was made to divide armament into weapons which were more suitable for defence and those which were more suitable for attack."

"I must here point out that Germany did not possess any of the weapons at all which were designated as suitable for attack. They were all destroyed without exception. And it must further be pointed out that it was these very weapons which were suitable and designed for attack that the partners of the Peace Treaty developed, improved and increased to the very utmost extent."

"Germany had destroyed all her aircraft. She not only had no active aerial weapons but she did not even have any weapons for warding off attack from the air."

"At the same time, however, the other partners to the Treaty not only failed to destroy their existing aircraft, but on the contrary they developed it to a vast extent."

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Hitler then gave details of recent improvements and new developments in armaments (ibid., pp. 21-4). He continued: "This was the contribution to the problem of disarmament on the part of the States which under the Treaty of Versailles had undertaken to follow the example of Germany and destroy their submarine weapon. These are only single facts. They can be supplemented and completed at will in every direction. Taken together, they are a proof, which can be supported by documentary evidence at any time, that contrary to the obligations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, not only was the disarmament policy ignored by the signatories, but a constant increase and improvement of high-class weapons of war was undertaken."

"So they did what was absolutely contrary not only to President Wilson's intentions, but also—in the opinion of the most prominent representatives of the other side—contrary to the obligations to which they had subscribed in the Treaty of Versailles."

"If that is not a glaring example of breach of the Treaty and indeed one-sided breach of the Treaty, after the other partner had completely fulfilled his obligations, it will be difficult to see what is the use of signing treaties in future at all."

"No. . . . There is no excuse and no glossing over that fact. For Germany in her completely defenceless and unarmed state was really anything but a danger for the other States."

"In spite of years of waiting in vain for the fulfilment of the Treaty by the other side, Germany was still prepared not to refuse to take part in a plan for genuine collective co-operation. The British Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Eden, says that readiness to arrive at parity in the quantitative determination of defensive strengths was to be met with everywhere. If that is so it is all the more

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to be regretted that no practical steps were taken as a consequence. It was not Germany that wrecked the plan for an army of 200,000 men for all European States, but the other States which did not wish to disarm. And finally it was also not Germany that rejected the British proposal for mediation in the spring of 1934, but the French Government, which broke off the negotiations on the subject on the 17th of March 1934."

"The hope is now frequently expressed that Germany might herself come forward with a constructive plan. I have made such proposals not once but several times. If my constructive plan for an army of 300,000 men had been adopted, then perhaps many a care would have been less and many a burden lighter to-day. But it is almost useless to present constructive plans when their rejection can be regarded as certain from the start. Nevertheless, I propose once more to give a short survey of our views. This is done solely from the feeling that it is our duty to leave no stone unturned in order to restore the necessary internal security to Europe and the feeling of solidarity to the European nations."

"After the other States had not only failed to fulfil their obligation to disarm, but in addition all proposals for a limitation of armaments had also been declined, I felt myself obliged, as the Führer of the German nation, responsible to God and my own conscience, in face of the growth of new military alliances and after receiving the information that France was introducing a two-year period of service, to restore once more, by virtue of the right to life of the nation itself, the legal equality of Germany, which has been refused her internationally. It was not Germany who thus broke a contractual obligation which had been laid upon her but those States which had compelled us to adopt this independent action. The introduction of the universal military service

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and the promulgation of the law for the establishment of the new German army were nothing else than the restoration to Germany of a status of equal rights which threatens nobody but guarantees Germany security."

"In this connexion I cannot avoid expressing my astonishment here at a statement which was publicly made by the British Prime Minister, Mr. MacDonald, who said—with regard to the restoration of a German defence force—that the other States had been right after all in being cautious about disarmament. If this view is generally adopted, any sort of conduct may be expected in the future. For, according to this view, every breach of a treaty will be subsequently condoned because the other partner is supposed to deduce the same consequences; that is to say, A and B conclude a treaty. B fulfils his obligation and A fails to observe his obligation: After years of warning B also finally states that the treaty is no longer valid for him, whereupon A is entitled to declare that thereby his previous breach of the treaty has now received subsequent moral justification, in that B has now also abandoned the treaty."

"I should like here to deal just briefly with the reproaches and imputations which have been levelled against the restoration of the German military service."

"It is stated in the first place that Germany is not menaced by anyone and hence, secondly, that it is not comprehensible why Germany should rearm at all."

"This would give rise to the counter-question of why the other side, who in any case could feel less menaced by a disarmed Germany than vice versa, did not stop rearming and finally reduce armaments. But when it is asserted that Germany menaces the other States by rearming, then the increase of the armaments of the other States was at least a much greater menace for a disarmed and defenceless Germany."

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"I believe that in this case there is only a choice of one thing or the other. If warlike armaments are a menace to peace, then they are a menace for all States. But if they are not a war menace, then they are not a menace for any State. It will not do for one group to represent their armaments as an olive branch of peace and those of the others as the devil's wand. A tank is a tank, and a bomb is a bomb. The opinion that it is possible to divide up the world for all time into States with different rights will always be recognized only by the one side. The German nation, in any case, is not prepared to be regarded and treated for all time as a second-class nation or one with inferior rights. Our love of peace is perhaps greater than that of the other nations, for we suffered most from this unhappy war. No one of us means to threaten anybody. It is only that we are all determined to secure and maintain equality for the German people. But this equality is also the primary prerequisite for every form of practical and collective co-operation."

"So long as there are any mental reservations in this respect, really successful European co-operation will be impossible from the start. Once in possession of absolute equality of rights, Germany will never refuse to participate in those efforts which are intended to serve the cause of human peace, progress, and economic welfare. I believe, however, that I must not refrain here from criticizing certain methods which have their origin in the dictated Peace Treaty of Versailles and which are responsible for the failure of so many endeavours that were certainly well meant."

"The world is living to-day in the age of conferences. If many of these meetings were completely unsuccessful, then the reason for this disappointment is not infrequently to be found in the way in which the programme

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was drawn up and in the kind of goal which it was desired to achieve. Some cabinet or other feels—like all the others—that it is necessary to do something for the peace of Europe, which is considered to be menaced. But instead of communicating the general idea to all those whom it is proposed should co-operate, with the wish to learn the views of the various States and of their Governments regarding the possible ways and means of dealing with and solving this question, a complete programme is drawn up between two or three chancelleries. In such cases it is frequently difficult to resist the impression that, in fixing the contents of the resolutions to be adopted, the wish is the father of the thought in mingling the possible with the impossible and thus bringing about certain failure at the cost of those invited to participate later. For, while two or three States agree upon a programme laid down in such detail, the party subsequently invited is merely informed of the contents of such a programme, with the remark that this programme is an inseparable whole, and must either be accepted or rejected in its entirety. As very good ideas may naturally be found in such a programme, the State which does not agree to the whole draft is thereby held responsible for the failure of the useful parts as well. The procedure is very reminiscent of the practice of certain film distributors who adopt the principle of always distributing good and bad films together." . . .

"So far as Germany is concerned, I can only say the following in regard to such attempts:—"

"We shall take part in no further conference if we have not had our share in the drawing up of the programme from the outset. Because two or three States dish up a draft treaty, we have no wish to be the first to sample it; which is not, however, to say that we do not reserve the right to give our assent and signature subse-

quently to a treaty because we were not present when it was drafted or at the conferences themselves. Not at all. . . . It is quite possible that in its final shape and form a treaty may satisfy us as being useful although we were present neither when it was drafted nor at the conference in which it was accepted by a number of States. We would not on that account hesitate to assent to and sign such a treaty afterwards under certain conditions, in so far as it seemed desirable and possible. The German Government must reserve the right to decide for itself when this is the case."

"I must, however, again emphasize the fact that to draft programmes for conferences with the heading 'All or Nothing' seems to me to be the wrong method."

"Such a principle I consider to be altogether impractical in political life. I believe that much more would have been achieved towards the pacification of Europe if people had been content to accept what was attainable in each instance as it arose. In recent years hardly a draft treaty has come up for discussion where one point or another was not generally accepted. Because, however, it was assumed that these points necessarily hung together with others which for some States were difficult to accept and for other States absolutely unacceptable, the good that could have been accomplished was left unattained and the whole attempt miscarried. It seems to me an equally doubtful procedure to misuse the thesis of the indivisibility of peace as an excuse for interpretations which—intentionally or unintentionally—serve the cause of war preparations rather than that of general security. In this respect the World War should serve as a terrible warning. I do not believe that Europe can survive such a catastrophe for a second time without the most frightful upheaval. But such a catastrophe can arise all the more easily when the possibility of localizing

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smaller conflicts has been rendered less and less by an international network of intersecting obligations, and the danger of numerous States and nations being dragged into the struggle becomes all the greater. So far as Germany is concerned I wish to leave no shadow of doubt in what I am about to say:—”

“Germany has solemnly recognized and guaranteed France her frontiers as determined after the Saar plebiscite. Without taking the past into account Germany has concluded a non-aggression pact with Poland. This is more than a valuable contribution to European peace, and we shall adhere to it unconditionally. We dearly wish that it may continue without interruption and that it may tend to still more profound and friendly sincerity in the mutual relationships between our two countries. We did all this although we thereby finally renounced, for instance, all claims to Alsace-Lorraine, a land for which we have also fought two great wars. But we did it in particular to spare our own German nation a new and terrible sacrifice of lives. We are convinced that in so doing we are benefiting not only our own people, but also this frontier territory. We are prepared to do everything on our part to arrive at a true peace and a real friendship with the French nation. With the understanding and heartfelt friendship of genuine nationalists, we recognise Poland as the home of a great and nationally conscious people. While wishing to spare the German nation further bloodshed even where the renunciation of war implies a certain sacrifice, we certainly have no intention of pledging our blood, without right of choice, for the sake of foreign interests. We do not intend to enable anybody to sell by treaty the people of Germany, her manhood and her sons, in some conflict for which we cannot lay down conditions and which we cannot influence. The German soldier is too valuable and we

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love our people too well to commit ourselves to mutual assistance pacts where our undertakings are not defined."

"We believe that we can thus serve the cause of peace much better. For it can but enhance the necessary feeling of responsibility on the part of every individual State to know from the beginning that it possesses no mighty and powerful military allies in an eventual conflict."

"Here, too, of course, there are things which are possible and things which are not."

"As an example I should like to deal briefly with the Eastern pact as proposed to us."

"In this pact we find a mutual assistance clause which in our view may lead to completely unforeseeable consequences. The German Reich—and in particular the present German Government—have no other wish than to live on friendly and peaceful terms with all neighbouring States. We entertain these feelings not only towards the larger States, but also towards the neighbouring smaller States. Indeed, in so far as they have a really independent existence we welcome them as peaceable neutral factors on our frontiers, which are otherwise from the military standpoint quite open and unprotected. Much as we ourselves love peace, it does not lie in our power to prevent inter-State conflicts breaking out, and especially in the East. In itself it is infinitely difficult in such a case to determine the guilty party. A divinely inspired court, which would be able to discover and pronounce the eternal truth in such a case, does not exist on this earth. As soon as the dogs of war are loosed on the nations the end begins to justify every means. And then people soon begin to lose all clear sense of Right and Wrong. More than twenty years have passed since the beginning of the World War, and every nation lives in the sacred conviction that right stood on its side

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and wrong on the side of the opponents. I am afraid that if such a conflict were to break out again treaty obligations would contribute less to the identification of the aggressor than to the support of that State which served his particular interests. It would perhaps be more serviceable to the cause of peace if the other nations were to withdraw at once from both sides at the outbreak of such a conflict rather than to allow themselves to be involved in this conflict from the outset by treaty obligations."

"But apart from these considerations of principle we have here a special case. Germany to-day is a National Socialist State. The ideas by which we are governed are diametrically opposed to those of Soviet Russia. National Socialism is a doctrine which applies exclusively to the German people. Bolshevism lays emphasis on its international mission."

"We National Socialists believe that in the long run man can be happy only in his own nation. We live in the belief that the happiness and the achievements of Europe are indissolubly connected with the existence of a system of free, independent national States. Bolshevism preaches the constitution of a world empire and only recognises sections of a central International."

Hitler then proceeded to elaborate the contrast between National Socialism and Bolshevism (see p. 669, supra). "One might," he continued, "go on with this interminably. Both we National Socialists and the Bolsheviks are convinced that there is a gulf between us which can never be bridged. But, moreover, there are more than 400 murdered National Socialists between us. Thousands of National Socialists have fallen in other organizations to forestall a Bolshevik revolt. Thousands of soldiers and policemen have been shot and massacred in the fight for the protection of the Reich and the

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States from the everlasting Communist uprisings, and more than 43,000 members of the National Socialist Party have been wounded. Thousands of them have been either blinded or crippled for life."

"In so far as Bolshevism can be considered a purely Russian affair we have no interest in it whatever. Every nation must seek its salvation in its own way. So far as Bolshevism draws Germany within its range, however, we are its deadliest and most fanatical enemies."

Hitler then gave a list of revolutionary happenings in the last fifteen years with which "the Bolshevik Press, Bolshevik literature, and prominent Bolshevik statesmen and orators openly admit their connexion and even boast of it . . ." (*authorized English translation, pp. 35-6*).

"Germany", *Hitler continued*, "has nothing to gain by a European war of any kind. What we want is freedom and independence. For this reason we were ready to conclude pacts of non-aggression with all our neighbours, Lithuania excepted.¹ The sole reason for this exception, however, is not that we wish for a war against that country, but because we cannot make political treaties with a State which ignores the most primitive laws of human society."

"It is sad enough that, owing to the way in which the European peoples are split up territorially, very difficult circumstances would be encountered by any practical plan for the delimitation of frontiers which would coincide with the various national groups. It is sad too that in the making of certain treaties national affiliations have been consciously disregarded. But this makes it all the more necessary that people who have had the misfortune to be torn away from their national kindred should not be oppressed and maltreated."

"A few weeks ago I saw the statement made in a great

¹ For Memel see the Note on pp. 1216-18 *supra*.

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international newspaper that Germany could easily renounce her claim to the Memel Territory because she is big enough already. But the noble humanitarian author of that statement forgot one thing—namely, that 140,000 people have the right to live in their own way and that it is not a question whether Germany wants them or not but whether they themselves want to be Germans or not.”

“They are Germans. By a surprise attack in the midst of peaceful conditions they were torn away from Germany and the attack was subsequently sanctioned. As a punishment for still adhering to their German feelings, they were persecuted, tortured, and maltreated in a most barbarous way. What would be said in England or France if members of one of these nations were subjected to a similar tragedy? When people who have been torn away from their own nation, in defiance of every natural right and sentiment, still preserve a feeling of allegiance to their motherland and that feeling is considered as a punishable crime, then this means that such human beings are denied even the right that is allowed to every beast of the field. By this I mean the right of remaining devoted to the old master and the community in which it was born. In Lithuania 140,000 Germans have been reduced to so low a status that they are even denied this primitive right. Therefore as long as the responsible guarantors of the Memel Statute fail to induce Lithuania to respect the most primitive of human rights, it will be impossible for us to conclude any treaty with that country.”

“With this exception, however—an exception which can be removed at any time by the Great Powers who are responsible—we are ready, through pacts and non-aggression undertakings, to give any nation whose frontiers border on ours that assurance which will also be

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beneficial to ourselves. But we cannot supplement such treaties by giving undertakings to assist other countries in case of war". . . .

"Moreover, in the concluding of certain assistance pacts which are known to us we see a development that in no way differs from the old type of military alliances. We regret this in a special way because, as a result of the military alliance between France and Russia, an element of legal insecurity has been brought into the Locarno Pact, which is the most definite and most really valuable treaty of mutual assurance in Europe. The points that have recently been raised in various quarters as to the legal obligations arising out of these new alliances are presumably the result of similar misgivings and prove, both in the way the questions are put and the manner in which they are answered, how great is the number of possible eventualities which might give rise to corresponding differences of opinion. The German Government would be specially grateful for an authentic interpretation of the retrospective and future effects of the Franco-Russian military alliance on the contractual obligations of the single parties who signed the Locarno Pact. The German Government also does not wish to allow any doubts to arise as to its own belief that these military alliances are contrary to the spirit and letter of the Covenant of the League of Nations."

"The signing of individual non-aggression pacts, as long as it is not clearly defined what this non-aggression means, is just as impossible for us as to undertake the aforementioned unlimited obligations. On our part we, Germans, would have more reasons to rejoice than anyone if, finally, a way or method could be found to prevent the exercise of influence by outside forces on the inner political life of the nations. Since the end of the War Germany has been the victim of such interferences con-

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tinually. Our Communist Party was a section of a political movement which had its headquarters abroad and was directed from abroad. All the revolts in Germany were fomented by teaching from abroad and were materially supported from abroad. The rest of the world knows this quite well but has never taken much pains about it."

"An army of emigrants is working against Germany from abroad. In Prague and Paris revolutionary newspapers are still being printed in the German language and are constantly being smuggled into Germany. Public incitements to acts of violence are published not merely in these papers but also in several of the great papers which have a large circulation. What are called 'blackleg' radio stations broadcast appeals which call for murderous activities in Germany. Other stations make propaganda in the German language for terror-organizations which are forbidden in Germany. Courts of justice are publicly set up abroad which endeavour to interfere in the German administration of justice. We are interested in seeing all these ways and methods abolished; but besides our own interest we recognize that if such operations are not defined with great exactitude a Government which—in its own interior—does not govern by any other right but that of force might attribute any internal revolt to the influence of outside interference and then, in order to maintain its position, demand such military assistance as had been guaranteed contractually."

"The fact that in Europe political frontiers do not correspond to the cultural frontiers is a fact that can be and is very much regretted. Since the rise of Christianity certain ideas have spread in an unbroken tradition throughout Europe. They have formed groups which have had a decided influence on the destiny of Europe.

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They have bridged across frontiers of States and nations and have created elements of union."

"If, for instance, some foreign cabinet minister should express his regret that certain ideas which are held valid in Western Europe are not recognized to-day in Germany, then it will be easier to understand how the doctrines of the German Reich cannot be entirely without their influence in one or other of the German countries."

"Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an 'Anschluß'. The German people and the German Government have, however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of a simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent, namely, that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed not only for foreign nations but to the German people everywhere. I myself believe that no régime which does not rest on public consent and is not supported by the people can continue permanently. If there are no such difficulties between Germany and Switzerland, which is to a large extent German, that is due to the fact that the independence and self-reliance of Switzerland is a reality, and because nobody doubts that the Swiss Government represents the real and legal expression of the will of the people."

"We Germans have every reason to be glad that there is on our frontier a State, a large percentage of whose population is German, which is firmly established and possesses a real and actual independence. The German Government regrets the tension which has arisen from the conflict with Austria all the more because it has resulted in disturbing our former good relations towards Italy, a State with whom we otherwise have no conflict of interests."

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"Passing from these general considerations to a more precise summing up of the present issues, I hereby declare that the position of the German Government is as follows:

"1. The German Government reject the Geneva resolution of 17 April. It was not Germany which unilaterally broke the Versailles Treaty. The Versailles Dictate was unilaterally broken, and thereby rendered invalid as regards the points at issue, by those Powers who could not decide to carry out in their turn the disarmament which was imposed on Germany and which should have followed in their case by virtue of the Treaty."

"The new discrimination introduced at Geneva makes it impossible for the German Government to return to that Institution until the preconditions for a real legal equality of all members have been established. For this purpose the German Government consider it necessary to make a clear separation between the Treaty of Versailles, which was based on a classification of the nations into victors and vanquished, and the League of Nations, which must be constituted on the basis of equal valuation and equality of rights for all the members."

"This equality of rights must be extended to all functions and all property rights in international life."

"2. The German Government, consequent on the failure of the other States to fulfil their disarmament obligations, have on their part renounced those articles of the Versailles Treaty which, because of the one-sided burden this laid on Germany contrary to the provisions of the Treaty, have constituted a discrimination against Germany for an unlimited period of time. They hereby most solemnly declare that these measures of theirs relate exclusively to the points which involve moral and material discrimination against the German people and

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of which notice has been given. The German Government will therefore unconditionally respect the articles concerning the mutual relations of the nations in other respects, including the Territorial provisions, and those revisions which shall be rendered necessary in the course of time will be put into effect only by the method of peaceful understandings."

"3. The German Government intend not to sign any treaty which seems to them incapable of fulfilment; but they will scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily signed, even though it was concluded before their accession to power and office. In particular they will uphold and fulfil all obligations arising out of the Locarno Treaty, so long as the other partners are on their side ready to stand by that pact. In respecting the demilitarized zone the German Government consider their action as a contribution to the appeasement of Europe, which contribution is of an unheard-of hardness for a Sovereign State. But they feel bound to point out that the continual increase of troops on the other side can in no way be regarded as a complement to these endeavours."

"4. The German Government are ready at any time to participate in a system of collective co-operation for safeguarding European peace, but regard it necessary to recognize the law of perpetual evolution by keeping open the way to treaty revision. In making possible a regulated evolution in the treaty system they recognize a factor for the safeguarding of peace and in the suppression of every necessary change a preparation for future explosions."

"5. The German Government are of the opinion that the reconstruction of European collaboration cannot be achieved by the method of imposing conditions unilaterally. In view of the fact that the various interests

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involved are not always concordant, they believe it right to be content with a minimum instead of allowing this collaboration to break down on account of an unalterable maximum of demands. They have the further conviction that this understanding—with a great aim in view—can be brought about only step by step."

"6. The German Government are ready in principle to conclude pacts of non-aggression with their neighbour States and to supplement these pacts with all provisions that aim at isolating the war-maker and localizing the area of the war. In particular they are ready to assume all consequent obligations regarding the supply of material and arms in peace or war where such obligations are also assumed and respected by all the partners."

"7. The German Government are ready to supplement the Locarno Treaty with an air agreement and to enter upon discussions regarding this matter."

"8. The German Government have announced the extent of the expansion of the new German Defence Force. In no circumstances will they depart from this. They do not regard the fulfilment of their programme in the air, on land, or at sea, as constituting a menace to any nation. They are ready at any time to limit their armaments to any degree that is also adopted by the other Powers."

"The German Government have already spontaneously made known the definite limitations of their intentions, thereby giving the best evidence of their good will to avoid an unlimited armaments race. Their limitation of the German air armaments to parity with the individual Great Powers of the West makes it possible at any time to fix a maximum which Germany will be under a binding obligation to observe with the other nations. The limitation of the German Navy is placed at 35 per cent. of the British Navy, and therewith still

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at 15 per cent. below the total tonnage of the French Navy. As the opinion has been expressed in various Press commentaries that this demand is only a beginning and would increase, particularly with the possession of colonies, the German Government hereby make the binding declaration: For Germany this demand is final and abiding."

"Germany has not the intention or the necessity or the means to participate in any new naval rivalry. The German Government recognize of themselves the overpowering vital importance, and therewith the justification, of a dominating protection for the British Empire on the sea, precisely as we are resolved conversely to do all that is necessary for the protection of our continental existence and freedom. The German Government have the straightforward intention to find and maintain a relationship with the British people and State which will prevent for all time a repetition of the only struggle there has been between the two nations hitherto."

"9. The German Government are ready to take an active part in all efforts which may lead to a practical limitation of boundless armaments. They regard a return to the former idea of the Geneva Red Cross Convention as the only possible way to achieve this. They believe that first there will be only the possibility of a gradual abolition and outlawry of weapons and methods of warfare which are essentially contrary to the Geneva Red Cross Convention, which is still valid. Just as the use of dum-dum bullets was once forbidden and, on the whole, thereby prevented in practice, so the use of other definite arms should be forbidden and prevented. Here the German Government have in mind all those arms which bring death and destruction not so much to the fighting soldiers as in the first instance to non-combatant women and children."

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"The German Government consider as erroneous and ineffective the idea of doing away with aeroplanes while leaving bombardment free. But they believe it possible to proscribe the use of certain arms as contrary to international law and to excommunicate those nations still using them from the community of mankind—its rights and its laws."

"Here also they believe that gradual progress is the best way to success. For example, there might be prohibition of the dropping of gas, incendiary, and explosive bombs outside the real battle zone. This limitation could then be extended to complete international outlawry of all bombing. But so long as bombing as such is permitted, any limitation of the number of bombing planes is questionable in view of the possibility of rapid substitution."

"Should bombing as such be branded as an illegal barbarity, the construction of bombing aeroplanes will soon be abandoned as superfluous and of no purpose. If, through the Geneva Red Cross Convention, it turned out possible as a matter of fact to prevent the killing of a defenceless wounded man or prisoner, then it ought to be equally possible to forbid, by an analogous convention, and finally to stop, the bombing of equally defenceless civil populations."

"In such a fundamental way of dealing with the problem Germany sees a greater reassurance and security for the nations than in all pacts of assistance and military conventions."

"10. The German Government are ready to agree to any limitation which leads to abolition of the heaviest arms, especially suited for aggression. Such are, first, the heaviest artillery, and, secondly, the heaviest tanks. In view of the enormous fortifications on the French frontier such international abolition of the heaviest

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weapons of attack would *ipso facto* give France 100 per cent. security."

"11. Germany declares herself ready to agree to any limitation whatsoever of the calibre-strength of artillery, battle-ships, cruisers, and torpedo boats. In like manner the German Government are ready to accept any international limitation of the size of warships. And finally they are ready to agree to limitation of tonnage for submarines, or to their complete abolition in case of international agreement. And they give the further assurance that they will agree to any international limitation or abolition of arms whatsoever for a uniform space of time."

"12. The German Government are of the opinion that all attempts to bring about an alleviation of certain strained relations between individual States by means of international or multilateral agreements must be in vain until suitable measures are taken to prevent the poisoning of public opinion among the nations by irresponsible elements orally or in writing, through the theatre or the cinema."

"13. The German Government are ready at any time to reach an international agreement which shall effectively prevent all attempts at outside interference in the affairs of other States. They must demand, however, that such a settlement be internationally effective, and work out for the benefit of all States. As there is a danger that in countries where the Government does not rest on the general confidence of the people, internal upheavals may all too easily be ascribed to external interference, it seems necessary that the conception of 'interference' should be subjected to a precise international definition."

"Members of the German Reichstag,

"I have been at pains to give you a picture of the problems which confront us to-day. However great the

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difficulties and worries may be in individual questions, I consider that I owe it to my position as Führer and Chancellor of the Reich not to admit a single doubt as to the possibility of maintaining peace. The peoples wish for peace. It must be possible for the Governments to maintain it. I believe that the restoration of the German defence force will contribute to this peace. Not because we intend to increase it beyond all bounds, but because the simple fact of its existence has got rid of a dangerous vacuum in Europe. Germany does not intend to increase her armaments beyond all bounds. We have not got ten thousand bombing-planes and we shall not build them. On the contrary; we have set for ourselves such limits as we are convinced are necessary for the protection of the nation, without coming into conflict with the idea of a collective and regulated security. Nobody would be happier than we if such a regulation should make it possible for us to apply the industry of our people to the production of more useful things than instruments for the destruction of human life and property."

"We believe that if the peoples of the world can agree to destroy all their gas, inflammatory, and explosive bombs this would be a more useful undertaking than using them to destroy one another."

"In saying this I am not speaking any more as the representative of a defenceless State which would have no responsibilities but only advantages as a result of such a procedure. I do not intend to take part here in discussions such as have recently been started in various places as to the value of other armies or one's own army and the cowardice of foreign soldiers and the supreme bravery of one's own."

"We all know how many millions of fearless opponents, contemptuous of death, faced us, alas, in the

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World War. But history has certainly often shown of us Germans that we understand less the art of living reasonably than that of dying nobly. I know that if ever this nation should be attacked the German soldier will do more than his duty, remembering from the experiences of one and a half decades what is the fate of a conquered people. This conviction is for us all a serious responsibility, and at the same time a noble duty. I cannot better conclude my speech of to-day to you, my fellow fighters and trustees of the nation, than by repeating our confession of faith in peace. The nature of our new constitution makes it possible for us in Germany to put a stop to the machinations of the war agitators. May the other nations too be able to give bold expression to their real inner longing for peace. Whoever lights the torch of war in Europe can wish for nothing but chaos. We, however, live in the firm conviction that in our time will be fulfilled not the decline but the renaissance of the West. That Germany may make an imperishable contribution to this great work is our proud hope and our unshakable belief."¹

On 22 May 1935, after the death of Pilsudski, Lipski presented to Hitler the thanks of the Polish Government for his expression of sympathy with Poland. Of that interview Lipski on 23 May 1935 sent a report to Beck. In that report he wrote:

Le Chancelier a répondu que la mort du Maréchal l'avait profondément ému; la personnalité du Maréchal l'avait toujours vivement attiré et son désir était de se rencontrer avec le Chef de la nation polonaise. Il avait même songé à une entrevue à la frontière polono-allemande, dans un train; il comprenait toutefois que cela

¹ Authorized English translation (in pamphlet form): Müller & Sohn, Berlin; German text: *F.Z.*, 22 May 1935.

pourrait produire une trop grande sensation dans l'opinion mondiale.

Dans la suite de notre entretien le Chancelier fit observer que le Maréchal était un homme d'État exceptionnel, qui comprenait la réalité de la situation internationale d'après laquelle il orientait la politique de son pays.

Le Chancelier se mit ensuite à exposer tout au long sa politique à l'égard de la Pologne.

Il constata avant tout qu'il avait fait litière de l'ancienne politique de Rapallo à l'égard de la Pologne, représentée par la Reichswehr, avec les généraux Gröner et Schleicher en tête. Déjà avant la prise du pouvoir, le Chancelier avait exercé une pression sur le général Schleicher, l'engageant à rompre ses relations avec les Soviets. Mais ce fut en vain. Le fait seul que celui-ci ait aidé à la formation en Russie soviétique d'une puissance militaire justifierait suffisamment sa fin. Le Chancelier me dit que des choses pires encore grevaient l'hypothèque du général Schleicher, et dont il serait difficile de parler aujourd'hui. Un jour viendra où ces choses pourront être révélées. On se sent rougir de honte en y pensant. Il résulterait des paroles du Chancelier que la politique du général Schleicher n'aurait pas été désintéressée.

Le Chancelier dit ensuite que la Reichswehr pensait alors que les Soviets, militairement puissants, pourraient menacer uniquement la Pologne, mais non l'Allemagne. C'était là une politique de courte vue. Le seul homme qui comprenait alors la manière de voir du Chancelier était le général Blomberg. En sa qualité de commandant du Corps d'armée de la Prusse Orientale, il était au courant des problèmes de l'Est, contrairement à ceux qui passaient leur temps dans leur bureau de la Reichswehr à Berlin. De l'avis du Chancelier, le général de Reichenau la comprenait également.

Dans sa politique orientale, le Chancelier était d'avis qu'un rapprochement avec la Pologne donnait beaucoup plus au Reich que des 'liaisons dangereuses' avec la Russie. La Russie est l'Asie—*dit-il*. Pour l'Allemagne, une seule question se pose, celle de trouver des terrains d'expansion économique ou de l'espace pour la population, espace que la Pologne ne possède pas et ne peut donner. On lui reprochait la question du 'corridor', à quoi il répondait que le 'corridor' n'avait aucune importance en comparaison de problèmes d'une telle portée.

Les relations polono-allemandes étant bonnes, en quoi pouvait nuire au Reich le passage d'une cinquantaine de kilomètres à travers le territoire polonais? Dans un certain nombre d'années, et étant donné nos bonnes relations réciproques, on oubliera le 'corridor' en Allemagne et en Pologne également, ce problème ne sera plus aussi épineux. Lui, Chancelier, il aurait une idée dont on ne saurait encore parler aujourd'hui, mais qui, peut-être, pourrait être réalisée dans une quinzaine d'années et qui serait notamment la création d'une voie ferrée spéciale ainsi que d'une autostrade à travers la Poméranie, pour servir au transit.

La politique du Reich à l'égard de la Pologne ne sera pas modifiée même si lui, Chancelier, venait à disparaître, étant donné que, cette politique, il l'a inculquée à ses collaborateurs. Au cas de son décès éventuel, qui peut toujours se produire—un idiot (*ein Narr*) peut jeter une bombe—il y a deux successeurs désignés.

Le Chancelier dit que sa politique est partagée par la nation tout entière. Il constate qu'à la suite de son discours d'hier, un très grand nombre de lettres d'hommages lui parviennent, provenant de toutes les couches de la population.

Qui y a-t-il encore contre sa politique?

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Un peu d'aristocratie, une partie du clergé et certains anciens "Deutschnationale", ces derniers uniquement parce qu'il les a écartés du pouvoir, car ils n'ont aucun argument contre son programme. Il considère M. Hugenberg comme un homme loyal, par contre, ses adversaires de la droite sont tous dans le genre de M. de Oldenburg-Januschau.

Le Chancelier passe ensuite à la question du désarmement. Il considère qu'il y aurait lieu de procéder à une certaine limitation des armements. Il constate que dans certains cas la technique de la guerre a été poussée au point d'exclure, par elle-même, son application. Il remarque, pour donner un exemple, qu'à la fin de la Grande Guerre les Allemands avaient inventé des "Brandbomben" (bombes incendiaires), mais ne pouvaient se décider à en faire usage par crainte que la même arme ne fût employée contre eux.

Les inventions actuelles dans le domaine des bombes incendiaires permettent la destruction de villes entières, d'immenses forêts, etc. Une action armée doit donc toujours donner comme résultat la ruine complète des deux côtés, cependant que le vainqueur éventuel trouvera devant lui le vide, ce qui, somme toute, ne peut, pour ce vainqueur, produire qu'une catastrophe. C'est pourquoi l'exclusion de l'emploi de certains engins de guerre est dans l'intérêt de tous les États.¹

In a speech delivered at Rosenheim on 11 August 1935 Hitler said: "Woe to the people which is not prepared to take its freedom and its independence under its own protection and shelter. No one will wish to doubt that Germany during the last two and a half years has occu-

¹ *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la Période 1933-1939. Recueil de documents officiels*, Paris, Flammarion, 1940, pp. 51-3.

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pied a different position in the world from that which she held before. There can be no social happiness in a State whose citizens (*Volksgenossen*) are subject to the will of aliens. I am convinced that no one in the world can henceforth attack our Reich. We wish for peace, we want to build up on every side, we have work to do, work, and again work. Just as we wish for peace, so should the other peoples, too, wish for peace. But he who would disturb this peace of ours, will no longer come up against a people of pacifists but against a people of *men*! The mere fact that that is so will prove a greater contribution to peace than any talking.”¹

On 8 September 1935 Hitler received the new Italian Ambassador, Bernardo Attolice, “when a significant, and presumably deliberately arranged, German-Italian exchange of cordialities took place” (“The Times”, 9 Sept. 1935). Hitler in his reply to the Ambassador’s address said:

“With lively satisfaction I gather from your remarks that you regard it as your task to devote all your energies to consolidating and developing ever further the relations between Germany and Italy, for I share your conviction that these relations will be of the greatest importance for the future political development and for a fruitful and peaceful co-operation among the nations. I, too, believe that such co-operation can be founded only on the idea of justice and of the mutual understanding of the vital needs of the peoples. At the same time I trust that the community of many ideals which unites Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany will work out more and more for the profit of our countries and that the advantages arising therefrom will also benefit the rest of the

¹ Speech on the celebration of the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the National Socialist *Ortsgruppe* in Rosenheim. *V.B.* 12 Aug. 1935.

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world. In your efforts to further the relations of our countries on this basis you can, Mr. Ambassador, rely upon my fullest support and upon the support of the Government of the Reich."¹

In his Proclamation read at the Nuremberg Parteitag of 1935 (11 September) Hitler said: "National Socialism nurses no aggressive purpose against any European nation. We are on the contrary convinced that each European nation must lead its own individual life—a life characterized, ordered, and determined by its traditions, by necessities which history and economics have prescribed—if Europe as a whole is not to be ruined and an imperishable civilization jeopardized. This is the assumption which we shall maintain for Germany in all circumstances, and by so doing we believe that we shall make a contribution which will also serve the interests of the other European States."

*The Proclamation closed with an attack upon Russia: "Since the Bolshevist Jew in Moscow in a new declaration of war against the world preaches destruction, we National Socialists wish to grasp yet more firmly our glorious banner and bear it before us with the holy resolve to fight against the ancient foe, caring nothing for our life, in order that Germany may preserve her honour and freedom and thereby the foundations of her life in the future."*²

There is singularly little in Hitler's speeches on Auslandsdeutschtum—the position of Germans in foreign countries—but in Nuremberg on 13 September 1935 he addressed the political leaders of the Party acting abroad. He said that citizens of the Reich living abroad who were members of the Party must feel themselves to be living members

¹ F.Z., 10 Sept. 1935.

² F.Z., 12 Sept. 1935.

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of the German community of the people. The German people of to-day was not merely a State; it had become a body corporate pulsing through and through with a vital inner life. That was the great thing which National Socialism gave to the German people: the German who went abroad no longer felt himself a lost member of the community of the people: he could still be of use and service for the whole body of the people. And this fact carried with it duties: the German when abroad could not take a part in the life of the State at home, but he could make that limitation good by an inward sympathy with the people's life as it was now revealed in National Socialism. He had the duty everywhere and at every hour to feel himself a fellow-countryman (*Volksgenosse*) with those in the homeland, and thus he could share in that community which was represented by the *Auslandsorganisation* of the NSDAP.; indeed the very fact that he was living abroad rendered it the more necessary that he should co-operate with the Movement. Just as much as for any other German it was his duty to live in accordance with the principles of the new outlook (*Vorstellung*). And this fact also perhaps made it easier for him so to live, since at a distance all the elements of disunion sank into the background and became inessential appearances: and from the confused jumble of interests which had characterized the past age—interests of the separate States of Germany, interests of parties, Confessions, and unions—there could emerge the greater German Reich: the German living abroad “loses the capacity to see these countless subdivisions: all this quickly coalesces into a unity”. *At the close of his speech Hitler appealed to all Germans living in foreign countries to struggle through until they found their way into the life of their people and accepted the duties which that life laid upon them.*¹

¹ *V.B.*, 14 Sept. 1935.

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In the course of his speech at the annual Harvest Celebration on the Bückeberg on 6 October 1935 Hitler said: "Let us turn our gaze outward from here to the world at large. Unrest and insecurity are rife, war stands once more at its gates, revolutions convulse the domestic life of peoples. Like some calm island in the midst of all this lies Germany, our beloved German fatherland and Reich. Profound peace reigns amongst us, whereas in other countries the peoples no longer understand one another; men strive one against another, status against status, class against class, while we here are united in peace. A few days ago we were told by someone in another Reich 'Dictatorships can lead only too easily to wars arising from internal difficulties'. Our answer to this is that most wars arise from the very nature of democracies! We have no need to wage a war abroad, in order to be united at home. Here we are, here we stand, one people, one army, and one Reich! One feeling still dominates us to-day, when we carry our minds back to the first day that we met here on this mountain. Many of us then were filled with disquiet and anxiety lest perhaps we might be dragged into these disturbances of the rest of the world. And to-day; what a great, what a wonderful experience! Germany has become free once again, and her freedom is not entrusted to an institution, it does not lie in the hands of foreign Powers. No Commissions deliberate over Germany, no Commissions decide her affairs, no League of Nations watches over us. Here stands Germany, and keeps watch over herself. Our people is strong once more, and our homeland is protected, and we are infinitely happy to know that this protection is entrusted to our own hands."

"Let us recall the history of Germany! Let us remind ourselves that no Power was able to beat Germany. It was only when we laid the shield aside and trusted to

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the help of others that misfortune came upon us. . . . I believe that we see the problems of the world somewhat more clearly than many others, in our judgement of them our views are not so much distorted by hatred and envy."

"We have not the possibility of relying on others' help, and therefore we shall not be reckless. We measure the conditions for our existence, we know the difficulties of our life-struggle and therefore we wish to pursue these great tasks in calm and in peace. What I said in Nuremberg I must repeat here: we would keep it ever before us: Germany and the German people, they do not wish to harm anyone but neither will they suffer anyone to do them harm."¹

In an interview with Mr. Baillie, President of the United Press, in November 1935 Hitler said: "The aim of the restoration of the German army is the defence of Germany against the attacks of foreign Powers. Germany is a Great Power of the first rank and has a right to possess a first-class army."

An army of a million men as was that of 1914 would be created in Germany only under the pressure of the demands of a new war—a new war from which, as he confidently hoped, God would preserve Germany and the coming generations.

Hitler referred to his former proposals for the stabilization of the armies of European States at 200,000 or 300,000: these had all been rejected. In considering the strength of the German army one must always take account of the geographical situation of Germany. If in America a strip of territory one hundred kilometres deep were occupied by an enemy this would be hardly more than a slight scratch which America could easily bear.

¹ *F.Z.*, 8 Oct. 1935.

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Germany, however, in the case of invasions which perhaps for the United States would be of such small significance as this would be hit in a vital nerve.

Hitler further stated that Germany would never surrender her claim to colonies.¹

On 18 December 1935 Lipski was received by Hitler in Berlin: in his report to Beck he stated that Hitler had declared qu'il était résolument opposé à toute coopération de l'Occident avec la Russie. En sa qualité de national-socialiste, il discerne dans le bolchevisme un sérieux danger, ceci indépendamment de la manière de voir d'autres États. L'Allemagne a payé de la révolution sociale son rapprochement avec la Russie des Soviets. Le Chancelier craint que d'autres États également ne le payent chèrement. Il est pour la solidarité européenne. Toutefois, il est d'avis que cette solidarité s'arrête à la frontière polono-soviétique. Un pacte aérien d'un ordre plus général pourrait englober uniquement les États qui professent les mêmes principes moraux dans la politique internationale. Comment peut-on se lier à la Russie soviétique qui proclame la révolution mondiale?²

1936

In his New Year Proclamation issued on 1 January 1936 Hitler said that "at the very time when we may with satisfaction look back upon a really vast constructive work alike in the political, the cultural, and the economic spheres certain journalistic clairvoyants have once more

¹ *V.B.*, 28 Nov. 1935. The interview took place "a few days" before 27 Nov. 1935. For Germany as the bulwark of the West against Bolshevism see pp. 668, 1257.

² *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la Période 1933-1939. Recueil de documents officiels*, Paris, Flammarion, pp. 53-4.

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fixed the date for the collapse of Germany. Even so, we can still be satisfied. For these phrases will pass, but the results of our work will abide. And 1936—the year which lies before us—will be a further year of National Socialist resolution and achievement. But the more the strength of the Reich increases and finds its visible expression in the revival of our people's army, the more shall we be filled with a consciousness of the heavy responsibility which the new armed force lays upon us. When we look on the many confusions and disturbances in the rest of the world, then only can we estimate the blessing of the clear and stable régime in our own State, as well as the blessing and the profit of the peace which is thereby guaranteed. To remain such a bulwark of national European discipline and civilization against the Bolshevik enemy of mankind will in the coming year, too, be our fervent endeavour. The Bolshevik attempt, through continual revolutions, bloody uprisings, and disturbances, to undermine the order of the world and to incite peoples one against the other we in Germany, in the future as in the past, shall successfully counter. But our highest endeavour, in the coming year also, must be to preserve for our rediscovered national life of honour and freedom peace in our foreign relations.”¹

Hitler at the New Year reception of the Diplomatic Corps (10 Jan. 1936) in replying to the address of the Papal Nuncio, Monsignor Orsenigo, said:

“The comprehensible desire of our people to protect the fruits of its labour, like other peoples, against disturbance from without, against the changing conditions of a time of political unrest, has in the past year at last been realized. Thus with gratitude towards the Providence which has blessed our work we look back upon

¹ *V.B.*, 2 Jan. 1936.

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the year 1935 and with the firm determination to continue with success the task which we have begun we enter upon the new year. The German people, filled with the ardent desire to live in peace with the other peoples of the earth and to co-operate with them in all spheres of life in mutual understanding for the welfare and progress of humanity, wishes with all its heart to see also in all other peoples the same effort towards trustful co-operation and mutual respect."

"I myself, the Government of the Reich, and the whole German people, therefore, join with you, Mr. Nuncio, in the hope that the new year may bring the longed-for lessening of tension and appeasement amongst the peoples and a true peace."¹

In a speech to more than 6,000 students delivered at Munich on 26 January 1936 Hitler said:

"The colonizing nations now regard it as their duty to set undeveloped peoples on their feet. At the same time, however, not one of them cares to take the consequences of giving independence to colonial peoples."

"We must remember that India did not send a deputation to London to say 'Please teach us how to walk'. On the contrary, the English went out to India to teach them the proper British style of walking."

"It was a painful process. The Indians insisted on walking in the Indian fashion, while the English felt impelled to teach them to walk along English lines. After 150 years they succeeded."

"The white race is destined to rule. This is its unconscious urge which arises from an heroic conception of life and which is entirely non-pacifist."

"By what right do nations possess colonies? By the right of taking them. If you had asked Cortez or Clive

¹ F.Z., 11 Jan. 1936.

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by what right they had taken land for their own countries, they would have replied 'I am a Spaniard' or 'I am an Englishman!'

The Chancellor criticized those Powers which excused themselves for capturing colonies with the apology that they were going to civilize barbarous people.

"If the European nations adopt this weak conception, their colonies will turn and throw off the yoke."¹

"After all, what a great statesman said is true, that the British Empire was built up by adventurers. To-day American professors dispute the justification of this conception, but when the white race abandons the foundations of its rule over the world it will lose that rule. It is a rule which is the basis of the European economic structure."²

In the course of the speech, which lasted two hours, Hitler said:

"Germany is so strong now that she needs no help from the League. She does not even need treaties of alliance."³

In January 1936 Madame Titayna, as representative of the "Paris Soir", was accorded an interview by Hitler. Madame Titayna said: The Frenchman fears war more than anything else, and because he fears and hates it he believes it to be a possibility. I should like to hear from your mouth that Germany is building up her foreign policy on a pacifist basis. Hitler replied:

"The word 'Pacifism' has two meanings, and in

¹ I cite this from the *Daily Telegraph*, 28 Jan. 1936. These passages do not appear in the reports of the speech given in the German Press, so far as these reports are accessible to me.

² *The Times*, 28 Jan. 1936.

³ *Financial News*, 27 Jan. 1936. On the activity of the German censorship on newspaper reports of speeches at this time see *The Times*, 28 Jan. 1936.

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France it has not the same significance as with us. We cannot accept a pacifism which means the surrender of one's own vital rights. For us pacifism can become a reality only when it is built on the principle which is common to all mankind, viz. that every people has the right to live. I say 'to live', not 'to vegetate'. He who would establish peace must first recognize this right of the peoples. In other words: There is not a single German who desires war. The last war cost us two million dead and seven and a half million wounded. Even if we had been victorious, no victory would have been worth the payment of such a price. What European statesman could to-day gain through a war any corresponding territorial conquest? Are two million men to be killed to conquer a territory with two million inhabitants? Besides for us that would mean to sacrifice two millions of the best Germans, men in the flower of their strength, the *élite* of the nation, in order to win a mixed population which is not to the full extent German and which does not feel itself to be German. Human logic is against a territorial war."

Madame Titayna then said: I know how the German spirit has risen in revolt against the Treaty of Versailles. But even granted that everyone agrees in the necessity for the revision of the Treaty, how could that be effected without injuring the interests of other peoples?

Hitler answered: "The Treaty of Versailles has had two consequences: it secured a territorial victory and established a moral victory. Every territorial solution has its weaknesses. In territorial questions the voice of the people and its economic needs should alone be decisive. But if one regards the moral aspect, it is impossible and inadmissible to discriminate against a people and to humiliate it. The Peace Treaty of 1870 was content with a material and territorial victory without violating

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French honour. Every decision which degrades a people's personality creates only bitterness and hatred amongst the oppressed and mistrust amongst the others. Man has the right to live, whether it be as a nation or as an individual."

What then should one do in the case of the Treaty of Versailles? asked Madame Titayna.

"The human conscience", *Hitler replied*, "should set justice above interests and parties. Every people has the right to live on its own soil, with its own faith, its history, its customs, and its economic possibilities. To favour some to the prejudice of others is absurd, for that destroys the balance of human society. I should like to draw a parallel for you: a law which favours the workers at the expense of the peasants is just as false as one which favours the peasants at the cost of the workers. One must not adopt a position which favours the consumer, nor one which favours the tradesman, one must not be for the workman, nor for the employer, but one must maintain the balance between the conflicting interests of all alike. We have one single doctrine which is that in economic life there is no place for doctrine. If private initiative fails, its place must be taken by the initiative of the State. Social tensions with us will not be adjusted through strikes and lock-outs. A higher statesmanship which has the welfare of all in view must find other ways of securing social peace. Peace, too, can be born only from such a balance, therefore from justice. So far as the individual measures are concerned which should establish this peace, they can easily be found when everyone approaches them with human sympathy, with understanding, and skill."

"We have in Germany 68 million inhabitants—68 million human beings who want to eat, to clothe themselves, to have a house to live in. No treaty in the world

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can in any way alter that fact. The child who comes into the world cries for milk. And it has a right to milk. And a statesman must give to his people what it needs."

Certainly, said Madame Titayna, we are touching on a very serious question. The population-policy which is propagated in Germany necessarily creates a craving for expansion¹ owing to the increase in the population—and that means war. You complain that you have not enough bread and yet you want more people.

Hitler answered: "There are in the world talented and untalented peoples. The first have generally too little living-space (*Lebensraum*), while the others have at their disposal a great and often undeveloped extent of living-space (*Lebensfläche*). The European States belong to the first category. One must remember that in this respect they represent a community of peoples, though often enough they are a quarrelsome family."

To the question So on account of the growing strength of the German people you need colonies? Hitler replied: "Do not you think so, too?"

How in practice do you mean to attain this end?

"If the conscience", *Hitler answered*, "of the rest of the peoples would admit the idea of equalization and of justice, the material details could be easily settled. What concerns me most at the moment is to awaken in the world the realization that the good will of the peoples must create a co-operation without any mental reservation in order to allow each individual people to enjoy a better life. And I would, further, repeat that it is essential for the life of Germany and France and for the good of mankind that the welfare of Europe should be rendered secure". . . .

Hitler was asked: What are your views on the Anschluß (with Austria)? He replied: "That is a question which

¹ German: *Expansionsdrang*.

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excites no one here. Vienna finds this bogey necessary because of her domestic policy. In Berlin the *Anschluß* question is not acute."

*Hitler closed the interview by saying that he hoped that foreigners visiting the Olympic Games in Berlin would travel in Germany—there would be no propaganda tours arranged—and see for themselves, in complete freedom, that there was a calm and ordered life in the country, that people were busy at work. They would thus see the progress which had been made, they would see Germany's effort and her will for peace.*¹

*On 29 January 1936 Hitler received the first Ambassador of Chile and spoke of the long friendship between Chile and Germany.*²

In a speech at the Commemoration of the National Socialist Revolution delivered in Berlin on 30 January 1936 Hitler said:

"Just as we have always preached peace in the domestic life of our people, so we wish also to be a peace-loving element amongst the other peoples. We cannot repeat that too often. We seek peace because we love it. But we stand by our honour, for without that we have no wish to live. . . . That the world must understand. Germany will be as peace-loving as it is possible for a people to be so long as the honour of this German people is not assailed. Anyone who thinks that he can treat us as slaves will find that he has to deal with the most stubborn people in the world. . . . We would hope that in the world a general understanding for the rights of all peoples may

¹ I have translated from the German report of the interview published in *F.Z.*, 26-7 Jan. 1936. I have not seen the French version of the conversation.

² I have no report of this speech. Cf. *Die Reden des Führers nach der Machtübernahme. Eine Bibliographie*, Berlin, Eher, 1939, p. 111.

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ever increasingly gain ground. This will be the first condition if a really deep inner peace is to descend upon the peoples."

... "To-day we can once more proudly appear before the world as Germans. To the German people in this last year of our government its honour has been restored in the eyes of the world. We are no longer defenceless helots: we have become free and self-conscious 'citizens of the world'."

Auslandsdeutschtum

One of Hitler's bitterest attacks on the Jews occurs in the speech which he delivered at Schwerin on 12 February 1936 at the Memorial Celebration in honour of the National Socialist Landesgruppenleiter Gustloff, who was murdered in Switzerland. Hitler spoke of the victims of the Räte-republik in Munich (the ten men and one woman who were held as hostages and then murdered), who perished simply because "they cherished the ideal of a new, purified, better community of the people"; he spoke of "the endless line of National Socialists murdered by dastards, almost always ambushed, beaten to death, stabbed, or shot. And behind every murder stood the same power which is responsible for this murder; behind these harmless, insignificant fellow-countrymen who were instigated and incited to crime stands the hate-filled power of our Jewish foe, a foe to whom we had done no harm, but who none the less sought to subjugate our German people and make of it its slave—the foe who is responsible for all the misfortune that fell upon us in 1918, for all the misfortune which plagued Germany in the years that followed. Those members of the Party and honourable comrades of ours all fell, and the same fate was planned for others: many hundreds survived

¹ *V.B.*, 31 Jan. 1936.

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as cripples or severely wounded, blinded or lamed; more than 40,000 others were injured. And among them were so many loyal folk whom we all knew and who were near and dear to us, of whom we were sure that they could never do any harm to anyone, that they had never done any harm to anyone, whose only crime was that they devoted themselves to the cause of Germany."

"In the ranks of those whose lives were thus sacrificed there stood also Horst Wessel, the singer who gave to the Movement its song, never dreaming that he would join those spirits who march and have marched with us."

"And now on foreign soil National Socialism has gained its first conscious martyr—a man who did nothing save to enter the lists for Germany which is not only his sacred right but his duty in this world: a man who did nothing save remember his homeland and pledge himself to her in loyalty. He, too, was murdered, just like so many others. Even at the time when on 30 January three years ago we had come into power precisely the same things happened in Germany, at Frankfort on the Oder, at Köpenick, and again at Brunswick. The procedure was always the same: a few men come and call someone out of his house and then stab or shoot him down."

"That is no chance: it is the same guiding hand which organized these crimes, and purposes to do so again. Now for the first time one who is responsible for these acts has appeared in his own person. For the first time he employs no harmless German fellow-countryman. It is a title to fame for Switzerland, as it is for our own Germans in Switzerland, that no one let himself be hired to do this deed so that for the first time the spiritual begetter of the act must himself perform the act. So our comrade has fallen a victim to that power which wages a fanatical warfare not only against our German people but against every free, autonomous, and independent people.

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We understand the challenge to battle and we take up the gage! My dear comrade! You have not fallen in vain!"

"Our dead have all become alive again. They march with us not only in the spirit: they live with us still. And one of those who will go with us into the most distant future will be this man who has died. Let this be our holy oath in this hour that we will see to it that this, our dead, shall take his place in the ranks of the deathless martyrs of our people. Then for our people there will come from his death life a millionfold. That is what this Jewish murderer never dreamed of or foresaw—that he killed one man, but that he will thereby awake to a truly German life millions upon millions of comrades into the most distant future. Just as in past years it was not possible through deeds such as these to check the triumphal march of our Movement, but on the contrary these dead became the banner-bearers of our idea, so this deed will not stay Germans in other countries from joining our Movement, from belonging to our fatherland. No! now every local group in foreign countries has its National Socialist patron, its holy martyr, who died for this Movement and for our idea. In every office now his picture will hang, his name each will carry in his heart, and for all time he will never be forgotten. That is our pledge. And this deed shall fall back upon the doer. Germany is not weakened thereby, but the power which did this deed. In the year 1936 Germany lost a living man, but for the future she gained an immortal!"¹

On 21 February 1936 Hitler in an interview with Bertrand de Jouvenel² of the "Paris Midi" said: Cannot

¹ *F.Z.*, 13 Feb. 1936; *V.B.*, 14 Feb. 1936.

² On the holding back of the publication of this interview see Hitler's speech of 7 Mar. 1936, authorized English translation, pp. 28-9, p. 1291 *infra*.

you employ this famous logic to which the French declare themselves to be so attached? "N'est-il pas évidemment à l'avantage de nos deux pays d'entretenir de bons rapports? . . . N'est-il pas logique que je veuille ce qui est le plus avantageux, n'est-ce pas évidemment la paix?" . . .

"Maintenant, je fais un appel à la raison dans l'ordre international comme j'ai fait un appel à la raison dans l'ordre social. Je veux montrer à mon peuple que la notion d'inimitié éternelle entre la France et l'Allemagne est absurde, que nous ne sommes nullement des ennemis héréditaires. Le peuple allemand le comprend. Il m'a suivi dans une réconciliation infiniment plus difficile, la réconciliation de l'Allemagne avec la Pologne."

"Chez vous, on a interprété l'accord entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne comme un acte de virtuosité diplomatique de ma part. C'est un compliment, mais qui ne me fait pas plaisir et qui n'est pas mérité. Simplement la tension entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne ne pouvait pas durer. Elle était malsaine, énervante. Il était logique que je cherche à y mettre fin. J'ai réussi, et tout le peuple allemand s'en est senti soulagé. Et maintenant, je veux réussir la même détente avec la France. Il n'est pas bon que les peuples usent leurs forces psychologiques en haines infécondes". . . .

"Chez vous, on m'imagine tout autre que je ne suis, parce qu'on voit bien que je suis parti de rien pour devenir le maître de l'Allemagne, et que c'est une destinée étonnante, et qu'on croit devoir y trouver des causes extraordinaires. Les uns disent que c'est par violence que je suis devenu le chef de la nation allemande, mais, vous savez, les quelques camarades que nous étions au début auraient eu fort à faire pour s'emparer par la violence d'une nation de 65 millions d'habitants!"

"On dit aussi que j'ai dû mon succès à ce que j'ai créé une mystique . . . ou bien simplement que j'ai été servi par le hasard. Eh bien, je vais vous dire ce qui m'a porté là où je suis."

"Les problèmes politiques apparaissaient compliqués. Le peuple allemand n'y comprenait rien. Il aimait mieux, dans ces conditions, laisser aux politiciens de profession le soin de se débrouiller dans ces complications. Moi, j'ai décompilé les problèmes. Je les ai réduits en termes simples. Les grandes masses ont compris. Et elles m'ont suivi."

On the views expressed in regard to France in "Mein Kampf" Hitler said:

"J'étais en prison, quand j'ai écrit ce livre. Les troupes françaises occupaient la Ruhr. C'était le moment de la plus grande tension entre nos deux pays. Oui, nous étions ennemis! Et j'étais avec mon pays, comme il sied, contre le vôtre. Comme j'ai été avec mon pays contre le vôtre durant quatre ans et demi dans les tranchées! Je me mépriserais si je n'étais pas avant tout Allemand quand vient le conflit. . . . Mais aujourd'hui il n'y a plus de raison de conflit. Vous voulez que je fasse des corrections dans mon livre comme un écrivain qui prépare une nouvelle édition de ses œuvres? Mais je ne suis pas un écrivain, je suis un homme politique. Ma rectification? Je l'apporte tous les jours dans ma politique extérieure toute tendue vers l'amitié avec la France."

"Si je réussis le rapprochement franco-allemand comme je le veux, ça, ce sera une rectification digne de moi! Ma rectification, je l'écrirai dans le grand livre de l'Histoire!" . . .

"C'est bien étrange que vous jugiez encore possible une agression allemande! Est-ce que vous ne lisez pas notre presse? Est-ce que vous ne voyez pas qu'elle

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s'abstient systématiquement de toute attaque contre la France, qu'elle ne parle de la France qu'avec sympathie?"

"Alors, si je voulais pouvoir lancer un jour mon peuple contre le vôtre, croyez-vous que je ferais systématiquement dire du bien de la France? Les opinions que j'aurai, en quelques années, imprimées à la nation allemande me gêneraient fort le jour où je voudrais vous faire la guerre. Il faut à cela une préparation psychologique!" . . .

"Il faut que nous fassions dans les deux opinions publiques le travail nécessaire pour que l'entente se réalise et se maintienne, quels que soient les dirigeants qui se succéderont à la tête des deux pays." . . .

On the effect of the Franco-Russian pact Hitler said:

"Mes efforts personnels vers un tel rapprochement subsisteront toujours. Cependant, dans le domaine des faits, ce pacte plus que déplorable créerait naturellement une nouvelle situation."

"Est-ce que vous vous rendez compte de ce que vous faites? Vous vous laissez entraîner dans le jeu diplomatique d'une puissance qui ne désire que mettre dans les grandes nations européennes un désordre dont elle sera la bénéficiaire. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue le fait que la Russie soviétique est un élément politique ayant à sa disposition une idée révolutionnaire explosive et des armements gigantesques. Comme Allemand, j'ai bien le devoir de tenir compte d'une telle situation. Le bolchevisme n'a pas de chances de réussir chez nous. Mais il y a d'autres grandes nations qui sont moins prémunies que nous contre le virus bolcheviste". . . .

"Chaque peuple a son apport à faire à la culture européenne. Chaque nation imagine que son apport particulier est le plus important. Qui donc pourrait les départager? Mais ce qui est certain, c'est l'extrême

importance des apports français et allemands. Il y a entre nous, en quelque sorte, des Jeux olympiques de l'esprit. . . . Le génie germanique, le génie latin, ce sont des concurrents dont l'émulation grossit un patrimoine commun. Des Français viennent chaque année plus nombreux à Bayreuth goûter les chefs-d'œuvre musicaux de l'Allemagne, et mes compatriotes vont en pèlerinage auprès de vos monuments. Dans le domaine nouveau de la technique, la collaboration internationale s'est révélée extraordinairement féconde. Voyez l'automobile! Daimler invente le moteur à explosion, vous, Français, vous organisez les premières courses d'automobiles qui frappent l'imagination du monde entière, puis les Américains commercialisent le mode de transport. Quand nous sommes devant le produit fini, nous ne savons à qui adresser le plus de remerciements!"

"Vous feriez bien de réfléchir sérieusement à mes offres d'entente. Jamais un dirigeant allemand ne vous a fait de telles ouvertures ni de si répétées. Et ces offres émanent de qui donc? D'un charlatan pacifiste qui s'est fait une spécialité des relations internationales? Non pas, mais du plus grand nationaliste que l'Allemagne ait jamais eu à sa tête! Moi, je vous apporte ce que nul autre n'aurait jamais pu vous apporter: une entente qui sera approuvée par 90 % de la nation allemande, les 90 % qui me suivent! Je vous prie de prendre garde à ceci: Il y a dans la vie des peuples des occasions décisives. Aujourd'hui la France peut, si elle le veut, mettre fin à tout jamais à ce 'Péril allemand' que vos enfants, de génération en génération, apprennent à redouter. Vous pouvez lever l'hypothèque redoutable qui pèse sur l'histoire de France. La chance vous est donnée, à vous. Si vous ne la saisissez point, songez à votre responsabilité vis-à-vis de vos enfants! Vous avez devant vous une Allemagne dont les neuf dixièmes font

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pleine confiance à leur chef, et ce chef vous dit: 'Soyons amis!'"¹

*On 27 February 1936 Hitler received the new Chinese Ambassador; he said: "Germany is anxious carefully to foster and deepen the friendly relations which have long existed between our countries. The raising of the diplomatic representatives of both countries to the rank of Ambassador is a sign of this desire and an expression of the friendship which unites our peoples."*²

*In his speech in the Reichstag on 7 March 1936 Hitler drew a picture of the melancholy condition of Europe which had resulted from "the shortsightedness and unreasoning passion" of the Treaty of Versailles. That picture followed familiar lines and it is unnecessary to reproduce it here.*³ The worst feature, he said, is that "as a result of this wrongheadedness people are not only unwilling to recognize the causes of the world's sufferings but even seem to revel in them and in public discussions will gloat over the fact that the decreasing means of living are threatening the life of this or that other nation". . . . "It is a very bad sign when statesmen begin to regard presumptive signs of poverty and need in a nation as welcome symptoms for assessing the general situation and forming judgements as to the future. . . . I should like the German people to learn a lesson from this absence of common sense and not make the same mistakes themselves. I wish that in other peoples the German

¹ *Paris Midi*, 28 Feb. 1936.

² I have not the full text of Hitler's speech: I have translated the passage cited from the speech in *Die Reden des Führers nach der Machtübernahme. Eine Bibliographie*, Berlin, Eher, 1939, p. 114.

³ See the authorized English translation of the speech published in pamphlet form by Müller & Sohn, Berlin. I have throughout quoted from this version.

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nation should recognize those historical realities which fancy would like to banish but which, as a matter of fact are not to be banished by the mere wish." Conditions "contrary to their reasonable vital claims" must not be imposed upon nations. "Therefore I should like the German people to understand the inner principles that are the motivating forces in the foreign policy of National Socialism."

"We feel it unpleasant for instance that access to the sea, accorded to a nation of thirty-three millions, should cut through former territory of the Reich; but we recognize that it is unreasonable, because impossible, to dispute the question of access to the sea for so great a State. A reasoned foreign policy cannot have for its purpose or aim the establishment of conditions which would of necessity cry out to be changed immediately afterwards. It may be quite possible, especially behind the appeal to what they call 'Might', for politicians to gainsay natural and vital interests; but if this be frequently done, and if the cases in which it is done be serious, then the urge towards an explosion will be all the stronger. In its turn, this leads to increase in new means of defence, whereby we have an ever-increasing strain in the counter-pressure of those national and vital energies which it is sought to restrain. Then the world becomes anxious and restless before the threat of an explosion and refuses to recognize that the real responsibility for this state of affairs must be attributed to the stupidity of its so-called statesmen. How many troubles would be spared humanity, and especially Europe, if natural and inevitable vital conditions were respected and if these had been taken into consideration in the territorial readjustment of Europe and also if economic co-operation had been taken into account."

"This is what seems to me absolutely essential if

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better and more peaceful results are to be achieved in the future. And this applies especially to Europe. The European nations now form a family in the world. Sometimes it is a quarrelsome family; in spite of everything, the members are related to one another in divers ways. Culturally and spiritually and economically they are indivisible. In fact, their break-up is unthinkable. Every attempt to regard and deal with the European problem by any other rule than that of calm and cool reason would be bound to lead to reactions that would be unpleasant for all. We are living in a time of internal social readjustments among the various nations. The statesman who does not understand the significance of this era and who does not strive by concessions to alleviate, and if possible to remove, the various internal tensions among his people will one day become the victim of explosions which will then inevitably bring about either the removal of the tension or, what is more possible, will at first only bring chaotic ruin in its train. It is an act of wise statesmanship to curb turbulent unreason; but at the same time, attention must be paid to the manifest trend of the times, and an adjustment must be found which removes one extreme without falling a victim to the other. To-day one can safely prophesy for Europe that where this course is not wisely taken, or should prove a failure, tension will increase and finally follow the trend of the times by bringing about an adjustment of itself. In constructing and consolidating a family of nations, such as we have in Europe, it will be wise to apply these inner laws of each State in a super-national manner. It is not wise to imagine that, in so small a household as Europe, there can be a permanent commonwealth of nations in which each nation has its own jurisprudence and in which each wants to uphold its own concept of law and justice.

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Every tendency of that kind leads to an explosion of will-energies on the part of those who have been unjustly treated and must necessarily lead to a fear psychosis on the part of those who have inflicted such treatment. I consider such a course of action as not only unreasonable but also meaningless and furthermore very dangerous." . . .

"Seeing that the outside world often speaks of a 'German Question', it would be worth while for us to try to gain an objective and clear understanding as to the nature of this. For quite a large number of people this 'question' is to be found in the present German régime, in the difference between the German régime and other régimes—which difference is not understood at all—in the so-called 'Rearmament', which is felt as a pressing menace, and in everything else that is conjured up by fervid imaginations as to the results of this rearmament. For many other people the question lies in the alleged militarist intentions of the German people, in their latent desire for aggression, or in the satanic efficiency which they are capable of in getting the better of their opponents."

"No, my dear political dabblers, the German question is something quite different."

"Here sixty-seven millions of people are living in a very restricted area of the earth and on land which is not everywhere very fertile. This means that we have about one hundred and thirty-six persons to each square kilometre. These people are not less industrious than the other European peoples, but their vital needs are not smaller or fewer. They are not less intelligent, but their will to live is also not a whit less strong and they are no more ready than the Englishman or Frenchman to allow themselves to be shot down as heroes for the sake of some dream or other. But they are not less courageous

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and by no means less honourable than the members of other European nations."...

"Comparing the German nation with the Russian in regard to territory, the Russians have eighteen times more land for each member of the population than the Germans have. Manifestly this fact alone renders the daily struggle of life difficult. Without the ability and industry of the German peasant and the organizing capacity of the German nation, existence would hardly be conceivable for these sixty-seven millions. But what is to be said of the mental simplicity of those who recognize these difficulties and yet talk with childish delight about them in press articles, various publications, and speeches. Not only that, but they even seek out every symptom of distress in Germany in order to be able to shout triumphantly about it to the rest of the world. Apparently they would be delighted if our distress were even greater than it is, and it would be greater did we not succeed, through our industry and intelligence, in making the situation such that it can be borne when one crisis comes up after another. They do not seem to have the least idea that the German question would take on quite a different aspect if the efficiency and industry of these millions should become paralysed and if Germany should thus be made to suffer, not only the pains of poverty, but also be drawn into the vortex of political madness. And this is one of the German questions. And the world can only be interested in seeing that this question of assuring the livelihood of the German people from year to year should be successfully solved. In like manner I wish that the German people should also understand and appreciate that it lies in their own innermost interests to have the same vital questions successfully solved in the case of other peoples."

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"The solution of this question, however, in Germany is first and foremost the business of the German people themselves and need not awaken any interest at all in the outside world. It touches the interest of other nations only in so far as the German people, by the solution of this question, would thereby resume trade relations with the rest of the world as buyers and sellers. And here it would only be to the advantage of their own interests if other nations of the world would understand this question. This means that they should realize that the cry for bread on the part of a nation of forty, fifty, or sixty millions is not a deliberate evil engineered by the régime or by certain forms of government, but that it is the natural assertion of the urge to live. And it ought to be quite clear to everybody that contented people are more reasonable than hungry people and that not only their governments ought to be interested in seeing that the citizens get enough to eat but also that this is a matter which affects neighbouring States and peoples. And, furthermore, to render possible the maintenance of such a life in the highest sense of the word is in the interest of all.¹ Before the war the opposite opinion still held sway and was even proclaimed as a reason for war. This opinion specifically held that one part of the European family of nations would fare all the better if the other part fared worse."

"The German nation needs no special aid to help it in following out its own way of life. But it will not be content with the possession of opportunities which are inferior to those granted to other people. This is the German question on the one hand. The second German question is as follows":

"As a result of exceptionally unfavourable conditions,

¹ Here I have deserted the authorized translation: in my judgement it misrepresents Hitler's meaning.

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the struggle for economic existence among the German nation is extremely difficult; but their intelligence, industry, and consequently the standard of life natural to them, are very high. Therefore an exceptional effort on the part of all the forces of the nation is necessary in order to master this first German problem. But such an effort can be made only if the German nation feels itself on a footing of political equality with other nations, and thus politically secure. It is impossible to hold together a nation which has a high sense of honour and courage if that nation be treated permanently as the world's slave and, under such conditions, it would be impossible to govern it. There is no better proof of the German love for peace than the fact that, despite its ability and its courage, which can scarcely be called in question by its opponents, and in spite of its numbers, the German nation has secured for itself only quite a modest share of the world's space and the world's goods. But it is just this very internalized¹ character of the German nature which makes it impossible for the German to bear humiliation and ill-treatment."

"The unfortunate Peace Treaty of Versailles was historically unique by reason of the fact that it officially perpetuated, in the moral sense, the conditions that existed as the immediate result of the war. Thus it created that German question which constitutes a fatal burden for Europe as long as it remains unsolved and on the solution of which the freedom of Europe depends."

"In the year 1919, when the Peace Treaty had been signed, I took upon myself the duty of solving this question. Not because I wanted to injure France or any other State but because the German people cannot per-

¹ German: *diese immer mehr nach innen gewandte Art des deutschen Wesens*, "this character of the German nature which is always more inclined to turn inwards upon itself".

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manently bear the wrong which has been done to them. They shall not bear it and they will not bear it."

"In the year 1932 Germany stood on the verge of a Bolshevist collapse. Perhaps at a future date some European statesmen will have the occasion to study elsewhere what this chaos in so great a nation would have meant to Europe. Anyhow, I myself was able to master the crisis that followed in Germany, which was most apparent in the economic sphere, only by mobilizing the ethical and moral forces of the whole German nation. The man who wished to save Germany from Bolshevism was necessarily bound to make the question of Germany's equality of status a decisive one and solve it at the same time. Not to bring any injury whatsoever to other people but on the contrary, by preventing the inrush of the Bolshevist wave, they were thus saved from the terrible experience that would have followed such a break-up and which would have brought such ruin to Europe as can hardly be imagined. The re-establishment of German equality of rights has had no harmful effect on the French people; but the red revolution and the break-up of the German Reich would have shattered the social order of Europe and its economic system, the consequences of which are unfortunately not properly understood by most European statesmen. This struggle for German equality which I have carried on for three long years has not raised a new European question but has solved one."

"It is indeed a tragic misfortune that this Treaty of Versailles created a situation the maintenance of which was considered by the French people to be in their own interests. This situation contained in itself little that could bring advantage to the individual Frenchman, and yet the French people clung to this fantastic association which coupled the Versailles discrimination against the

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German nation together with the interests of France. Perhaps it may have been the weakness of character displayed in Germany during the post-war period by our governments, and especially by our parties, which is to blame for the fact that the erroneous character of this policy was not adequately brought home to the conscience of the French nation and of serious French statesmen. For the more incompetent the various governments before our time were, the more reason they had to fight shy of a national awakening on the part of the German people. Consequently, when they were confronted with an awakening of national self-consciousness their fear became all the greater and their attitude towards the general international defamation of the German people was accordingly all the more subservient. This disgraceful state of bondage was a necessity for them so that they might support their wretched régime in this way. The collapse which at last menaced the nation showed clearly where this régime had led Germany."

"In view of the fact that the idea of inequality had become so rooted in the minds of our neighbours, it was naturally difficult to show that the restoration of German equality was not only unharmed to them, but that on the contrary it was, in the last analysis, an international benefit. You, my fellow members of the Reichstag, know how hard was the road that I have had to travel since 30 January 1933 in order to free the German people from the dishonourable position in which it found itself and to secure equality of rights step by step without thereby alienating Germany from the political and economic commonwealth of European nations, and particularly without creating new ill-feeling from the aftermath of old enmities. There will come a time when I may appeal to history for confirmation of the fact that

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at no moment of my struggle on behalf of the German people have I ever forgotten the duty incumbent on me and on us all firmly to uphold European culture and European civilization. But the special character of this continent is after all the diversity of its various civilizations. For that reason it is a necessary condition for its existence that there should be free and independent national States. Each European nation may feel convinced that it has made the greatest contribution to our West-European culture. But on the whole we should not wish to be without anything which the individual nations have contributed, and we shall not therefore dispute the value of their individual contributions. We must rather acknowledge that the greatest achievements in all spheres of culture have undoubtedly arisen from rivalry between individual European efforts. Although we are quite ready to co-operate as a free and equal member in this world of European culture, we are obstinately determined to remain what we are."

"In these three years I have again and again endeavoured—unfortunately too often in vain—to throw a bridge of understanding across to the people of France. The farther we leave behind the bitterness of the World War and the fears that followed it, the more do evil memories fade from the minds of men, and the more do the beautiful aspects of life and knowledge and experience come to the fore. Those who once faced one another as bitter opponents honour each other to-day as men who fought bravely in a great struggle that is past and gone and regard each other as the depositories and trustees of a great and common cultural inheritance."

"Why then should it not be possible to put an end to this useless strife which has lasted for centuries and which has never been and never will be finally decided by either of the two nations concerned? Why not replace

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it by the rule of reason? The German people have no interest in seeing the French people suffer. And on the other hand what advantage can come to France when Germany is in misery? What boon can the French peasant expect to come to him when times are bad with the German peasant, or vice versa? Or what advantage can the French worker expect from the distress of the German worker? What blessing could it bring to Germany, to the German labourer and to the German middle classes or the whole of the German people, if France were overwhelmed with misfortune?"

"I have followed the principles of common sense in trying to solve questions which arose from the mischievous preaching of class war among the German people themselves. And I have been successful in my effort. Why then should it not be possible to lift the general problem of conflicting interests between the European States above the sphere of passion and unreason and consider it in the calm light of a higher vision?"

"I once swore to myself that I would fight boldly and steadfastly for Germany's equality and obtain it in one way or the other; but at the same time my earnest desire has been to increase the feeling of responsibility for the necessity of mutual consideration and collaboration in Europe."

"If my international opponents reproach me to-day that I have refused this co-operation with Russia, I make them the following declaration: I do not and did not reject co-operation with Russia but with Bolshevism, which lays claim to a world rulership. I am German. I love and am attached to my nation. I know that this nation can be happy when it can live a life in accordance with its own nature and in its own way. The German nation has not only wept but has laughed heartily throughout its life and I will not see it descend

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into the gloom of international Communism and the dictatorship of hate. I tremble for Europe at the very thought of what would happen to our old and overpopulated continent if this Asiatic concept of the world, which is destructive of all our accepted ideals, should be successful in bringing upon us the chaos of the Bolshevik revolution. Perhaps I am looked upon as one who is accustomed to issue fantastic and inconvenient warnings. But it is for me a great honour and a justification of my conduct in the eyes of posterity that I am looked upon by the international oppressors as one of their greatest enemies. I cannot prevent other States from going the way they think they ought to go or at least can go, but I shall prevent Germany from taking this road to ruin. And I believe that the first step to this ruin is taken when the government of a State itself enters into an alliance with the doctrine of destruction. Should I myself, as a leader of the Nation, enter into close relations with this menace, then I do not see how it would be possible for me to convince the German worker as to the danger of a misfortune falling upon Germany in the shape of Bolshevik chaos. With respect to such matters, as statesman and leader of the German people, I shall myself do everything that I expect and demand from each of my fellow-countrymen."

"I do not believe that close association with the political doctrine and outlook on life which are destructive of national existence can be helpful to statesmen. We have had many experiences of this in Germany within the past twenty years. The first contact with Bolshevism, in 1917, brought on us the revolution itself a year later. The second time that Germany entered into relations with Bolshevism the result was within a few years she herself was brought to the brink of a communistic collapse. I severed that connexion and by

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so doing I saved the country from destruction. Nothing will force me to take any other course than that which my experience, insight, and foresight point out to me. And I know that this conviction has become a profound factor in the political thought and ideals of the whole National Socialist Movement. With steadfast determination we shall deal with the social problems and tensions that exist in our nation in such a way that they may be solved by a progressive evolution and thus assure to us the blessings of a peaceful development in public affairs such as will be to the advantage of all our people. And any new tasks that fall to our lot during this process will be gladly accepted by those for whom life means work and therewith the discharge of task after task."

"Let me now apply this fundamental principle to European politics in general. The moment I do so I find that Europe is divided into two groups. The first group consists of autonomous and independent national States and of nations with whom we are linked together in a thousand ways by reason of a common historical experience and a common culture. With these same people we want to remain thus linked for ever, and indeed also with the free and independent nations of other countries outside of Europe. The second group is ruled by that intolerant Bolshevist doctrine which aims at international domination and which preaches the annihilation of what are to us the most eternal and most sacred ideals relating to this world and the next. In place of all this Bolshevism would instal a world which is abhorrent to us in its culture and its outlook and its teaching. With this Bolshevist section of Europe we desire no closer contact than the ordinary political and economic relations."

"Now there is deep tragedy in the fact that after all our long years of honest striving to establish relations of

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confidence, sympathy, and closer understanding with the French people, this people has entered into a military alliance, the first phases of which we can see to-day, but the ultimate results of which may be incalculable, unless Providence again proves more kindly than men deserve."

"During the past three years I have worked slowly and steadily to establish the conditions that are necessary for a Franco-German understanding. In doing this I have made it plain that one of the conditions of such an understanding should be absolute equality of rights and identity of legal status for the German State and nation. But in regard to this effort to reach an understanding I have clearly seen, not merely a problem to be solved by means of pacts, but also a problem as to how the two nations could be psychologically brought closer together; because the way would have to be prepared for such an understanding, not merely by an appeal to reason, but also by an appeal to sentiment. For this reason I have often been confronted with the reproach that my offers of friendship did not embody any concrete proposals. That is not correct."

"I have boldly made concrete proposals in regard to all those concrete factors which could be suggested as a means of lessening the strained tension existing in Franco-German relations. On one occasion I did not hesitate to support a concrete proposal for limiting the German army to 200,000 men.¹ And when this proposal was abandoned by its own authors I made an entirely fresh concrete proposal to the French people and to the European Governments, but even this proposal to limit the armies to 300,000 men each² was also rejected."³

¹ MacDonald Plan of 10 Mar. 1933.

² In the German Memorandum of 18 Dec. 1933 on the basis of Hitler's conversations with the French Ambassador François-Poncet on 24 Nov. and 11 Dec. 1933.

³ In the French Aide Mémoire of 1 Jan. 1934.

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"I have made a whole series of such concrete proposals for the purpose of eliminating that poison with which public opinion had been infected in the various countries, and to abandon those more atrocious features of modern warfare, with the ultimate purpose of reaching a condition of practical disarmament, even though that purpose might prove slow in the achievement.¹ Only one of these German proposals was seriously considered. A sense of realism led an English Government to accept my proposal for the establishment of a permanent ratio between the German and the British navies, which is not only consonant with the demands of German security, but also takes into account the enormous overseas interests of a great world Empire.² And here I may mention the fact that this agreement remains the only practical agreement which embodies an understanding of mutual viewpoints and therefore has been the only successful attempt at the limitation of armaments. The Government of the Reich is ready to supplement this treaty by a further qualitative agreement with England."

"I have expressed the very concrete principle that collective programmes which arise from an international pactomania have as little chance of realization as the general proposals for a world disarmament which under such circumstances proved impracticable from the very beginning. Against this I pointed out that these questions can be dealt with only step by step and always along what promises to be the line of least resistance. In this conviction I also drew up a concrete proposal for an air pact on the basis of parity of strength as between France, England, and Germany.³ The immediate result

¹ Points 9, 12, 13 of the speech in the Reichstag of 21 May 1935.

² Agreement of 18 June 1935.

³ German proposal for an Air Locarno Pact presented in London on 30 May 1935.

was that this suggestion was inconsiderately rejected and subsequently a new East-European-Asiatic factor was introduced into the field of European equilibrium, a factor which is incalculable in its military possibilities."

"Therefore I have been making concrete proposals for years past. And I do not hesitate to say that the psychological preparation for an understanding has always appeared to me to be quite as important as those so-called concrete proposals. In this field I have done more than any honest foreign statesman ever dared even to hope for. I have removed the problem of eternal frontier revisions from the atmosphere of public discussion in Germany. Unfortunately it is often said, even by foreign statesmen, that this attitude of mine and the negotiations arising out of it are of no particular significance. I may point out that as a German it would have been just as possible for me to make the restoration of the 1914 frontiers the moral basis of my programme and to uphold it in writing and in speaking, just as French ministers and French national leaders did after 1871. My critics cannot deny that I have some share of ability in this sphere. It is often much more difficult for a nationalist to bring his nation to a sense of reason than the contrary. It would probably have been much easier for me to arouse instincts of revenge rather than to awaken and strengthen a feeling for the necessity of European understanding. This latter I have done. I have stopped public opinion in Germany from making attacks of this kind against neighbouring nations."

"I have expurgated from the German Press all expressions of hatred against the French people. I have laboured to instil into the minds of our youth an appreciation for the ideal of an understanding with France. And here my work has not been in vain. A few weeks

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ago, when our French guests marched into the Olympic Stadium at Garmisch-Partenkirchen,¹ they may have taken the occasion of noticing whether and how far I had succeeded in bringing about such a change in the mentality of the German people."

"The inner readiness for seeking and finding such an understanding is more important than the finely woven attempts of statesmen to ensnare the world in a legal net, and in pacts that are not clear as to the obligations they involve."

"My endeavours along these lines were doubly difficult because, at the same time I had to deliver Germany from the entanglement of a Treaty which robbed her of equality of rights, a Treaty which the French people—rightly or wrongly, it does not matter—believed it in their interests to maintain."

Hitler then spoke of the Locarno Pact and of the sacrifice which Germany had made by joining in this Pact in order that a better political atmosphere might be created between France and Germany and England and Germany. This Treaty of Locarno "was intended to prevent for all future time the employment of force between Belgium and France on the one side, and Germany on the other. Unfortunately the treaties of alliance that had already been made by France were the first obstacles laid in the practical path of this Pact, namely the Rhine Pact of Locarno. To this Pact Germany made a contribution which represented the greatest sacrifice; because while France fortified her frontier with steel and concrete and armament, and garrisoned it heavily, a condition of complete defencelessness was imposed upon us on our Western frontier. Nevertheless we abided by that obligation in the hope that we might serve the cause of European peace and advance international understanding

¹ 6 Feb. 1936.

by making a sacrifice which meant so much for a great Power."

"The agreement concluded between France and Russia last year, and already signed and accepted by the French Chamber, is in open contradiction to this Pact. This new Franco-Soviet Agreement introduces the threatening military power of a mighty Empire into the centre of Europe by the roundabout way of Czechoslovakia, the latter country having also signed an agreement with Russia.¹ Such being the state of affairs, it is impossible that these two countries should undertake in their agreement to decide the question of guilt, in the event of an Eastern European conflict, according to their own judgement, and accordingly to regard the obligation of mutual assistance as having arisen or not, entirely irrespective of an already existing or pending decision on the part of the League of Nations Council."

"It has been asserted that in this Pact the first obligation need not necessarily apply because it is restricted by a certain condition attached to the text; but this assertion is incomprehensible. I cannot state that a certain course of action is expressly a breach of an obligation otherwise valid and therewith considered as binding, and then, in a further paragraph, declare that no action shall be taken which would be contrary to these other obligations. In this case the first obligation would be unreasonable and therefore incomprehensible."

"This problem is first and foremost a political one and must be considered as such in all its serious implications."

"France has not concluded this Treaty with a European Power of no special significance.² Even before the

¹ 16 May 1935.

² German: *mit einer x-beliebigen europäischen Macht*. The authorized translation here makes no sense.

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Rhine Pact came into existence France already had treaties of assistance with Czechoslovakia and with Poland. Germany made no objection to this, not only because these pacts, unlike the Franco-Soviet Pact, were subject to the provisions laid down by the League of Nations but because at that time Czechoslovakia, and more particularly Poland, were in the habit of following a policy in keeping with their own national interests. Germany has no desire to attack these States, and does not believe that it is in their interests to attack her. Above all, however, Poland will remain Poland and France will remain France. But Soviet Russia is the exponent of a revolutionary political and philosophical system organized in the form of a State. Its political creed is the confession of faith in the world revolution. It cannot be foreseen whether this philosophy will not be victorious to-morrow or the next day in France as well. But should this happen—and I as a German statesman must count on such a possibility—then it is certain that this new Bolshevik State would be a section of the Bolshevik International, which means that the decision as to aggression or non-aggression would not be made by two different States according to their own independent and objective judgements, but orders would be issued from one headquarters. Should such a development take place these headquarters would not be in Paris but in Moscow."

"For purely territorial reasons alone Germany is not in a position to attack Russia; but Russia could at any time bring about a conflict with Germany by the indirect way of her own advanced positions. In such an event the definition of the aggressor may well be called a foregone conclusion, because it would be independent of the decision of the League Council. To object or assert that France and Russia would do nothing which might expose them to the infliction of sanctions on the part of England

or Italy is immaterial here; because it is impossible to imagine what kind of effective sanctions could be found against such an overwhelming combination welded together by its world outlook and its united military forces."

"For years past we have issued warnings against such a development, not because we need to be more afraid of it than others but because one day it may entail terrible consequences for all Europe. An attempt has been made to brush aside our very grave apprehensions by referring to the unreadiness of Russia as a war instrument, by referring also to its unwieldy character and its unfitness for a European war. We have also opposed this view, not because we are convinced that the Germans would be inferior in quality, but because we all know that sheer force of numbers is of supreme importance. We are all the more grateful for the information which M. Herriot conveyed to the French in the French Chamber¹ on Russia's importance from the standpoint of military aggression. We know that M. Herriot received this information from the Soviet Government themselves and we are convinced that the Soviet Government cannot have furnished the spiritual inspirer of this new alliance in France with false information. Nor do we doubt that M. Herriot reported his information truly. Now, according to this information it is established in the first place that the Russian Army has a peace strength of 1,350,000 men, and secondly, that its war strength and reserves amount to 17.5 million men. Thirdly, we are informed it has the largest tank force in the world, and, fourthly, that it has the largest air force in the world. This most powerful military factor has been described as excellent in regard to mobility and leadership and ready for action at any time.

¹ 20 Feb. 1936.

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Its introduction into Central Europe would destroy the European equilibrium existing there. Furthermore, we are absolutely unable to make any possible estimate of the means of defence on land and in the air for the European States concerned and especially for Germany, which has been singled out as the sole opponent."

"This gigantic mobilization of the East against Central Europe is opposed not only to the letter but above all to the spirit of the Locarno Pact. Not only do we feel this as the party chiefly concerned, but the same feeling is agitating the minds of intelligent men in all the nations and has been openly expressed everywhere by publicists and political writers and speakers."

"On 21 February a French journalist came to me and asked me to grant him an interview. I was informed that he was one of those Frenchmen who try just as hard as we do to find a way towards an understanding between the two nations and so I did not like to refuse him, especially as my refusal might immediately be interpreted as a sign of disrespect towards French journalism. I gave him the information he desired, just as I had given it hundreds and thousands of times in Germany, and I tried once more to approach the French people with the request for an understanding on which we have set our hearts and which we would like to see carried into effect. Furthermore I expressed my deep regret about the menace of the development arising in France from the conclusion of a pact for which we are convinced that there is no conceivable necessity, but which would create a new situation in Europe in case it should be brought to realization. This interview, as you are aware, was held back for reasons unknown to us and was not published until the day after the ratification of the Pact in the French Chamber."¹

¹ See p. 1266, note 1, *supra*.

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"In accordance with the declarations which I made at that interview, I am still ready and shall always and sincerely be ready in the future to help the cause of this Franco-German understanding; for I look upon it as a necessary element in securing Europe against dangers that are incalculable, and because I am unable to see what possible advantage could come to either nation from any other attitude, which indeed would involve the gravest general and international dangers. But when the knowledge of the final conclusion of this Pact came to me I was forced to analyse the new situation that had arisen from it and from this analysis to draw the necessary conclusions."

"These are conclusions which are very grave and fill us and myself personally with a deep regret. Yet I am obliged, not only to make sacrifices for the sake of a European understanding, but I am obliged also to bow to the interests of my own nation. So long as a sacrifice is accepted with appreciation and understanding on the other side I will gladly stand by that sacrifice and will recommend the German people to do the same. At the moment, however, when it is certain that the other party no longer takes these sacrifices into account or ceases to appreciate them, a one-sided burden is laid upon Germany and therewith a discrimination which is intolerable for us."

"In this historic hour and place I should like to repeat what I said in my first important Reichstag speech, which was delivered in May 1933.¹ I then said that the German people would rather accept distress and affliction than renounce the call of honour and the will to freedom and equality of rights."

"If the German nation is to be of some value for European collaboration it can have this value only as a

¹ For the speech of 17 May 1933 see p. 1041 *supra*.

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partner who has equal rights with all the others and is devoted to the principles of honour. As soon as it ceases to possess this characteristic value it loses everything that is of essential worth. I should not like to deceive either ourselves or the rest of the world with a nation which would then have no further value because it would be lacking in that sense of honour which is the most natural part of a nation's character. But I also believe that in the hour of such bitter recognition and grave decision, in spite of everything, we ought not to fail, particularly at such a time, to play our part in European co-operation, and I believe that we should now more than ever seek new ways which might make possible a solution of those questions in a way that would be advantageous to all."

"I have therefore endeavoured to express the feeling of the German people by making concrete proposals. This people is anxious for its own security and is prepared to make every sacrifice for its freedom and is at every moment ready to enter into a sincere and honest European co-operation on the basis of equal rights for all."

"After a hard inner struggle with myself I therefore decided, on behalf of the German Government of the Reich, to hand the following Memorandum to the French Government to-day and to the other signatories of the Locarno Pact."

Memorandum¹

(dated 7 March 1936)

Immediately after being informed of the Pact between France and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics,

¹ At this point I have deserted the authorized English translation which I have previously reproduced. I have inserted the official English text from the Foreign Office publication *Germany No. 1* (1936) Cmd. 5118.

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concluded on 2 May 1935, the German Government drew the attention of the other signatory Powers of the Locarno Rhine Pact to the fact that the obligations which France has undertaken in the new Pact are not compatible with her obligations arising out of the Rhine Pact. The German Government then explained their point of view in full detail and in both its legal and political aspects—in its legal aspect in the German Memorandum of 25 May 1935,¹ in its political aspect in the many diplomatic conversations which followed on that Memorandum. It is also known to the Governments concerned that neither their written replies to the German Memorandum,² nor the arguments brought forward by them through the diplomatic channel or in public declarations, were able to invalidate the German Government's point of view.

In fact, all the diplomatic and public discussions which have taken place since May 1935 regarding these questions have only been able to confirm on all points the view expressed by the German Government at the outset.

1. It is an undisputed fact that the Franco-Soviet Pact is exclusively directed against Germany.

2. It is an undisputed fact that in the Pact France undertakes, in the event of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, obligations which go far beyond her duty as laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and which compel her to take military action against Germany even when she cannot appeal either to a recommendation or to an actual decision of the Council of the League.

3. It is an undisputed fact that France, in such a case, claims for herself the right to decide on her own judgment who is the aggressor.

¹ German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, iii, pp. 109-12.

² French answer 25 June; English answer 5 July 1935.

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4. It is thereby established that France has undertaken towards the Soviet Union obligations which practically amount to undertaking in a given case to act as if neither the Covenant of the League of Nations, nor the Rhine Pact, which refers to the Covenant, were valid.

This result of the Franco-Soviet Pact is not removed by the fact that France, in the Pact, makes the reservation that she does not wish to be bound to take military action against Germany if by such action she would expose herself to a sanction on the part of the guarantor Powers, Italy and Great Britain. As regards this reservation, the decisive fact remains that the Rhine Pact is not based only on the obligations of Great Britain and Italy as guarantor Powers, but primarily on the obligations established in the relations between France and Germany. Therefore it matters only whether France, in undertaking these treaty obligations, has kept herself within the limits imposed on her so far as Germany is concerned by the Rhine Pact.

This, however, the German Government must deny.

The Rhine Pact was intended to achieve the object of securing peace in Western Europe by providing that Germany on the one hand and France and Belgium on the other hand, in their relation to one another, should renounce for all future time the use of military force. If at the time of the conclusion of the pact certain exceptions to this renunciation of war going beyond the right of self-defence were admitted, the political reason for this, as is generally known, lay solely in the fact that France had already undertaken certain obligations towards Poland and Czechoslovakia, which she did not wish to sacrifice to the conception of absolute security in the West. Germany, with her own clear conscience in regard to the matter, at the time accepted these limitations on the renunciation of war. She did not raise

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objections to the treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, laid by France on the table at Locarno, solely on the obvious condition that these treaties were in conformity with the construction of the Rhine Pact, and contained no sort of provisions regarding the application of article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, such as those contained in the new Franco-Soviet agreements. The contents of these special agreements, as then notified to the German Government, fulfilled this condition. The exceptions admitted in the Rhine Pact were not, it is true, specifically confined to Poland and Czechoslovakia, but were formulated as an abstract principle. Nevertheless, the intention of all the negotiations relating to these questions was merely to find a compromise between the renunciation of war by Germany and France, and the wish of France to maintain the obligations which she had already undertaken towards her allies. If, therefore, France now utilizes the abstract provisions of the Rhine Pact, which permit the possibility of war, in order to conclude a fresh alliance against Germany with a Power highly armed in a military sense; if she thus further, and in so decisive a manner, restricts the scope of the renunciation of war agreed upon with Germany; and if in this connexion, as shown above, she does not even observe the fixed formal legal limits, she has created an entirely new situation, and has destroyed the political system of the Rhine Pact, not only in theory but also in fact.

The latest debates and decisions of the French Parliament¹ have shown that France, in spite of the German representations, is determined to put the pact with the Soviet Union definitively into force. A diplomatic conversation has even revealed that France already regards herself as bound by her signature of this pact on

¹ 20-7 Feb. 1936.

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2 May 1935. In the face of such a development of European politics, the German Government, if they do not wish to neglect or to abandon the interests of the German people which they have the duty of safeguarding, cannot remain inactive.

The German Government have continually emphasized during the negotiations of the last years their readiness to observe and fulfil all the obligations arising from the Rhine Pact as long as the other contracting parties were ready on their side to maintain the Pact. This obvious and essential condition can no longer be regarded as being fulfilled by France. France has replied to the repeated friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by infringing the Rhine Pact through a military alliance with the Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany. In this manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner meaning and ceased in practice to exist. Consequently, Germany regards herself for her part as no longer bound by this dissolved treaty. The German Government are now constrained to face the new situation created by this alliance, a situation which is rendered more acute by the fact that the Franco-Soviet Treaty has been supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union exactly parallel in form. In accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its frontiers and ensure its possibilities of defence, the German Government have to-day restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

In order, however, to avoid any misinterpretation of their intentions and to establish beyond doubt the purely defensive character of these measures, as well as to express their unchangeable longing for a real pacification of Europe between States which are equals in rights and

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equally respected, the German Government declare themselves ready to conclude new agreements for the creation of a system of peaceful security for Europe on the basis of the following proposals:

- (1) The German Government declare themselves ready to enter at once into negotiations with France and Belgium with regard to the creation of a zone demilitarized on both sides, and to give their agreement in advance to any suggestion regarding the depth and nature thereof on the basis of full parity.
- (2) The German Government propose, for the purpose of ensuring the sanctity and inviolability of the boundaries in the West, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany, France, and Belgium, the duration of which they are ready to fix at twenty-five years.
- (3) The German Government desire to invite Great Britain and Italy to sign this treaty as guarantor Powers.
- (4) The German Government agree, in case the Netherlands Government should so desire and the other Contracting Parties consider it appropriate, to bring the Netherlands into this treaty system.
- (5) The German Government are prepared, in order to strengthen further these security agreements between the Western Powers, to conclude an air pact calculated to prevent in an automatic and effective manner the danger of sudden air attacks.
- (6) The German Government repeat their offer to conclude with the States bordering Germany in the East non-aggression pacts similar to that with Poland. As the Lithuanian Government have in the last few months corrected their attitude

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towards the Memel Territory to a certain extent, the German Government withdraw the exception which they once made regarding Lithuania¹ and declare their readiness, on condition that the guaranteed autonomy of the Memel Territory is effectively developed, to sign a non-aggression pact of this nature with Lithuania also.

- (7) Now that Germany's equality of rights and the restoration of her full sovereignty over the entire territory of the German Reich have finally been attained, the German Government consider the chief reason for their withdrawal from the League of Nations to be removed. They are therefore willing to re-enter the League of Nations. In this connexion they express the expectation that in the course of a reasonable period the question of colonial equality of rights and that of the separation of the League Covenant from its Versailles setting may be clarified through friendly negotiations.

"Gentlemen, Members of the German Reichstag:² In this historic hour as German troops are moving into their future peace garrisons in the western provinces of the Reich let us all unite in two sacred vows."

"First, we swear an oath that we will yield before no power and before no coercion in our determination to restore the honour of our nation. And we swear to succumb with honour to the gravest distress rather than capitulate before it."

"And, secondly, we proclaim now more than ever before our wish to further the cause of mutual understanding between the nations of Europe and particularly

¹ Cf. p. 1236 *supra*.

² I return at this point to the authorized English translation of the speech.

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an understanding among our western nations and neighbours."

"Thus after three years I believe that to-day I can look upon the struggle for the restoration of German equality of rights as now concluded. I believe that therewith the first condition which was responsible for our abstinence from European collective collaboration has now disappeared. Therefore we are ready to return to this collaboration and we do so with the sincere wish that these events and a review of these years will help to create a deeper understanding for this collaboration also among the other European nations."

"In Europe we have no territorial claims to put forward. We know that all the strained tension resulting from erroneous delimitation of territory, or from a disproportion between the populations and the space at their disposal cannot be solved through wars in Europe. But we also hope that human intelligence will co-operate in alleviating the sufferings caused by these conditions and in lessening the strained tensions by means of a slow evolutionary development in friendly collaboration. And particularly I feel, to-day more than ever before, the necessity which is laid upon us to honour the obligations which our regained national honour and freedom now impose. These are obligations not only towards our own people but also towards the other European States."

"Therefore I should like again to remind European statesmen of the thoughts which I expressed in the thirteen points of my last speech in this House,¹ while giving an assurance that we Germans will gladly do everything that is possible and necessary in order to bring about a realization of these very practical ideals."

"Fellow Members of the National Socialist Party: For the past three years I have directed the affairs of

¹ See pp. 1240-5 *supra*.

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the Government of the German Reich and therewith the German nation. The successes which Providence has allowed me to achieve for our Fatherland during those three years have been great indeed. Our position has been improved in every sphere of our national, political, and economic life. To-day I may say that during this time numerous cares have weighed upon me and countless sleepless nights and days full of work have been my lot. I was able to do all this only because I never felt myself as a dictator of my people, but only and always their leader, that is to say, their mandatory. For fourteen years I struggled to bring my ideals to the inner conviction of the German people and then, thanks to their confidence in me, I received my call from the venerable Field Marshal. Since then all my strength has come from the happy consciousness of being inseparably united with my people as man and as leader. I cannot close this historic period of the restoration and honour of the freedom of my nation without asking the German people to give to me and also to all my collaborators and fellow combatants their retrospective approval of all that I have had to demand of them during these years, of the decisions that had to be made, and the hard measures that had to be carried through."

"I have therefore decided to dissolve the German Reichstag to-day so that the German people may give their verdict as to my leadership and that of my colleagues. In these three years Germany has regained her honour, has recovered faith in herself, has overcome her greatest economic distress and, finally, a new cultural resurgence has begun. I believe I can say this openly before my conscience and my God. I now beg the German people to strengthen me in my faith and through the force of their will further to endow me with the strength to take a courageous stand at all times for their

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honour and their freedom and their economic welfare. And I specially request the German people to support me in my struggle to bring about a real peace."¹

On 7 March 1936 German troops marched into the demilitarized Rhineland zone.

On 12 March 1936 the German Government issued its explanation of the action taken on 7 March 1936.²

The text of this official statement explaining the German case for the occupation of the Rhineland is translated in full in "The Times" for 13 March 1936. The last two paragraphs (cited from this translation) may be reproduced here:

What the German Government is striving for is not the conclusion of treaties which, through their being bound up with moral burdens for an honour-loving and decent people, inwardly and outwardly remain incredible, but the bringing about of a real and actual pacification of Europe for the next quarter of a century; in fact a peace which has in itself the character of an unconditional European legal order, based on the free decisions of European nations and States with equal rights. And only what has been signed on such assumptions can, in consequence of its agreement with the ideas of

¹ German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, iv, pp. 101-23. On the French pact with Russia see the bibliography in the Addenda at the end of this book.

² German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, iv (1937), pp. 133-7. On the military occupation of the Rhineland by Germany cf. *Survey of International Affairs 1936*, London, Oxford University Press, 1937, pp. 252-370; *Documents on International Affairs 1936*, *ibid.*, 1937, pp. 1-120. See further the section "Von der Begründung der deutschen Wehrhoheit zum Ende des Locarno-vertrages" in *Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart in Dokumenten 1935/36. Internationale Politik*. Ed. W. Frauendienst, Essen, Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1937, pp. 289-458; Axel Freiherr von Freytagh-Loringhoven, *Deutschlands Außenpolitik 1933-1939*, Berlin, Stollberg, 1939, pp. 84 sqq.; W. Ziegler, "Der 7. März 1936", *Zeitschrift für Politik*, xxvi (1936), pp. 105-8.

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the honour of nations, and will, so far as Germany is concerned, be kept honourably.

Should this attitude not meet with the consent of the other Powers, then the German Government will naturally withdraw their proposals, and, building on the trustworthiness, the loyalty, and historic self-sacrificing courage of the German people, rather choose from now on an honourable isolation than live as a nation discriminated against in the community of the others.¹

In an interview with Mr. G. Ward Price on 10 March 1936 Hitler said: "My proposal for the conclusion of non-aggression pacts on the East and West of Germany was meant as a universal one. There is certainly no exception intended to it. It applies equally to Czechoslovakia and Austria." His feeling was that such pacts could be most efficiently negotiated by direct dealings between the Governments concerned, and Germany would be glad if some other power—Britain for instance—would come forward as "honest broker" for the solution of these matters.

The proposals made in the Reichstag speech were subject to no time-limit, but "if these proposals, like so many that have gone before them, are again rejected or simply ignored, the German Government will not importune Europe with further overtures."

"If the Franco-Russian Pact which was signed on 2 May 1935 had been in existence when the Locarno Pact was drafted, the Rhineland clauses of the latter treaty would never have been signed. . . . Not only the spirit but the letter of the Locarno Pact has been disregarded."

Hitler further said in explaining his action in reoccupying the Rhine territory: "It is not possible for one party to

¹ *The Times*, 13 Mar. 1936.

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a treaty to transgress the sense and letter of the bond without the other party liberating himself from his engagements. That is what I have done."

*In this interview Hitler repeated his statement that "Germany has no further claims to make from France, nor will she make any."*¹

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

AFTER THE OCCUPATION OF THE RHINELAND

The campaign was opened by a speech at Karlsruhe on 12 March 1936. Hitler described his work in the domestic sphere in promoting unity in Germany: "I have sought to bring internal peace to the German people"; similarly in Germany's foreign relations "I started from the great ideal of peace in the conviction that only in and under this ideal could the European peoples, and beyond Europe the world, be permanently happy. It is my wish to resolve the great differences in the life of peoples, just as I have resolved domestic differences within Germany, on the principles of justice, of equity, and consequently of reason. It may be objected: 'that is impossible; that is a visionary's dream; these are mere "ideologies"'. But I believe in these 'ideologies', and in this sphere already wonderful success has been gained. It is not as an idle talker that I come before the German people. I can say: these conceptions have been my guide for three years and they have guided me well. . . . I have sought to bring reason into the relations of Germany with other countries. I have endeavoured to build up these relations on principles which have been proved to be eter-

¹ *Daily Mail*, 11 Mar. 1936.

nally valid—the principles of human brotherhood (*menschlicher Zusammengehörigkeit*), of human co-operation (*menschlicher Gemeinschaftsarbeit*). I have tried to make clear to the world and to the German people that Europe is but a small idea, that in this small Europe for centuries past there have been no great movements of peoples—that here in Europe one is dealing with a family of peoples and that the individual members of this family have become immensely consolidated—they represent nations filled with tradition, looking back upon a great past, each with an individual civilization which it calls its own possession, each with proud hopes for the future. I have tried to make our own people and the other peoples understand that every conflict inspired by hate can win but temporary, small successes. The frontiers of European States may change, but their peoples remain stable. Frontiers of States one can alter, but the frontiers of a people are positively unalterable. There are no empty spaces in Europe which could easily be deprived of their essential character. But there is no necessity, and it is therefore senseless, to seek to strip peoples of their individuality in order to force upon them an alien individuality. I have sought, starting from this quite sober consideration, to better Germany's relations towards neighbouring countries and my efforts have not been without success."

"Three years ago, when Germany stood in profoundest opposition to Poland, I succeeded in gradually lessening the tension, and thanks to the profound understanding of another great Führer and statesman we succeeded in slowly bringing two peoples nearer to each other. From this approach towards each other there gradually arose an understanding, and from this understanding the conviction of the necessity for living together side by side in friendship, and from this again there arose

slowly a mutual regard. I am convinced that one day after a certain time it will be incomprehensible how it came about that two peoples could live in the sphere of a so-called 'traditional hereditary enmity'. I have endeavoured to normalize the relation between the two peoples so far as Germany is concerned; and to the advantage of both peoples my endeavours have been successful."

"I have sought to transfer this same idea from the East to the West. Here, for the first time I believe, as a German Nationalist, I endeavoured to show that the continuance of this doctrine of a so-called 'hereditary enmity' must be and is for both peoples unreasonable, because senseless. Doubtless here, too, many perhaps will say: 'That is an ideal': but I believe in this ideal, and I believe that here, too, one day reason will triumph. At least I believe that it is essential to do everything in one's power to help this reason to victory."

"And this is the source of my policy of understanding, viz.: the conception that there can be only two partners possessing equal rights or—none. Only from the recognition of equal rights can come mutual respect . . . and mutual consideration". . . .

"I believe that there can be nothing of value which cannot be expressed in terms of reason. I cannot agree that in statesmanship views can be represented as true unless they can be anchored in reason." It may be objected that this is impossible, that it is disproved by experience. No! the failure of modern statesmanship proves my assertion. "I am told that if I am a German Nationalist, I must desire military triumphs. I can only say that my ambition is directed towards quite other triumphs. I am a German Nationalist and I will represent my people with all the fanaticism of a soldier of the great German army of former days. I have the ambition to raise to myself a memorial in the German people.

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But I know that I can raise this memorial better in peace than in war."¹

To this "*The Times*" of 13 March 1936 adds:

"We have made the world the most generous offer ever expressed in history." *Hitler hoped that his offer would be accepted*, because, if not, it would not be made again. His offer was made in absolute sincerity. He had never made an offer which was not supported by his honour and no one had any right to doubt his honour any more than the honour of any other statesman.

On 15 March 1936 Hitler spoke in Munich. He dwelt on the familiar themes of Honour, Freedom, and Strength. "Neither threats nor warnings will move me from my path. I go with the assurance of a sleepwalker on the way which Providence dictates. . . . My aim is Peace, Peace founded on an equality of rights amongst the peoples. We are a European Great Power and we desire to be valued as a Great Power." Germany had been asked to make a gesture of peaceful intention by withdrawing some of her troops from the Rhineland: *Hitler said that* in his proposals he had made the greatest gesture which any European statesman had ever made or could make. These proposals would guarantee to the world twenty-five years of peace. Germany was prepared for any concession save one: she would never sacrifice her honour, and part of this honour was a people's right to be able to determine and decide upon its own living-space (*Lebensraum*).²

The German reports of the speech give only a brief summary: there is much more in the reports of "*The Times*" and the "*Manchester Guardian*". Some citations from these reports may be added here:

"The German people do not wish to continue waging

¹ V.B., 14 Mar. 1936.

² V.B., 16 Mar. 1936.

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war to readjust frontiers. Each of them is bought by sacrifices out of proportion to what is to be gained. The German people know a quicker and more natural way of making up for loss of population—that is, the surplus of births over deaths, which makes greater progress than many a war can gain or regain. If the German people have a surplus of 500,000 or 600,000 births, this means a rejuvenation without our having to do injury to other people; an increase without having to go to war for it."

"A previous German Government had concluded the Rhine Pact of Locarno. Even then it was one-sided, and imposed on Germany an infinitely heavy burden. It was laid down that throughout a territory with a population of 14,700,000 (twice that of Belgium) German sovereignty in its military aspect should be non-existent. No German soldier might occupy the territory. There was to be no fortification, although this territory is one of the most vital for the German people."

"In spite of this I declared in 1933 when I took office that, thanks to our love of peace, we would respect this Treaty as long as the other parties to it maintained it in the letter and the spirit. The pacts between France and Russia and Russia and Czechoslovakia are, however, an absolute violation of the Locarno Treaty both in the spirit and the letter. In the pacts it is not stipulated that the aggressor should be determined by the League of Nations, but by the high contracting Powers. For instance, if a war broke out in Eastern Europe we may be sure that France would allege Germany to be the aggressor, as in 1914, when we were falsely accused of having begun the World War. I have to bear in mind that in a crisis no State can judge the rights and wrongs of its position for itself."

"Let us assume a hypothetical case. France declares that we are the aggressors although our frontiers do not

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border on Russia and the only possibility of a collision would be if Russia were to send an army into Czechoslovakia. In such an eventuality the three countries, France, Russia, and Czechoslovakia, would be united against Germany. What country would apply sanctions against these three nations?"¹ "That is why the Franco-Soviet Pact violates the sense of the Locarno Treaty, which is supposed to guarantee the peace of Europe. Russia is no national State, but an Imperialistic Bolshevik State."

"Nobody knows whether one day France will also be embroiled in Bolshevism. In such event Moscow would decide who the aggressor was in a conflict on Germany's western frontier."²

"One of the most vital decisions which the new régime has made is the transformation of the political power of the nation into the military power of a new Army. I was convinced that if a nation does not protect itself by its own strength it is lost in this world because even a hedgehog needs spines for its own defence. At the present time the idea had become ingrained with some foreign statesmen that the dependence (*Unfreiheit*) of the German people is a natural legal status and they have become so attached to this notion that they regard an alteration of this alleged legal status as a wrongful act, whereas in reality it is nothing more than the re-establishment of the most primitive right imaginable. . . . We will not suffer Germany to be all the time haled before international courts, particularly when we are definitely in the right."³

At the close of his speech Hitler said:

"Only the Almighty has the right to decide on what is just and what is not, and God's voice is the people's

¹ *The Times*, 16 Mar. 1936.

² *M.G.*, 16 Mar. 1936.

³ *The Times*, 16 Mar. 1936.

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voice, and you, my German compatriots, are therefore the only ones who have the right to judge my actions. This is why I have given you this opportunity of passing a verdict on me. At the election on 29 March the slogan will be 'For German freedom and German equality,' and millions on that day will bind their wills with mine and allow me to represent German rights."¹

On 16 March 1936 Hitler spoke in Frankfurt: he dwelt on his favourite theme of self-help: "Build on your own strength; hope not for the help of others: for if you do, you do not deserve it. You must be anchored in yourself, set yourself with steadfast feet on this shifting earth. Only then can you raise yourself to your God and pray Him to support and bless your courage, your work, your endurance, your strength, your resolution, and with these your claim to life in this world."

In the world of to-day "two conceptions clash violently one against the other: on the one side the letter of an extorted treaty, and on the other the eternal ethic of life. On the one side hollow prestige, on the other the true love for peace, a peace which can be built up only on a partnership of equal rights and on free agreement. . . . Every treaty which has its root in violence, in menace or oppression will be endured only for a certain time. On such foundations one can build no eternal laws, no eternal obligations, no eternal treaties." The question which he would put before the German people was "German people, do you wish that now at last the hatchet should be buried as between us and France and peace and understanding take the place of war?" [*Loud shouts of "Yes".*] Germany could do no more than hold out to the world the hand of reconciliation and under-

¹ M.G., 16 Mar. 1936.

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standing. "I will accept your decision as the people's voice which is the voice of God."¹

The report of the speech in the German Press is but a short summary: there is much more in the "Manchester Guardian" of 17 March 1936.

*On 19 March 1936 Hitler spoke in Königsberg. The speech was in large measure an apologia for the National Socialist régime. In foreign policy the aim of the Government was "to replace the tearing asunder of the peoples, born of hatred, which was the mark of the Treaty of Versailles, by a higher reason which should bring together and unite the peoples. Germany has no wish for conquests in Europe: she has no intention of wronging anyone, but she has also no intention of allowing herself to be wronged in future. For three years, my German people, I have been your herald, now once more I am your herald for the peace of Europe."*²

On 20 March 1936 Hitler spoke in Hamburg. The claim for equality of rights dominates the speech. Hitler himself needs no vote of confidence: he needs only the German people in the fight for equal rights for Germany which he is fighting on the people's behalf. "I need the German nation in order that together with it I may profess before the world that, come what may, we will not yield a centimetre—an inch—in our claims for recognition of our equality of rights. Not that we wish to disturb European order, but because we are convinced that a permanent order in Europe is thinkable only if the condition of equality of rights amongst peoples is first recognized. The view that order in Europe can be

¹ *V.B.*, 18 Mar. 1936.

² *V.B.*, 20 Mar. 1936. According to *M.G.*, 19 Mar. 1936, Hitler said in this speech that he was tired; he did not wish to be a dictator and was not cantankerous.

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permanently founded on the defamation of a people of 67 millions is unhistorical, it is insane, it is a stupidity. . . . Without a fundamental clarification of the position in Europe no lasting peaceful co-operation of States and nations is in any way possible. It is quite unhistorical, indeed in the highest sense of the word short-sighted, to imagine that a stable order can be established on easy momentary successes which may perhaps be based on terrorism or violence. It is madness to think that through threats one can shatter the internal structure of a nation. . . . If the rest of the world should still not have abandoned the spirit of Versailles, the German nation has rejected that spirit—and for ever! The problem which remains to be solved is not the revision of the letter of a Treaty but the revision of a state of mind which is disclosed by the fact that now, seventeen years after the end of the War, people still believe that they can continue to deny to the German people equality of rights." Either that problem will be solved decently so that we can co-operate with the rest of Europe or Germany will go her own way—alone. . . .

We stand by our offer; the world asks: "Yes, but will Germany keep it?" The world has not a shred of right to talk about treaties not being kept. We could draw up an account of how treaties have been kept since 1918! . . . This election shall show that the whole nation supports that offer and it shall show also that "in Germany bayonets do not terrorize a people but that here a Government is supported by the confidence of the entire people. I come from the people. In fifteen years I have slowly worked my way up together with this Movement. I have not been imposed by anyone upon this people. From the people I have grown up, in the people I have remained, to the people I return. My pride is that I know no statesman in the world who with

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greater right than I can say that he is the representative of his people."

The speech closed on the theme of self-help: "He who helps himself, him will the Almighty also always help: to him He will show the way which leads to his rights, to his freedom, and therewith to his future."

"I have taught you faith: now give to me your faith."¹

On 22 March 1936 Hitler spoke at Breslau on the same themes: faith in Germany, confidence and trust in their own strength had been recreated: "from this faith I have once more awakened the strong hope that this shameful fate which has struck us will not last for ever, that one day the hour will come again when we as a nation, holding our heads high, can take our stand with other nations in the world."

"In these last three years not a word has been allowed to fall from our lips which could threaten another people, no step has been taken which another people could interpret as directed against itself. . . . And in these three years there have been formed in the German people a fanatical inner resolution and an unexampled inner determination—that in no circumstances shall that which was continue to be: in no circumstances shall that ever be tolerated again."

"All of us and all peoples have the feeling that we are at the turning-point of an age. New ideas, new conceptions, new realities appear on our horizon. Not we alone, the conquered of yesterday, but also the victors have the inner conviction that something was not as it should be, in particular that reason seemed to have deserted men, that the place of reason had been taken by the madness of hate, of jealousy, and of envy, and thence had arisen fear and apprehension."

¹ *V.B.*, 22 Mar. 1936.

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"On every side, especially on this continent where the peoples are compressed one against the other in so narrow a space, the peoples feel that a new order is on the way. Peoples must find a new relation to each other, some new form must be created which makes life possible for all, and that new form must start from the conviction that people are historical realities which one may, it is true, wish away, but which one cannot destroy. But over this new order which must be set up stand the words:

"Reason and Logic, Understanding and Mutual Consideration."

"They make a mistake who think that over the entrance to this new order there can stand the word 'Versailles'. That would be not the foundation stone of a new order, but its gravestone. Germany strives towards this new order—not towards an order which robs other people of anything, but one which restores equal rights that men may come thereby to a ready assumption of equal duties." . . .

"If the world about us ties itself up in new military alliances, then at least we wish to know that our sovereignty is restored over the whole territory of the Reich. The assertion that this restoration of the sovereignty of the Reich over its own territory is intolerable for others—that assertion is intolerable for us! . . . Before such views we will never capitulate: that the world must understand! . . . Germany makes no demands, no claims on others, but she is not prepared to recognize the demands and claims of other statesmen which relate to the internal form of the Reich and its sovereign rights. . . . We want no gestures but twenty-five years of peace for Europe! And the peoples? They, too, do not want their statesmen to demand from each other gestures: they want them to make peace and keep the peace." I have appealed to

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my people, let other statesmen do the same! My confession of faith is:

"I am a German. I believe in my people. I believe in its honour. I believe in its future. I believe in its rights and I defend these rights. I defend its freedom and thereby I defend the cause of a better peace than the peace of the past—the accursed peace of hatred." And my confession of faith has become the confession of faith of the German people.¹

On 24 March 1936 Hitler spoke in Berlin. It was another Germany which now faced the world: a Germany with a new faith and a new confidence. "If the rest of the world to-day clings to the letter, I cling to an eternal ethic. If they hold before me their paragraphs, then I profess my faith in the eternal right to life of a people! I would thank Providence and the Almighty that He has chosen me in particular to wage this fight for Germany. It is the fairest fight, the most glorious task that could be set before a mortal man—to champion the cause of a people which lies in humiliation, which men insult, whose honour they think they can trample underfoot. . . . I am not the leader of the German people in order to make gestures: I am commissioned by the German people to represent its interests." . . . When we are asked to perform "a symbolic act", I have already performed it: I have propounded a programme for an international peace for a quarter of a century. And thereto I have pledged my word and the word of the nation. I call upon the people on 29 March to show symbolically that this gesture is in accordance with their will.²

To this can be added from the report of the speech in "The Times" of 25 March 1936: He could not admit

¹ *V.B.*, 24 Mar. 1936.

² *V.B.*, 26 Mar. 1936.

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that other principles were valid for nations than for individuals. He could not admit that obligations could be placed upon him personally which were not obligations for others.

On 25 March 1936 Hitler spoke at Ludwigshafen on the same themes: "For peace, at any time, for subjection, never": what splendid social tasks awaited men if they had only eyes to see and were not perpetually dreaming of conquerors and conquered, of rights and wrongs. . . . It is no single man, it is the German people which holds out the hand to the French people and is unwilling to see its longing for reconciliation destroyed by individual politicians: the decisive point is: will the representative of the French people, whoever he be, be ready, as his people's representative, to conclude with us this permanent alliance based on understanding or will he not?—In this speech Hitler attacked the "secret diplomacy" which was to have ended with President Wilson's "Fourteen Points". "I do not intend," he said, "to draw up any secret documents or conclude any secret alliances. I assure you, my fellow-countrymen, I will never pledge Germany to anything without informing the whole German people. I will not allow the German general staff to conclude with anyone military agreements of which the public knows nothing. No, that I will never do. . . . No Council, no Conference is my judge: I can be judged by the German people alone!"¹

To the report of the speech in the German Press there can be added from the "Manchester Guardian" of 27 March 1936: "Now they say that we must go down on our knees again. What is the world thinking of? We are not a tribe of negroes but a highly civilized people of 67,000,000 Germans. . . . We are standing at a decisive

¹ V.B., 27 Mar. 1936.

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historical moment. The liquidation made by me of the past cannot be withdrawn. But at the same time I appeal to the world for a peace which I shall guarantee. In the eyes of the world this election will be the highest legitimization of my act."

On 26 March 1936 Hitler spoke in Leipzig. Of this speech there is only a very brief summary in the German Press: from this speech the "Manchester Guardian" of 27 March 1936 quotes Hitler as saying:

"After another State had broken a treaty in letter and spirit I declared this treaty as non-existent for Germany. We interpret treaties as we think right and we do not submit to the judgement of others. . . . You (the foreign statesmen) speak on behalf of perishable, juridical viewpoints, but I speak on behalf of an everlasting people."

On 27 March 1936 Hitler spoke in Essen to the workmen of the factories. He stressed his independence of any single class or interest: "I have not upheld the rearming of the German people because I am a shareholder. I am perhaps the only statesman in the world who has no banking-account."

"Just as in the domestic sphere I have brought to victory the principles of reason, of reconciliation within a people's life, of drawing the classes nearer to each other, precisely in the same way I desire as a National Socialist to act in foreign policy."

"Just as I championed the cause of peace in the domestic sphere without any cowardly submission to anyone, so in the same way I would champion the cause of peace abroad. There too I have no intention of playing the coward or of capitulating before threats". . . .

"You yourselves know how often I have held out the hand to the other Powers; always I met only with

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rebuffs. I proposed in order that no one could feel himself threatened that all should disarm completely. We are prepared to disarm if the others will do the same. That proposal was rejected. I declared my readiness to accept an army of 200,000 men. That was also rejected. I then declared that I would be content with an army of 300,000 men. That too was rejected. Finally I declared myself ready for an agreement on an air force under equal conditions. Once again that was rejected.¹ Then on the ground of our own moral right I have myself restored German equality of rights and that at a time when the other parties to the Treaty had in spirit and intention broken with the Treaty."

"Just as we do not interfere in the affairs of other peoples, so we would have the others respect our frontiers and our territory. Europe is like a house in which a number of families are living. It is impossible that two or three families should claim the right continuously to interfere in another's dwelling or even to determine which rooms should be occupied and which not. The other lodgers cannot tolerate it. We do not concern ourselves with the way in which other lodgers choose to live; we allow others freely to arrange their dwelling as they wish. But we for our part ask that we should be left to do what we like in our world, in our house. If anyone asserts that this is against the interests of the others, the only answer that I can give him is that in our house no others have any interests, in that house we only are interested. We have no interests in France, we have no interests in Belgium, and we do not wish to have any interests in any other State. But in precisely the same way we cannot allow others to maintain that they must have interests in Germany". . . .

"I have not set a foot on the territory of others! I

¹ Cf. p. 1284, *supra*, 1340 *infra*.

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have not robbed any people of anything! I have not broken into another's house! I have stolen nothing from anybody! No one has the right to set himself up as judge in a matter which concerns my German people alone. My people alone is my judge, in a German matter there is no place for any international conference."

"Because we wish to believe in the sanctity of treaties, we would desire to establish the condition for any such sanctity. And that condition is that two parties on a footing of equality of rights of their own free will and without compulsion take up the pen and affix their signatures to a treaty. That alone gives sanctity to a treaty; everything else is an act of violence. And then it is said, 'Yes, but the article!' Over against the articles of a treaty I set the voice of the eternal moral law. And there is a law: 'thou shalt not kill thy neighbour, nor oppress him, nor do him violence nor rob him. That shalt thou not!' We do not wish to wrong other peoples and we wish to suffer no wrong at the hands of others upon our way."

"In order that the world may have no illusions, that it may know that this conception of our honour is not that of a single man, but that of an entire people, for this reason I have ordered this election. The German people desires peace, desires understanding, desires calm. It wishes to work; it wishes to earn its bread and live decently. If anyone does not believe this, we cannot help him. But it would be a good thing if other politicians would concern themselves more with their own affairs than with those of our people."

"I have within my own people so many tasks, I see in our own country so much work to be done. I have no time to puzzle out what ought to be done in France in this way or in that. What concern is that of mine? Germany is my concern. I have work to do here in

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abundance, a work for peace of unimaginable extent. Millions are badly housed; millions are badly clothed. Many in winter suffer from cold, perhaps even from hunger. To help them—that is my programme. I must draw German folk nearer to each other; it is in that sphere that there are possibilities of equalizing social conditions.”

“Our work is determined for us! If only other statesmen would in their turn see *their* work which they have in their peoples! Let each one stay in his own house and attend there to order, calm, and prosperity. Only then will the level of international prosperity also rise. Only if amongst all peoples the chimneys smoke again and the hammers clang, if on every side work is resumed, if new values are produced, then of necessity there will appear the equalization of peoples, and then men will once more think of other things than those which now occupy their minds.”

“Let the statesmen go into the factories, let them ask the workmen ‘Do you wish to reject this offer? Shall we treat with the Germans or not? Shall we oppress the Germans or not? Shall we conclude peace with them or shall we ask for “gestures”?’ And then I believe they will get from their peoples a perfectly clear and unambiguous answer: I am convinced that everywhere they will find one single answer: ‘Don’t speak of gestures and symbolic acts, but make and keep peace.’ That is the wish of the peoples!”¹

The last speech of the campaign was delivered in Cologne on 28 March 1936. Hitler said:

“It is no use speaking of the sanctity of treaties if those treaties have been made under the menace of guns and rifles. . . . The question whether Germans can

¹ V.B., 29 Mar. 1936.

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observe the sanctity of treaties is misplaced. We have waited seventeen years for the others to observe treaties. We waited in vain. Our people stand by all their treaties concluded voluntarily and they will not sign treaties except on the basis of equality. We owe it to our own people and the world to help it out of its confusion. . . . The German people is united in one will and this people now stretches out its hand to the world, and the others have nothing to say in reply except talk about phrases, gestures, and symbolic acts." . . .

"In the distress of the past three years we have become a better people. And now we kneel down before our Lord. May He let us survive the fight for a better world. May the Lord help us!"¹

Result of the Election to the Reichstag on 29 March 1936

<i>Total of qualified voters</i>	. . . 45,453,691
<i>Total of votes cast</i>	. . . 45,001,489 = 99 %
<i>Votes cast against the list and votes invalid</i>	. . . 540,211
<i>For the list</i>	. . . 44,461,278 = 98.8 %

In his speech on May Day 1936 in Berlin Hitler said that peace at home was not enough: for the realization of their ideals peace abroad was essential. "We can hope for nothing from a Europe which is exposed to the madness of attacks inspired by mutual hatred or has fallen a victim to them. Because we have mighty plans, because we have set before us great tasks, we wish to preserve peace."

" . . . It is not necessary for me to win esteem and respect with my people through any famous triumph which carries in its train millions of dead. Esteem and respect I have without that! I stand not on ground

¹ I have no German text of this speech: the above extract is copied from *M.G.*, 30 Mar. 1936.

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which quakes beneath me; I need not to lead millions of our people to slaughter that other millions might perhaps believe in me. In these three years we have done nothing which could harm any other people, we have taken no step that could injure anyone. We have stretched out our hand to nothing which does not belong to us. We have remained within our own frontiers. A dozen times we have stretched out the hand to others. What does one want more?"

"In these three and a quarter years the German people in its domestic life has grown strong and secure; but it has never misused that security in order perhaps to threaten another. On the contrary in these three and a quarter years it has sought to fit this security as a stabilizing factor into the life of Europe. If that displeases others—how can we help that? In these last weeks we have had just such an experience. Only quite a short time ago we made a great offer to the world—an offer which was not artfully devised by some jurists or advocates but was based on a sound knowledge of men, simple and clear. If one is willing, one can with that offer give to Europe internal calm and the consciousness of security. But what do we find? At the very moment when, without regard to the past or the present, we declared ourselves ready to stretch out the hand to all peoples and to conclude treaties with them, at that moment we see once more a new agitation break out. Once more lies are spread abroad: to-morrow or the day after to-morrow Germany would invade Austria.¹ I do not ask who are these elements who do not want to have any calm, or peace or understanding, who must continually be agitating and sowing distrust—who are they after all? (*Loud shouts: The Jews!*) I know. I know that

¹ The report in *M.G.*, 2 May 1936, adds "or Czechoslovakia", and so in *The Times* of the same date.

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they are not the millions who would have to take to their arms if these agitators were successful with their schemes. No! it is not they!—not in any people! It is a small gang of interested parties, an international gang which lives by inciting the other peoples against each other. We know these gentlemen from our own country and we see their traces in all peoples. It is only the more necessary that now more than ever before, and precisely for that very reason, we should close our ranks and cling to our unity". . . .

"In this hour we can have only one wish: if the other people would only cast a glance on us in Germany, if they could only see this people of peace and of work, then I believe they would take the agitators and drive them from their midst. Then they would realize and understand why it is that this supreme community of the nation is and will be the supreme guarantee of a true order in Europe and thus of a genuine human culture and civilization."¹

On 17 June 1936 Hitler received the new Brazilian Ambassador and spoke of the good relations in the political, cultural, and economic sphere which existed between Brazil and Germany.²

Speaking on 3 July 1936 at Weimar at the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Parteitag at Weimar held there after the reconstruction of the NSDAP. in 1925, Hitler said: "Ten years of fighting lie behind us. Above all Providence has enabled us, together with our successes in the sphere of labour, to safeguard peace. I believe that to-day, too, the only petition we can address

¹ F.Z., 3 May 1936.

² *Die Reden des Führers nach der Machtübernahme. Eine Bibliographie*, Berlin, Eher, 1939, p. 121.

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to this Providence is that in the future to our people may be granted this peace. But before this peace we want always to write the word Honour, and under this conception of peace we want always to include the conception of Freedom! We wish to be convinced that without this Honour and without this Freedom there can be no peace. That our people knows, and the world should know it too. I believe that this clear speaking is the best way of destroying false ideas, false hopes, and false conceptions, and can therefore but serve to promote a true peace."¹

In August 1936 Hitler gave written answers to questions presented to him by the North American Newspaper Alliance. The questions and answers were as follows:

Question 1. There is widespread fear of a major war, involving two or more world Powers, breaking out in the next few years. Do you think war is inevitable and, if so, why? How could it be avoided?

Hitler's answer: "By common sense."

Question 2. Do you think a system of international co-operation, guaranteeing peace for an indefinite period, can be erected through reforms in the existing League of Nations or must the League be scrapped in favour of some new system?

*Hitler's answer: "The old Geneva League system contributed only one-sidedly toward the vital functions of Europe and the world as a whole. A new system based on reason and justice is needed."*²

On the conclusion of the agreement of 11 July 1936 between Austria and the German Reich Hitler sent to Dr. Schuschnigg a telegram:

Dr. Schuschnigg's greetings he heartily returned, "and to them I add the wish that as a result of this

¹ V.B., 5 July 1936.

² New York Times, 7 Aug. 1936.

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agreement the old traditional relations which grew up through community of race and through a history which has been shared for centuries may be re-established and the way opened up for further work in common to the benefit of the two German States and to the safeguarding (*Festigung*) of peace in Europe."¹

On 12 August 1936 Count Szembek had a conversation with Hitler on the difficulties of the situation at Danzig; of that interview the Count gave a report which was sent to Beck. Hitler declared "qu'il désirait justement me fournir des éclaircissements à ce sujet. En 1933, lorsqu'il prit le pouvoir, les relations entre la Pologne et Dantzig étaient des plus tendues. Le Chancelier ordonna alors à ses 'gens' de se mettre d'accord avec la Pologne. On peut déplorer les résolutions du Traité de Versailles et s'en montrer mécontent, néanmoins il faut tenir compte des faits qui ont résulté dudit traité."

"La question de Dantzig est insignifiante, comparée à l'immensité des problèmes qui recommandent un ajustement des deux politiques polonaise et allemande. L'ordre donné par le Chancelier à Dantzig de mettre fin aux dissensions avec la Pologne s'était heurté à de véhémentes attaques à la fois des nationaux allemands, des socialistes et communistes, ceci aussi bien à Dantzig que dans le Reich. On accusa le Chancelier d'avoir trahi les plus impérieux intérêts allemands. Cependant le Chancelier n'en a nullement tenu compte; il n'a pas cédé d'un pas et a suivi la voie qu'il s'était tracée, celle notamment d'une entente indispensable avec la Pologne. Cette idée, il l'avait déjà eue alors qu'il assumait le pouvoir et, au moment de sa réalisation pratique, il fut activement secondé par 'meinen alten Herrn'—le Maréchal Hindenburg. Peut-être par suite de ses origines, le

¹ *Reichspost*, 13 July 1936.

Maréchal témoignait-il toute sa sympathie à cette idée et encourageait-il, sans restrictions, le projet du Chancelier."

"Le régime national-socialiste poursuivra, sans conteste, à Dantzig une politique d'entente avec la Pologne et de respect de tous ses droits." *Ceci il l'affirme de la façon la plus catégorique.* Le Chancelier connaît et comprend les droits de la Pologne à Dantzig, lesquels ne sauraient être en rien lésés. De même il ne faut pas toucher à la forme actuelle du statut.

"*Le Chancelier insista, une fois de plus sur ce point, qu'aucune atteinte ne saurait être portée aux droits de la Pologne à Dantzig. En réponse je fis observer que ce qui nous intéresse, c'est la question de savoir comment s'établiront à l'avenir les relations polono-dantzigaises et quelles garanties nous aurons du maintien dans la Ville Libre de nos droits, alors que le statut actuel et la S.D.N.¹ disparaîtraient à Dantzig. Le Chancelier répondit qu'il ne saurait en être question. Dans toute sa politique il s'inspire d'un seul principe, à savoir: il ne signe rien et ne promet rien, dès l'instant où il doute de pouvoir faire suivre ses engagements de leur réalisation pratique. Mais lorsqu'il assume une obligation et contracte une amitié, il n'y a pas de force au monde qui puisse l'obliger à faillir à sa parole. Dans sa politique à l'égard de la Pologne, il demeure rigoureusement fidèle à ce principe. A l'heure qu'il est, des problèmes d'une gravité exceptionnelle se posent, aussi bien devant la Pologne que devant l'Allemagne. C'est sur eux que l'attention des deux Pays doit se porter avant tout. C'est pourquoi ce n'est guère le moment de parler de questions, certainement importantes, mais qui, en regard d'autres problèmes, apparaissent secondaires.²*

¹ i.e. the League of Nations.

² *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la Période 1933-1939. Recueil de documents officiels*, Paris, Flammarion, pp. 55-6.

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On 24 August 1936 the period of military service in Germany was raised from one year to two; while an embargo was placed on the export of arms to Spain.

The official commentary, pleading the dangers threatened by Bolshevism, was translated into English in "The Times" of 25 August 1936. It is not necessary to quote more than two sentences here:

"If now a Bolshevik authority (*Machthaber*) declares with cynical frankness that in certain circumstances it will be the task of the Bolshevik army to impose from without through the intervention of the Red Army revolution upon those countries which would resist internal Bolshevik agitation, National Socialist Germany in the face of such an announcement will capitulate just as little as it capitulated before the threats of the Moscow-paid agitators in Germany itself". . . .

"History has taught us that it is better, if necessary, to make great sacrifices for external peace rather than to be overwhelmed in Bolshevik chaos."¹

The Proclamation read at the opening of the Nuremberg Parteitag on 9 September 1936 is full of bitterness against Bolshevism, and of pride in the new German Army. In it Hitler wrote: "We are determined to make the nation so strong that it can repel any attack from without with the most brutal resolution. This is the reason for the measures which we have taken in the military sphere. These measures of Germany rise or fall only according to the extent to which the dangers which surround us rise or fall. For it gives us no pleasure to banish the strength of our people into armament factories or barracks. But we are men enough to look this necessity in the face coldly and firmly. I would wish in this Proclamation before the entire German people to declare . . . that

¹ *F.Z.*, 25 Aug. 1936.

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I will shrink from no measure which is calculated to give to the nation not only the feeling of security but above all to ourselves the feeling of conviction that in all circumstances the independence of the Reich is guaranteed."¹

*In the same Proclamation Hitler said that Germany would be in a position to master her economic problems more easily if she possessed her own colonies. The objection that colonies would not help them much had no justification. A Government which under conditions such as those in Germany produced economic achievements which could no longer be denied would also in any event know how to administer colonies profitably. Thus, for instance, it was harder for German leadership both in the State and in economic life to reduce the figure of 6½ million unemployed to one million in an over-populated country and at the same time to secure for all their daily bread than in those countries which would still appear to be unable to solve this question.*²

*It should perhaps be added that in this Proclamation Hitler repeated his assertion of Germany's desire for peace: "The German people," he said, has no other wish than to live in peace and friendship with all those who desire peace and who leave us undisturbed in our own country."*³

THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST STATE

In his closing speech to the Nuremberg Parteitag on 14 September 1936 Hitler said:

"The life of the new National Socialist State is

¹ Cf. the speech delivered at the *Tagung* of the German Labour Front on 12 Sept. 1936: "I shall demand every sacrifice that is necessary for the protection and security of our people." *V.B.*, 13 Sept. 1936. ² *V.B.*, 10 Sept. 1936. ³ *Ibid.*

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founded on a political ideal which finds its satisfaction in the circle of its own blood. National Socialist doctrine considers the purpose of the existence of a State to lie in the maintenance of the people's life (*Volkstum*). It thinks that it can thus best point the way by which justice can be done to those problems which arise from the unfortunate fact that in Europe the frontiers of States do not correspond with the frontiers of peoples. A doctrine which rejects the artificial—not to speak of the violent—denationalization of a people as something unnatural perhaps creates the one and only possibility for an understanding amongst the European States—an understanding to be conceived from higher and nobler points of view—which should avoid the necessity of new wars continuously producing in the world new suffering and new injustice.”

... “The National Socialist State was founded and is led in the spirit of a *Weltanschauung* which excludes a political export-interest. We grant to every other people the natural right to find its happiness—whether in its *Weltanschauung*, in its political or its economic life—in accordance with its own views, and its own needs, always under the presupposition that it is prepared to adopt the same attitude towards us. Many critics from the world without suggest that we are fanatically Chauvinist, that in spirit, as Nationalists or Socialists, we are all for expansion. The world cannot deny that our Nationalism bears the name of National Socialism. It is not very logical of this world beyond our frontiers to think that anyone who is regarded as a fanatical national Chauvinist should wish to betray to others or even force upon others that idea which first created those conditions both in political ideals and in material resources which were essential for his own national pride. No! National Socialism is our most valuable German patent. As

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National Socialists we are thus fighters for this doctrine within our own people but we are not missionaries carrying abroad our political views. What is stated, believed, and lived by other peoples is no concern of ours."¹

In the same speech Hitler said:

"With the introduction of the two-year period of service the German Reich in less than four years of National Socialist government is once more free from the worst consequences of that conscienceless mutiny which endeavoured to defame us not only in the military sphere but still more morally. Perhaps those peoples which have not been visited by a misfortune such as that of Germany will have no understanding for the importance which we attribute to the settlement of this question. But if in future the world about us respects those natural rights of the German people in the same way as we are prepared to respect the rights of other peoples, then here, too, through the National Socialist rebirth only an element of disquiet has been removed from the world. For through the creation of equality of rights for the German people by its own strength there has for the first time been established a basis for an honest co-operation between the European nations."²

The speeches delivered by Hitler throughout this "Parteitag of Honour" are all characterized by their aggressive tone and by the extreme violence of the attacks upon Bolshevism. They are dominated by the conviction expressed in the final speech: "A new Germany has arisen thanks to the National Socialist idea and through National Socialist leadership. One can love it or hate it, but no

¹ F.Z., 16 Sept. 1936. With this statement cf. J. Goebbels, *Signale der neuen Zeit*, Munich, Eher, 1934, p. 244; and see pp. 267, 311.

² F.Z., 16 Sept. 1936.

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one can change it and no one can overthrow it", while on the other hand "Every successful rising of Bolshevism in one country encourages other countries. If these methods succeed, Europe will go under in a sea of misery and blood. European culture which has a history of nearly 2,500 years would be superseded by the most frightful barbarism of all times." *For the significance of these attacks compare the "Manchester Guardian" and "The Times" for 15 September 1936.*¹

*The speech at the Harvest Thanksgiving Festival on the Bückeberg (4 October 1936) was full of the menace of Bolshevism: "We all, as we look about us, see a seething, threatening world," and it is only then that we begin to realize the value of our own domestic order. "When another year has passed the world perhaps will have become still more full of unrest; then I believe we shall stand out from the Red flood like a granite rock of order, security, and stability. . . . One people are we and no one can break us: one people we remain and no world can ever subjugate us."*²

Similarly in his speech at the celebration in Munich of the anniversary of the "Putsch" of 1923 (9 November 1936) Hitler said: "Come what may, Germany will stand firm, she will not bow, she will never again submit. Perhaps the time is coming more quickly than we all think when the rest of Europe will see in our Germany the strongest safeguard of a truly European, a truly human, culture and civilization. Perhaps the time is coming more quickly than we think when the rest of Europe will no longer regard with resentment the

¹ See also *Der Fluch von Nürnberg. Hitlers Kriegsrat gegen Freiheit und Frieden*. Mit Beiträgen von W. Pieck, W. Florin, P. Wieden, W. Ulbricht, F. Dahlem, P. Merker. Strasbourg, Editions Prométhée, 1937.

² *V.B.*, 5 Oct. 1936.

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founding of a National Socialist German Reich but will rejoice that this dam was raised against the Bolshevik flood. . . . People will say: we have fought them, but after all fundamentally they have achieved what we ourselves thought we could achieve. For they alone have saved Europe from ruin and from chaos. And thus many an apostle of peace may still perhaps confess: the peace of Europe was preserved through the power which this National Socialist State raised up at the last hour."

*It was in the same speech that Hitler said: "For the first time I celebrate this Day of Remembrance without profound anxiety for our German people."*¹

November 1936. The Argentine legation is raised to an ambassadorship.

*On 12 November 1936 Hitler received the new Ambassador, Eduardo Labougle. In his speech he said: "The raising of the diplomatic representations of both our countries to the status of ambassadorships serves to express the significance which Germany and the Argentine attribute to their mutual relations; it shows how highly both Governments value the friendship which has long existed between them and which stood the test even during the difficult years of the World War. By this step the Argentine and Germany emphasize their common determination to develop and deepen still further the ties which already unite them alike in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. . . . In your efforts to draw ever closer together the relations between our two countries you can, Mr. Ambassador, rely upon my full support and upon that of the Government."*²

¹ *V.B.*, 10 Nov. 1936.

² *F.Z.*, 13 Nov. 1936. On the same day Hitler received the representative of Bolivia.

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1937

In his New Year Proclamation to the Party on 1 January 1937 Hitler spoke of the vast, the hardly conceivable, achievement of the last four years. "In all spheres of our national life—in the domestic sphere, in foreign affairs, in the spheres of culture and of economics—we have lived through the onrush of the greatest revolution in our German history. A people profoundly humiliated, politically and morally beaten, with its economy ruined, has risen again. . . . This miracle is the work of the National Socialist Party. . . . And I know that we shall step forward to meet the tasks of the future not weaker but only the stronger. Germany will ever be, even more than in the past, a bulwark of European culture and civilization against the Bolshevist foe of humanity, and thereby at the same time a sure guarantor of a strong European peace."

*At the close of the Proclamation Hitler said that at the opening of the New Year "their resolution was, in yet greater love towards our people, to shun no work, no sacrifice, and no toil in order to secure from every distress and danger the path of our people's earthly life. Then, as in past years, so in the time to come, the blessing of the Almighty will not desert us, that blessing which in gratitude and humility we would invoke upon our German people and upon our own honest care, our action, and our creative work."*¹

In his reply to the address presented (in the absence through illness of the Papal Nuncio) by the French Ambassador, François-Poncet, at the New Year reception of the diplomatic corps on 11 January 1937 Hitler said:

"I have the hope that our honest desire to play an important part through our co-operation towards the pro-

¹ *F.Z.*, 1 Jan. 1937.

gress of all peoples will meet with an increasing measure of understanding on the part of the other Governments. For the anxieties of the present should be for all peoples at once a warning and a spur, leading them to recognize in due time the dangers which threaten the peace and therewith the development of Europe, so that they may work decisively towards a true understanding and reconciliation amongst the peoples which in the economic sphere may secure to all countries their own existence and thus give the surest guarantee for the welfare and progress of humanity as a whole."¹

On this occasion Hitler expressed to Lipski la conviction que les affaires dantziennes prendront un cours favorable et a rappelé ses thèses essentielles dans cette question: à savoir que le renforcement du national-socialisme à Dantzig sera une garantie de paix et de bonnes relations avec la Pologne.

Il releva l'importance de l'accord polono-allemand, en le définissant comme une base de la paix dans cette partie de l'Europe, ce qui sera universellement compris à l'avenir.²

*In his speech in the Reichstag on 30 January 1937 Hitler said:*³

"The consolidation of the internal life of our German nation establishes a united front towards the outside world. I believe that it is here that the National Socialist Revival has produced the most marvellous results."

¹ *F.Z.*, 12 Jan. 1937.

² Citation from a report sent by Lipski on 11 Jan. 1937 to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs. *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la Période 1933-1939. Recueil de documents officiels*, Paris, Flammarion, pp. 58-9.

³ I have in this version reproduced the authorized English translation of the speech issued in Germany in pamphlet form with the title *On National Socialism and World Relations*, Berlin, Müller & Sohn, pp. 26 sqq.

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"Four years ago, when I was entrusted with the Chancellorship and therewith the leadership of the nation, I took upon myself the bitter duty of restoring the honour of a nation which for fifteen years had been forced to live as a pariah among the other nations of the world. The internal order which we created among the German people offered the conditions necessary to reorganize the army and also made it possible for me to throw off those shackles which we felt to be the deepest disgrace ever branded on a people. To-day I shall bring this whole matter to a close by making the following few declarations":

"*First*: The restoration of Germany's equality of rights was an event that concerned Germany alone. It was not the occasion of taking anything from anybody or causing any suffering to anybody."

"*Second*: I now state here that, in accordance with the restoration of equality of rights, I shall divest the German Railways and the Reichsbank of the forms under which they have hitherto functioned and shall place them absolutely under the sovereign control of the Government of the German Reich."¹

"*Third*: I hereby declare that the section of the Versailles Treaty which deprived our nation of the rights that it shared on an equal footing with other nations and degraded it to the level of an inferior people found its natural liquidation in virtue of the restoration of equality of status."

"*Fourth*: Above all, I solemnly withdraw the German signature from that declaration which was extracted

¹ This declaration was followed on 10 Feb. 1937 by the publication of the "Gesetz zur Neuordnung der Verhältnisse der Reichsbank und der Deutschen Reichsbahn"; text in W. Hoche, *Die Gesetzgebung Adolf Hitlers*, Heft 22, Berlin, Vahlen, 1937, pp. 665 sqq., and see *Survey of International Affairs* 1937, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, vol. i, pp. 381-2.

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under duress from a weak government, acting against its better judgement, namely the declaration that Germany was responsible for the war."

"Members of the German Reichstag: The revindication of the honour of the German people, which was expressed outwardly in the restoration of universal military service, the creation of a new air force, the reconstruction of a German navy, and the reoccupation of the Rhineland by our troops, was the boldest task that I ever had to face and the most difficult to accomplish."

"To-day I must humbly thank Providence, whose grace has enabled me, who was once an unknown soldier in the War, to bring to a successful issue the struggle for the restoration of our honour and rights as a nation."

"I regret to say that it was not possible to carry through all the necessary measures by way of negotiation. But at the same time it must be remembered that the honour of a people cannot be bartered away; it can only be taken away. And if it cannot be bartered away it cannot be restored through barter; it must simply be taken back."

"That I carried out the measures which were necessary for this purpose without consulting our former enemies in each case, and even without informing them, was due to my conviction that the way in which I chose to act would make it easier for the other side to accept our decisions, for they would have had to accept them in any case. I should like to add here that, as all this has now been accomplished, the so-called period of surprises has come to an end."

"As a State which is now on an equal juridical footing with all the other States, Germany is more conscious than ever that she has a European task before her, which is to collaborate loyally in getting rid of those problems that

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are the cause of anxiety to ourselves and also to the other nations."

Hitler then proceeded to review the whole field of Germany's foreign relations. He first countered Mr. Eden's statement¹ that Germany desired to pursue a policy of isolation: "We Germans do not in the least want to be isolated: we do not at all feel ourselves isolated. . . . Our relations with most of the European States are normal from our standpoint and we are on terms of close friendship with quite a number. . . . Through a number of treaties which we have made we have relieved many strained relations and thereby made a substantial contribution towards an improvement in European conditions." *Hitler instanced the agreement with Poland "which has proved advantageous for both countries", the agreements with Austria and Japan,² the close relations with Italy. He repeated the assurance that "with France there are no grounds for quarrel that are humanly thinkable. The German Government has further assured Belgium and Holland that it is ready at any time to recognize and guarantee these States as inviolable neutral territories."*

Further, Germany is not withdrawing from co-operation in the economic sphere. Her foreign trade has increased since 1932, both in volume and in value. But at present the outside world is not able to place huge orders with us or offer prospects of an increase in the exchange of goods. But Germany is in any event determined not to give up the Four Years Plan. The case of Spain, from which country 15,000 Germans have been driven out, shows the danger of the Bolshevist infection. "I also am a responsible statesman and I must take such

¹ Speech in the House of Commons on 19 Jan. 1937.

² Anti-Komintern Agreement of 25 Nov. 1936; German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, iv (1937), pp. 166-8.

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possibilities into account. Therefore it is my unalterable determination so to organize German labour that it will guarantee the maintenance of my people."

But possibly the ground of Mr. Eden's complaint is Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations. But "the Geneva League has never been a real league of peoples. A number of great nations do not belong to it or have left it. And nobody has on this account asserted that they were following a policy of isolation."

Mr. Eden states that "under no circumstances does the British Government wish to see Europe torn into two halves". Unfortunately this division into two halves, not only of Europe but also of the whole world, is an accomplished fact. The Treaty of Versailles brought the first division of Europe—a division of the nations into victors on the one side and vanquished on the other, the latter nations being outlawed; the second division has been caused by the Bolshevik doctrine which its exponents try to enforce on all nations. Our attack upon Bolshevism has been not only in defence of our own civilization, but in defence of European civilization as a whole. "The teaching of Bolshevism is that there must be a world revolution which would mean world destruction. If such a doctrine were accepted and given equal rights with other teachings in Europe, this would mean that Europe would be delivered over to it. If other nations want to be on good terms with this peril, that does not affect Germany's position. As far as Germany itself is concerned, let there be no doubts on the following points:

- (1) We look on Bolshevism as a world peril for which there must be no toleration.
- (2) We use every means in our power to keep this peril away from our people.
- (3) And we are trying to make the German people immune to this peril as far as possible."

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"It is in accordance with this attitude of ours that we should avoid close contact with the carriers of these poisonous bacilli. And that is also the reason why we do not want to have any closer relations with them beyond the necessary political and commercial relations; for if we went beyond these we might thereby run the risk of closing the eyes of our people to the danger itself."

"I consider Bolshevism the most malignant poison that can be given to a people. And therefore I do not want my own people to come into contact with this teaching. As a citizen of this nation I myself shall not do what I should have to condemn my fellow-citizens for doing. I demand from every German workman that he shall not have any relations with these international mischief-makers and he shall never see me clinking glasses or rubbing shoulders with them. Moreover, any further treaty connexions with the present Bolshevist Russia would be completely worthless for us. It is out of the question to think that National Socialist Germany should ever be bound to protect Bolshevism or that we, on our side, should ever agree to accept the assistance of a Bolshevist State. For I fear that the moment any nation should agree to accept such assistance, it would thereby seal its own doom."

"I must also say here that I do not accept the opinion which holds that in the moment of peril the League of Nations could come to the rescue of the member States and hold them up by the arms, as it were. No, I don't believe that. Mr. Eden stated in his last address that deeds and not speeches are what matters. On that point I should like to call attention to the fact that up to now the outstanding feature of the League of Nations has been talk rather than action."

"There was one exception, and in that case it would probably have been better to have been content with talk."

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In this one case, as might have been foreseen, action was fruitless."¹

"Hence, just as I have been forced by economic circumstances to depend on our own resources principally for the maintenance of my people, so also I have been forced in the political sphere. And we ourselves are not to blame for that."

"Three times I have made concrete offers for armament restriction or at least armament limitation. These offers were rejected. In this connexion I may recall the fact that the greatest offer which I then made was that Germany and France together should reduce their standing armies to 300,000 men; that Germany, Great Britain, and France should bring down their air force to parity and that Germany and Great Britain should conclude a naval agreement. Only the last offer was accepted and it was the only contribution in the world to a real limitation of armaments."²

"The other German proposals were either flatly refused or were answered by the conclusion of those alliances which gave Central Europe to Soviet Russia as the field of play for its gigantic forces.³ Mr. Eden speaks of German armaments and expects a limitation of these armaments. We ourselves proposed this limitation long ago. But it had no effect because, instead of accepting our proposal, treaties were made whereby the greatest military Power in the world was, according to the terms of the treaties and in fact, introduced into Central Europe. In speaking of armaments it would be well to mention in the first instance the armaments possessed by that Power which sets the standard for the armaments of all others."

¹ The enforcement of sanctions against Italy (after her action against Abyssinia) 18 Nov. 1935 until the summer of 1936.

² See p. 1318 *supra*.

³ Franco-Russian Pact of 2 May 1935; Czechoslovak-Russian Pact of 16 May 1935.

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"Mr. Eden believes that in the future all States should possess only the armament which is necessary for their defence. I do not know whether and how far Mr. Eden has sounded Moscow on the question of carrying that excellent idea into effect, and I do not know what assurances they have given from that quarter. I think, however, that I ought to put forward one point in this connexion. It is quite clear that the measure of a country's defensive armament should be in proportion to the dangers which threaten that country. Each nation has the right to judge this for itself, and it alone has the right. If therefore Great Britain to-day decides for herself on the extent of her armaments everybody in Germany will understand her action; for we can only think of London alone as being competent to decide on what is necessary for the protection of the British Empire. On the other hand, I should like to insist that the estimate of our protective needs, and thus of the armament that is necessary for the defence of our people, is within our own competency and can be decided only in Berlin."

"I believe that the general recognition of these principles will not render conditions more difficult but will help to release tension. Anyhow Germany is pleased at having found friends in Italy and Japan who hold the same views as ourselves and we should be still more pleased if these convictions were widespread in Europe. Therefore nobody welcomed more cordially than we did the manifest lessening of tension in the Mediterranean, brought about by the Anglo-Italian agreement.¹ We believe that this will first of all lead to an understanding which may put a stop to, or at least limit, the catastrophe from which poor Spain is suffering. Germany has no

¹ Anglo-Italian Agreement of 2 Jan. 1937: see *Documents on International Affairs 1937*, London, Oxford University Press, 1939, pp. 80-98.

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interests in that country except the care of those commercial relations which Mr. Eden himself declares to be so important and useful. An attempt has been made to connect Germany's sympathy for Nationalist Spain with some sort of colonial claims against countries which have taken no colonies from her. Our sympathies with General Franco and his Government are in the first place of a general nature and, secondly, they arise from a hope that the consolidation of a real National Spain may lead to a strengthening of economic possibilities in Europe. We are ready to do everything which in any way may contribute towards the restoration of order in Spain."

"But I think that the following considerations should not be left out of account":

"During the last hundred years a number of new nations have been created in Europe which formerly, because of their disunion and weakness, were of only small economic importance and of no political importance at all. Through the establishment of these new States new tensions have naturally arisen. True statesmanship, however, must face realities and not shirk them. The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities. The German nation and the German Reich are likewise realities. And for my own fellow-citizens I should like to state that the Polish nation and the Polish State have also become realities. Also in the Balkans nations have re-awakened and have built up their own States. The people who belong to those States want to live and they will live. The unreasonable division of the world into nations that have and nations that have not will not remove or solve that problem, no more than the internal social problems of the nations can be simply solved through more or less clever phrases."

"For thousands of years the nations asserted their vital claims by the use of power. If in our time some other

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institution is to take the place of this power for the purpose of regulating relations between the peoples, then it must take account of natural vital claims and decide accordingly. If it is the task of the League of Nations only to guarantee the existing state of the world and to safeguard it for all time, then we might just as well entrust it with the task of regulating the ebb and flow of the tides or directing the Gulf Stream into a definite course for the future."

"But the League of Nations will not be able to do the one or the other. The continuance of its existence will in the long run depend on the extent to which it realizes that the necessary reforms which concern international relations must be carefully considered and put into practice."

"The German people once built up a colonial Empire without robbing anyone and without violating any treaty. And they did so without any war. That colonial Empire was taken away from us. And the grounds on which it was sought to excuse this act are not tenable."

"First: It was said that the natives did not want to belong to Germany. Who asked them if they wished to belong to some other Power? And when were these natives ever asked if they had been contented with the Power that formerly ruled them?"

"Second: It is stated that the colonies were not administered properly by the Germans."

"Now, Germany had these colonies only for a few decades. Great sacrifices were made in building them up and they were in a process of development which would have led to quite different results than in 1914. But anyhow the colonies had been so developed by us that other people considered it worth while to engage in a sanguinary struggle for the purpose of taking them from us."

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"Third: It is said that they are of no real value."

"If that is the case then they can be of no value to other States also. And so it is difficult to see why they keep them."

"Moreover, Germany has never demanded colonies for military purposes, but exclusively for economic purposes. It is obvious that in times of general prosperity the value of certain territories may decrease, but it is just as evident that in times of distress such value increases. To-day Germany lives in a time of difficult struggle for foodstuffs and raw materials. Sufficient imports are conceivable only if there be a continued and lasting increase in our exports. Therefore, as a matter of course, our demand for colonies for our densely populated country will be put forward again and again."

"In concluding my remarks on this subject I should like to note a few points concerning the possible ways which may lead to a general pacification of Europe, which might also be extended outside Europe."

"(1) It is in the interests of all nations that the individual countries shall possess internally stable and orderly political and economic conditions. They are the most important conditions for lasting and solid economic and political relations between the peoples."

"(2) The vital interests of the different peoples must be frankly recognized. Mutual respect for these vital interests alone can lead to the appeasement of the essential needs of the nations."

"(3) The League of Nations, to be effective, must be reformed, and must become an organ of the evolutionary concept, and must not remain an organ of inactivity."

"(4) The relations of the people towards one another can only be regulated and solved on a basis of mutual respect and absolute equality."

"(5) It is impossible to make one nation or another

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responsible for armaments or for limitation of armaments, but it is necessary to see this problem as it really is."

"(6) It is impossible to maintain peace among the nations so long as an international irresponsible clique can continue their agitation unchecked."

"A few weeks ago we saw how an organized band of international war-mongers spread a mass of lies which almost succeeded in raising mistrust between two nations and might easily have led to worse consequences than actually followed."

"I greatly regret that the British Foreign Secretary did not categorically state that there was not one word of truth in those calumnies about Morocco which had been spread by these international war-mongers. Thanks to the loyalty of a foreign diplomat and his Government, it was possible to clear up this extraordinary situation immediately.¹ Supposing another case arose in which it turned out impossible to establish the truth so readily, what then would happen?"

"(7) It has been proved that European problems can be solved properly only within certain limits. Germany is hoping to have close and friendly relations with Italy. May we succeed in paving the way for such relations with other European countries. The German Reich will watch over its security and honour with its strong army. On the other hand, convinced that there can be no greater treasure for Europe than peace, it will always be

¹ From 8 Jan. 1937 the French Press published reports of the occupation of Spanish Morocco by German troops. At the reception of foreign diplomats in Berlin on 11 Jan. 1937 Hitler assured the French Ambassador, François Poncet, that "Germany had never had any intention of violating the integrity of Spain or of the Spanish possessions in any form". The French Ambassador in the name of his Government then gave an assurance that "France was firmly resolved to maintain the integrity of Spain and the Statute governing Spanish Morocco within the framework of the existing treaties".

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a reasonable supporter of those European ideals of peace and will be always conscious of its responsibilities."

"(8) It will be profitable to European peace as a whole if mutual consideration be always shown for the justified feeling of national honour among those nationalities who are forced to live as a minority within other nations."

"This would lead to a decisive lessening of tension between the nations who are forced to live side by side, and whose State frontiers are not identical with the ethnical frontiers."

"In concluding these remarks I should like to deal with the document which the British Government addressed to the German Government on the occasion of the occupation of the Rhineland."¹

"I should like first to state that we believe and are convinced that the British Government at that time did everything to avoid an increase of tension in the European crisis, and that the document in question owes its origin entirely to the desire to make a contribution towards disentangling the situation of those days."

"Nevertheless, it was not possible for the German Government, for reasons which the Government of Great Britain will appreciate, to reply to those questions."

"We preferred to settle some of those questions in the most natural way by the practical building up of our relations with our neighbours; and I should like to state that, complete German sovereignty and equality having now been restored, Germany will never sign a treaty which is in any way incompatible with her honour; with

¹ Dispatch from the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden to the British Ambassador at Berlin, containing the British Questionnaire to the German Government, 6 May 1936 (British White Paper, Cmd. 5175). This was handed to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs on 7 May 1936. The text of the dispatch is reproduced in *Documents on International Affairs 1936*, London, Oxford University Press, 1937, pp. 211-16.

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the honour of the nation and of the Government which represents it ; or which otherwise is incompatible with Germany's vital interests and therefore in the long run cannot be kept."

"I believe that this statement will be understood by all. Moreover, with all my heart I hope that the intelligence and goodwill of responsible European Governments will succeed, despite all opposition, in preserving peace for Europe. Peace is our dearest treasure."

"Whatever contributions Germany can make towards preserving it, these she will make."¹

In an address to members of the staff of the German State Railway delivered in Berlin on 4 February 1937 Hitler said that: The Deutsche Reichsbahn was once more under the control of the Reich and no people in the world possessed so imposing an undertaking as the German State Railway. . . . Germany was now liberated from treaty-fetters which it had been desired to impose upon her for centuries.²

In his interview with Marshal Smigly-Rydz on 16 February 1937 Goering said: que le Chancelier Hitler lui avait enjoint d'insister sur sa décision plus ferme que jamais de continuer sa politique de rapprochement avec la Pologne.³

In an address to members of the Standing International

¹ German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, v (1938), pp. 23-56.

² I have no text of this speech; I cite from *Die Reden des Führers nach der Machtübernahme. Eine Bibliographie*, Berlin, Eher, 1939, p. 133.

³ In relation to Hitler's speech of 30 Jan. 1937 see the whole account of this interview given in *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la période 1933-1939. Recueil de documents officiels*, Paris, Flammarion, pp. 59-61.

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Commission of Front-line Fighters (17 February 1937)
Hitler said: The German people had no longer the smallest trace of ill-will in their memory of the war¹—nothing remained save profound respect for their former opponents who had taken upon themselves the same suffering and the same dangers as had the German soldiers. In a land where the Government was almost exclusively composed of front-line fighters people regarded war with other eyes than did those who did not know what war was. Front-line soldiers knew that war was a great, but a ghastly experience—they all had but one wish: that such a war might never recur. Not from weakness or from cowardice but in the spirit of the old front-line fighters they were champions of the cause of peace.²

To this extract translated from the summary of the speech given in the "Frankfurter Zeitung" the "Daily Telegraph" adds: "We could not have another war. It would be too great a disaster. It would be better in the interests of world peace if more ex-service men and fewer politicians were at the head of governments."³

Later, speaking to the British delegates, Hitler said: "They do not believe that I want peace. They ask me what I will do when the four years plan is over. I have enough work ahead of me for twenty years."⁴

On 24 February 1937 in his speech to the Old Guard Hitler said: "We have once more become a World-Power." The National Socialist Party possessed eternal youth: it remained young because there were always new tasks to be accomplished.⁵

¹ German: *nicht die geringste böse Erinnerung mehr an den Krieg.*

² *F.Z.*, 19 Feb. 1937; *Daily Telegraph*, 18 Feb. 1937.

³ *Daily Telegraph*, *ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *V.B.* 26 Feb. 1937. Only a very brief summary of the speech is given in this report.

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On 26 February 1937 at a meeting of the Swiss Federal Council a statement by Hitler was communicated through Dr. Schulthess in which he said: "The existence of Switzerland answers a European need. We wish as good neighbours to live on the best of terms with her, and loyally to come to an understanding with her in all matters. When in my last speech in the Reichstag I spoke of the neutrality of two other countries¹ I purposely made no mention of Switzerland because her traditional neutrality, observed by her and always recognized by the Powers, including ourselves, in no way stands in question. At all times, come what may, we shall respect the inviolability and neutrality of Switzerland. That I can say to you most definitely. Never have I given any ground for any other view." Hitler authorized Dr. Schulthess to communicate this statement to the Swiss Government.²

On 13 March 1937, the fortieth anniversary of General von Blomberg's entry into the German army, in a speech of congratulation addressed to him as Minister for War, Hitler said: "From the very beginning it has been the aim of the NSDAP. to create both a new strong army and the political, economic, and psychological conditions necessary for that creation. That this reformation of the German army could be successfully accomplished without friction or disorganization and that the old army and the young Party have met as allies is the fulfilment of the deepest desire of my heart and at the same time the greatest service of the Minister of War."

"An army cannot live in a vacuum: it must stand on the basis of a Weltanschauung. That the troops could be brought to adopt the National Socialist Weltanschauung is due to the understanding and the boundless loyalty of the Minister for War. Only on this basis has it been

¹ See p. 1337 *supra*.

² *F.Z.*, 27 Feb. 1937.

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possible to take the great decisions which led to the rebirth of the German army."¹

*On 11 May 1937 Sir Nevile Henderson presented his credentials to Hitler as Great Britain's new Ambassador to Berlin. In his speech Hitler said: "Your Excellency expressed the conviction that there is no question between us which cannot be solved in peaceful co-operation and with goodwill on both sides. This is also my conviction and I may add that this peaceful co-operation I regard as a necessity both for the prosperity of our two peoples whose kinship you have specially stressed and in the interest of general peace. You may be assured, Mr. Ambassador, that in the execution of your task you will always find my personal support and a ready response on the part of the Government of the Reich."*²

For the interview with Hitler of M. Abel Bonnard in May 1937 see p. 458 supra.

In a speech delivered at Regensburg before the Bavarian SA. on 6 June 1937 Hitler said: "We believe that our first task, the creation of a people, is to-day as good as completed: before us there stands a single purpose, and this purpose has cast its spell upon us. Under the spell of this purpose we march. He who sets himself in our path must not complain if sooner or later the march of a nation pursues its way over his body."

¹ F.Z., 14 March 1937.

² F.Z., 12 May 1937. On this audience cf. Sir Nevile Henderson, *Failure of a Mission. Berlin 1937-1939*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1940, pp. 48-9. "As it happened the disaster to the airship *Hindenburg* had occurred just before my audience; there were rumours of foul play, and Hitler was in an excited state on the subject. . . . We read to each other friendly set speeches, but he showed little interest until I expressed my condolence at the loss of his airship. . . . He then invited me into another room to sit down."

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Hitler explained the extent of Germany's disarmament after the War and asked why the other Powers had not disarmed. "It is remarkable that people apparently begin to realize the blessing of disarmament only at the moment when Germany is once more protected with men and with munitions."

"The German people is not a people which begins a war to-day or to-morrow. The German in his whole character is not only peaceable and peace-loving but before everything else conciliatory.¹ He wants to work! In our country millions of peasants want to till their fields and bring in their harvest. Millions of workers want to pursue their work. This people wishes for no quarrel, but it also wishes that others should not seek a quarrel with it. It seeks only its right to live, and then it is true it does not allow itself to be insulted or attacked by the first comer.² If anyone thinks that because the Germans are a peace-loving people he can hurl bombs on German ships which have international duties to perform then we will show him that we know how to defend ourselves."

"In order to defend our freedom and thereby our honour we have built up this great new German army. German man! you need hang your head no longer. Now you have regained your equal rights and can go proudly through the world and hold your head high. For you know that no one can touch you without the whole people's rising in your defence."

And this security is essential for the realization of our economic policy: "There can be no spirit of enterprise in economic life if the steel shield of national defence is not held above it."

"And when someone says that in a short time we shall not be able to support the burden, let it be said to him: 'The

¹ German: *verträglich*.

² German: *von jedem Nächsten*.

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German will wear his steel helmet in every case as long as the others can wear theirs.' But if the time should ever come when the helmet is really removed then we will also remove ours—but we shall always be ready, if necessary, to put it on again. I believe we thus in the end do the greatest service to peace."

"Only a few days ago I was pleased to hear from the mouth of an English statesman that Great Britain would only then be able to take her stand for peace when she had at her disposal a powerful armament. That is my own view concerning Germany."

"In just four years we have bit by bit set aside the treaty which once as a 'Diktat' was our people's greatest shame: we have liberated the nation and given back to it those qualities which are characteristic of a free people and a free nation."¹

To this report the "Manchester Guardian" (7 June 1937) added the sentence: "No power within or without the Reich will keep us from going our way to our future," and remarked: "The presence in Regensburg of quite a number of Austrians, who attended the unveiling of the bust of the Austrian composer Anton Brückner at the Walhalla, caused Adolf Hitler to remark: 'A common language welded us all together into one people.'"

On 16 June in Berlin, in an address to 1,300 representatives of the Italian Balilla, Hitler said that Italy and Germany were united in the same defence against one of the greatest possible world-dangers, Bolshevism. In similar circumstances Germany and Italy had both found their way to national power, strength, and at the same time to a nation's rights. Both Germany and Italy were proud of their youth and "our youth is also something which links us together—a youth which has ideals, which is

¹ V.B., 8 June 1937.

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ready to live for these ideals and if necessary to meet death for them. That is a proud knowledge. . . . Millions upon millions see in you the young representatives of a nation which has become our friend."¹

*On 20 June 1937 Hitler sent a telegram to General Franco congratulating him on the capture of Bilbao.*²

*On 27 June 1937 Hitler spoke at Würzburg on the failure of collective action in the case of the bombing of the "Leipzig" in Spain.*³ He said: "You know that only recently Communist-Bolshevist criminals in a treacherous attack bombarded a German ship—an action which cost us 31 dead and 73 wounded. I decided at the time we should ourselves immediately give to the gentlemen of Valencia a warning which I am convinced is the only method of calling such criminals to order and of making plain to them that the time when one could treat the German nation in such a way is once for all closed and past. Then we were told that that would be a quite unjustified proceeding. In this modern period one must admit intervention by those institutions which at present in such cases are on every hand anxious to remove the interests of peoples from the action of the individual States and to place them in collective hands. To this request I acceded and we went back to the Control Commission with the honest wish and hope that now such plans would prove effective in action as well as in theory. Since, after our declaration that from henceforth we should fire upon every Red aeroplane and surface ship

¹ *F.Z.*, 17 June 1937; and see the report in the *Corriere della Sera* of 17 June 1937.

² *The Times*, 21 June 1937.

³ The truth of the German statements concerning the *Leipzig* incident was never verified. For the use which Hitler made of the incident cf. Sir Nevile Henderson, *Failure of a Mission, Berlin 1937-1939*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1940, pp. 68-9.

directly it approached, the Bolshevist criminals found that surface attacks by sea were no longer possible, the Bolshevist authorities now went under the sea and launched four torpedo attacks upon the *Leipzig*. We now expected that international solidarity would effect a common collective protection of the peace. But you yourselves have learned by your experience: Commissions had to be formed to inquire whether . . . &c. We have asked nothing more than that the authorities in Valencia should at least be shown by a common declaration of all the Powers associated in the Control Commission that they had no longer to deal with one single Power but with all the Powers. But even this modest action proved to be impracticable. From this you can judge what we Germans might expect if we were ever to place the fate of the Reich in the hands of such institutions or deliver it up to such agreements. Folk in London can now be convinced of this: the present experiences have taught us a lesson that we shall never forget! In similar cases in the future we shall prefer to take the freedom, the independence, the honour, and the security of the nation into our own hands and protect ourselves! And, thank God, we are to-day strong enough to be able to do so!"

"From this event we have drawn consequences which will be effective for our whole future. Phrases in Parliament or from the lips of statesmen will in future no longer be able to fog us. We have experienced an attack, we have seen how that attack has been treated, and that has cured us for ever!" . . .

"Had this collective agreement of 12 June 1937 stood the test, one might perhaps have considered whether one could not go further. But when this agreement on the smallest scale proved impracticable, that must now be a warning to us lest perhaps one day in a more serious case we might experience the same disillusionment. Every

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cat can burn its paws once and any man can make a mistake once, but only fools do the same thing twice. Neither I nor the German nation have any desire to run such a risk a second time."¹

In the same speech Hitler said: "Germany needs to import ore. That is why we want a Nationalist Government in Spain, so that we may be able to buy Spanish ore."²

On 21 July 1937 Hitler received the new Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Jureniev: he said;

"Your declaration that you desire to direct your efforts towards the creation and maintenance of normal relations between Germany and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics I have heard with satisfaction. I share your view that such a relation between the German Reich and the Soviet Union will correspond with the necessity, greater to-day than ever it was, for non-intervention in the affairs of another State³ and will thus correspond also with the interests of both countries and so contribute to the cause of general peace."⁴

On 6 August 1937 at the reception of the Marqués de Magaz, the Ambassador of Nationalist Spain, Hitler said:

"I feel myself at one with you in the view that the common aim of resistance to the destructive forces of international Communism closely unites our two peoples. . . . You have, Mr. Ambassador, described the signing of the new trade agreement between Germany and Spain as a favourable augury for closer contact between our two

¹ *F.Z.*, 28 June 1937. For the *Leipzig* incident see *Survey of International Affairs 1937*, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, vol. ii, pp. 317-19.

² *V.B.*, 28 June 1937.

³ A paraphrase: German text: *der heute mehr denn je notwendigen Anforderung der Nichteinmischung.*

⁴ *F.Z.*, 22 July 1937.

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countries. In the conviction that the development of economic relations is clearly in the interest both of Germany and Spain, it is also my earnest desire that the exchange of goods between our two countries should be promoted by every means in our power."

Hitler expressed the keenest sympathy of the German people "with the heroic fight of the Spanish people and with the effort to build up the Spanish State," and the hope that General Franco might "succeed in winning for the Spanish people peace and freedom".¹

In the "Daily Mail" of 4 September 1937 an extract from a letter sent by Hitler to Lord Rothermere was published; in his letter Hitler wrote:

"All hope for the future is dead, so far as human eye can see, unless it comes from England and Germany."

"I am no new advocate of an Anglo-German understanding. In Germany I have made between four and five thousand speeches to small, large, and mammoth audiences, yet there is no single speech of mine, nor any line that I have written, in which I have expressed anything contrary to this concept or against an Anglo-German understanding."

"Such an agreement between England and Germany would represent the weight of influence for peace and common sense of 120,000,000 of the most valuable people in the world. The historically unique colonial aptitude and the naval power of Britain would be combined with one of the first military nations of the world. If this understanding could be still further enlarged by the adhesion of the American nation, it would be absolutely impossible to see who in the world could disturb a combination for peace which would never, of set purpose or intent, neglect the interest of the white people."

¹ *F.Z.*, 7 Aug. 1937.

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"We have in German a fine proverb: 'The Gods love and bless those who seem to strive for the impossible.' That is a divinity in which I believe."¹

In the Proclamation read on 7 September 1937 at the opening of the Nuremberg Parteitag Hitler said that he wished to state "three facts which marked the close of a chapter in German history:

"(1) 'The Treaty of Versailles is dead.'

"(2) Germany is free."

"(3) The guarantee of our freedom is our own army."

... "A 'Diktat' that was designed for the eternities we have destroyed in less than five years and within four years we have built up again a new army. Added to this, Germany to-day is not isolated but united in close friendship with powerful States. The natural community of interest between National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy has in recent months proved itself more and more to be an element calculated to safeguard a Europe which is faced with chaotic madness. It will no longer be possible for anyone simply to ignore this community of will."

"The same purpose is served by our agreement with Japan—the purpose to stand together in resistance to an attack on the civilized world which may take place to-day in Spain, to-morrow in the East, the day after perhaps somewhere else. In all of us there lives the fervent hope that other Powers, too, may understand the signs of the times and strengthen this Front which is inspired by reason and determined to defend peace and our civilization! For in the sphere of culture as well as in other spheres the National Socialist State stands united and secure over against a world of utter insecurity."²

In the same Proclamation Hitler said that in the economic

¹ *Daily Mail*, 4 Sept. 1937.

² *V.B.*, 8 Sept. 1937.

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sphere there was only one question which had for years past caused them grave anxiety—the difficulties in the nation's food-supply. "The German living-space (*Lebensraum*) without any colonial complement is too small to guarantee an uninterrupted, certain, permanent food-supply. . . . It is an intolerable thought that year by year we are compelled to be dependent on the chance of a good or a bad harvest. Therefore the claim for colonial possessions belonging to the Reich is one that is founded on our economic needs and the attitude of the other Powers towards this claim is simply incomprehensible. Germany in the past did not rob or steal its colonies from these Powers and at a time when people are so overflowing with moral phrases as they are to-day some regard should also be paid to this fact."¹

In his address delivered to the political leaders of the Party at the Nuremberg Parteitag on 10 September 1937 Hitler said:

"You know that our old foe is now once more making his preparations for driving the world into unrest. You know that with that end in view he is seeking to fight with the weapons which are familiar to us. But you also know that in Germany this attempt must from the first suffer shipwreck on the close unity of our Movement. It is a ridiculous undertaking to try to introduce into Germany once more the disease which we have driven out. But if this attempt should be undertaken from outside instead of from within our country, then we all know: the German nation under the leadership of its Party will protect Germany and never allow her to pass away."

"And with this knowledge is bound up our faith. The Almighty has permitted us to follow this wondrous path

¹ *V.B.*, 8 Sept. 1937.

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and He will bless us still. For we fight here for a higher right, for a higher truth, and for a higher human dignity. . . . May the world realize that for it it is fortunate that, in the midst of a hot-bed of unrest that is ever spreading wider and wider, in Europe besides the great State in the south there is also a State in the north which is consolidated, which stands firm, and will so remain."

"Germany will not be overrun, neither from within nor from without. And I believe that this is a very great contribution towards peace, since it will be a warning to all those who, starting from Moscow, seek to set the world ablaze."¹

In an informal conversation with journalists on 12 September 1937 Hitler said that the colonial question would have to be solved one way or another just as the question of Germany's equality had been solved. "It is not a question of war or peace but of common sense. I am one of those who believe in common sense. What we have a moral right to in the question of colonies is that which belonged to us before the War." He regarded it as absolutely impossible that Germany should not have colonies under her own flag: they were essential to supply her with food and raw materials which she needed. "Europe will never be able to settle down until the colonial question has been settled." "Colonies", he said, "are worth nothing if an enormous armed force has to be maintained to protect them. Our interest in colonies is chiefly commercial, and commercial exploitation of colonies is possible only under conditions of co-operation among the colonial Powers. . . . It is not true that trade follows the flag. It is people who follow the flag and trade follows the people. . . . We never had naval bases in our pre-war colonies."

¹ *V.B.*, 12 Sept. 1937.

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"Germany faced the international situation quite calmly. She had no desire to do anything against anyone and no one could do anything against her. There was a time when he had had anxieties, when unarmed Germany constituted a dangerous vacuum in Europe. But the vacuum had now been filled—and very well filled. Germany was so much occupied with domestic matters that she had no time for senseless adventures."¹

For the attack on Bolshevism in Hitler's speech which closed the Parteitag at Nuremberg in 1937 see p. 692.

The reception held in Berlin on the evening of 27 September 1937 in honour of Mussolini's visit to the German capital was, Hitler said, "no mere diplomatic or purely conventional meeting. At a time when dangerous elements were seeking to attack and destroy the ancient civilization of Europe, Italy and Germany had come to know each other in loyal friendship and political co-operation."

This co-operation is not sustained merely by the same indestructible will for self-preservation which is shared by both peoples, but "by closely related political ideals which, it is our conviction, form a basis for the internal strength and stability of our States. Between the true vital interests of Italy and Germany there are no factors of division; there are but complementary or unifying factors."

"We believe that our political work for securing peace and the high flowering of European civilization cannot be regarded as the formation of a block directed against other European States. We are on the contrary convinced that through this common work of ours we can best serve not only the interests of our two countries, but

¹ Cited from *The Times* and *M.G.* of 13 Sept. 1937.

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beyond that the aim which lies so near to our hearts of a general international understanding."

"It is in this spirit that Italy and Germany side by side will test and handle political questions in order to counter any attempt to separate the two nations or any possible wish to play one people off against the other."¹

Hitler's speech at the vast demonstration held in honour of Mussolini on the following evening (28 September 1937) ran as follows:

"We are witnesses of an historic event which in this form and on such a scale has never had its equal."

"Over a million persons are assembled here in a demonstration in which, with warm sympathy, one hundred and fifteen million members of two peoples have their share and which hundreds of millions in the rest of the world follow as more or less interested listeners."

"That which, in the first place, at this moment inspires us all is our great joy to know that we have in our midst as our guest one of those lonely men of the ages on whom history is not tested but who themselves are the makers of history."

"In the second place we feel that this demonstration is not one of those gatherings which can take place at any time and in countries other than our own: this demonstration is a profession of faith, which springs from common ideals—a profession of faith in our common interests. A profession of faith which is spoken by two men—heard here by a million, but awaited and affirmed with warm hearts by one hundred and fifteen millions."

¹ V.B., 29 Sept. 1937. For the visit of Mussolini to Germany see *Mussolini in Deutschland. Eine Volkskundgebung für den Frieden in den Tagen vom 25. bis 29. September 1937, herausgegeben von Dr. Fred C. Willis mit 45 Tiefdruckbildern.* Berlin, Freiheitsverlag, 1937 (pp. 64, pp. 33-64 photographs).

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"And thus this evening represents no gathering of a people—it is a demonstration of peoples."

"The profoundest significance of this demonstration of two peoples is the honest wish to guarantee for our countries that peace which is not the wage of a self-renouncing cowardice but is the result of safeguarding, with a full consciousness of responsibility, those substances and values which are ours whether in the national, spiritual, corporeal, or cultural spheres."¹

"And thereby we believe also that we shall best serve the interests which, over and above those of our two peoples, must be in truth the interests of the whole of Europe."

"If we are to-day in a position to hold here this demonstration, by that fact we can measure the change from the period which lies behind us. No people can have a greater longing for peace than the German people, but no people, too, has come to know more fully than ours the dangers of weak and confiding trustfulness! For behind us, in the time before the coming into power of National Socialism, there lies a period of fifteen years which was but one succession of oppressions and extortions, of rights denied, of indescribable spiritual and material distress."

"The ideals of Liberalism and democracy in our country have not saved the German nation from the worst acts of violence which in the light of history could be conceived. Thus National Socialism was compelled to establish another and a more effective ideal in order to restore to our people those general rights which had been refused to it for one and a half decades. During

¹ A sentence which defies translation into English; German: *sondern das Ergebnis eines verantwortungsbewußten Sicherns unserer volklichen, seelischen und leiblichen sowohl als unserer kulturellen Substanzen und Werte ist.*

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this period of bitterest afflictions—this I must state this evening before the German people and the entire world—Italy, and particularly Fascist Italy, took no part in the humiliations of our people. In these years Italy proved that she was capable of showing understanding for the demands of a great nation for equality of rights, for its bare livelihood, and not least for its national honour.”

“Thus we were filled with unfeigned satisfaction that an hour should come in which we could remember this service—and, I believe, we have remembered. From the consciousness of that which the Fascist and National Socialist revolutions have in common, there has to-day arisen not merely a community of views but also a community of action.”

“And that is fortunate at a time and for a world in which the tendencies of destruction and perversion are visible on every hand.”

“Fascist Italy through the creative activity of a man of constructive power has become a new Imperium.”

“You, Benito Mussolini, in these days with your own eyes will have been assured of one fact concerning the National Socialist State—that Germany, too, in her political attitude (*Haltung*) and her military strength is once more a World Power.”

“The force of these two empires (*Reiche*) forms to-day the strongest guarantee for the preservation of a Europe which still possesses a perception of its cultural mission and is not willing through the action of destructive elements to fall into disintegration.”

“For all of you who are assembled here in this hour or are listening in the world without must admit that here two independent national Governments have found their way to each other and stand united each to the other at the very time when everywhere the ideas of our demo-

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cratic-Marxist International can point only to demonstrations of hatred and disunion."

"Every attempt to break up, every wish to dissolve, such a community of peoples through playing off one against the other, through sowing suspicions or through the imputation of false aims will suffer shipwreck on the desire of the one hundred and fifteen millions who form in this hour this demonstration of community, and in particular will suffer shipwreck on the will of the two men who stand before you here and speak to you!"¹

In his speech at the Harvest Celebration on the Bückeberg on 3 October 1937 Hitler said:

"If we say to-day that our living-space (*Lebensraum*) is too small and that therefore it is essential for us to supplement it through colonies, then somewhere in the world some wisehead² goes and explains:³ 'What do you want colonies for? Colonies would be no use to you. You can buy what you want.' Even we, too, are clever enough to know that we can buy, if we have the money. If only folk had not fleeced us for fifteen years on end, then we might have been able to buy to-day."

"There are rich men who say 'Wealth is a burden . . . let no one hanker after such a burden'. One would have thought that they would be only too glad to be free of some of it. But that, too, doesn't suit them. In the same

¹ *V.B.* 30 Sept. 1937. In a telegram to Mussolini on the 15th anniversary of the March on Rome Hitler wrote: "With me the whole German people recalls the March on Rome which was so wonderfully begun by you fifteen years ago to-day—that March which marks a turning-point not only for the history of Italy but for the whole development of Europe." *F.Z.*, 29 Oct. 1937.

² A reference to Mr. Eden's speech at Geneva; cf. *The Times*, 4 Oct. 1937.

³ In the printed text of the speech: *erklärt*. In *The Times* (loc. cit.) translation of the passage: *jabbers*. Was the text of the speech changed before being printed?

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way some foreign statesmen say 'Colonies are a heavy burden'. But they are unwilling to surrender any part of this burden. They say 'Colonies are of no value at all'. But in spite of that they refuse under any conditions to restore this 'worthless' object to its lawful owner. And if I speak of 'the lawful owner' I do it only because we are living at a time and in a world which are filled with the ideals of League of Nations rights, of League of Nations morality and decency. And it was in accordance with these ideals that we Germans formerly gained our colonies, and it is in accordance with other principles which a League of Nations morality ought most sternly to condemn that we have lost them."¹

Later in the same speech Hitler said: "Every one should know: of this garden of ours—this Germany—which we have cultivated we alone enjoy the harvest; and let no one imagine that he can break into this garden. The international Jewish Bolshevik leaders must let me say: wherever they may make their way, at the boundaries of Germany they will come up against a wall of iron."²

In his speech on the opening of the Winter-Help Fund (5 October 1937) Hitler said: "We live in a very disturbed time.³ Germany—apart from a second State with which we go hand in hand—is the only land which is spared, and will remain spared, the troubled conditions of the world about us. Germany to-day truly forms an island of peace. So many a man goes to-day to his business and earns his living but completely forgets that in the last resort for all this he has to thank only the belief in the community of the people, that community which has

¹ F.Z., 4 Oct. 1937.

² German: *ein eisernes Stop*, *ibid.*

³ The report of the speech in *The Times*, 6 Oct. 1937, adds at this point: "It is not always agreeable to the critics of our foreign policy when I point that out, but why should I not? For it is so. We see tension wherever we look."

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given to our people the strength to assert itself in the world without the necessity for drawing the sword."¹

In his speech at the fifteenth anniversary of the "Deutscher Tag" in Coburg (15 October 1937) Hitler said:

"Remain strong in your faith, as you have been in the past! In this faith, in its close unity our people goes straight forward on its way and no power on earth will be able to hinder it. It is this conviction which makes me strong to play the part of your spokesman before the outside world . . . and to protect the nation's right to live. . . . This unity of spirit gives to a nation unheard-of strength—a strength greater than that of material weapons.² For the first time in our history . . . a German in the name of his people can raise before the world those claims which cannot be bartered away because their fulfilment is essential for the life of the nation."³

*For Hitler's views on National Socialism in Danzig as represented by Goering in a talk with Count Szembek on 4 November 1937 see the document printed in "Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la Période 1933-1939. Recueil des documents officiels." Paris, Flammarion, pp. 62-3. For the declaration of the Polish and German Governments on the subject of the reciprocal treatment of their respective minorities dated 5 November 1937: German text, "V.B.", 6 November 1937 or in "Dokumente der deutschen Politik", v (1938) pp. 199-200; French translation in "Les Relations", &c. (as above), pp. 63-4; for the note sent on 5 November 1937 by Beck "à tous les postes diplomatiques" see *ibid.*, p. 63. Hitler on*

¹ F.Z., 7 Oct. 1937.

² German: *Diese innere Geschlossenheit gibt einer Nation unerhörte Kraft, eine Kraft, die stärker ist als äußere Waffen!*—I am not sure of the translation: is the meaning "than that of the weapons of the outside world"?

³ F.Z., 17 Oct. 1937.

that day received Lipski in audience; for the official communiqué issued after that audience see ibid., pp. 64-5. Of that interview Lipski sent an account (dated 5 November 1937) to Beck in which he said (ibid., pp. 65-6):

Le Chancelier a exprimé, dès l'abord, son vif contentement à l'occasion de l'aboutissement de la déclaration minoritaire. De mon côté, je constatai qu'en dépit des difficultés intérieures et extérieures d'ordre politique, le Gouvernement polonais s'était rallié à la suggestion du Chancelier relative à une telle déclaration. Ce faisant, le Gouvernement polonais a cherché à amener à une détente dans ce domaine particulier des relations polono-allemandes. Le Président de la République, de même que le Maréchal Smigly-Rydz et le Ministre Beck, ont traité le problème d'un large point de vue. Si, au cours des entretiens à ce sujet, nous avons parlé également d'une détente dans les relations avec Dantzig, c'est parce que nous désirions voir se produire une accalmie générale.

De son côté le Chancelier définit son attitude, et il le fit d'une façon particulièrement précise. Il constata notamment:

- 1° que dans la situation juridique et politique de Dantzig, il n'y aurait aucune modification (an der rechts-politischen Lage Danzigs wird nichts geändert werden);*
- 2° les droits de la population polonaise à Dantzig doivent être respectés;*
- 3° les droits de la Pologne à Dantzig ne seront en rien lésés.*

Le Chancelier a affirmé, avec une ferme résolution, que l'accord qu'il avait conclu avec la Pologne serait respecté et cela également à l'égard de Dantzig. La parole qu'il donne est et sera tenue. Il ne saurait être question d'agir par surprise. Le Chancelier a désiré uniquement que la population allemande de Dantzig pût choisir elle-même le système de gouvernement qui convient le mieux à des Allemands. D'ailleurs, un tel état de

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choses sera la meilleure garantie contre des complications éventuelles: il permettra de prévenir des actes inconsiderés des partis politiques particuliers. Le Chancelier m'a demandé de communiquer sa déclaration au Gouvernement polonais, en insistant particulièrement sur son désir que celle-ci soit portée à la connaissance du Maréchal Smigly-Rydz. . . .

Le Chancelier releva à deux reprises que "Dantzig demeurerait lié par ses intérêts à la Pologne. (Danzig ist mit Polen verbunden)."

On the same day Hitler received in audience in Berlin three representatives of the Polish minority, Dr. Jan Kaczmarck, Stefan Szczepaniak, and Dr. Brunon von Openkowski. At this meeting Hitler said:

"The identical German-Polish Declaration on the reciprocal protection of foreign national groups which is published to-day by both countries should improve and strengthen the friendly relations between the two countries. The practical enforcement of the principles contained in this Declaration can substantially contribute to the attainment of this goal."

"The effort of the German Government is directed towards creating a harmonious and internally peaceful co-habitation of the Polish national group with the German people of the Reich."

"I assert that the intention of the German Government to create bread and work for every citizen of the Reich holds good also in the case of the members of the Polish national group and is being put into effect. In a period of widespread unemployment and great privations to which members of the German national groups in Europe are still often exposed, the Polish national group has its full share in the economic revival of the Reich. Similar forward steps have been made in the

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cultural activity of the Polish national group, as is proved by the many-sided organizations which they have established, and recently by the erection of an additional Polish high school¹ in Germany. The Poles in Germany must, however, always remember that the granting of rights to protection must be met on their part by a corresponding loyalty in the fulfilment of duties owed to the State and by obedience to the laws."

"The protection of the German national group in Poland especially in its right to work and to remain upon its inherited lands will also contribute towards the security of the Polish national group in Germany."

"The high purpose of the Pact which I formerly concluded with the great head of the Polish State,² Marshal Josef Pilsudski, through this common German-Polish Declaration on the Minorities Question is thus brought nearer to its realization."³

In his speech to the Old Guard on the anniversary of the "Putsch" of 1933 Hitler said (8 November 1937):

"Germany is to-day no longer isolated. . . . We all have the happy confidence that the isolation which surrounded us for more than fifteen years is at an end." Germany has recovered this position by her own efforts: and "from the fact of this position there have resulted new relations which perhaps cannot be regarded as fitting in with the ideology of the League of Nations, but at least they fit us and our interests. And they also fit the interests of other peoples who have accepted these relations with us! The surest guarantee for the permanence of such

¹ German: *Die Errichtung einer weiteren höheren polnischen Schule.*

² The Declaration of 26 Jan. 1934.

³ German text: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, v (1938), pp. 200-1. French translation in *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la période 1933-1939*, Paris, Flammarion, pp. 66-7.

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relations is not to be found in any phrases but in the sober and clear recognition of their expediency. Starting from this expediency to-day three States have come together as allies. First a European axis and now a great triangle in world politics. . . . And this triangle is not composed of three feeble organizations, but of three States which are ready and determined resolutely to defend their rights and vital interests."¹

In a speech addressed to the Old Guard delivered at Augsburg on 21 November 1937 at the celebration of the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the local group of the Party in that city Hitler said:

"To-day we are faced with new tasks, for the living-space (*Lebensraum*) of our people is too narrow. The world seeks to evade the examination of these problems and the answering of these questions. But that it will not be able to do. One day the world will have to pay attention to our demands. I do not for one second doubt that just as we have been able to raise up the nation at home so, too, abroad we shall secure the same vital rights as other peoples. I do not doubt that this vital right of the German people will in its turn one day be understood by the whole world."

"I am convinced that the most difficult part of the preparatory work has already been achieved. It only remains for all National Socialists ever and again to recall the principles by which we have grown great. If the whole Party and also the whole nation stand united behind the leadership, then this leadership, relying on this common strength of a people of sixty-eight millions expressed in the last resort by its army, will be able both to defend with success the nation's interests and successfully to accomplish the tasks which are set before us."²

¹ *V.B.*, 10 Nov. 1937.

² *F.Z.*, 23 Nov. 1937.

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*To this the report in the "Manchester Guardian" for 22 November 1937 adds: "The main truth is that Germany has now a new and strong army and that she has got rid of her inferiority complex." From the "New York Times" report of the speech one may add further:*¹ "In order to become a great world Power this inferiority complex must be overcome. I am going to build in Hamburg the world's largest bridge. My great building programme is a tonic against the inferiority complex which was nurtured by preceding Governments."

On the question of colonies Hitler is reported to have said in this speech:

The colonies taken from Germany at the end of the World War were "our lost property and the world will have to return it. What the world shuts its ears to to-day, it will not be able to ignore in a year's time. What it will not listen to now, it will have to think about in three years' time, and, in five or six, it will have to take into practical consideration."²

"We shall voice our demand for living room in colonies more and more loudly till the world cannot but recognize our claim."³

"We demand our colonies not out of obstinacy but as a necessity of life."⁴

Further in the same speech the "New York Times" reports Hitler as saying:

"All the great empires have been founded by a small group of men. Forty-six million Britons rule the British Empire. France has less than 40,000,000. Russia was

¹ *New York Times*, 22 Nov. 1937.

² Cf. Sir Neville Henderson, *Failure of a Mission. Berlin 1937-1939*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1940, pp. 64, 118: "When I spoke to Hitler about colonies in March 1938 his attitude was that the time had not come for discussion about them. They might wait, he said, four, six or ten years."

³ *The Times*, 22 Nov. 1937.

⁴ *Ibid.*

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founded by 6,000,000 White Russians, and the United States is governed by a small nucleus of real Americans; the rest of the population is German, Scandinavian, Italian, and other immigrants. Here in Central Europe are 80,000,000 Germans living in a confined space and geographically disunited."

The comment of the "New York Times" is: "His hearers drew their own conclusion as to Hitler's obvious meaning and pointed the moral with an almost hysterical demonstration."

*"The Times" report adds: "The reason why 80,000,000 Germans in Central Europe live in cramped economic conditions is due to the fact that during the centuries when the great empires were being formed they were busy with religious and dynastic feuds."*¹

1938

In his New Year Proclamation of the year 1938 Hitler looked back on the five years of National Socialist achievement and reviewing the formation of the unitary State, the giving of work to 6,000,000 men, the stability of the Reichsmark, &c., saw in Germany an element of order and peace in domestic life and therefore of peace abroad in contrast with the fever-symptoms in other peoples. Through association with powerful friends the new World Power constituted an international element of order, feeling sure of itself as it faced the intrigues of those dark forces which Mommsen once called "the leaven of decomposition in peoples and States". The watchword in all spheres of life must be the strengthening of the nation: strengthening of National Socialist education, stiffening of National Socialist organization: in the sphere of economics, more vigorous execution of the Four Years Plan: in the sphere of foreign policy,

¹ It may be noted that both the *V.B.* and the *F.Z.* gave only very brief reports of a two hours' speech.

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development of the army. "For only as a strong State do we believe, in a time of such unrest, that we can in the future, as in the past, safeguard for our people that which to us appears to be the most precious of possessions—Peace. For the restoration of the German nation has been won without any attack on foreign Powers, solely through the achievements of our people within our own country. Would that at last the rest of the world should recognize this, and for their part contribute to solve peacefully those questions which have both their material and moral basis as much in reason as in the general principle of justice (*im allgemeinen Recht*). Yet however great human achievement may be, it will never be able to pride itself upon final success unless Providence blesses its action. Our deepest prayer is that in the coming year, as in the past, the favour of Almighty God may accompany our German people upon the path of its destiny."¹

*Similarly in his speech at the New Year reception of the Diplomatic Corps on 11 January 1938 Hitler promised honest and trusting co-operation with other peoples in the sphere of foreign policy. "The German people will, with all its heart, choose a truly constructive labour for peace in the service of general progress rather than that warfare which destroys peoples. And may this longing lead to a real mutual consideration, and may we thus attain in fact to a peace of justice and of confidence. . . . The leaders of the German people and State look forward with confidence to such a sincere understanding amongst the peoples."*²

On 12 January 1938 the German Press announced that Field-Marshal von Blomberg had been married on the previous day to Fräulein Eva Gruhn, with Hitler and

¹ F.Z., 1 Jan. 1938.

² Ibid., 12 Jan. 1938.

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Goering as sole witnesses of the ceremony. "It gradually became public property that Fräulein Eva Gruhn was inscribed on Himmler's police records as an attractive lady, but of the lighter virtues."¹ The Commander-in-Chief General von Fritsch, and Marshal von Mackensen informed Hitler that army discipline could not tolerate the retention of Blomberg, married to a lady with such a past, as Minister for War. On this point General von Fritsch insisted, while he also criticized Hitler's foreign policy especially in respect of Austria. The result was that Fritsch and Blomberg were retired, and on 4 February 1938 Hitler himself assumed the supreme command of the armed forces of the Reich and the War Ministry passed under his control. General Keitel under Hitler's direct supervision took over Blomberg's executive functions; General von Brauchitsch became Commander-in-Chief.² A secret Cabinet Council was formed, with von Neurath as Chairman, of which the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force were to be members; its function was to advise Hitler on foreign affairs. The Reichstag was summoned for 20 February 1938 to hear a statement of the policy of the Government.

On 14 January 1938 Beck had an interview with Hitler in Berlin: in his memorandum on that interview he wrote:

Le Chancelier a parlé à plusieurs reprises des ques-

¹ Sir Nevile Henderson, *The Failure of a Mission*. Berlin 1937-1939, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1940, p. 107.

² Under the *Erlaß* of 4 Feb. 1938 the *Wehrmachtsamt* in the War Office which previously was the administrative office for all the armed forces became the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* and formed Hitler's military staff directly under his orders. At the head of the staff of the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* stood the former chief of the *Wehrmachtsamt* with the title *Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht*: he was in rank to be the equal of the Ministers of the Reich. He took over the duties of the former Ministry of War and performed them under Hitler's commission. *F.Z.*, 6 Feb. 1938; cf. *The Times*, 5 Feb. 1938.

tions polono-allemandes. Il a exprimé sa satisfaction de mon arrivée à Berlin et *a fait observer à plusieurs reprises* que les relations polono-allemandes, qui évoluent favorablement, constituent un des rares éléments positifs dans la situation internationale actuelle, particulièrement aiguë. *A cette occasion il affirma* sa ferme volonté de suivre la voie qu'il s'était tracée.

Pour ce qui est de ses thèses générales, le Chancelier confirma son point de vue, qui est que toute correction de frontière serait en disproportion avec les sacrifices qui devraient être consentis et que, partant, elle n'avait aucune espèce d'importance.

En abordant la question de Dantzig, le Chancelier dit textuellement que le 5 novembre 1937, il avait fait à l'Ambassadeur de Pologne une déclaration à ce sujet. Il désirait m'en répéter la teneur. Il l'avait conçue de telle sorte que les droits de la Pologne à Dantzig ne seront en rien lésés et que, de plus, le statut juridique de la Ville Libre ne subirait non plus aucune atteinte. En cette matière également les relations polono-allemandes — *a ajouté le Chancelier* — se placent, pour lui, au premier rang et sont décisives. Ce qu'il désirait uniquement c'est que la population allemande de Dantzig fasse elle-même le choix d'une forme de gouvernement qui lui conviendrait le mieux, ce qui, en conséquence, contribuera au maintien de la paix. *Le Chancelier affirma avec fermeté que* la déclaration qu'il faisait, il la considérait comme obligatoire pour lui. *Dans la suite de l'entretien, le Chancelier rappela que* ladite déclaration avait été conçue indépendamment des destinées de la S.D.N.¹

Le Chancelier a parlé longuement, ensuite, de son attitude à l'égard du communisme, en insistant sur ce que sa position hostile était inébranlable. A cette occa-

¹ i.e. the League of Nations.

sion, *il rappela* certains points de vue quant à la possibilité d'une évolution de la Russie dans le sens national. Des opinions du même genre se faisaient jour également dans la Reichswehr. On supposait que les milieux militaires soviétiques seraient capables de continuer à imposer leur direction. Il en est advenu autrement; la Russie actuelle est en plein communisme et les généraux ne vivent plus.¹

There have been many accounts given of the Berchtesgaden interview between Hitler and Schuschnigg on 12 February 1938; they cannot be reproduced here. It will suffice to refer to Guido Zernatto, *Die Wahrheit über Österreich*, New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1938, pp. 211-28; Martin Fuchs, *A Pact with Hitler*, London, Gollancz, 1939, pp. 232-8; G. E. R. Gedyé, *Fallen Bastions*, London, Gollancz, 1939, pp. 225-30; Oswald Dutch, *Thus Died Austria*, London, Arnold, 1938, pp. 161-5.

*Hitler postponed his speech in the Reichstag from 30 January, the anniversary of the "Machtübernahme", until after the military crisis was settled: in his speech at the meeting of the Reichstag held on 20 February 1938 he said that he intended to give "not merely a report on the past but also some suggestion as to what may be expected in the future". The review of the past followed familiar lines and need not be reproduced in extenso here.*² The coming into power of the National Socialist Party "was a turning-point in the history of our people, then, now, and for ever. There is nobody who fails to realize that 30 January 1933 formed the end of one epoch and beginning of another. So uncontested, indeed so obvious is this

¹ *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la Période 1933-1939. Recueil de documents officiels*, Paris, Flammarion, p. 67.

² I cite throughout from the authorized English translation of this speech published in the form of a pamphlet of 63 pages. I have slightly modified this version where it renders the German text so oddly as to be virtually a falsification of the original.

fact that men even now divide the history of our country into two periods, before and after the coming into power of National Socialism."¹ The result of the national collapse at the close of the Great War had been that "there commenced a profoundly serious examination of the foundations of our historical existence, the laws of our origin and development, the causes of our rise and fall, and consequently of the conditions necessary for a new upward impulse."² This examination had for its consequence "the rise of a new ideal—that of the people as such".³ It was seen that "the awful fact remained that the German nation (*Volk*) as such was immature, and its State-form had not been completed. . . . The supreme sovereignty of the Reich . . . became the instrument of local, class, and Confessional interests."⁴ . . . I was not the first to be called upon to save the German people but the last. That means that there was no one after me, except at best chaos!" National Socialism through the years of its long struggle had passed through a process of selection which brought the most capable men to the top. "National Socialism was thus able to take over power not only as a compact organization, but also as a rich reservoir of capable men. In the years of struggle, as well as to-day, I have frequently been filled with real satisfaction to know that this work of mine is not dependent on any single person. Our opponents have completely failed to realize that never in German history has there been such an abundance of highly capable and energetic individuals in the political field as at the time of the National Socialist conquest of the German Reich."⁵ *Hitler once more insisted on* "the

¹ Authorized English translation, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³ German: *erhob sich bestimmend ein neues [Ideal]: das völkische.*

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 7. The translation here has "denominational interests"; German: *konfessionsbedingten Interessengruppen.* ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

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unparalleled discipline and restraint observed by the National Socialist Movement in carrying out its Revolution".¹

"It is a profound satisfaction to us to know that throughout this time the iron structure of our organization and, above all, the discipline of the National Socialist Movement (*Sturmbevægung*) were never impaired. When has a State ever been conquered under such circumstances and in such a quiet and orderly manner?"²

"The greatest transformation in the history of our people, an event whose significance is now beginning to dawn slowly on the rest of the world, took place without even the least destruction of property and without that bloodshed³ which is so often the rule in ridiculous little internal squabbles in other countries."

"This did not happen because the National Socialist leaders could not bear to see bloodshed. No! We were all at the front during the war, lived through the most frightful of wars, witnessed innumerable deaths, and ourselves looked death in the eye and expected him."

"The German revolution took place without bloodshed because we were all determined to stress our national character⁴ even in the course of this revolution. We wished to achieve a maximum effect with a minimum of suffering."

"If I look back to-day over the first five years of the National Socialist revolution I can state that the number of deaths of our adversaries is not even half as great as the number of National Socialists previously murdered by them, while these persons themselves were but the

¹ See pp. 209 sqq. *supra*.

² German: *mit einer solchen inneren Sicherheit und Ruhe*. . . .

³ German: *jene blutigen Excesse*.

⁴ German: *unseren deutschen germanischen Charakter*.

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victims of their own fresh attacks on the National Socialist revolution."

Hitler then turned on "the statesmen, politicians, and journalists in our so-called democratic countries who particularly in the years 1933 and 1934 felt it to be their duty to criticize the methods and measures of the National Socialist revolution".

"It was a rare mixture of arrogance and pitiful ignorance which more than once presumed to sit in judgement on occurrences in a nation, which might very well have served at least as models precisely for these same democratic apostles. For when has there ever been an internal upheaval in those countries which took place under similar circumstances?"

"Should I, perhaps, remind you of the great model of all revolutions, when the guillotine held its bloody orgies for five years, the same length of time that the German reconstruction has been going on? Or that Bolshevik revolution, which slaughtered millions upon millions of people and whose blood-stained murderers hold positions of high esteem in the councils of democratic institutions? Or should I recall the carnage of the Marxist mob in Spain, whose victims, according to estimates of cautious men who themselves come from the lands of democracy, number half a million or more?¹ We know that this butchery has as yet not in the least disturbed the brave democratic minds of our world pacifists. This we can also understand. For behind their hypocritical masks there is usually hidden only the will to brutal violence. Hence I am not mentioning this in the belief that I might convert certain notorious Jewish international liars and slanderers. I mention it only in order to show the German people the unparalleled forbearance

¹ German: *mit einer halben Million eher zu niedrig als zu hoch anzusehen sind.*

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with which the National Socialist revolution took place in Germany and the unequalled lies which have been and are still being spoken and written about it. But the best proof of the untruthfulness of all these assertions is our indisputable success. For if we had managed things in these five years in the manner of the fine democratic world-citizens of Soviet Russian or Soviet Spanish origin, I mean the Jewish race, we should never have succeeded in making the Germany of extreme material breakdown into a country of material order and universal prosperity. Simply because this is so, and should be so, we have claimed the right to surround our work with a form of protection to make it impossible for criminal characters or lunatics to disturb it!"

Hitler then considered the economic achievement of the National Socialist Government. When the National Socialists came to power the economic condition of the Reich "appeared practically hopeless. . . . A malignant fatalism has taken possession of our people. They listened more and more to those who preached that everything must first be destroyed before any reconstruction could be considered. A disastrous doctrine, for the salvation of the nation was only conceivable so long as there was a desire for a better standard of living on the part of individual citizens. . . . Bolshevism's cult of primitive living destroys with deadly certainty the slumbering forces of struggle for a better standard of living, and as a preliminary to this, the raising of the standard of work."

And on the other hand were "those *bourgeois* egoists for whom the economic salvation of the nation meant nothing more than the securing of cheap profits for themselves, irrespective of the interests of the community. As in all times of distress, base speculation sought

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to transform universal wants into personal profit, i.e. to exploit the general distress for blood-sucking manipulations and fraudulent dealings". . . .¹

"When in a country hundreds of thousands of farmers are about to lose their houses (*Höfe*) and lands, when hundreds of thousands of industrial workers are losing their bread, when tens of thousands of enterprises must close their doors, employees and workers are being dismissed, when an army of over 6,000,000 unemployed, constantly increasing, more and more burdensome to the finances of the Reich, the States and the Communes, is scarcely able to buy vital necessities in spite of all assistance rendered, when an intellectual proletariat is growing up whose acquired knowledge acts as a curse rather than as a blessing, when all the flourishing industrial cities are becoming desolate and huge areas beginning to become depopulated for want of a market for their products, when in other regions children of three and four years have not developed teeth because of an appalling poverty and the resultant undernourishment, when neither bread nor milk can be obtained for them, when the statement of a hard-hearted enemy² that our German nation contains 20,000,000 people too many is thus almost becoming a terrible reality, then such a nation does not cry for journalistic scribblers or parliamentary prattlers, it does not cry for commissions of inquiry, international debates, ridiculous votes, or insipid platitudes from so-called 'statesmen' at home and abroad! No! It cries for action which will bring salvation in spite of all prattling and silly newspaper articles. It has no interest in the literary discourses of drawing-room Bolshevik international correspondents; it is interested solely in assistance which will snatch it back from the utmost misfortune! And above all, a man who feels

¹ Op. cit., pp. 12-13. ² The statement is ascribed to Clemenceau.

it his duty at such an hour to assume the leadership of his people is not responsible to the laws of parliamentary usage or to a particular democratic conception, but solely to the mission placed upon him. And anyone who interferes with this mission is an enemy of the people, no matter whether he attempts this interference as a Bolshevik, a democrat, a revolutionary terrorist, or a reactionary dreamer (*Phantast*). At such a time of distress the person who is acting in the name of God is not he who roams about the countryside with Biblical quotations in his mouth and spends the livelong day either doing nothing and or else criticizing what others are doing, but he who gives his prayer the highest expression which can bind a man to his God, namely work!"

"And in giving this account to the German people to-day, I can look proudly and frankly into the eyes of all those hundreds of thousands and millions who, in town and country, earn their honest bread by the sweat of their brow. In these five years I too have been a worker. Only, my personal cares were increased by the care for the present and future of 68,000,000 others."

"And so, just as these others can justly refuse to allow ignoramuses or idlers to disturb them in their work, I have declined to permit my work to be disturbed by incapables, ne'er-do-wells, or malicious idlers. I had a right in this case to take steps against anyone who, instead of helping, saw his mission only in a critical review and judgement of our work. Nor does a profession of faith absolve a person from his obligation to adjust himself (*sich gleichzuschalten*) to the work of those who are carrying out the salvation of a nation. But that I have had a right to protect this work of mine and of all of us from such disturbers of the public peace, I should now like to prove by the results of this work. They are

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indisputable, but above all they are made more remarkable by the fact that in most cases I had no models of former achievements to go by, I had only my own common sense and the determination never to give in to obstacles, but to defy them bravely and courageously."

Hitler then gave his account of the National Socialist economic achievement (see pp. 950 sqq. *supra*), and *continued*¹: "So far as the lies invented by the pathological minds of lying foreign journalists are concerned, the tales they choose to tell their credulous readers could remain a matter of complete indifference to us Germans, if this constant campaign of hate did not threaten the peace of the world!"

Hitler then turned to "achievements even greater than those in the economic field":²

"For in the same five years we have transformed a people which was humiliated and powerless . . . into a national body imbued with the strongest self-confidence and proud assurance."

"And above all, we have given this German nation a weapon of defence which is a guarantee that any intention of carrying out the designs—well known to us—inspired by the malicious campaign of hate carried on by certain international journalists, will be stopped by an iron hand³ at the frontier of the Reich." . . .

"It was not our mission to impose our way of thinking upon the German people by force. It was our intention to unite the entire German people in our way of thinking, that is, to put an end to all those institutions of earlier times which could only be considered the elements or symbols of German disunion and, therefore, of German powerlessness."

"Indolence and unreason on the one hand and mali-

¹ Authorized English translation, p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

³ German: *das eiserne Halt findet*.

cious intent on the other competed together to persuade the German people that their multiform political life—that is, their lamentable political disunion—was characteristic of the German attitude towards life and of a truly German way of thinking. To them a democratically divided Germany, powerless in its relations with the outside world, was a more worthy representative of the German people and the German spirit than an armed people proudly united under one leadership and one will. They talked of political and cultural ‘individuality’, and thus merely perpetuated the division of the German nation, the helplessness of our Reich, and, consequently, the outlawry (*Rechtlosigkeit*) of all Germans. It was perhaps our hardest task to fight against this conspiracy and to have the new ideal of a National Socialist attitude of community generally adopted. I do not believe that anyone can dispute our success in this great endeavour.”

“The first step which seemed necessary to me was the restoration of the lost self-confidence of our people. For this purpose it was necessary for me to require standards of achievement which were perhaps in their connexion with our purpose not understood by many Germans.”

“It was, however, necessary to combat the spirit which had been systematically encouraged by the governments which preceded us at the helm. This spirit led not only to a military defeatism, but above all to a defeatism of the will. How often did we not hear in those years the constantly repeated statement that the Germans were a very estimable people but that, of course, they could not compare with the peoples of our so-called great democracies, either temperamentally or especially in the excellence of their qualities (*Werte*).”

“Our people were told so often that their future should

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consist in quiet, meditative admiration of the achievements of others, rather than in attempts to carry out such projects themselves. People spoke of intellectual and physical indolence to excuse the physical and intellectual indolence which characterized the leadership of the period. They limited the aims of the nation's life because they themselves were too weak to battle for them. The faith of the people in itself was destroyed in order that it might finally be satisfied with its artificially restricted mission in life."

"In opposition to this, I held it to be my first and most important task to restore the self-respect of the German people, in every sphere and whenever I had a chance. I wished to drive from the minds of the people their fatal doubt of their own ability and to make them once more a proud and self-conscious people. It was for this reason that I often made demands which could only be fulfilled by the maximum amount of effort. I wished, and shall continue to wish, that the German people should judge by the practical proof of its productive ability and the results of its work that it is not a second-class or inferior people in comparison with the other peoples of the world, but is unquestionably their equal according to any true standard of values, and therefore, in the highest sense of the word, of the same rank and thus entitled to equal rights."

"I therefore hated and put an end to all those institutions which helped to inculcate narrowness of vision¹ in the German people. Only people with small minds had need of the small individual States! They alone invented the so-called 'values' of these former States to prevent their own limitations from becoming obvious in larger tasks! The dreadful view that it is better to be first in one's village rather than second in a great Reich

¹ German: *Kleinheit des Denkens*.

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became an article of faith for all those who are too limited to become the leaders of a great community, but too ambitious or too demoralized to be content with the second or third place. They would prefer the nation to be broken up into tiny fragments, so that there would be opportunities for them too to appear as leaders."

"The National Socialist revolution would have remained incomplete, if it had not placed the interests of the nation as a whole above those of the former States and especially above their so-called foundations of sovereignty (*souveräne Wurzeln*). It was not only the political parties which had to disappear. The abolition of the State Diets had long been overdue. There can be only one sovereign power in the German Reich. It proceeds from the entire German people and not from a part of the people. In abolishing these States as sovereign Powers and doing away with their Diets as the representatives of their own sovereignty we created the conditions necessary for a true sovereign power of the entire German people."

"The future of the German Reich was first assured at the moment when the Reich became the sovereign and sole representative of the German nation. The unalterable principle of one people, one Reich, has made it possible to release Germany from the paralysing effect of obligations towards numerous individual States, and has as a result led to a development of power from which the German citizen within the individual States benefits to a far larger extent than would ever before have been possible."

"In all fields of our national existence it has only now become possible to set truly great tasks, and above all to ensure the material means which are the prerequisite for the realization of great creative plans."

"Thus National Socialism made good in a few years

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what centuries had failed to undertake, and redressed the results of the sins of numerous preceding generations. Thus by putting an end to the internal tribal and party divisions, we were able to set before us and also in part to complete those tremendous tasks which to-day inspire the entire German people with pride and therefore with self-respect."

"Imposing traffic routes, gigantic industrial structures, unique city planning and buildings, tremendous bridges, are to-day being designed, are about to be built, or in part are already completed!"

"By the end of the next five years the Germans will be conscious of achievements which can well fill the entire people with the greatest pride."

Then came the passage translated on p. 455 supra.

. . . "In these five years", *Hitler continued*, "the National Socialist Party has not only made the nation National Socialist but has also given to itself that perfect organization which makes certain its continued existence for all time. The greatest safeguard of this National Socialist revolution with regard to leadership consists both within and without in the complete penetration of the Reich and all its organizations and institutions by the National Socialist Party."

Hitler then denied that there was any conflict between the Party and the army (see p. 451 supra). He spoke of Marshal von Blomberg's "impaired health" and consequent retirement and thanked him and General von Fritsch for their services: "with great unselfishness and generosity they had given up their places to younger men."

"We all know what sort of a foundation the former Reichswehr of a hundred thousand men was for the rapid rearmament of the German armed forces. But we know also that the vast new tasks before us require for their performance a steady influx of younger men to

take the places of those who have grown old. Above all we know that the tasks of the future demand a stronger concentration of the political and military power in the Reich than was perhaps necessary before. Therefore after the retirement of Field-Marshal von Blomberg I determined in future to exercise directly my command over the three sections of the army, and to place the *Wehrmachtsamt* under the title of *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*¹ under my personal authority. I hope that thus we shall in the shortest possible time reach that strengthening of our military power which the general conditions of the time to-day render advisable."

"As its elected Leader I should like to assure the German people to-day: that however much peace means to us, we are equally resolved to defend our honour and the inalienable rights of our people. Though I stand for the cause of peace, I shall always see to it that that instrument which I am convinced is the only sure and effective guarantee of peace in such troubled times is never weakened, much less taken away from the German people."

"And though I can assure the world of the German people's sincere and profound love of peace, I must assert, beyond all doubt, that this love of peace has nothing to do with feeble renunciation or with cowardice and dishonour. If ever an international campaign of hatred and defamation (*Brunnenvergiftung*) seeks to wreck the peace of our Reich, steel and iron will protect the German people and the German homeland."

"And then, as quick as lightning, the world would see to what extent this Reich, people, Party and armed forces are imbued with the same fervid spirit and will!"² . . .

¹ Cf. p. 1374 *supra*.

² German: *von einem Geist erfüllt und in einem Willen fanatisiert sind*.

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"The German people is a people which makes high demands on life. If the rest of the world were influenced by great statesmen instead of by journalists, it would be thankful for this fact. For the higher the standard of living and culture of a nation, the greater will be its longing for peace. It is peace alone which can enable it to accomplish those things which make so high a standard of life possible."

"Our economic position is difficult—not, however, because National Socialism rules in Germany, but because in this country there are 140 human beings to the square kilometre, because we have not been given those great natural resources which other nations possess, because, above all, we have a lack of fertile soil. If Great Britain were suddenly to be dissolved to-day and England were to be restricted to its own living space, then perhaps the English would better understand the difficulty of the economic problems which confront us. The fact that Germany has mastered these problems and the manner in which she has done so are miracles and something of which we can be really proud. Germany possesses no sort of gold or foreign exchange reserves, the reason for this not being that National Socialism is in power, but that the non-National-Socialist, democratic-parliamentary State was despoiled for fifteen years by a world eager for plunder; Germany is a country which has to support 140 people to the square kilometre and possesses no colonial complement whatever; Germany is lacking in numerous raw materials and is neither able nor willing to lead a fraudulent existence on credits; but this same country has reduced its unemployment to zero, and has not merely maintained its standard of life, but has even improved it and has done all this by its own efforts. Now when a people has accomplished a miracle of this sort, then those

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nations at any rate should be silent who, in spite of the most favourable economic conditions, hardly manage to solve their own unemployment problems." . . .

But whatever we may achieve "in the way of an increase of production the hopeless inadequacy of the space allotted to the German nation will not thereby be removed. Therefore our demand will become more and more insistent as the years go by for those colonial possessions which Germany after all never deprived any other nation of, which are practically worthless to the Powers that hold them but appear indispensable to our own nation."

"I should like here to point out that it is futile to hope that we shall bargain away our demand in return for credits. It is not credits that we want, but those fundamental necessities of life which will enable us, by our own efforts, to secure the existence of the nation. Above all, we do not want naïve assurances that we shall be permitted to buy what we need. Once and for all we reject such declarations, which are felt in our country to be only a mockery. There is no economic recipe which could be a complete substitute for the possibilities of intensive economic activity in one's own currency area."

The separate international plans which at the moment seem to awake the interest of various Governments "are too vague and too nebulous for me to express any opinion on them. But above all I want you to realize that I have the deepest suspicion of all so-called Conferences which may perhaps provide their participants with hours of interesting and stimulating conversation but which generally lead only to the disappointment of the hopes of mankind." . . .

"Recently it has again and again been rumoured that Germany was about to revise her views concerning a

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possible return into the League of Nations. Notwithstanding the danger that the journalists of the democratic world Press, who are as dense as they are indolent, may by to-morrow have forgotten again what I am about to say, I should like to state once more the following: In the year 1919 there was imposed on several nations a treaty of peace which involved violent interference with national communities and property rights, to an extent hitherto inconceivable. The violence done to national and economic life, the tearing asunder of national communities, took place behind a smoke screen of moralizing phrases which were perhaps good enough to soothe the bad consciences of the perpetrators, but which seemed to the victims to be only a bad joke. After this act of violence had completely and decisively altered the map of the world, from a territorial as well as from a demographic point of view, a League of Nations was founded whose task it was to be to make permanent these insane and unreasonable actions as a final conclusion to the political and economic development of the nations and to fix the results of the Treaty as the eternal and unalterable foundation for the life and boundaries of human communities on this planet. In future no one was to seek to change by force what had arisen through force. But in order to mitigate somewhat the insanity of such an atrocious violation of humanity, the possibility was at least kept open that in future this reorganization of what had arisen through the violence of thousands of years might be modified in a legal, that is to say a reasonable, way."

"This somewhat difficult task was then, incidentally as it were, assigned to the League of Nations."

"Germany herself had, to begin with, no right at all to join this noble society for the moral defence of former acts of violence, but only received the gracious permis-

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sion to do so through the memorable Reich Chancellor, Gustav Stresemann. Now you know, gentlemen, what a failure this institution has been. It never was a League of Nations, for, from the very beginning, one of the greatest Powers in the world did not belong to it, while yet another important Power resigned later; neither was it an institution of justice nor yet, as is still maintained to-day with astonishing effrontery, of the principles of justice; it is an institution for the maintenance of a state of things which has arisen from the injustice of a thousand years. For either violence is right, or violence is wrong."

"But if violence is wrong to-day, then violence was wrong in the past. If, therefore, the present condition of the world has arisen through violence, and there is no doubt that this is so, then this condition is one which was produced by a wrong. The League of Nations does not, therefore, defend a condition of right, but one born of a thousand years of wrong. We do, indeed, hear that all this is to be changed. We often hear, for instance, that English politicians would be only too delighted to give us back our colonial possessions if they did not suffer so much from the thought of all the wrong and violence which the natives would thereby undergo. In the year 1918 when the League of Nations had not yet come into existence, it was quite possible in practice to hand over these territories to their new owners without the consent of the natives, in order later to have this transfer morally confirmed by the League of Nations. To be sure, if one were to extend this noble principle—that a colony may only belong to the owner expressly desired by the natives—to the past history of colonial acquisitions, the colonial possessions of the world Powers would probably be seriously diminished. All these colonial empires have in fact not come about

through plebiscites, much less democratic ones, of the people living in them, but have been acquired by naked and brutal violence."

"They are to-day, of course, inseparable parts of the States in question and as such form a part of that world order which is always represented to us, by democratic politicians in particular, as the 'World Order of Law'—of that 'law' which the League of Nations exists to protect. I quite understand that those who have an interest in the maintenance of this legal order see in the League of Nations a convenient moral forum for the maintenance and, if necessary, the defence of the possessions which they formerly acquired by violence. But what I do not understand is that the nation which has itself been robbed by such an act of violence should in its turn become a member of this illustrious society. And I must protest against the accusation that we are not ready to stand for the principles of law because we are not in the League of Nations. On the contrary: we are not in the League of Nations, because we believe that it is not an institution of justice, but rather an institution for the defence of the wrong done at Versailles."

"But there is in addition a series of practical considerations."

"1. We formerly left the League of Nations because, true to the principles of its birth and constitution, it denied us the right to equal armaments and therewith equal security."

"2. We shall never join it again, because we have no intention of being involved in the defence of injustice in any part of the world by a majority decision of the League."

"3. We believe that we are thereby doing a service to all those nations who are so unfortunate as to rely on and place confidence in the League as a factor of real assistance."

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"For, in the case of the Abyssinian War, for instance, we should have held it better to have had, to begin with, more understanding for Italy's vital needs and secondly to have given the Abyssinians less hope and, above all, fewer promises. This would perhaps have made possible a simpler and more reasonable solution of the whole problem."

"4. But, if the worst should come to the worst, we have no intention of allowing the German nation to be drawn into conflicts in which our own interests are not involved. We are not willing to stand up for the territorial or economic interests of other nations if Germany obtains not the least advantage thereby. In addition we do not ourselves expect support of this kind from other nations. Germany is resolved to impose upon herself a wise restriction in her interests and demands. But if German interests should anywhere be seriously at stake, we shall at no time expect assistance from a League of Nations, but shall from the first assume that we shall have to do what is necessary ourselves. And it is as well to be clear about this, for it will always impose on our wishes and hopes that moderation which we often unfortunately fail to see among those who enjoy collective security."

"Finally:

"5. We do not intend in future to allow an attitude to be prescribed for us by any international institution which refuses officially to recognize indisputable facts and thus in its actions resembles less the conduct of a responsible human being and more that of a well-known large bird. Since the League of Nations is itself obviously incapable of understanding historical or economic necessities and of fulfilling the demands based on them, and since on the other hand the essential interests of nations are in the long run stronger than formal con-

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siderations, a peculiar situation would arise if it were to continue for a hundred years. For it is very probable that in the year 2036 new States will have arisen, or others have disappeared, without its having been possible to register this new situation at Geneva."

"Germany was once compelled by her membership of the League to associate herself in such an unreasonable action; she was, thank Heaven, as a result of leaving it, in a second case able to act in accordance with reason and justice. But I make known to you to-day, gentlemen, that I have now decided in the second case also to make the necessary historically conditioned correction: Germany will recognize Manchukuo."

"By deciding to take this step we make a final break between a policy which is fantastic and incomprehensible, and one which implies a sober respect for real facts."

"I will therefore sum up by saying once more that Germany has not the slightest intention of ever returning to the League, especially now that Italy has left it."

"This does not mean that we refuse to co-operate with other Powers; on the contrary, it means only that we refuse to undertake obligations which are incalculable and in most cases impossible of fulfilment."

"We are of the opinion that Germany has made many valuable contributions to co-operation with other Powers. The Reich to-day cannot be considered isolated, either politically or economically. I have on the contrary endeavoured since taking office to establish the best possible relations with most of the other States of the world. There is only one State with which we have not sought to establish relations, nor do we wish to enter into closer relations with it: Soviet Russia. More than ever do we see in Bolshevism the incarnation of the human destructive instinct."

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"But we do not make the Russian people as such responsible for this ghastly ideology of annihilation. We know perfectly well that a small, upper class of Jewish intellectuals plunged a great nation into a state bordering on insanity. This would not concern us so much after all, had this doctrine remained within the frontiers of Russia herself, since Germany has no intention of foisting our conceptions of life on the Russian nation. Unfortunately, however, the Bolshevism of international Jewry attempts from its central point in Soviet Russia to rot away the very core of the nations of the world, to overthrow the existing social order, and to substitute chaos for civilization."

"We certainly do not seek for contact with Bolshevism. On the contrary, it makes persistent efforts to corrupt the rest of mankind with its thoughts and ideas, and by so doing to plunge the world into a disaster of unprecedented magnitude. And here we are ruthless foes. We overcame the Communist machinations of Moscow in our own land, and we have not the least intention of allowing Germany to be annihilated from without by the material forces of Bolshevism!"

"Great Britain has repeatedly assured us through the mouth of her responsible statesmen of her desire to maintain the *status quo* in the world. This should apply here, too. Whenever a European country falls a prey to Bolshevism, a shifting of positions becomes apparent. For the territories thus bolshevized are no longer sovereign States with independent, national lives of their own, but are now mere sections of the Moscow Revolutionary Centre. I am aware that Mr. Eden does not share this view. M. Stalin does, however, and is perfectly frank about it. In my opinion M. Stalin is still at the moment of speaking a much better judge and interpreter of Bolshevik views and aims than a British

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Cabinet Minister! Therefore we look upon every attempt to spread Bolshevism, no matter where it may be, with utter loathing, and where it menaces us, we shall oppose it."

"This explains our relations with Japan. I cannot agree with those politicians who think they do Europe a service in harming Japan. I am afraid the defeat of Japan in Eastern Asia would never benefit Europe or America but only Bolshevik Soviet Russia. I do not consider China strong enough, either spiritually or materially, to withstand from her own resources any attack by Bolshevism. I believe, however, that even the greatest victory gained by Japan would be infinitely less dangerous for civilization and world-peace than any success achieved by Bolshevism. Germany has concluded a pact with Japan to counteract Comintern aims. She has always been on friendly terms with China, so I think, under the circumstances, we may best be considered truly neutral spectators of this drama. I need hardly say we all earnestly desired, and still desire, appeasement and at length peace between these two great Eastern nations. We believe, however, that peace would perhaps have been restored long ere now, if certain elements had not, as in the case of Abyssinia, upset the balance in Eastern Asia by putting their advice and perhaps promises of moral assistance into the scale of one party. This attitude—as matters stand—could only have a purely platonic significance. A drowning man, however, clutches at every straw. It would have been more expedient to have drawn China's attention to the full gravity of her position, instead of citing, as so often before, the League of Nations as the certain guarantee of peace and security!"

"No matter at what time and in what manner the happenings in Eastern Asia may ultimately right them-

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selves, Germany, in the defensive attitude she adopts towards Communism, will always regard and value Japan as an element of security, and a guarantee, moreover, for the culture of mankind. For just as we are perfectly certain that Japan's greatest victory would not affect the civilization of the white races in the very least, so do we not doubt for a moment that a victory gained by Bolshevism would signify the end of the present thousand-year-old civilization of the white races!"

"In this connexion I should like to defend myself most emphatically against those idiotic attacks which accuse Germany of betraying the interests of the white race in the conflict in the Far East, because of the attitude we have adopted. Really, I must confess we are simply amazed when forced to read such assertions in French and English newspapers."

"That just this very National Socialist State, always the object of attack on account of its racial policy, should now suddenly have the honour of drawing the sword for racial ideals, or, rather let us say racial interests, is a huge jest in world history. Germany has no territorial interests of any kind in Eastern Asia. She has the natural wish to carry on trade and commerce, and in so doing she is not obliged to support any one party. But one thing we are obliged to do, and that is to recognize the fact that a Bolshevik victory would here, too, destroy all possibilities."

"Moreover, Germany once possessed territory herself in Eastern Asia. True this did not prevent certain Powers with the help of a coalition of white and yellow races from expelling the German Reich from the country. To-day we have really no longer any desire to receive invitations to return, to Eastern Asia, let us say."

"Neither does Germany have any territorial interests

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which might be connected in any way with the terrible civil war now raging in Spain. The situation there is similar to that which we ourselves formerly experienced in Germany. The attack, inspired and conducted both personally and materially by Moscow, is directed against a national independent State and arouses the fierce opposition of a national population unwilling to be slaughtered. And precisely as in the case of Germany, the democratic International is on the side of the Bolshevist incendiaries. The German Government would see in the bolshevizing of Spain not only an element detrimental to the peace of Europe, but also one disturbing to the balance of power on the Continent. If Spain were to become a section of the Moscow Centre, there would be grave danger of the spread of this plague of annihilation and destruction, the consequences of which we could under no circumstance view with indifferent calm. We are indeed happy in the knowledge that our anti-Bolshevist attitude is also shared by another State."

"Italo-German relations are based on conceptions of life and of the State common to both nations, as well as on co-operative action in warding off the international dangers that menace us both. How greatly this fact is appreciated everywhere in Germany was most strikingly evidenced in the joyous enthusiasm with which the creator of the Fascist State was welcomed in the Reich. One fact at least ought to be acknowledged by all European statesmen. If Mussolini had not conquered Italy in 1922 with the help of his Fascist Movement, the country would in all probability have fallen a prey to Bolshevism."

"The dire consequence to Western culture in the event of such a collapse would be inconceivable. The very thought of such a possibility is horrifying to a man of historical vision and sense of responsibility based on

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a knowledge of the facts. The sympathy which Benito Mussolini enjoys in Germany is a tribute to a personality of saecular greatness."

"Italy's position resembles that of Germany in certain respects. Under the circumstances, therefore, it was but natural that suffering as we both do from overcrowding, we should show a keen understanding for the activities of a man and his Government who, refusing to allow their people to be sacrificed on the altar of the fantastic ideals of the League of Nations, were rather fully determined to save their nation. And all the more so, since there is no doubt that the apparent ideals of the League of Nations coincide rather too closely with the exceedingly realistic interests of its chief Powers."

"Furthermore, Germany and Italy have taken a common stand with regard to the Spanish conflict. Its aim is to see a national Spain which enjoys complete independence. The Italo-German friendship, springing as it does from definite causes, has become an element of stabilization in the appeasement of Europe. The connexion of both States with Japan presents the most powerful of all obstructions to the further advance of the menacing power of Russian Bolshevism."

"There has been much talk and still more writing in recent years about the differences between France and England on the one hand, and Germany on the other. I do not quite see wherein these differences are supposed to be embodied. Germany has no further territory in Europe to claim from France, a point I have frequently stressed. We hope the regaining of the Saar districts has now definitely closed the chapter of Franco-German territorial disputes."

"Nor has Germany any quarrel with England unless perhaps it may be our wish for colonies. There is, however, not a single reason for any kind of pos-

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sible conflict. But what does poison friendly relations between the two countries, and consequently causes trouble, is an absolutely intolerable Press campaign which is being conducted in France and England under the slogan of 'Liberty for expression of personal opinions'. I have little use for the reiterated sentiments of foreign statesmen and diplomats who declare that there is no law in these countries to put an end to lies and calumnies. Here it is not a case of private affairs, but one concerned with the cohabitation of peoples and States. And we are not in a position to make light of such things for any length of time. We simply cannot close our eyes to the effects of such a virulent campaign. If we do so, it can easily happen that in certain countries the malicious machinations of international weavers of lies will succeed in arousing hatred of our country, which, if disregarded, will gradually develop into an openly hostile attitude towards us. The German nation could not possibly face this with the necessary power of resistance, since our own Press policy prevents the expression of such hostility towards these nations. And this is a grave menace indeed, and one that endangers peace. For this very reason I refuse to tolerate any longer the unbridled and persistent scoffing and slandering to which our country and people are subjected. We shall answer these calumnies in future and with real National Socialist thoroughness." . . .

"Mr Eden boasted in a recent speech of the various liberties of his land. One special liberty he failed to mention, liberty for journalists to slander and jeer at other nations, their organizations, men, and Governments to their heart's content. . . . But the harm caused by such incitement is nevertheless so great that in future we do not intend to tolerate it without a vehement protest. This crime is all the more serious when it delibe-

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rately aims at goading on the nations to war. I need only mention a few facts in this connexion."

"Let me remind you of the sudden, slanderous reports of last year when it was alleged that Germany had landed 20,000 men in Spanish Morocco.¹ It was indeed fortunate that this infamous lie could be immediately refuted. But what would happen if such a *démenti* could not be made quickly enough to avoid trouble?"

"This list of major crimes also includes statements that Germany and Italy had formed an alliance to divide up Spain, and a quite recent malicious statement to the effect that Germany and Japan had made a pact to possess themselves of the Dutch colonies. Can one call this an honest trade, or still speak of a liberty which enables international criminals of this kind to keep the world in a state of constant unrest? Are not these people war-mongers and war-makers of the most infamous kind? The British Government wishes to limit armaments or ban bombing. I once proposed that myself. But at that time I also suggested that it was still more important to prevent the poisoning of public opinion by infamous articles in the Press."

"What has strengthened our feelings towards Italy—if that were at all possible—is the fact that in that country State leadership and Press policy follow one path. The Government does not talk of mutual understanding while the Press agitates for the opposite course."

"This chapter on the disturbance of international relations includes the impertinence of writing letters to the head of a foreign State asking for information about sentences passed in courts of law. I would suggest that certain members of the House of Commons concern themselves with sentences passed by the British Courts

¹ See p. 1345 *supra*.

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Martial in Jerusalem, and not with the sentences passed in the German People's Court. We can perhaps understand interest in German traitors, but it does not improve relations between England and Germany."

"For the rest, let no one imagine that such tactless interventions will have any influence on German law courts or on their sentences. I, for instance, would never allow a member of the German Reichstag to interfere in matters of English justice. The British Empire has wide interests, and we recognize them as such, but the affairs of the German nation and Reich are determined by the German Reichstag, and by me, its representative, not by a delegation of English letter-writers!"

"I am sure it would be a most praiseworthy achievement were we to come to an international agreement, so as not only to prevent the use of poison, incendiary, and explosive bombs, but above all to prevent the circulation of those newspapers which do more harm to the promotion of friendly relations between nations than any poison or incendiary bombs."

"Since such an international Press campaign is not conducive to appeasement, but must rather be regarded as a grave menace to peace among the nations, I have decided to carry through the strengthening of Germany's armed forces as a security against the day when these wild threats of war might actually turn into bloodshed and violence. On 4 February these measures were begun and since then have been in progress: they will be carried through with speed and resolution."

"Germany at any rate has a sincere desire to restore mutual confidence between herself and all the Great Powers of Europe, as well as with other States. If this is not successful, it is not our fault."

"We earnestly believe that little can be expected at this time from conferences and single conversations

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because of this attitude on the part of the Press. It is impossible to deceive oneself as to the following facts. This international Press campaign against peace will immediately destroy every attempt to arrive at an understanding between peoples. It will immediately misinterpret or distort the meaning of every conference. It will immediately place a false light on every agreement. And there is, therefore, nothing to give one confidence under these circumstances that any good can come out of such conferences or out of such conversations, as long as Governments on the whole are not in a position to act decisively because they must always consider the public interpretation placed upon their actions."

"We believe, therefore, that for the time being the only practical way of arriving at an understanding is through the normal diplomatic exchange of notes, thus preventing too crude falsifications of the International Press."

"Though Germany does herself set a limit to her interests, this must not be taken as a lack of interest in everything that goes on in the world outside. We are happy to have been able to maintain normal, and in part also, friendly relations with most of the States that border on Germany. We believe that by so doing the feeling of general tension has been relieved. We are filled with deep and sincere satisfaction at the genuine wish to maintain a real neutrality that we have observed in several European States. We believe we can see in this an element of increasing calm, and therefore of increasing security. But we see also, on the other hand, the deplorable consequences of the economic and population problems caused by the violence done to the map of Europe in the mad act of Versailles."

"Over ten million Germans live in two of the States adjoining our frontiers."

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"Till 1866 they were constitutionally united with the whole German people. They fought up to 1918 in the Great War shoulder to shoulder with the German soldiers of the Reich. Under the terms of the Peace Pact they were kept against their will from forming a union with the Reich. This in itself is sufficiently distressing. But about one thing there can be no doubt. The fact that they are now citizens of other States should not deprive them of their rights as members of a national community.¹ Yet a people has the right to self-determination, as we were solemnly assured in Wilson's Fourteen Points which served as the basis of the Armistice. This cannot be overlooked simply because the people in question happen to be Germans! In the long run it is intolerable for a self-respecting World Power to know that across the frontier are kinsmen who have to suffer severe persecution simply because of their sympathy, their feeling of union with Germany, because of their common fate, their common point of view. Of course, we realize that a frontier settlement pleasing to all is scarcely possible in Europe. It should, therefore, be all the more important to avoid all unnecessary humiliation of national minorities, for it is quite enough that they must be separated from their homeland without adding to this the pain of persecution for belonging to a certain national community (*Volkstum*). We can prove that it is possible with a good will to find ways of conciliation, of relief of tension. If one tries to prevent the solution of the problem in this way and uses force in so doing, then one day this violence will be returned with violence. We cannot dispute the fact that,

¹ German: *Die staatsrechtliche Trennung vom Reich kann nicht zu einer volkspolitischen Rechtlosmachung führen, d.h. die allgemeine Rechte einer volklichen Selbstbestimmung . . . können nicht einfach mißachtet werden.*

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as long as Germany was feeble and powerless, she simply had to endure these persecutions of Germans across her frontiers. Just as England looks after her interests which cover the whole globe, so also will the Germany of to-day look after and safeguard her relatively restricted interests. And to these interests of the German Reich belongs also the protection of those fellow-Germans who live beyond our frontiers and are unable to ensure for themselves the right to a general freedom, personal, political, and ideological."

"We are glad to be able to state now in the fifth year after the first great foreign political agreement of the Reich that in our relationship with the State from which we might have expected the greatest opposition, there has occurred not only a lessening of the tension, but also during this year there has been a pronounced rapprochement. Of course I realize that we have a certain circumstance to thank for this—the circumstance that there was then no western parliamentarianism in Warsaw, but rather a Polish marshal, who, an outstanding personality, realized the importance to Europe of relieving this tension between Germany and Poland. That work, regarded at the time with scepticism by many people, has endured the test of time, and I may well say that dating from the moment that the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts at disturbing affairs in Danzig and appointed a new Commissioner, a man of high personal qualities, that from that very moment the danger point to European peace entirely lost its threatening aspect."

"The Polish State respects the national relations of Danzig, and Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. So it was possible to find the way to an understanding in spite of attempts to disturb it, and, beginning with Danzig, to remove difficulties in relations between Ger-

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many and Poland, thus arriving at a sincere spirit of friendly co-operation."

"I am happy to be able to tell you, gentlemen, that during the past few days a further understanding has been reached with a country that is particularly close to us for many reasons. The Reich and German Austria are bound together not only because they are the same people, but also because they share a long and common history, and a common culture."

"The difficulties which had been experienced in carrying out the agreement of 11 July [1936] compelled us to make an attempt to clear out of the way misunderstandings and hindrances to a final conciliation. Had this not occurred, it was clear that an intolerable situation might one day have developed, whether intentionally or otherwise, which might have brought about a very serious catastrophe. It is then as a rule no longer within the power of man to stay the course of a destiny that first arose through negligence or stupidity! I am glad to be able to assure you that these considerations corresponded with the views of the Austrian Chancellor whom I invited to come to visit me. The idea and the intention were to bring about a relaxation of the tension in our relations with one another by giving under the existing legislation the same legal rights to citizens holding National Socialist views as are enjoyed by the other citizens of German Austria. In conjunction with this there should be a practical contribution towards peace by granting a general amnesty, and by creating a better understanding between the two States through a still closer friendly co-operation in as many different fields as possible—political, personal, and economic—all complementary to and within the framework of the Agreement of 11 July."

"I want to express in this connexion before the German people my sincere thanks to the Austrian Chan-

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cellor for his great understanding and the warm-hearted willingness with which he accepted my invitation and worked with me so that we might discover a way of serving the best interests of the two countries, for after all, it is the interest of the whole German people, whose sons we all are, wherever we may have been born."

"I believe that in reaching this mutual understanding we have also made a contribution to European peace."

"The best proof that we are right in this supposition is the rising fury of democratic world citizens who are always talking about peace, and yet who let no opportunity pass of inciting to war. They are angry with, and infuriated by, this work of understanding. It is therefore a permissible conclusion that our work was good."

"Perhaps this example will be helpful in gradually bringing greater relief to the tense situation in Europe. Germany is willing, in any event, supported by her friendships, to leave nothing untried in order to preserve that greatest blessing, that blessing that is the basis for every future work, namely, peace."

"I can assure you, gentlemen, that our relations with the other European Powers, as well as with the States outside Europe, are either normal or else very friendly."

"I need only point to our especially warm friendship with Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and many other States. Our foreign trade balance has given you an impressive picture of our economic co-operation with the other peoples!"

"But above all stands our co-operation with those two great Powers who have recognized a world danger in Bolshevism, just as Germany has, and are determined to unite their strength in common defence against the Comintern movement."

"That this work of co-operation with Italy and Japan may ever become closer is my sincere desire. In addi-

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tion, we are happy for every relief of tension that can be effected in the general political situation. For however great may be the achievement of our people we are not in doubt that general prosperity would be increased if a closer international co-operation could be secured."

"The German people in its whole character is not warlike, but rather soldierly, that is, while they do not want war, they are not frightened by the thoughts of it. They love peace, but they love honour and their freedom just as much. Fifteen terrible years lie behind us as a warning and a lesson, which, I believe, the German nation will always remember and never forget."

"Gentlemen! You have authorized me to act by adopting the laws giving me full power. I have laid before you an account covering five historic years in the life of the German people. I cannot close without assuring you how great is my faith in the future of our people and the Reich, that we all so warmly love. My motive as an unknown soldier in taking up the struggle for the regeneration of Germany had as its deepest ground my belief in the German people—not belief in her public institutions, her social order and social classes, her parties, her State and political power, but belief in the eternal values inherent in our people."

"And above all there is my belief in the millions of individual German men and women, who, just as I was once myself, are nameless servers of our community and our people. It is for them that I endeavoured to build up this new Reich!"

For the closing passages of the speech see pp. 410, 427 supra.¹

In his speech in Munich (24 February 1938) on the eighteenth anniversary of the founding of the Party Hitler

¹ V.B., 21 Feb. 1938.

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dwelt on Germany's imperative demand¹ for the return of her colonies, and referring to the great architectural and cultural plans of the Third Reich which would take decades to complete, said that in view of these gigantic projects Germany could have no more fervent wish than her desire for peace and understanding, but for a peace with honour. He then turned against the fresh lies appearing in the Press since his speech in the Reichstag on 20 February 1938. For example the News Chronicle, despite the Berchtesgaden agreement with Austria, had stated that 40,000 men of the Austrian Legion had been collected on the Austrian frontier. The maps at the head-quarters of the Legion showed that the advance into Austria was to be executed by three columns which were to effect a junction at a short distance from Vienna and thence move on the Austrian capital. A further formation of 10,000 men was ready to invade Czechoslovakia. These statements were from beginning to end pure inventions, and from them it could be seen how the Jewish international mixers of poisons fabricate and spread their lies. "From this we can learn a lesson. At least against the Jewish agitators in Germany we will take energetic measures. We know that they are the representatives of an International and we will treat them all accordingly. They can do nothing but lie and slander and incite and we well know that these Jewish agitators will never share in the fighting in any war; they are the only people who will profit by these wars." . . . The National Socialist Movement by uniting the German people had begun a new epoch in the history of the German people—that history which went back for thousands of years.²

In March 1938 Hitler received in audience the newly appointed Ambassador of the United States, Hugh R.

¹ German: *unabdingbare Forderung*. ² *V.B.*, 26 Feb. 1938.

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Wilson. Hitler said that Mr. Wilson's knowledge of Germany derived during his earlier diplomatic activity in the country would considerably lighten his endeavour to serve the cause of the mutual understanding of both peoples. "Your Excellency can rest assured that I and the Government of the Reich are guided by the same endeavours and will do everything to support you in your effort to reach this goal."¹

AUSTRIA

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¹ *V.B.*, 4 Mar. 1938.

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For the Austrian Constitution before 1934: Ludwig Adamovich, *Grundriß des österreichischen Staatsrechtes*. 2te neu bearbeitete Auflage nach dem Stande der Gesetzgebung vom 1. November 1932. Vienna, Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1932. pp. xx, 640. This work embraces both "Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrecht".

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For the Constitution of 1934: Erich Voegelin, *Der autoritäre Staat. Ein Versuch über das österreichische Staatsproblem*. Vienna, Springer, 1936; O. Ender (who was largely responsible for the drafting of the Constitution), *Die neue österreichische Verfassung eingeleitet und erläutert* (= *Der neue Staat*, Band 1). Vienna, Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1934 (this contains the text of the constitution and the text of the Concordat published at the same time as the Constitution). I know of no adequate study in English of the Constitution, but cf. Edward Quinn, *The Mission of Austria*, London, Sands, 1938, ch. iv; J. D. Gregory, *Dollfuss and his Times* (see *supra*), ch. vi, pp. 321 sqq., and see P. T. Lux, *La Leçon de l'Autriche* (see *supra*), pp. 83 sqq.; M. S. Wertheimer, "Austria establishes a Fascist State", *Foreign Policy Reports* (New York), xi (1935-6), pp. 182-8. And on the Constitution of 1934 see further: J. Dobretsberger, *Vom Sinn und Werden des neuen Staates*. Graz, Vienna, Kommissionsverlag Styria, 1934; Richard Schmitz, *Der Weg zur berufsständischen Ordnung in Oesterreich* (= *Schriften zur berufsständischen Ordnung*, herausgegeben vom österreichischen Heimatdienst, Nr. 1). Vienna, Manzsche Buchhandlung, 1934; R. Kerschagl, *Die "Quadragesimo anno" und der neue Staat* (= *Der neue Staat*, vol. 6). Vienna, Leipzig, Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1935; H. Bayer, *Der berufsständische Aufbau in Österreich*. Innsbruck, Vienna, Munich, Tyrolia Verlag, 1935.

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a Hitlerian tract of 1934 cf. P. T. Lux, *La Leçon de l'Autriche* (see above), pp. 92-4]. Amongst English books may be mentioned Martin Fuchs, *A Pact with Hitler*. London, Gollancz, 1939; M. W. Fodor, *South of Hitler*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1938 (the American edition has the title *Plot and Counter-plot in Central Europe*); Franz Borkenau, *Austria and After*. London, Faber & Faber, 1938; Oswald Dutch, *Thus died Austria*. London, Arnold, 1938; G. E. R. Gedy, *Fallen Bastions. The Central European Tragedy*. London, Gollancz, 1939; H. W. Blood-Ryan, *Franz von Papen. His Life and Times*. London, Rich & Cowan, 1940. Further see R. Machray, *The Struggle for the Danube and the Little Entente 1929-1938*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1938, ch. ix. For the situation since the *Anschluss* cf. *Österreich unter dem Reichskommissar. Bilanz eines Jahres Fremdherrschaft*. Paris, Éditions "Nouvelles d'Autriche", 1939.

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For the Austro-German Agreement of 11 July 1936 see the documents translated into English in appendices 1-5 of Martin Fuchs, *A Pact with Hitler* (see *supra*). The text of the Austro-

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German Agreement of 11 July 1936 is translated into English in *Friends of Europe Publications*, No. 61, p. 14 [1938].

The End of Austria, Friends of Europe Publications, No. 61 (1938) reproduces in an English translation much of Schuschnigg's speech before the Federal Diet on 24 February 1938 and of his speech in Innsbruck (10 March 1938) announcing the holding of the plebiscite.

Hitler's Proclamation to Germany issued on 12 March 1938 ran as follows:

"It is with the deepest sorrow that for years past we have watched the fate of our fellow-countrymen in Austria. Austria from ancient times has formed part of the German people; the two countries have shared a common destiny. That eternal historic association was broken only by the war of 1866 but was sealed afresh in the World War. The suffering which was inflicted on this country first from without and later from within we felt as though it were our own, just as we know that for millions of German Austrians the misfortune of the Reich caused a like concern and sympathy."

"At the time when in Germany thanks to the victory of the National Socialist idea the nation once more found its way to the proud self-consciousness of a great people there began in Austria a new period of suffering and bitter trials. By the most brutal methods of terrorism, of bodily and economic torture and annihilation, a régime which lacked any legal mandate sought to maintain an existence which was condemned by the overwhelming majority of the Austrian people. Thus we, as a great people, had the experience of seeing more than six million people of the same stock as ourselves suffering oppression at the hands of a numerically small minority simply owing to the fact that this minority had gained possession of the means necessary to enforce its will. From this deprivation of political rights and coercion

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there arose an economic decline which stands in terrible contrast with the development in the new Germany."

"Who can blame these unfortunate members of our German people if they cast longing eyes to the Reich—to that Germany with which their ancestors had been associated for so many centuries, with whose citizens they had fought shoulder to shoulder in the cruellest of all wars, whose civilization was their civilization, and to which they had made in so many spheres contributions of their own of the highest value? To suppress this sentiment was to condemn hundreds of thousands to profound mental suffering."

"If some years ago this suffering was still borne in patience, with the rise in prestige of the Reich the will to end the oppression grew ever stronger."

"Germans! I have of recent years sought to warn the former rulers of Austria from pursuing this path. Only a madman could believe that it was possible permanently through oppression and terrorism to rob men of their love for the people of their birth.¹ The history of Europe proves that in such cases one breeds only a greater fanaticism. This fanaticism then compels the oppressors to resort to ever stronger methods of violence, and these in turn do but increase the loathing and the hatred of the victims."

"I have further tried to persuade the responsible authorities that in the long run it is impossible for a great nation, because it is unworthy of it, to have to stand by and watch those belonging to the same people as themselves being continually oppressed, persecuted, and imprisoned solely because of their origin or of their allegiance to this people or on account of their association with an idea. Germany alone has been forced to receive over 40,000 fugitives, 10,000 others within this small

¹ German: *die Liebe zu ihrem angestammten Volkstum.*

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country have passed through prisons, dungeons, and concentration camps, hundreds of thousands have been reduced to beggary, to misery, and poverty. No nation in the world would be able permanently to tolerate these conditions on its frontier without being itself despised—and that deservedly."

"In the year 1936 I endeavoured to find some way which might afford a hope of alleviating the tragic fate of this German brother-country so that one might perhaps reach a real conciliation."

"The agreement of the 11th of July [1936], however, was signed only the next moment to be broken once more. The majority of the population remained without rights: their unworthy position of being pariahs in this State was not abolished. He who openly professed his allegiance to the life of the German people¹ continued to be persecuted whether he was a National Socialist worker on the roads or an old leader of the army in the World War who had proved his worth."

"I then tried for a second time to bring about an understanding. I endeavoured to make clear to the representative of this régime—who when compared with myself, the Leader chosen by the German people, possessed no legitimate mandate of his own—I endeavoured to make it clear that this state of affairs, if it continued, could not be maintained, since the increasing exasperation of the Austrian people could not be suppressed for ever by increasing violence and that the moment was bound to come when it would also be intolerable for the Reich to stand by any longer in silence in the face of such oppression. For if to-day solutions of colonial problems were made to depend on questions of the right of self-determination of such inferior peoples as might be concerned, it was unbearable that 6½ millions be-

¹ German: *Wer sich zum deutschen Volkstum offen bekannte.*

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longing to a great, an ancient civilized people should be practically denied these rights by the character of his Government."

"I wished therefore to secure by a new agreement that in this country all Germans should be granted the same rights and be subject to the same duties. This agreement was intended to secure the execution of the treaty of 11 July 1936."

"A few weeks later we were unfortunately forced to the conclusion that the men composing at that time the Austrian Government had no intention of carrying out this agreement in the spirit which had inspired it, but in order to create for themselves an excuse for their continued violations of the Austrian Germans' right to equality of treatment they conceived the notion of a plebiscite which was devised in order finally to deprive the majority of its rights. The methods adopted to realize this scheme were unexampled. A country which for many years had had no election at all, where there were no means of determining who were qualified to vote, announces an election which is to take place in less than three and a half days' time. There are no lists of voters, there are no voting cards, there is no means of testing a person's right to vote, there is no obligation to maintain the secrecy of the ballot, there is no guarantee that the election will be conducted with impartiality, there is no security that the votes will be properly counted—and so on. If these are the methods which can confer on a régime the stamp of legality, then for fifteen years we National Socialists in Germany were only fools! We had to go through a hundred election fights and laboriously win the support of the German people."

"When the late President of the Reich at last called me to power, I was the Leader of by far the strongest party in the Reich. Since then I have time and again

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sought to give to the German people an opportunity of confirming the legality of my existence and of my action: and that confirmation was granted me. But if the methods which Herr Schuschnigg wished to employ are the right ones, then the plebiscite in the Saar territory was only a mockery of a people whose return to the Reich it was desired to make more difficult. But on this point we think otherwise. I believe that we can all be proud that here too, in this Saar plebiscite, we won a vote of confidence from the German people in so unexceptionable a fashion."

"Against this unexampled expedient of an election fraud the German people in Austria itself at last revolted. But this time when the régime once more planned simply to crush the movement of protest with a strong arm,¹ the result could only be a new civil war."

"But the German Reich will not suffer that henceforth in this territory Germans should still be persecuted because they belong to our nation or because they profess their belief in certain views. It desires calm and order!"

"I determined therefore to place the help of the Reich at the service of the millions of Germans in Austria. Since this morning the soldiers of the German army are on the march across all the frontiers of German Austria."

"Tanks, infantry divisions, bands of SS. on the ground, and the German air arm in the blue heaven—summoned by the new National Socialist Government in Vienna—will be the guarantee that as soon as possible the opportunity will be given at last to the German people itself to fashion its own future and its own destiny by a real plebiscite. Behind these troops stand the will and the resolution of the whole German nation!"

"I myself as Leader and Chancellor of the German

¹ German: *mit brachialen Mitteln*.

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people shall be happy now once more as a German and a free citizen to be able to tread the soil of the country which is also my homeland. The world must convince itself that the German people in Austria is experiencing in these days hours of bliss and deep joy."

"It sees in the brothers coming to its help its saviours from profound distress."

"Long live the National Socialist Reich!"

"Long live National Socialist German Austria!"

Berlin, 12 March 1938.

ADOLF HITLER.¹

On 11 March 1938 Hitler sent a letter to Mussolini in which he explained the reasons for his action: towards the close of his letter he said:

"1. In this action one must see nothing save an act of legitimate national defence and thus an action which any man of character in my position would execute in the same manner as I have done. You, too, Excellency, would not have been able to act otherwise if the destiny of Italians had been at stake. And I, as Führer and as National Socialist, cannot do otherwise."

"2. In an hour which was critical for Italy I showed you the firmness of my sentiments. Have no doubt that in the future, too, nothing will be changed in this respect."

"3. Whatever may be the consequences of recent events, I have marked a clear German frontier towards France and now I trace another, equally clear, towards Italy. It is the Brenner."

"This decision will never be either questioned or violated. This decision I have not taken in the year 1938 but immediately after the close of the Great War, and I have never made any secret of that decision."²

¹ F.Z., 13 Mar. 1938.

² Translated from the Italian text in *Voce d'Italia*, 13-14 Mar. 1938.

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On 13 March 1938 Hitler sent to Mussolini a telegram:
"I shall never forget this. Adolf Hitler."¹

On 12 March 1938 Hitler broadcast a speech from Linz addressing the Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, and the inhabitants of Linz:

"I thank you for your words of greeting. Above all I thank all of you assembled here who have borne witness that it is not the will and the wish of some few only to found this great Reich of the German people, but that it is the wish and the will of the German people. Would that on this evening some of our international seekers after truth whom we know so well could not only see the facts but later admit them to be facts. When years ago I went forth from this town, I bore within me precisely the same profession of faith which to-day fills my heart. Judge of the depth of my emotion when after so many years I have been able to bring that profession of faith to its fulfilment."

"If Providence once called me forth from this town to be the leader of the Reich, it must, in so doing, have charged me with a mission, and that mission could be only to restore my dear homeland to the German Reich. I have believed in this mission, I have lived and fought for it, and I believe I have now fulfilled it. You all are witnesses and sureties for that. I know not on what day you will be summoned; I hope it will not be far distant. Then you must make good your pledge with your own confession of faith, and I believe that then before the whole German people I shall be able to point with pride to my own homeland. And this must then prove to the world that every further attempt to tear this people asunder will be in vain."

"And just as then it will be your duty to make your

¹ *F.Z.*, 14 Mar. 1938.

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contribution to this German future, so all Germany is ready for its part to make its contribution and it is already making it to-day. In the German soldiers who now from all the shires (*Gauen*) of the Reich are marching into Austria you must see those who are ready and willing to make sacrifices in their fight for the unity of the whole great German people, for the power of the Reich, for its greatness and its glory now and evermore—Germany, Sieg Heil!"¹

*On 13 March 1938 Hitler announced the incorporation of Austria into the German Reich and the incorporation of the Austrian army into the army of the Reich.*²

In an interview with Mr. G. Ward Price published in the "Daily Mail" of 14 March 1938 Hitler was asked "Will the developments of to-day have any effect on the Anglo-German conversations that are beginning?" "On our side, none at all," he replied, "and, I hope, none on the British side."

"What harm have we done to any foreign country? Whose interests have we hurt by falling in with the will of the overwhelming majority of the Austrian people to become Germans?"

"I cannot understand the Anglo-French note of protest. These people here are Germans. A protest note from other countries about my action with regard to them has no more sense than a note from the German Government would have which protested against the relations of the British Government with Ireland."

"I assure you in all sincerity that four days ago I had no idea at all that I should be here to-day, or that Austria would have been embodied, as she is from to-night, with the rest of Germany on exactly the same basis as Bavaria or Saxony."

¹ *F.Z.*, 14 Mar. 1938.

² *F.Z.*, 15 Mar. 1938.

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"I have done this because I was deceived by Herr Schuschnigg, and betrayal is something which I will not tolerate."

"When I give my hand and word on any matter, I stand by it, and I expect anyone who enters into an agreement with me to do the same."

"I came to terms with Herr Schuschnigg by which he was to cease his oppression of the majority of the people of his country."

"I dealt quite fairly with him in my Reichstag speech. I gave him the chance to say: 'I have come to terms with the German Government and I will loyally co-operate in carrying them out.'"

"Instead, Herr Schuschnigg tried to spring this plebiscite on his country. . . ."

"This is my home. I have long grieved to see the people to whom I belong by birth oppressed and suffering."

"More than 2,000 of them have lost their lives. Many have been in prison. Some of them have been hanged for their political opinions and their faithfulness to German ideals."

"A minority of 10 per cent. has oppressed the majority of 90 per cent. Well, I have put an end to that. But I have done still more. I have prevented the majority from revenging itself upon its oppressors."

"I hope the world will realize that it is a work of peace that I have performed here."

"If I had not intervened and the Schuschnigg Government had tried to carry through its trick plebiscite, there would have been bloody revolution here."

"Austria might well have become another Spain in the heart of Europe."

"I am a realist. Look at my relations with Poland. I am entirely ready to admit that Poland—a land of 33,000,000 inhabitants—needs an outlet to the sea."

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"It is a bitter thing to us that this has to be obtained at the expense of a corridor through German territory, but we realize what it means for the Poles."

"There are Germans living under Polish government and Poles living under German government."

"If the two countries quarrelled, each would oppress its minorities. It was far better to settle our differences by agreement."

"I hope that all nations will recognize from what has happened in Austria the folly of oppressing their national minorities."

"Wait a little, and see what I will do for Austria. Come back here in four years' time, and you will find that the number of the Austrian unemployed has greatly fallen."

"You will see how much better off and happier the people of Austria will be."¹

On 14 March 1938 Hitler entered Vienna and in his speech said: "Whatever may come, the German Reich as it stands to-day no one will in future be able to shatter, no one will tear asunder." This is our pledge, and "no distress, no threat, and no violence can break this oath of ours. This to-day is the faith of all Germans from Königsberg to Cologne, from Hamburg to Vienna."²

On 15 March 1938 Hitler spoke on the Heldenplatz in Vienna:

"Germans, Men and Women. In a few days within the community of the German people there has been accomplished an upheaval, the extent of which we can, it is true, see to-day but whose significance only later generations will be able fully to estimate. During recent years the heads of the régime which has now been over-

¹ *Daily Mail*, 14 Mar. 1938.

² *F.Z.*, 15 Mar. 1936.

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thrown have often spoken of the special 'mission' which in their eyes this country had to fulfil. A leader of the legitimists sketched this mission in detail in a memorandum. According to this memorandum the task of this so-called independence of the country of Austria—an independence based upon the Peace Treaties and dependent upon the favour of foreign countries—was to hinder the formation of a really great German Reich and thus to bar the way leading to the future of the German people. Now I proclaim for this land its new mission which corresponds with the command which in times past summoned hither the German settlers from all the shires (*Gauen*) of the Old Reich. The oldest East Mark of the German people shall henceforth be the youngest bulwark of the German nation and thus of the German Reich."

"Through the centuries in the disturbed periods of the past the assaults of the East have broken on the frontiers of the Old Mark. Through the centuries in the long future the Mark shall be the iron guarantee for the security and freedom of the German Reich and thus a pledge for the happiness and the peace of our great people. And I know that the East Mark of the German Reich will perform its new task as well as the old East Mark performed and mastered its task in the past."

"I speak in the name of the millions of this extraordinarily beautiful German land, in the name of the men of the Steiermark, of the men of Lower and Upper Austria, of the men of Carinthia, of Salzburg, of Tirol, and above all in the name of the city of Vienna when I assure the other 68 millions of German fellow-countrymen in our wide Reich who are listening to me at this moment that this land is German, that it has understood its mission and will fulfil it, and that no one shall ever outdo it in loyalty to the great community of the German people."

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"Our task will now be through work, through industry, through common effort, and through standing together to solve the great social, cultural, and economic problems, and above all to develop Austria more and more and build it up as an outpost of National Socialist sentiment and of National Socialist strength of will."

*Hitler then returned thanks to those who with God's help had enabled him to effect this great change, and especially "to the unnumbered nameless idealists, the fighters of our formations, who in the long years of persecution have proved that the German under oppression only grows still harder. These years of the period of suffering have but strengthened in me my conviction of the value of the German Austrian within the framework of the great community of our people. Further, the wonderful order and discipline of this tremendous happening is a proof of the force of the idea which inspired these men. Thus at this hour I can make to the German people the greatest announcement of the realization of a purpose that I have ever made: as the Leader and Chancellor of the German nation and the German Reich I now announce before the bar of history the entry of my homeland into the German Reich. Germany and its new member, the National Socialist Party and the army of our Reich, Sieg Heil!"*¹

*On 16 March 1938 Hitler returned to Berlin and in a speech there said that "Germany had now become Great Germany and will so remain: The German people as a whole—from East to West and now from the South up to this city of Berlin—will see to that!" He expressed his own happiness that he had been chosen by Providence to bring about this great union of the German people: "the land which had been the unhappiest was now the happiest."*²

¹ *Reichspost*, 16 Mar. 1938.

² *V.B.*, 18 Mar. 1938.

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On 18 March 1938 Hitler addressed the Reichstag in order to give his report (Bericht) of events "the importance of which you all recognize". He referred to his survey of five years of National Socialist achievement given to the Reichstag on 20 February 1938; in that speech he had amongst other political problems dealt with that question "which in its gravity could be ignored only by certain European ignoramuses". Hitler then spoke of the rise of the principle of nationalities: a number of peoples by the turn of the century had succeeded in giving expression to their national unity through the formation of a nation State. Other peoples carried this ideal through the Great War as the decisive factor which determined their action until it reached fulfilment. The sole people in Europe to whom fate had denied this most natural of all rights was the German people. The differences amongst the German tribes, religious discussion, dynastic egoism had prevented constitutional unity; the World War only increased the division and bade fair to separate parts of the people from the motherland for all time. "In the place of the 'self-determination of peoples' proclaimed by President Wilson came the most brutal national oppression of many millions of German fellow-countrymen. Rights which were granted as a matter of course to the most primitive of tribes in the colonies were denied to an ancient civilized nation of our world under pretexts which were as untenable as they were insulting."

"I have already explained in my speech on 20 February that it is hardly possible to obtain a completely satisfactory regulation of the relations between peoples and territories in Europe: that is to say that it is not our view that it should be the aim of a national Government to realize on every side, whether through protests or through interventions, territorial claims which, though supported by the argument of national necessities,

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could yet in the end lead to no general national justice. The countless enclaves of peoples which are to be found in Europe make it in part simply impossible to find a frontier delimitation which will everywhere do equal justice to the interests alike of peoples and of States."

"But there are State constructions which are so obviously stamped with the character of conscious and willed national injustice that in the long run their preservation is only possible through the employment of the most brutal violence. Thus, for example, the formation of the new Austrian rump State was a measure which necessitated the naked violation of the right of self-determination of some 6½ millions of Germans. And this violation of right was admitted with cynical frankness. For the well-known inventors of the right of self-determination, of the independence and freedom of peoples, for the pious governesses of the world with their universal interests who otherwise profess themselves to be so deeply concerned for the maintenance of justice on this earth it meant nothing at all that through the Peace 'Diktats' the wishes of 6½ million human beings were throttled and that these millions were compelled to accept this rape of their right of self-determination and to suffer this unnatural separation from the great common motherland." When Austria decided to hold a plebiscite on the question of the *Anschluß* and over 95 per cent. voted in its favour, this free expression of opinion was forbidden out of hand by the apostles of the new International Law. And "the tragic element in the situation thus created was that the new State represented from the first a political construction which was completely incapable of living its own life. The economic distress was consequently ghastly, the yearly mortality figures rose to a terrifying height. In Vienna alone last

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year there were 10,000 births as against 24,000 deaths." That will not move democratic statesmen: their hearts have no feelings: they are completely unmoved when half a million men are butchered in Spain: I mention these facts only to establish quite dispassionately that, through the acts of violence of the authors of the "Peace-Diktats", upon millions of men there was passed a death sentence which gradually took effect: that is the result of the creation of this State which could not live. It is not surprising that there were men who supported this artificially created State—as rulers of the State they found it to their own interest to do so; neither is it surprising that the mass of nationally minded Austrians began to feel exasperation and bitterness against their oppressors and that a fanatical determination arose to set "the more sacred rights of the eternal life of the people in place of a régime of violence tricked out with lying democratic forms".

But an attempt on the part of these unfortunates to alter their lot necessarily led to an increase in terrorism. And thus in turn resistance and oppression were each increased in violence. "But he who has any knowledge of history cannot doubt that in the long run the tenacity (*Beharrlichkeit*) of the forces which maintain a people's individuality are generally stronger than the effect of any oppression."

On behalf of the small French population of the Saar a plebiscite had to be taken, but when it is a question of millions of Germans the attitude of the democracies is very different. "Here the fulfilment of the wish to return to their Fatherland is refused because inopportune for the democracies; even the bare hope for such a return is expressly branded as a crime. . . . But right must be right even where Germans are concerned, and can one wonder that, where this right is persistently

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refused, peoples should at last find themselves compelled to resort to self-help to secure their rights? Nations are a creation after the will of God and endure eternally, but the League of Nations is a highly doubtful construction of human incapacity, of human greed and self-interest. And one thing is certain: just as the nations have lived for countless millennia when there was no League of Nations, so the time will come when the League of Nations has long since ceased to be, but in spite of that the peoples will continue to exist through further millennia. The League will only have significance as a force making for liberty if it brings its morality into agreement with that higher morality which corresponds to a justice which is the same for all—and therefore is a superior form of justice.”

Even when Germany was prostrate in its hour of deepest distress the Austrians had wished for unity with the Reich; as Germany recovered, grew in strength, and was filled with a new national faith, so the longing of the Austrians for union grew. The mere instinct of self-preservation favoured the thought of union with a State which, despite all difficulties, seemed to be mastering its economic distress, while within the Reich exasperation at the persecution of those Germans who lived beyond its frontiers continually increased. “Germany has once more become a World Power. But what Power in the world in the long run could calmly stand by and see before its very door millions of the same people as those composing its own population suffering the cruellest ill-treatment? There are moments when it is impossible for a self-conscious people any longer to remain merely passive spectators!”

Hitler then gave an account of the interview with Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden which is almost identical with that translated on p. 1418.

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He then proceeded: "I begged Herr Schuschnigg to spare German Austria, the German Reich, and himself a situation which in the end must lead to most serious conflicts. With this end in view I proposed a way which might lead to a gradual internal lessening of tension and, as a consequence, to a gradual reconciliation not only between the Austrians themselves, but also between the two German States."

"I made it clear to Herr Schuschnigg, however, that this would be the last attempt so far as I was concerned and that I was determined in the event of the failure of this attempt to protect the rights of the German people in my homeland by those means which always from time immemorial on this earth alone remain when human judgement bars the way to the command of ordinary justice. For no people with any sense of honour¹ has as yet died on behalf of democratic forms, and least of all in those democracies where talk is loudest."

On 20 February in the Reichstag I stretched out the hand to Herr Schuschnigg: in his first answer to that appeal he rejected that gesture. The obligations which he had undertaken were only grudgingly fulfilled: the campaign of lies directed against Germany by the foreign Press was in part, we have discovered, inspired by Herr Schuschnigg's own Press Bureau. There can be no doubt that Herr Schuschnigg had determined to violate the agreement.

"On Tuesday 8 March the first statements reached me about a plan for a plebiscite. These statements appeared so fantastic and untrustworthy that they were regarded as mere rumours. Then on the evening of Wednesday through a truly astounding speech we were

¹ German: *kein anständiges Volk*. I think this implies my rendering in this passage.

informed of an attack¹ not only on the terms agreed upon between us but more than that—an attack upon the majority of the Austrian people.” *Hitler’s criticism of the plebiscite was then repeated (see p. 1419) and he proceeded:* “Those who should say ‘No’ would be marked men, while for those who said ‘Yes’ every opportunity was given to falsify the result of the voting; in other words: Herr Schuschnigg, who knew very well that he had behind him only the minority of the population, sought through an unexampled election fraud to create for himself the moral justification for an open violation of the obligations to which he had agreed. He wished to gain a mandate for a further and still more brutal oppression of the overwhelming majority of the German Austrian people.”

Such a breach of faith could only lead to a revolution which must have resulted in frightful bloodshed, for when after the infliction of such continuous wrong the glowing coals of passion burst into flame they can, experience proves it, be extinguished only in blood. “I was now determined to put an end to further oppression of my homeland. I therefore immediately took such steps as seemed necessary to avert from Austria the same fate as Spain had suffered. The ultimatum of which the world suddenly began to complain consisted simply of the determined assurance that Germany would not tolerate any further oppression of her German Austrian fellow-countrymen and at the same time of a warning not to enter on a path which must of necessity have led to bloodshed.”

“That this was the right attitude to adopt was proved by the fact that within three days the entire homeland hastened to meet me when I carried out the intervention

¹ German: *Attentat*: perhaps one should translate “a murderous attack”.

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which had now become unavoidable, while not a single shot was fired, not a single victim fell—a result which must, I imagine, have caused not a little regret to our international pacifists. If I had not answered the wish of the Austrian people and its new National Socialist Government, then conditions would most certainly have arisen which would later have still made it necessary for us to intervene.”

“I wished to spare this beautiful country endless misfortune and suffering. For when once hatred begins to burn, reason is clouded. There can then be no just weighing of guilt and its expiation. National exasperation, personal vengeance, and the lower instincts of egoistic passion unite in raising the torch of war and in their frenzy seek their victims without any thought of justice, without any consideration of the consequences.”

“Herr Schuschnigg perhaps did not think it possible that I could make up my mind to intervene. He and his adherents can thank the Lord God for my intervention. For in all probability it is only my resolution that has saved his life and that of ten thousand others—a life that after their complicity in the deaths of countless Austrian victims of the Movement they no longer deserve to live, but which the National Socialist State in its moderation, as sovereign victor, grants to them.”

“What prouder satisfaction in the world can there be for a man than to have led the folk of his own homeland into the greater community of his people! And you can all realize my feelings of happiness when I consider that it was no cemetery, no waste of ruins that I had to win for the German Reich, that I would give to the Reich an unravaged land and a delighted people. I have acted in the only way which could enable me to accept responsibility for what I have done as a German standing before the history of our people, before the past and the

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living witnesses of the community of our people, before the holy German Reich and before my beloved homeland. Behind this decision which I have taken stand now 75 million people and before it stands henceforth the German army."

"It is almost tragic that before an action which in its profoundest significance meant simply the removal of a tension in Central Europe which, as a permanent condition, had become intolerable our present-day democracies stand disconcerted in complete incomprehension. Their reactions were in part beyond understanding, in part insulting. A number of other States had, it is true, from the first declared that they were not concerned in the matter or had expressed their hearty approval. This was the case not only with most of the smaller European countries, but also with quite a number of large States. I will mention only the dignified and understanding attitude of Poland, the friendly and warm-hearted approval of Hungary, the declarations, inspired by hearty friendship, of Yugoslavia together with the assurances of sincere neutrality on the part of several other countries."

"I cannot, however, close the enumeration of friendly opinions without recording at greater length the attitude adopted by Fascist Italy. I felt it to be my duty to explain the reasons for my action in a letter to the leader of the great Fascist State who is united to me personally in ties of close friendship and to assure him in particular that after this event not only will the sentiments of Germany towards Italy undergo no change, but that, precisely as in the case of France, so with Italy Germany regards the present frontiers as permanently fixed (*als gegebene*)."

"I wish in this House to express to the great Italian statesman in the name of the German people and in my own name our warm thanks. We know what the attitude

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of Mussolini has meant for Germany in these days. If any strengthening of the relations between Italy and Germany were possible, they have been now so strengthened. From a community of interests, from a common outlook on the world (*weltanschaulichen*), for us Germans there has arisen a friendship which nothing can break. The country and the frontiers of this friend are for us inviolate. I repeat my words: I shall never forget this attitude of Mussolini, and the Italian people can rest assured that behind my word there stands the German nation!"

"Thus on this occasion, too, the axis which unites our two countries has proved of the highest service to the peace of the world. For Germany desires only peace. Germany desires to wrong no one, but Germany itself will in no circumstances suffer a wrong: Germany is ready to defend to the last at any time her honour and her freedom". . . .

Hitler then dissolved the Reichstag, fixed the election of the new Reichstag of Great Germany for 10 April 1938, and appealed for another four years of power to effect the internal unification of the newly won territories with the German Reich. He asked the German people to give him a Reichstag "with which under the gracious help of our God it will be possible to solve the great new problems which face us".

In his closing words he thanked all those who had played their part in the formation of "das neue deutsche Volksreich"—the new Reich of the German people, and continued: "As the last sacrifices which have rendered possible this unification of Germany there should at this moment arise before our gaze those numerous fighters who in the East Mark, which has now returned to the Reich, were the heralds who proclaimed their faith in the German unity which now is ours, who sealed their

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witness with their blood, who, as martyrs, with their last breath confessed that which henceforth for all of us shall be more sacred than ever before: One people, one Reich; Germany! Sieg Heil!"¹

Hitler began his election campaign by a speech in Königsberg on 25 March 1938. Here in East Prussia, a district which had formerly suffered under a feeling of being neglected and abandoned, he could most naturally count upon sympathy with his intervention in Austria. What can words like "independence" or "sovereignty" mean for a State of only six millions? What can a sovereignty mean which was originally granted by foreign Powers—enforced on a people by foreign Powers—and is maintained by the grace of foreign Powers? It was not out of any love for German Austria that the German people there was saddled with this so-called "sovereignty": it was simply the interests of foreign Powers which were to be served: "Germany was to be weakened! She was to be torn asunder so that she might remain powerless as in past times. That was the purpose of this 'sovereignty', that was the meaning of the veto on the *Anschluß*." And in the economic sphere: the consequences were distress, misery, and care. "And that is only what one might expect. To-day it is only under quite peculiar presuppositions that such small State formations can have a possibility of life." And under the mortgage of the War-collapse no economic life was possible. Above all how can a territory to-day be capable of having an economic life when the strength of the faith in the possibility of its own existence is lacking? The recovery in the economic life of the Reich followed a political rebirth, but in Austria such a political impulse was unthinkable. And in fact Austria did experience

¹ *F.Z.*, 20 Mar. 1938.

² *V.B.*, 20 Mar. 1938.

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this economic annihilation—the statistics prove it. Abroad no one cared a whit that in this beautiful country hundreds of thousands died simply from distress and misery: the apostles of humanity remained unmoved.

This economic distress could be relieved only if the strength of a great people and its economic life stood behind Austria; that was the only means whereby a concentration of forces could be effected. Even the German Reich is too small: it needs a complement of colonies: how should a State which was but the size of a single province succeed? But far greater than political and economic sufferings was the bitter consciousness of being deprived of the right of self-determination.¹ . . . "In Germany to-day we enjoy the consciousness of belonging to a community, a consciousness which is far stronger than that created by political or economic interests. That community is conditioned by the fact of a blood-relationship.² Man to-day refuses any longer to be separated from the life of his people (*Volkstum*); to that he clings with a resolute affection. He will bear extreme distress and misery, but he desires to remain with his people." It is this noble passion which alone can raise man above thoughts of gain and profit. "Blood binds more firmly than Business."

And across the frontiers of Austria was the German Reich, and the wish grew ever stronger to be united with the great kindred people. This wish found its most powerful expression in the National Socialist Movement and idea. "This National Socialist idea goes far beyond the bounds of a small Germany. True, we do not desire to make proselytes in foreign countries, but no one can

¹ See p. 1428. Here "as a matter of course this right is granted to *all peoples* on the earth".

² A paraphrase: German: *die blutmäßig bedingt ist*.

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prevent National Socialist doctrine from becoming the political faith of all Germans!" That faith at least restores community of spirit. And persecution only raises that faith to fanaticism: witness the hundreds of thousands who in Austria at the time of the Counter-Reformation for the sake of their faith became either martyrs or exiles.

So the symbol of the swastika—a new symbol not burdened with the legacy of the past—spread wherever there were Germans: "in it every German had the certainty: we overcome the past, we open up the way to a great common German future." In Austria this National Socialist faith became the source of bitterest persecution and torture: it was sought to force upon this people a new Counter-Reformation. Once more the stream of exiles flowed from the country: tens upon tens of thousands left their homeland and came as emigrants into Germany because they refused to surrender their political faith. And faith awoke opposition at the hands of "an infinitesimal, a ridiculously small minority". The only question was: when will the hour which gives us freedom strike?

"That is what all these international apostles of truth should have seen who to-day lie about an act of violence and refuse to see the facts because they do not suit their book. The world and the conscience of the world had no understanding for the facts." A foreign paper asks: "Why could I not have done this 'peaceably'? The world would have been ready to grant us all we wanted?" We know better: "the conscience of the world, the justice of the world shone forth upon us for the first time from the Peace Treaties. When has more shameless violence been done to peoples than in the period when men began to talk about 'world-conscience' and 'world-justice'? When have economic territorial unities been

torn apart with less regard to conscience than since the day when a 'League of Nations' was established with the professed aim of serving the interests of peoples?" . . . How often have I made representations, have warned and counselled—but all to no effect. "I should only rejoice if now—as perhaps may be deduced from the remarks in this English newspaper—there should be a change of mind. We still have a few injustices to complain of : perhaps now they may be settled by agreement! Up to the present our complaints fell on ears that were stone deaf." The position in Austria grew steadily worse "and then one day there came the hour when one had to make a decision before one's conscience, before one's own people, and before an eternal God Who had created the peoples. And a fortnight ago I made that decision, and it was the only possible decision. For when men are deaf to every behest of justice, then the individual must assert his rights himself. Then he must turn to that ancient creed: Help yourself and then God will help you. And God has helped us!"

For in Austria "since the time when the National Socialist Movement set itself by legal means to win power, the guardians of democracy have themselves deserted the path of legality and have set up a naked tyrannical dictatorship—a real dictatorship, for there was no majority of the people behind it". When abroad the Government of Germany is represented as a dictatorship I say: "I stand in the midst of my people; but where stood the men who as champions of the democratic cause and of democratic ideas ill-treated and oppressed the people in Austria? For many years past they have not dared to appeal to the people. I do not believe that there is any State whose Government is so securely founded as our own but which yet has so often taken its way to the people and allowed the people to

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confirm its mandate." In Austria any appeal to the people would have overthrown the Government—this tyrannous group which had promulgated a new Constitution and then withdrawn from the people every chance of expressing a protest, of passing judgement. "The name of the managing director¹ of this small ruling clique was Schuschnigg." During the course of this winter I realized that there must be "either an ordered solution of this question or a disordered revolutionary outburst, and the latter I wished to avoid". *Hitler then gave an account of his interview with Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden*: "I said to him: 'Herr Schuschnigg, you are oppressing a country. You have no right to do so. This country is my homeland as much as it is yours. How comes it that you are continually doing violence to it? I am ready to stand with you before the people at an election. Both of us will stand as candidates. The people shall decide.'² He objected that that was impossible on constitutional grounds. But I warned him to seek a peaceful way of lessening the tension, as otherwise no one could guarantee that a people's tortured soul would not cry aloud. And besides I could not let there be any doubt that on the frontiers of Germany no more fellow-countrymen could be shot."

¹ German: *Sachwalter*: bitterly contemptuous; I am not sure of the English rendering.

² In the course of an interview with Sir Neville Henderson on 3 Mar. 1938 Hitler spoke of a vote in Austria. "I asked him if he meant a plebiscite—a suggestion which had long been canvassed in the German Press. Hitler's answer was that he demanded that 'the just interests of the German Austrians should be secured and an end made to oppression by a process of peaceful evolution'. In other words, he begged the question with a vague reply. He did not intend, as he proved later, to tolerate a plebiscite unless it was held under his own direct auspices." Sir Neville Henderson, *The Failure of a Mission. Berlin 1937-1939*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1940, p. 117.

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"And I tried to make clear to him in all seriousness that this was the last way which perhaps might lead to a peaceful solution of this crisis. I left him in no doubt that, if this way should fail, in one way or another matters would not end there. I begged him to have no doubt that I was serious in my intention to place the help of the Reich at the service of my oppressed fellow-countrymen and not to doubt my resolution if, through deserting this way, a crisis should arise. He did not believe the seriousness of my assurances and for this reason, one may suppose, he broke the agreement."

"To-day we have the proofs of that. We have found the letters in which on 19 February—one day before my speech in the Reichstag—he writes that on his part the whole affair would be purely a tactical move in order to gain time so that he could wait until the situation abroad should be more favourable. He therefore counted on being able at a more propitious hour to stir up foreign countries against Germany. In order to give a moral foundation to his scheme this man then invented this ridiculous comedy of a plebiscite on which the clearest light is thrown by the fact that we were able to confiscate broad-sheets and placards in which eight days before the plebiscite the figures of the voting were published! It was an unheard-of fraud in a country in which for many years there had been no election, where no one could vote. It was clear that if this new fraud should be a success, then the world, cold as ice, would have declared: 'Now this régime is legitimated!'"

"And against this the German people in Austria at last began to rise; it turned against its persecutors. It revolted. And now I had to intervene in its behalf. And so I gave the order to answer the wish of this people: I let the forces march!"

And I did this firstly in order to show the world

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that I was now in bitter earnest, that the time for any further oppression of Germany was past.

Secondly: there was the danger of revenge. "I admit openly that at times, in view of the terrible persecutions, the thought might even come to one that it was only right if the people did at last wreak its vengeance on its torturers; but in the end I decided to prevent that. For I saw one thing: amongst our opponents there are men who are so depraved that they must be counted as lost to the community of the German people, but on the other hand there are many blinded and mad folk who have only run with the rest. Perhaps their eyes have been thoroughly opened. And above all, who can guarantee that, when once madness has begun, private passions will not begin to rage as well, that private scores will not be settled under the watchword (*Motto*) of a political act?" And thirdly just as it had been my greatest pride that the Revolution in Germany should be carried through with the least possible sacrifice, so I wanted the work of unification not to be stained with unnecessary suffering, with unnecessary bloodshed. Many had deserved their fate: they did not even give to patriots whose only crime was to love their country more than anything else "an honourable bullet": they hanged them: 13 were hanged in Vienna alone: over 400 murdered, two and a half thousand shot—such is the tale of "the victims of this lowest, basest, worst oppression of modern times in our people".

And yet I am persuaded that it was right to spare this beautiful land the horrors of a civil war. "We will be quit of those of our opponents who are incurable through the normal means of our State. Part of them will without our help go where all the European 'worthies' of this stamp have assembled of recent years. And we are glad that some of them have gone already. I can but hope

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and expect that the rest of the world which feels so deep a sympathy with these criminals will be at least magnanimous enough to turn this pity into practical assistance. On our side we are quite prepared to put all these criminals aboard luxury ships and let these countries do with them what they will. We have in the overwhelming joy of these days forgotten all desire for vengeance." . . .

I wanted to spare this country the horrors of Spain and then I *had* to help: I had been summoned. I could not have borne the responsibility before the history of Germany if I had not given the order to march.

"Certain foreign newspapers have said that we fell on Austria with brutal methods: I can only say: even in death they cannot stop lying. I have in the course of my political battle won much love from my people, but when in these last days I crossed the former frontier of the Reich there met me such a stream of love that I have never experienced a greater. Not as tyrants have we come but as liberators: an entire people rejoiced."

And we must remember that this triumph is due to the strength of the National Socialist idea: without that it could never have happened. "It was wonderful in these days to see how, like the Phoenix, our Movement rose again—the Movement which long ago had been thought to be dead—how in a few hours it took possession of the whole State, how all these care-worn faces of National Socialists were now radiant with happiness, how they took the authority of the State into their hands and how in a few hours they became the representatives of this State. *That* is what the power of the idea achieved." It was this that lent wings to our army on the march. "Here not brutal violence, but our Swastika has conquered. As these soldiers marched into Austria, I lived again a song of my youth. I have in days past sung it so often with faith in my heart, this proud battle-song:

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"The people arises, the storm breaks loose.' And it was in truth the uprising of a people, and the breaking loose of the storm. Under the force of this impression I decided not to wait until 10 April but to effect the unification forthwith." I have done this because I know the whole people will support this act of mine. You may ask: then why do you want a vote? This is a solemn act which we wish to make a part of German history. The people must make its profession of faith. I am a better democrat than so many of the democrats around us. "The people in Austria must have the opportunity of arising and I wish to see whether it will not choose the son of its homeland and the leader of the German nation." The people shall make its profession of faith for all time. "For we National Socialists swear that, as it was in the past, so to-day: That which we once possess we surrender—never! Where our banner has once been planted in the earth there before it stands a living wall of Germans!"

A miracle has been wrought for us in a few days. 84,000 square kilometres and 6·8 millions of people have been won. "That is a mighty, a mighty success. That Germany must know and feel: that the German nation must remember for all time. It shall this time be a holy election: all Germany must step forward and profess its faith! . . . Great Germany shall have its first Reichstag."

The peroration was highly rhetorical: a few sentences may be translated:

"That which has happened in these last weeks is the result of the triumph of an idea, a triumph of will, but also a triumph of endurance and tenacity, and, above all, it is the result of the miracle of faith: for only faith has availed to move these mountains. I once went forth with faith in the German people and began this vast fight. With faith in me first thousands, then hundreds

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of thousands, and at last millions have followed after me. With faith in Germany and in this idea millions of our fellow-countrymen in the New Ostmark in the south of our Reich have held their banners high and have remained loyal to the Reich and to the life of the German people. And now I have faith in this 10 April. I am convinced that on this day for the first time in history in very truth all Germany will be on the march." . . .

"And on this day I shall be the Leader of the greatest army in the history of the world; for when on this 10 April I cast my voting-paper into the urn then I shall know that behind me come 50 millions and they all know only my watchword: One People and one Reich—Deutschland!"¹

On 26 March 1938 Hitler spoke in Leipzig. He contrasted the economic life of the Reich with that of Austria: in the Reich, the concentration of the economic possibilities of a great people; in Austria, a splitting up of energies resulting in powerlessness. Within the Reich behind the individual stand the potentialities of a great people, and that increases the spirit of enterprise, it increases daring and joy in responsibility, it leads to achievement. In Austria the death of a people, where children began to fail and therefore the capacity for achievement failed. "The care of those who shall come after is the ultimate meaning of progress. A people without descendants creates no longer. . . . I have thought of nothing but to make this Reich after its collapse great again and strong and powerful—but I have also never forgotten my homeland and I have longed for the hour when I could bring this homeland back into the Reich." Hitler then renewed his attack upon Schuschnigg: the call for help of the new Government: "and I have helped: in three days an ideal has filled a State. The 12th of March

¹ *V.B.*, 27 Mar. 1938.

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was to have been the day of dupery: it became the day of liberation." Greater Germany (*das große Deutschland*) on 10 April would perform its first solemn act as a State.¹

On 28. March 1938 Hitler spoke in the Sportpalast, Berlin, on the same lines. "The small country of Austria has more murdered National Socialists than the whole of Germany." *There is the same attack upon the "traitor" Schuschnigg:* "I have talked good German with him! He thought that he could confound the Germany of to-day with the Germany of the past. It was the worst mistake of his life. . . . A miracle has happened in the history of Germany: In three days a people rises, in two days it breaks in pieces a régime and in one day it greets its liberator. That is the greatest victory of an idea. On the day when this man's trick should have taken place he and his State were no longer there! After the Peace Treaties Austria had possessed neither a mission nor an economic basis for her future existence. Those who under the watchword 'Freedom for the peoples' had broken States in pieces had thereby doomed ten millions to a loss of freedom."

There were many representatives present of Auslandsdeutschtum and to them Hitler addressed himself: "This new German ideal cannot be confined within limits: it cannot be measured out in doses. Formerly in Germany this ideal, starting from a tiny cell, spread its waves abroad and it has ever brought new folk under its spell. Who can wonder that this ideal flies far over the frontiers of a Reich, a State construction—that this ideal casts its spell upon Germans wherever they may be?" . . . What

¹ *V.B.*, 28 Mar. 1938.

² Cf. the speech at Hamburg on the following day: "An idea cannot be imprisoned; no frontiers can be raised against it. States can be torn apart, but the community of race can never be cast off." *The Times*, 30 Mar. 1938.

is more natural than that suddenly the memory of their own birth in Austria should with irresistible force come to life within this people, that the whole people should now recognize its mission, that its only wish should now be to return to the land whence it came?"

Hitler closed his speech with the words: "I have performed my duty. And now I ask that every German man and every German woman on this 10 April shall likewise play their part. On 13 March Great Germany was created and on 10 April that creation will be confirmed."¹

From the English reports of the speech one may add from Hitler's account of the Berchtesgaden interview: "Had I not the right to say to him 'Listen to me. You are sowing the wind and one day you will reap the whirlwind. Do not deceive yourself. The time is past when you can hope to beat these men down with murder and death!'"

"I gave to this man the chance of his life to make good the wrongs he had done. He chose another way and thus brought his fate on his own head."²

On 29 March 1938 Hitler spoke in Hamburg. He delivered a violent attack upon the democracies which talked of the right of peoples to self-determination but "in the face of the most bloody oppression and murderous brutality inflicted on Germans conscious of their nation and their blood veiled themselves in silence. For us such a democracy is the personification of lying, of falsehood, of indecency. It is the summit of human hypocrisy." Of Schuschnigg Hitler said: "He took my decency and my wish to avoid bloodshed for weakness, but I was

¹ There are only summaries of this speech in the Press. I have translated from the reports in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 29 Mar. 1938, *V.B.*, 30 Mar. 1938, and *F.Z.*, 30 Mar. 1938. Cf. the report in *The Times*, 29 Mar. 1938.

² *Daily Telegraph*, 29 Mar. 1938.

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determined to answer the call of the German brothers in Austria and to complete their liberation."¹

*On 30 March 1938 Hitler spoke in Cologne. "What would Cologne be," he asked, "if it had no Greater Germany behind it? This great stream—the Rhine—is nothing if not German. Providence has blessed me in allowing me to live at such a time. Had it not been for Germany's distress I should probably have become a man who built houses. Formerly I could not speak, but the people's need taught me to speak. . . . God has created us not that we should fade away but that we should maintain ourselves. And the end of it all is the unity of the Austrian and German people." In four days he with his soldiers had made world-history. He closed the speech with the words: "The dice are cast: may Germans in time to come inscribe in their Book of Honour: 'A soldier of the Great War raised up Germany once more and twenty years later the entire nation confirmed his work.'"*²

On 31 March Hitler spoke in Frankfurt. He said: "I can count myself amongst those who have not remained mere theorists. What I have demanded and proclaimed in theory that I have also achieved and carried through. How often have I declared in this hall my determination to free the German people from the fetters of the shameless Treaty of Versailles! For five years I have been in power and in five years I have torn page after page of this Treaty from its binding—not as violator of justice but as the restorer of justice: not in breach of a treaty

¹ There is only a very brief summary of this speech. I translate from *F.Z.*, 31 Mar. 1938.

² There are only very brief summaries of this speech in the Press: the above is a conflation of the reports in *V.B.*, 1 Apr. 1938 and the *Daily Telegraph*, 31 Mar. 1938.

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but as one who refuses to recognize a godless 'Diktat' as a holy treaty. A few days ago Fate chose me to tear out another of these pages. . . . In three days we have captured a State through the force of an idea."¹

To the reports of the speech in the German Press there may be added from "The Times": "We are reproached with carrying on propaganda. No, National Socialism is to us such a dear, holy German cause that we feel inclined to pray that God may keep it primarily for our own people. Let the other nations foster their own ideals."²

*On 1 April Hitler spoke in Stuttgart. In this speech he announced that a letter had now been found addressed by Schuschnigg to one of his provincial governors in which he said that nothing remained for him save apparently to comply with the demands of this man [Hitler], but that he did this only to gain time until the position abroad was different;*³ then he was determined to defend himself. "We knew that Herr Schuschnigg thought that, for he thought too loud." "But," said Hitler, "I acted too quickly for him. On Wednesday Schuschnigg made his plan known, and it should have been executed on Sunday. But on Friday Schuschnigg was overthrown."

"We live in a world in which he who has an entire people behind him is called a dictator and he who has an entire people against him can pose as a democrat. . . . I know that on 10 April I shall be the richest man in the world. I shall possess the highest thing which can be granted to a man on this earth—an entire people!"⁴

¹ A short summary of the speech in *F.Z.*, 2 Apr. 1938.

² *The Times*, 1 Apr. 1938.

³ German: *bis das Ausland anders eingestellt sei.*

⁴ This translation is a conflation of the brief summaries of the speech given in the *Daily Telegraph*, 2 Apr. 1938, *Reichspost*, 3 Apr. 1938, and *V.B.*, 3 Apr. 1938.

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The electoral campaign within the old Reich was brought to a close by a speech delivered in Munich on 2 April 1938. I have no report of this speech, but in it Hitler, speaking of the Anschluß, said: "It is not I who have wrought this deed: it was willed by seventy-five millions."¹

Hitler's first speech in Austria was delivered at Graz on 3 April 1938. "I am so happy," he said, "to be here at this time, for a dream of my youth and the longing of my life are fulfilled. . . It is not formalities which count: above everything else the individual German must rise supreme as the eternal substance of our people. . . . After the World War I resolved to build up Germany once again on the strength of the masses, on the millions of the German people. I went back to those from whom I had come. I went back to my comrades—straight back to the people. It was there that I began to teach, there that at that time I began to win men to a new idea, the idea of an eternal national and social ideal—to subordinate one's own interests to the necessary interests of the whole society—an idea which constrains everyone to take his stand on behalf of this community and if need be to throw his own life into the scale." He spoke of the few incurables who had never understood the happiness of belonging to this great, this inspiring community: "all they possess they can leave to their children as an inheritance—save only their narrowness of mind!" Once more the German can carry his head high in the conviction that now no Power in the world can any longer subdue us to its will. Hitler repeated his confession of faith: "I am a German, I believe in this Germany of mine, I believe in my people, and I will not suffer that any alien force shall ever set

¹ See *Die Reden des Führers nach der Machtübernahme. Eine Bibliographie*, Berlin, Eher, 1939, p. 160.

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limits to this my faith. . . . There can never be any true independence under foreign protection or at the wish of the foreigner: an independence which must be protected by the foreigner there is not and there cannot be. I would rather go to ruin together with my people than accept such an independence." The rulers of Austria had been but "the docile serfs of the will of the foreigner, seeking to uphold with violence and with terrorism an independence which had been forced upon the country against the will of the people".

In his description of his interview with Schuschnigg he added to former accounts the statement that "he had said quite definitely that as soon as the Chancellor gave any fresh order for Germans to be shot on account of their beliefs (Gesinnung) at that moment German regiments would cross the frontier".

*After saying that "German Austria had now found its true mission—to be the bulwark and support of the German Reich, the East Mark of the Germans," Hitler acknowledged the friendly and sympathetic attitude of Italy: "I have already laid stress upon the fact that we shall never forget this, and a German's word holds good unconditionally (bedingungslos). Yugoslavia and Hungary have adopted the same attitude; we are fortunate in possessing four frontiers which relieve us from the anxiety of having to protect them with military force."*¹

He closed the speech with the words: "for the first time in the history of our people a Reich has been built in accordance with the will of the people itself. I do not desire to be in the future anything other than what I have been in the past: the monitor of my people, the teacher of my people, the leader of my people. And for

¹ The comment of the *Daily Telegraph*, 5 Apr. 1938, on this passage was: "Since the fourth frontier is presumably that of Switzerland, his words are clearly aimed at Czechoslovakia."

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the future I wish to know only one behest, that to which I have been in duty bound since my youth—Germany!”¹

*On 4 April 1938 Hitler spoke in Klagenfurt. He said: “He who believes in God must confess that if the fate of peoples is changed in three days then that is a judgement of God. This plebiscite signifies the creation of Great Germany: now, German people, hold this Great Germany fast in your fist and never let it be wrested from you.”*²

On 5 April 1938 Hitler spoke in Innsbruck. He said that there had never been any separate mission for Austria: there could never be such a separate mission for any German country. Only one mission could be recognized: to form a single people and to live in a single Reich. . . . “How could folk be so infatuated as to think that a whole people could remain blind to the rise of Germany and on the other hand how could they imagine that I should be blind or deaf to the sufferings of this land? What is more natural than that a man should love his great fatherland above all else in the world yet cannot forget the country from which he himself came? Only one who himself possesses no character can presume such lack of character in another that he should break his oath where the fate of his own homeland is at stake. I should not deserve the love, the confidence, and the loyalty of so many Germans of our old Reich if I myself should have no loyalty and love for my homeland. I have shared all the sufferings which my homeland had to endure.” The speech closed with the words: On 10 April “the whole world will know: on

¹ *Reichspost*, 4 Apr. 1938.

² A very brief summary of the speech is given in *Reichspost*, 5 Apr. 1938.

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13 March a man unified a people—a month later the people approved the man”.¹

“My fairest work is that I have joined this country, my homeland, to the German fatherland and fairer still that I could restore seven million people to the Reich.”²

To the report of the speech given in the German Press there may be added from the “Manchester Guardian”: “My success may not be approved abroad, but this leaves me unmoved. I can appeal to my people when I wish to consult them and do not have to glue Parliamentary majorities together as each case arises.”³

On 6 April Hitler spoke in Salzburg. He said: “I believe that the period in which I lead Germany is an historic period of German greatness. I believe that posterity and the history of Germany will one day confirm the fact that in the period in which I led the State I wrought the highest profit for the German people. But he who has this conviction of himself must wish that his homeland should have its share in the same blessings. I was convinced that I should lead this country within the circle of the German Reich better than Herr Schuschnigg or anyone else. That is not presumption on my part, for when anyone has raised a State of 68 millions in five years to the height which Germany has reached to-day then such a man is entitled to believe that he himself can also solve a problem such as this. I had this conviction, and what makes me specially glad at heart is that millions of my fellow-countrymen shared that conviction.”

“I see in Herr Schuschnigg one of those forces who themselves wish to create evil, but by the dispensation

¹ Only a short summary of the speech in *F.Z.*, 7 Apr. 1938.

² *Die Reden des Führers nach der Machtübernahme. Eine Bibliographie*, Berlin, Eher, 1939, p. 161.

³ *M.G.*, 6 Apr. 1938.

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of Providence are yet ordained at the last to work for good. I felt in my heart the necessity to free the former Austrian army (*Bundesheer*) as quickly as possible from what, in my eyes, was its intolerable position and to declare that it formed a part of the German army. That which still to-day wears a different uniform is yet one in blood, and in a few years even in its uniform will have been merged in a unity which nothing will be able to sever. It was an irrevocable decision that cannot be altered. When German soldiers are on the march their commission cannot be withdrawn. We all must be grateful to Providence and to our Lord God. He has granted to us success in that for which formerly generations fought and for which countless numbers of the best Germans had to sacrifice their lives. The Reich has grown richer and greater. There is no more glorious country, no fairer Reich than our Germany."

"Before our eyes we have a splendid goal—to deepen ever more and more the community of the people and in the economic sphere to build this country into the mighty cycle of our great national economic life—a marvellous goal and I am so happy that I can still create and work."

"A few months more and through this land there will pass the rhythm of new creation and new work, and after a few years the thought of Social Democracy and Communism will sound like an evil phantom of the past: they will raise but a laugh". . . .

"On 10 April the whole German people will make its greatest historical profession of faith. Our children and children's children must have no cause to be ashamed of their ancestors."¹

On 7 April Hitler spoke at Linz, his birthplace: the opening of the speech was autobiographical: from Linz to

¹ *Reichspost*, 7 Apr. 1938.

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Vienna, and then the departure from the Austrian capital: "I had to go out into the Reich, the land of my dreams and of my longing." *Hitler spoke of* Bismarck's work in uniting the separatist German tribes and States; and "probably it was only a South German who could effect the second unification, for he must want to lead back into the great Reich that part which in the course of our history had lost its connexion with the Reich". He himself had been able to fulfil his mission only through the stern education which he had received as a German soldier. "The six years which I spent as a German soldier were the foundation for my hardness, my resolution, my perseverance. Everything which today I have won of virtue and of worth was given to me in the unique, the incomparable, old German army." At the time of the collapse he had never lost his faith in the German people. In the battles of the Great War and later in the years of political struggle he had come to know the German people as none of his predecessors had done. "They only looked down upon the people from above, I saw the people from within. I came from this people and I lived in it. I know the German people and I know my homeland. In neither of them have I been disappointed. The German people within the former frontiers of the Reich has fulfilled what I thought I could expect of them. My homeland has arisen when the call rang out and has turned to the place whither the voice of the blood and of the people's life called it. German Austria has not come to the Reich by compulsion through an act of violence, the heart longed for the community of the German people with a passion that would not be denied". . . .

"An iron will has now created this Reich, and steel and iron will defend it against every man. . . . On 10 April submit yourselves not to any alien force but to the

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eternal greatness of your own people! Our swastika is the symbol of no single country. It is not Prussia which has conquered, not Bavaria, not Württemberg or Austria: it is the German people which at last has conquered the German States."¹

On 9 April 1938 Hitler closed the electoral campaign by a visit to Vienna. To the Burgomaster of the city he said: "Be assured that this city is in my eyes a pearl. I will bring it into that setting which is worthy of this pearl and I will entrust it to the care of the whole German Reich, the whole German nation." In his final speech Hitler said: "I desire particularly to address those who in this hour do not feel that they can give their approval and confidence to the new Germany or still less to me or who think that they must stand apart in the face of this truly great world-historical decision. I want to speak as a man who is himself completely guiltless of all that which Germany has suffered in the past." He had but done his duty as a soldier: he had never delivered speeches; he had been no politician: he had only obeyed orders as did millions of others. "And then after the War when I found my native land again, divided, powerless, defenceless, deserted by all then I, the nameless soldier, formed the decision: after I had obeyed all these years—I would speak, I would tell of that which alone could lead to a resurrection of Germany."

"For every people there is only one help possible: the help which lies in itself. But for that there is a condition:

¹ *F.Z.*, 8 Apr. 1938. It was at this demonstration that Forster, the National Socialist *Gauleiter* of Danzig, read a letter written by Hitler from Landsberg on 24 Oct. 1924 to Commandant Hollitscher of the *Vaterländischer Schutzbund* in Upper Austria, in which he said that he had "but one longing—that the day might come when my former homeland might be included within the garland of the German States of a common Great Germany".

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the people must come together into a single closely united body, for only from such a unity can come the strength to win salvation."

Hitler then sketched the progress of Germany in the recent years: "I have not relied upon Geneva or Moscow, but on one thing alone, on my people, on Germany."

"Others have built castles in the clouds, but we build for our German folk an earthly but a decent life." In National Socialism the principle has been realized that everyone carries the Marshal's baton in his knapsack.

Austria has been a German land for centuries: they of the East Mark have been Germany's shield-bearers. Austria cannot live without the Reich: the conditions for a vigorous economic life are lacking: that is proved by statistics—Austria has the lowest birth-rate, the highest death-rate. Austria did not want to be separated from the Reich. After the collapse of 1918 Austria desired to return to the Reich forthwith, but the democracies prevented that return. And Austria was Hitler's own homeland—that was title enough for him to stand before them. "But if that will not suffice, I stand here because I pride myself that I can do more than Herr Schuschnigg!"

"I believe that it was God's will to send a boy from here into the Reich, to let him grow up, to raise him to be the leader of the nation so as to enable him to lead back his homeland into the Reich."

"There is a higher ordering and we all are nothing else than its agents. When on 9 March Herr Schuschnigg broke his agreement then in that second I felt that now the call of Providence had come to me. And that which then took place in three days was only conceivable as the fulfilment of the wish and the will of this Providence."

"In three days the Lord has smitten them! . . . And

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to me the grace was given on the day of the betrayal to be able to unite my homeland with the Reich!" . . .

"I would now give thanks to Him who let me return to my homeland in order that I might now lead it into my German Reich! To-morrow may every German recognize the hour and measure its import and bow in humility before the Almighty who in a few weeks has wrought a miracle upon us!"¹

The Result of the Poll

Yes: 48,799,269 out of 49,646,950 voters=99.08 per cent.

Yes: in Austria 99.75 per cent.

No: 452,180 (=0.91 per cent.).

*Hitler, on learning the result of the poll, said that it had exceeded all his expectations. This historic confirmation of the unification of Austria with the Reich meant the completest justification of all his action. "For me this is the proudest hour of my life."*²

*In his speech on May Day 1938 Hitler said that the motto "Never again war!" was not enough. The watchword must be "Never again Civil war! Never again Class war! Never again domestic strife and discord."*³

In May 1938 Hitler visited Rome and while there addressed the Germans living in the city (4 May 1938). He said that the traits of character which marked National Socialist Germany were closely akin to those of the country whose guests they were. He thanked them for their loyalty, shown especially in recent weeks, to the new Germany. "I expected nothing else of you: for

¹ The assembled tens of thousands then sang the hymn *Wir treten zum Beten vor Gott den Gerechten*. *Reichspost*, 10 Apr. 1938. I have translated these extracts from this report of the speech. There is more in the *Observer* for 10 Apr. 1938.

² *Reichspost*, 11 Apr. 1938.

³ *F.Z.*, 2 May 1938.

a citizen of the Reich who has a strong character can be nothing else than a National Socialist. The farther you are from the homeland the more glowing is your devotion and the more loyally do you profess your faith in that *Weltanschauung* which has made of your homeland once so depressed, shamed, and scorned a Reich of honour and prestige—because a Reich of character.”¹

*In his reply to the toast of his health proposed by King Victor Emanuel on the evening of 4 May 1938 Hitler said that the warmth of the reception with which he had been greeted in Italy was no merely external expression of friendliness shown to a guest: “it was the proof of the firm and intimate association of our two peoples alike in their views and aims. I am pleased to be able to regard myself as the interpreter of my own people which is filled with frank sympathy and deep friendship towards your Majesty and the Italian people. . . . The overwhelming reception which I have experienced in this country is evidence that Fascist Italy feels that in National Socialist Germany it has a loyal and steadfast friend. This mutual friendship is not only a guarantee for the security of both peoples, it remains also a strong pledge for the maintenance of general peace.”*²

In his reply to Mussolini's speech at the State banquet given on 7 May 1938 Hitler said:

“Duce, with deep emotion I thank you for the moving words which you have addressed to me in the name both of the Italian Government and of the Italian people. I am happy to be here in Rome in which the powerful manifestations of the young Fascist Italy are united with the evidences of its incomparably venerable past.”

¹ F.Z., 6 May 1938. For Hitler's visit to Italy see *Hitler in Italien. Herausgegeben von Heinrich Hoffmann, Reichsbildberichterstatter der NSDAP. Geleitwort: Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reichspressechef.* Munich, Verlag Heinrich Hoffmann, 1938 (126 Bilder).

² F.Z., 6 May 1938.

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"Since the moment when I first set foot on Italian soil I have been conscious everywhere of an atmosphere of friendship and sympathy which fills me with profound pleasure. With the same heartfelt emotion the German people last autumn greeted in your person the creator of Fascist Italy, the founder of a new Imperium and at the same time also the great friend of Germany."

"The National Socialist Movement and the Fascist Revolution have created two new powerful States which to-day in a world of unrest and disintegration stand as creations of order and healthy progress. Germany and Italy have thus like interests and through sharing in a common *Weltanschauung* are closely bound together. In this way there has been created in Europe a bloc of 120,000,000 people who are determined to safeguard their eternal vital rights and to defend themselves against all those forces which might venture to oppose their natural development."

"Out of this fight against a world which rejects and refuses to understand their claims, a fight which Germany and Italy have had to wage shoulder to shoulder, there has gradually grown up a warm friendship between the two peoples. This friendship has proved its strength during the events of the last few years. These events have, further, shown to the world that in one way or another account must be taken of those justified interests which are of vital import to great nations. It is therefore only natural that our two peoples should in the future continue to build up and deepen in constant co-operation this friendship which in recent years has ever proved of increasing value."

"Duce, last autumn on the Maifeld in Berlin, you proclaimed a principle which, you said, as the moral law was sacred both for yourself and for Fascist Italy:

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'Speak plainly and frankly, and if you have a friend, march with him right to the end.'"

"In the name of National Socialist Germany I, too, profess my allegiance to this law. To-day I wish to give you the following answer:"

"Two millennia have now passed since Romans and Germans met for the first time in history so far as that history is known to us. Standing here, on this the most venerable soil in our human history, I feel the tragedy of a destiny which formerly failed to draw clear frontier lines between these two highly gifted, valuable races. The consequence of that failure was untold suffering for many generations. Now to-day after nearly two thousand years, thanks to your historic activity, Benito Mussolini, the Roman State arises from remote traditions to new life, and north of you there arose, formed out of numerous tribes, a new Germanic Reich. Now that we have become immediate neighbours, taught by the experience of two millennia, we both wish to recognize that natural frontier which Providence and history have clearly drawn for our two peoples. That frontier will then render possible the happiness of a permanent co-operation peacefully secured through the definite separation of the living-spaces (*Lebensräume*) of the two nations, but it will also serve as a bridge for mutual help and support. It is my unalterable will and my bequest to the German people that it shall accordingly regard the frontier of the Alps, raised by Nature between us both, as for ever inviolable. I know that then through this delimitation a great and prosperous future will result both for Rome and Germany."

"Duce, just as you and your people maintained your friendship with Germany in days of crisis, so I and my people will show the like friendship towards Italy in times of difficulty."

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"The stupendous impressions I have just received of the youthful strength, the will to work, and the proud spirit of the new Italy will remain for me an imperishable memory. Unforgettable, too, was the sight of your soldiers and Blackshirts covered with the glory of their recent operations [in Abyssinia], of your well-trying fleet, and of the *élan* of your magnificent air force. They give me the certainty that your admirable constructive work which I follow with the sincerest well-wishing will in the future as in the past lead to great successes."

"So I raise my glass and drink to your health, to the good fortune and greatness of the Italian people and to our unchanging friendship."¹

This visit to Rome made a great impression upon Hitler. "How can I translate," he said to a representative of "Il Giornale d'Italia", "the sentiment which I experienced as I stood before the millennial monuments of Rome? How profoundly I regret that I could only see their grandeur far too quickly and then had to pass by. This journey to Italy and my visit here I have experienced not merely as a politician but also as an artist. It has always been against my will and with sorrow that I parted from every room of the splendid palaces which were shown to me."

*He was struck by the intimate understanding existing between National Socialism and Fascism. He found in Italy the same world as in his own country. In both peoples their ideological community of outlook was realized. "Our friendship," he said, "believe me, is not one that can be constructed artificially."*²

¹ F.Z., 9 May 1938. I have adapted the translation given in *The Times*, 9 May 1938, in order to make it a closer version of the German text.

² *Il Giornale d'Italia*, 11 May 1938.

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In his telegram to Mussolini after his return to Germany Hitler wrote:

"Above all, Duce, these days have made it possible for me to come to know your people. . . . The community of ideas between the Fascist and the National Socialist Movements provides a sure guarantee that the loyal comradeship which binds us both together will be carried over to both our peoples and unite them, too, for all time."¹

*When on 9 June 1938 Hitler received the newly appointed Ambassador of Switzerland, Dr. Frölicher, he said that the German Reich attributed the very greatest weight to the relations of friendly neighbourliness existing between the two countries, and he referred to the high significance of Switzerland's policy of neutrality both in the life of the peoples of Europe and as an important element in world-peace.*²

*At the reception, on 13 July 1938, of the newly appointed Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., Alexei T. Merekaloff, it was noticed that Hitler omitted the conventional phrases about the friendship which united the two peoples. He said: "I take cognizance with satisfaction of your declaration that you propose to centre your efforts upon the creation and maintenance of normal relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R."'*³

In his telegram to Mussolini on his birthday (29 July 1938) Hitler said: "It is for me a matter of satisfaction that in the year of your life which has just come to its close and which has been for you so successful the Rome-Berlin axis and our friendship have been still further

¹ *F.Z.*, 11 May 1938.

² *Reichspost*, 10 June 1938.

³ I have no German text for this. I cite from the *New York Times* of 14 July 1938.

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strengthened through the time which we spent together on the soil of your Reich."¹

*On 11 August Freiherr von Fritsch was appointed to command the 12th Artillery Regiment. Hitler wrote sending his hearty congratulations: "I recall to-day in particular your untiring work in the reconstruction of the German army."*²

At the dinner given in Berlin to Admiral von Horthy, Regent of Hungary, on 24 August 1938 Hitler said:

"In the person of your Excellency I greet the head of the Hungarian nation which is united with the German people in old and loyal friendship. Numerous are the relations which in the course of the centuries caused our two peoples to become friends. Those relations reach back to the times of your sainted King Stephen and have continued to grow ever closer through all the chances and changes of fate. In most recent times our old-time friendship was confirmed and sealed through the brotherhood of arms in the severe fighting of the World War and through our common struggle for a better future. This community, founded upon mutual unassailable confidence, will be of special value for both peoples now that we through the events of history have become neighbours and have thus found our final historical frontiers. I am persuaded that thereby not only are the interests of our own countries best served, but that through close co-operation with our common friend, Italy, we are creating a pledge for a worthy and just general peace. . . . Rest assured that Germany and its Government follow with sincere sympathy the national reconstruction which your Excellency began in such difficult post-War conditions and has continued with

¹ *V.B.*, 30 July 1938.

² *F.Z.*, 12 Aug. 1938.

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such wisdom and success. Your work which has borne such great fruit in all spheres of the nation's life has the most heartfelt well-wishing of myself and of the German people."¹

In an interview with M. Alphonse de Chateaubriant, the report of which was published in "Le Journal" for 2 September 1938, Hitler said:

"Je me rends compte de la difficulté qu'éprouve un étranger devant la mentalité allemande, combien il lui est malaisé de s'expliquer complètement l'effort allemand actuel. Car il ne s'agit pas seulement de sensibilités différentes, mais de méthodes différentes, et surtout d'un autre ordre de vie. Nous ne songeons donc aucunement à imposer notre façon de voir. . . . Cette façon de voir vaut pour nous, et elle peut ne pas valoir pour les autres. . . . Il n'en est pas de même des doctrines du bolchevisme qui, sans s'inquiéter de savoir si elles peuvent ou non s'adapter au génie des peuples, veulent s'imposer au monde entier". . . .

"La Russie, considérée dans son histoire depuis Yvan le Terrible et Pierre I^{er}, jusqu'à Lénine et Staline, parcourt une ligne qui est dans sa nécessité, tout au moins, elle me paraît l'être. . . . Je suis même tenté de dire que la Russie a trouvé dans l'organisation des Soviets une expression assez conforme à sa nature. Mais pour le reste de l'Europe, cette organisation ne pourrait mener qu'aux plus grandes catastrophes."

"Je crois au surplus que la mentalité bolcheviste russe est trop différente de la mentalité des autres nations européennes pour pouvoir coopérer avec elles en vue d'un travail à conduire en commun."

"En ce qui concerne l'absorption d'autres territoires par le bolchevisme, il est impossible de se désintéresser

¹ *Pester Lloyd*, 25 Aug. 1938. Cf. *M.G.*, 26 Aug. 1938.

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de cette question! Nous ne vivons pas dans une pièce close, en un *vacuum*! Nos échanges entre nations sont constants, étroitement indépendants, se compénètrent subtilement". . . .

"Maintenant, je ne crois plus à l'accomplissement de la bolchevisation des pays comme la Hollande, la Belgique ou la France. . . . Le communisme russo-asiatique dans ces pays est vaincu. Des crises intérieures pourront se produire, il y en aura encore, mais la France, par exemple, ne deviendra pas la proie de ce principe dévorateur". . . .

"Si l'Allemagne avait cédé, il n'était plus d'espoir pour l'Europe. . . . Ce fut l'Allemagne qui arrêta au dernier moment la ruée d'un tragique destin."

"La situation économique de l'Europe restera un foyer de désaccord et de dissentiment, aussi longtemps que chacun des États, en traitant de ses propres affaires, n'aura égard qu'à soi-même. La situation ne sera pas résolue d'une façon harmonieuse et heureuse que lorsque, délibérément, toutes les nations européennes seront entrées dans un régime actif de collaboration, lorsque ce régime de collaboration sera sincèrement, effectivement désiré par toutes, admis par toutes, voulu par toutes. C'est tout un esprit nouveau à contracter, à introniser. . . . Et il faut que cet esprit apparaisse, il faut qu'il naisse! Autrement, nous continuerons de voir les nations, dans des guerres semblables à la dernière, détruire comme de méchants enfants le fruit de leur travail."

"Les nations européennes sont faites pour coopérer à l'œuvre de leur commune prospérité. . . . Les guerres, et la dernière surtout, qui a disposé arbitrairement des territoires et des peuples, doivent être regardées d'un point de vue objectif comme de funestes erreurs commises par ces nations mêmes. Économiquement, comme

dans tous les domaines, les peuples ne devraient songer qu'à poursuivre une œuvre de collaboration féconde."

"On accuse l'Allemagne de vouloir couper ses relations avec l'extérieur et de s'enfermer dans le vase clos de sa vie économique. On ne réfléchit pas que l'Allemagne s'est trouvée plus atteinte par le bouleversement de l'économie mondiale qu'un autre pays, en raison de son espace économique relativement restreint et à la fois surpeuplé. Ce n'est d'ailleurs qu'après qu'il fut devenu entièrement évident que l'on ne pourrait obtenir de vastes accords commerciaux avec l'étranger, qu'en effet nous nous sommes résolus à rendre l'organisme économique indépendant de l'étranger. Il a donc fallu chercher des voies nouvelles. Aussi, par le plan de quatre ans nous travaillons à ce que l'Allemagne puisse se suffire à elle-même et ce n'est pas dans le but de l'isoler. N'oubliez pas qu'on l'a mise dans une situation qui l'oblige à réagir en ce sens et à s'efforcer à devenir indépendante économiquement. Elle s'est soumise à ce régime et à cette discipline, en prévision d'un isolement forcé possible, ainsi que pourrait le lui faire redouter, à quelque moment donné, les conséquences d'une pénétration bolchévique venant à s'étendre autour d'elle."

"On a effectivement l'habitude de dire à l'étranger que dans l'Allemagne nationale-socialiste les Allemands ne sont pas libres. Mais c'est un peu ridicule de tenir ce langage. . . . On ne violente pas un peuple de 70 millions d'hommes pendant des années. . . . Notre tâche n'a pas été d'imposer nos conceptions au peuple allemand, notre intention fut au contraire de rallier à nos convictions le peuple d'Allemagne tout entier." . . .

"Nous avons eu bien des démêlés avec la France au cours de l'histoire, mais nous n'en sommes pas moins les deux peuples de la même famille. Et cela je l'ai dit à toute l'Allemagne: il existe entre nous des liens qui

ont engendré un indescriptible souvenir. Nous avons échangé des idéaux, nous nous sommes donné des exemples et des enseignements. Soyons équitables, nous avons moins de raisons de nous haïr que de nous admirer réciproquement."

"Si l'on se faisait à l'étranger une idée plus juste de ce qu'est le national-socialisme, l'on comprendrait qu'il est réellement une nouvelle conception du monde et qu'il est impossible, sans la paix, que les esprits puissent s'adapter à cette conception. . . . Une paix longue et profonde est nécessaire."

"A chaque peuple sa Vérité."

"On suppose que dans ce nouvel organisme discipliné, les individus perdront leur personnalité; mais, c'est tout le contraire! . . . Nous ne croyons pas que le temps de la puissance créatrice des individus soit finie, et qu'elle pourrait être remplacée par la puissance de l'informe masse collective. . . . Nous estimons que la plus haute valeur de l'individu apparaîtra de nouveau, et que c'est en puisant dans l'activité fortement liée et ordonnée de la collectivité des hommes de sa race que l'individu, en tant qu'individu, trouvera sa plus grande force."¹

In his Proclamation read at the opening of the Nuremberg Parteitag on 6 September 1938 Hitler said:

The Party had point by point begun to realize its programme. "The strong State-authority we now possess, a mighty armed force protects the Reich on land, on water, and in the air, our economic life plays its part in securing the independence and freedom of the German people, our cultural life once more is enlisted in the service of beauty and of the greatness of the nation. In an unparalleled struggle the fight for external freedom

¹ *Le Journal*, 2 Sept. 1938.

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was waged. Just in the degree that the German people through the progressive realization of its internal unity in National Socialism became more worthy of freedom, to that extent we were able to loose fetter after fetter of that Treaty which was once designed to destroy our people for ever. To all of you the great historic dates are familiar. They will one day be inscribed gloriously in the book of our people's history. Above all through them it will be possible to prove for all time that intelligence and energy are not mutually exclusive conceptions."

"A few weeks ago an English newspaper wrote that I had a burning desire to conclude a pact on various subjects with certain States, since otherwise I could not venture to come before this year's Party Congress. I have no such intention. I come before you, my old comrades, not with a pact, but with seven new German shires of my own homeland."

"It is Great Germany which in these days makes its appearance at Nuremberg for the first time. If the insignia of the old Reich have returned for the future to this old German city, they have been brought hither and accompanied by 6½ million Germans, united in spirit to-day with all other men and women of our people. Stronger than ever, the glad consciousness in these days enfolds them, the consciousness that they belong to a great community, which can never be dissolved." . . .

"This return of the East Mark to the great German Reich sets us additional tasks for the coming year. We may regard the building up of the Movement on the political side in this territory, too, as in essentials completed. In the economic sphere the fitting of the country into the great cycle and the mighty rhythm of German life will make rapid progress. A few months ago I expressed the confident hope that in three or four years

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we should succeed in this part of the Reich also in banishing unemployment. Already to-day I can define this expectation more precisely: by the end of next year the unemployment crisis will be completely mastered in the East Mark of the Reich."

Later in the same Proclamation Hitler said that controlling all their action in the sphere of economics was the conviction that the primary consideration was the nation's security. "The nation's economic existence must therefore so far as material conditions are concerned be completely established on the basis of our own life and our own living-space (Lebensraum). For only so will the army be constantly in the position to take under its strong protection the freedom and the interests of the Reich. And then Germany will be for everyone of the highest value either as friend or ally." It gave him satisfaction to know that both politically and in the economic field the time of Germany's isolation was past. "The Reich has won the friendship of great and strong World Powers. Comrades! More threatening than ever there rises over this world the Bolshevik danger of a destruction of the life of peoples. We see a thousand times repeated the action of the Jewish instigator of this world-pest. I think that I must at this point announce, on my own behalf and on that of all of you, our deep and heart-felt happiness in the fact that another great European World Power has, through its own experiences, by its own decision, and along its own paths arrived at the same conception as ourselves, and with a resolution worthy of admiration has drawn from this conception the most far-reaching consequences. However much the course and the development of the Fascist and the National Socialist revolutions appear to be conditioned by their own obvious individual needs, however independent of one another both these two

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historic upheavals have been in their origin and development, it is none the less fortunate for us all that in every great vital question of this time we find a common attitude of the spirit, a common temper, which in this world of unreason and destruction brings us, simply as men, ever more closely together." . . .

The Proclamation closed with an expression of thanks to the men and women of the Movement and to the army of the National Socialist State. "But our highest gratitude we would express to the Almighty for the success of the unification of the old East Mark with the new Reich. He has permitted us thereby to confer upon the German nation a blessing and to present to the new Reich a great success without the necessity for hazarding the blood and life of our fellow-countrymen. May Germans never forget that that would never have been possible if the strength of the whole nation had not been united in National Socialism. For when on the morning of 12 March the standard of the new Reich was borne across the frontiers, it was no longer, as it had been formerly, the emblem of a conqueror but the symbol of a unity which long before had embraced all Germans."

"The war-flag which our young army then bore into the new shires (*Gaue*) had become for our brothers in their hard struggle in the East Mark the sign of their faith in victory. Thus for the first time an idea has conquered and unified a people. For us and for all those who come after us the Reich of the Germans will now always be only Great Germany (*Großdeutschland*)!"¹

On 9 September 1938 Hitler addressed the political leaders of the NSDAP. In his speech he said:

"In these fifteen years you have never once doubted of Germany's future and above all else you have reso-

¹ *V.B.*, 7 Sept. 1938.

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lutely given to me your confidence. . . . For the first time in the midst of my old loyal revolutionary guard I can welcome those comrades of ours from the East Mark who have shared in our fight. They stand amongst you, my old fighters, they cannot be distinguished from you. The same brown uniform, the same flag, and above all the same outlook and the same loyal German heart. For just as long as the political fighters of the National Socialist Movement have striven in the old Reich so long have they striven in the East Mark. Just as the fighters in the old Reich had to lead the onset against a world of opposition, so precisely was it with the fighters of our East Mark. From suffering and care they, too, have come and are now merged in our great German community of the people, in our new Great-German Reich for now and all eternity!"

"You will all among yourselves have the consciousness how strong we are in this community. And especially at a time when there are clouds in the firmament I feel myself doubly fortunate to know that about me are those millions of the guard of fanatic National Socialists whose ranks none can break, whose spirit draws from you its inspiration, whose leaders you are!"

"Just as in the long years of the struggle for power in Germany I could always blindly rely on you so—I know it—to-day can Germany, can I rely on you!"

"You have been tested and hardened in these long years, you have yourselves learned by experience what strength dwells in a community which is indissolubly bound together, which carries in its heart an unwavering faith and is determined that it will capitulate to no one."

"So it is that you to-day make it easy for me to be Germany's Leader."

"All those who for fifteen years reckoned upon the collapse of our Movement, they have been disappointed."

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From every distress, from every danger, the Movement emerged the stronger! And all those who to-day hope for a weakening of Germany, they will suffer just the same disappointment!"

"When I speak to you thus, then in you I see not the 140,000 political leaders who stand before me but you are the German nation! A people is not more and not less than its leadership. But our leadership must be good—that we promise to the German people."

"And with this solemn pledge you must once more go forth from Nuremberg into your shires (*Gaue*) and districts (*Kreise*), into your local groups (*Ortsgruppen*) and stations (*Stützpunkte*), into your market-places and villages, and there in the days to come you must not be only undaunted witnesses to the faith in our Movement, but witnesses also to that Great-German Reich of which you are the representatives."¹

In his speech to German Youth at the Nuremberg Parteitag on 10 September 1938 Hitler said:

"Last year I pointed out how keenly you must feel your great good fortune in being born into this time. Then we none of us dreamt of the great thing in German history which would have taken place when we met a year later. You have been the witnesses of an historic event such as does not often repeat itself in the course of centuries. You have in this event yourselves become fighters for this new greater Germany. In your² young hearts you have always borne that which has now become accomplished fact."

"To-day for the first time at the National Socialist

¹ *V.B.*, 11 Sept. 1938. For the background of this speech cf. G. Ward Price in the *Daily Mail*, 10 Sept. 1938.

² The report of the speech in *V.B.* reads *eure*: the sense, I think, demands *euren*.

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Parteitag of the Reich in Nuremberg there have appeared boys and girls from the East Mark of the Reich which henceforth for ever and a day is and will be a part of Germany. That this great success could be achieved, that we owe not to chance, not to lip-homage paid to unity and brotherliness, but to an inner experience, to a unity and a brotherliness which have been realized in human life. It is the imperishable service of the National Socialist Movement that in the time of our people's deepest humiliation it never for an instant lost its faith in this future development, that it cherished this faith and taught the Germans to live in accordance with this faith."

"What could this old Germany in its internal disunion mean for our future? Does anyone believe that this Germany of the past would have been able to fashion that which to-day is accomplished fact? A *new* Movement had to come to educate our people for their task, to make them ready to devote their energies to that task. And if National Socialism in its historical existence had achieved nothing save the days of 12 and 13 March 1938,¹ then by that alone it would have already proved the justification of that existence for a millennium! And I believe that this is but the beginning of the blessed activity of our Movement."²

In his speech on Army Day ("Tag der Wehrmacht") at the Nuremberg Parteitag (12 September 1938) Hitler spoke of the necessity for defending the order within the Reich from external dangers. "No negotiation, no Conference, no Pact (Abmachung) has given us the natural right to unify Germans. We had to take this right for ourselves and we could take that right only because of your existence, my soldiers."³

¹ i.e. the *Anschluß* of Austria to the Reich.

² *V.B.*, 11 Sept. 1938.

³ *F.Z.*, 13 Sept. 1938.

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For speeches of Karl Hermann Frank in Parliament (Prag) 19 June 1935 and 7 November 1935 see *Sudetendeutsche Politik. 2 grundsätzliche Reden zur politischen Lage* (= Bücherei der Sudetendeutschen, 5. Reihe, Heft 1), Karlsbad, Verlag K. H. Frank, 1935.

The conflict between Germans and Czechs was conducted through the medium of a vigorous pamphlet warfare. Some representative examples of a large literature may be cited. On the German side: Dieter Bleibtreu, *Besitzstand und Gefahrenlage des Sudetendeutchtums* (= Bücherei der Sudetendeutschen Heimatfront, 4. Reihe, 1. Heft). Karlsbad, Verlag Karl H. Frank, 1935 (*Nach der Beschlagnahme!*); Kurt Vorbach, *200,000 Sudetendeutsche zuviel! Der tschechische Vernichtungskampf gegen 3.5 Millionen Sudetendeutsche und seine volkspolitischen Auswirkungen*. Munich, Deutscher Volksverlag, 1936; *Sudetendeutschtum im Kampf. Ein Bericht von Arbeit und Not. Herausgegeben von der Hauptleitung der Sudetendeutschen Partei*. Karlsbad, Frank, 1936; Bruno Hübler, *Volk im Schatten. Tagebuchblätter eines Sudetendeutschen*. Berlin, Brunnen-Verlag, 1937; *Die Gesetzesanträge der Sudetendeutschen Partei*. Karlsbad, K. H. Frank, 1937; F. W. Essler, *Twenty Years of Sudeten-German Losses 1918-1938* (= Documents of Denationalisation edited by Karl Hermann Frank, Nr. ii). Vienna, Leipzig, Braumüller, 1938); Christian Sigl, *Quellen und Dokumente. Ein Tatsachenbericht*

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über die Lage im sudetendeutschen Gebiet und über die Entwicklung der tschechoslowakischen Innenpolitik. Vienna, Leipzig, Braumüller, 1938. On the Czech side: J. Borovička, *Dix ans de politique tchécoslovaque.* Prag, Orbis Verlag, 1928; Charles Hoch, *Les Partis politiques en Tchécoslovaquie* (= Sources et Documents tchécoslovaques, No. 28). Prag, Orbis Verlag, 1935; Josef Chmelař, *The German Problem in Czechoslovakia* (= Czechoslovak Sources and Documents, No. 14). Prag, Orbis Publishing Co., 1936; *Czechoslovak Cabinet Ministers on the Complaints of the Sudete German Party in the Czechoslovak Parliament* (= Czechoslovak Sources and Documents, No. 17). Prag, Orbis Publishing Co., 1937; Reply by Hans Richter, *No Oppression of the Sudete Germans in Czechoslovakia? Czechoslovakians reply to the Czechoslovakian Government.* Vienna, Leipzig, Braumüller, 1937; Kamil Krofta, *Die Deutschen im tschechoslowakischen Staate.* Prag, Orbis Verlag, 1937; Josef Fischer, Václav Patzak, Vincenc Perth, *Ihr Kampf. Die wahren Ziele der Sudetendeutschen Partei.* Karlsbad, Verlagsanstalt "Graphia", 1937.

For the conflict between the two universities in Prag: *Universitas Carolina.* Pragae, MDMXXXIV. Fine reproductions of the seal of the University and documents of foundation; *The Prague Universities: compiled according to the sources and records by Jan Krčmář, Minister of Education.* Prag, Orbis Press, December 1934.

For the German University in Prag see G. C. Boyce and W. H. Dawson, *The University of Prague. Modern Problems of the German University in Czechoslovakia.* London, Robert Hale, 1937.

The Crisis and the Munich Agreement.

For the chronology of the crisis see *La Crise internationale de Septembre 1938. L'Enchaînement des Faits* (= Cahiers d'Informations françaises, No. 1, décembre 1938). Paris, Jouve et Cie, 1938; "The Czechoslovak Crisis and Munich Agreement. Documents and Speeches together with a Chronological Summary of Events", *The Bulletin of International News*, xv, October 8 1938; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *When there is no Peace.* London, Macmillan, 1939: Chronology of the Czech-German Crisis, February to October 1938, pp. 159-232.

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For documents see *Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia*. H.M. Stationery Office, Cmd. 5847. 1938 (includes Lord Runciman's report); *House of Commons Debates of 28th September 1938*. H.M. Stationery Office 1938 (Chamberlain's report on his two visits to Hitler); *Further Documents respecting Czechoslovakia including the agreement concluded at Munich on 29th September 1938*. H.M. Stationery Office, Cmd. 5848, 1938; "Der Anschluß des Sudetengebietes" in *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, vi (1939), Teil i, pp. 227-396 and the bibliographical note on pp. 227-8; Fritz Berber, *Das Diktat von Versailles* (Essen, 1939) pp. 655-69, 1553-1631; "Die sudetendeutsche Befreiung. Vom Nürnberger Parteitag bis zum Münchner Abkommen." *Nation und Staat*, xii (1938), pp. 33-43.

Of the books written on the Agreement of Munich and its sequel there may be mentioned: *Munich Before and After. A fully documented Czechoslovak account of the crisis of September 1938 and March 1939 with a detailed analysis of the repercussions of the Munich Agreement on the situation of Europe as a whole and of Central Europe in particular, together with an essay on the reconstruction of a free Europe by Dr. Herbert Ripka*. Translated from the manuscript by Ida Šindelková and Comdr. Edgar P. Young. London, Gollancz, 1939 (pp. 523); J. M. J. Miroslav, *Ruthless Neighbour. A Czech looks at Germany*. London, Glasgow, Blackie & Son, 1940; Sydney Morrell, *I saw the Crucifixion*. London, Peter Davies, no date; Alexander Henderson, *Eye-witness in Czechoslovakia*. London, Harrap, 1939; Eugene Lennhoff, *In Defence of Dr. Benes and Czech Democracy*. London, Rich & Cowan, 1938; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *When there is no Peace*. London, Macmillan, 1939; S. Grant Duff, *Europe and the Czechs* (with appendix of translated documents on the crisis of September 1938)—a "Penguin Special", Harmondsworth, 1938; Douglas Reed, *Disgrace Abounding*. London, Cape, 1939; G. E. R. Gedy, *Fallen Bastions. The Central European Tragedy*. London, Gollancz, 1939; Franz Trubert, *Die Tschechoslowakei für Europa geopfert—vergebens!* Zürich, New York, Europa-Verlag, 1938; G. J. George, *They Betrayed Czechoslovakia* (Preface by E. A. Mowrer)—a "Penguin Special", Harmondsworth, 1938; Alexander Werth, *France and Munich. Before and after the Surrender*. London, Hamish Hamilton, 1939; Édouard

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Daladier, *Défense du Pays*. Paris, Flammarion, 1939 (Daladier's speeches from April 1938 to March 1939; see in particular the speech of 4 October 1938, pp. 133-154); Pierre Dominique, *Après Munich. Veux-tu vivre ou mourir?* Paris, Stock, 1938; Bernard Lavergne, *Munich. Défaite des Démocraties*. Paris, Alcan, 1939; André Tardieu, *Notes de Semaine 1938. L'Année de Munich*. Paris, Flammarion, 1939; Georges Duhamel, *Mémorial de la Guerre blanche 1938*. Paris, Mercure de France, 1939: English translation: *The White War, 1938*. Translated by N. Hoppé. London, Dent, 1939—a collection of papers written between July and November 1938: a criticism of the Munich Agreement; id., *Positions françaises. Chronique de l'année 1939*. Paris, Mercure de France, 1940: English translation: *Why France fights*. Translated by Basil Collier. London, Dent, 1940; Alfred Fabre-Luce, *Histoire secrète de la Conciliation de Munich*. Paris, Grasset, 1938; Henri de Kérillis and Raymond Cartier, *Kérillis on the Causes of the War*, translated by Philip Toynbee (= *Laissons-nous démembrer la France?* published in Paris, March 1939). London, Putnam, (October) 1939; Antoine Karl-gren, *Henlein, Hitler et les Tchèques. La Question allemande des Sudètes*. Traduit du suédois par Jacques de Coussance. Paris, Bloud et Gay, no date. (On the cover the title is *Henlein, Hitler et le Drame tchécoslovaque*); G. Schacher, *Germany pushes West*. London, Hurst & Blackett, [1939]—written "some months before" April 1939. (The sacrifice of the small nations at Munich is not enough: Germany's attack on S.E. Europe was but a prelude to the realization of her constant goal—the attack on France and on democracy in W. Europe); R. W. Seton-Watson, *From Munich to Danzig. Being the third edition, revised and much enlarged of "Munich and the Dictators"*. London, Methuen, 1939.

For Slovakia see C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and her Successors*, London, Oxford University Press, 1937, pp. 73-199; *Slovakia Then and Now. A Political Survey by many Slovak authors* arranged by R. W. Seton-Watson. London, Allen & Unwin, 1931; Robert Nowak, *Der künstliche Staat. Ostprobleme der Tschecho-Slowakei. Mit 12 Karten*. Oldenburg, Stalling, 1938; *The Slovak Question. A Memorandum submitted by the Slovak Council to Congress of the United States of America*. Geneva, published by the Slovak Council, 1940.

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For Teschen cf. Victor-L. Tapié, *Le Pays de Teschen et les Rapports entre la Pologne et la Tchécoslovaquie* (= Centre d'Études de Politique étrangère. Section d'Information. Publication No. 3). Paris, Hartmann, 1936.

For German policy towards the Ukrainians cf. W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine. A History*, Cambridge University Press, 1940, pp. 339-42, 383-9, and see Michael Winch, *Republic for a Day. An Eye-Witness Account of the Carpatho-Ukraine Incident*. Photographs by Czeslaw Jakubowski. London, Robert Hale, 1939.

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A few articles from periodicals may be cited: F. C. Hanighen, "Troubled Days in Czechoslovakia", *Current History*, March 1936, pp. 578-83; K. Henlein, "The German Minority in Czechoslovakia", *International Affairs*, xv (1936), pp. 561-72; Rolf Wagenführ, "Die Wirtschaftsnot der Sudetendeutschen in der Tschechoslowakei", *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*, 8 (1937), pp. 1003-14; K. Falk, "Strife in Czechoslovakia: The German Minority Question", *Foreign Policy Reports*, xiv (1938-9), pp. 2-12 (15 March 1938); R. W. Seton-Watson, "The German Minority in Czechoslovakia", *Foreign Affairs*, xvi (1937-8), pp. 651-66 (July 1938); P. B. Taylor, "Partition of Czechoslovakia", *Foreign Policy Reports*, xiv (1938-9), pp. 198-208. (Nov. 15 1938); G. F. Eliot, "The Military Consequences of Munich", *Foreign Policy Reports*, xiv (1938-9), pp. 222-8 (15 Dec. 1938); Elizabeth Wiskemann, "Czechs and Germans after Munich", *Foreign Affairs*, xvii (1938-9), pp. 291-304; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Armistice at Munich", *Foreign Affairs*, xvii (1938-9), pp. 197-290 (Jan. 1939); V. M. Dean, "Diplomatic Background of Munich Accord", *Foreign Policy Reports*, xiv (1938-9), pp. 230-48 (1 Jan. 1939); Hans Raupach, "Staat, Gesellschaft und Friedensordnung in Böhmen", *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, xcix (1939), pp. 721-37; "Czechoslovakia since the Munich Agreement", *The Bulletin of*

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International News, xvi (11 March 1939), pp. 187-90; "The Destruction of Czechoslovakia", *ibid.* (25 March 1939), pp. 235 sqq., and (6 April 1939), pp. 303 sqq., 333 sqq.; Karl Megerle, "Germany and the End of Czecho-slovakia". Sonderdruck of an article which appeared in the *Monatshefte für auswärtige Politik* (Hamburg), August 1939; Josef Hanč, "Czechs and Slovaks since Munich", *Foreign Affairs*, xviii (1939-40), pp. 102-15 (Oct. 1939).

In the speech which closed the Nuremberg Parteitag of 1938 (12 September 1938) the attack upon Bolshevism was continued and coupled with this was the attack upon the democracies. Through this attack upon the democracies Hitler led up to a consideration of the position of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. Part of this very lengthy speech I have therefore translated. Hitler said:

"So to-day in the National Socialist Reich we see ourselves opposed by the same forces, the same factors which, as a Party, we had an opportunity of coming to know during fifteen years. So far as this does but give a general witness to the hostile attitude towards Germany of the democratic countries it leaves us cold. Why should we fare any better than did the Reich before we came into power? Besides I frankly confess that I still find it more tolerable to be insulted by someone who is no longer able to plunder me than to be plundered by someone who praises me for it. To-day we are insulted, but, thank God! we are in a position to prevent any plundering of Germany or any violence done to Germany. The State before our day was for nearly fifteen years the victim of extortion. But it received what in my eyes is the somewhat inadequate compensation or reward that it was praised for being a good, democratic State."

"This attitude only becomes intolerable for us at the moment when it begins to launch as a threat against our

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fellow-countrymen its flood of democratic phrases in a land where a great part of our people is delivered up to shameless ill-treatment without any apparent means of self-defence. I am speaking of Czechoslovakia. This State is a democracy, that is to say it was founded on democratic principles, since the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of this State, without being asked their opinion, were compelled one day out of hand to accept and to adapt themselves to the construction which was manufactured at Versailles. As a genuine democracy this State forthwith began to oppress, to ill-treat, and to deprive of its vital rights the majority of its inhabitants. Gradually the attempt was made to impose upon the world the view that this State had a special political and military mission to perform. The former French Minister for Air, Pierre de Cot, recently explained this for us. Czechoslovakia (*die Tschechei*) is according to him there so that in the event of war it can attack with bombs German towns and industries. This probably is a case of those well-known explosives with civilizing effect! This duty, however, is in contradiction with the views on life, the vital interests, and the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of this State. Therefore the majority of these inhabitants must keep silence. Every protest against its fate is an attack upon the purpose for which the State exists and therefore contravenes the Constitution. The Constitution, it is true, since it was made by the democracies, did not start from the popular rights of those concerned, but from political expediency as viewed by the oppressors. This political expediency therefore demanded that some arrangement should be invented which should confer upon the Czech people an overriding position of privilege. He who opposes this claim is 'an enemy of the State' and therefore, according to the democratic view, he has

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no rights whatever.¹ The so-called 'State-people' of the Czechs² is thus ordained by Providence—which in this case has availed itself of the arrangement previously devised at Versailles—to see to it that no one opposes this State-purpose. Should, however, in spite of this, someone from the majority constituted by the oppressed peoples of this State raise a protest, then he can be struck down with brutal violence³ and, if necessary or desired, assassinated."

"If it were a matter of some foreign country which did not concern us at all, then we could regard this case, like so many others, merely as an illustration of democratic conceptions of a people's rights and self-determination and take no action. But the factor which makes it a duty upon us Germans to take an interest in this problem is something very natural. Amongst the majority of the nationalities which are suffering oppression in this State there are to be found three and a half million Germans, that is to say about as many people of our race as, for example, the whole population of Denmark. But these Germans—they too are God's creatures. The Almighty did not create them in order that by means of a State-construction designed at Versailles they should be given over to a hated alien Power. And He did not create the seven million Czechs that they should watch over and take under their care—much less that they should outrage and torture—these three and a half millions."

"The conditions in this State, as is generally known, are intolerable. Here in political life over seven and a half millions in the name of the right of self-determination of a certain Mr. Wilson are

¹ German: *vogelfrei*.

² i.e. the Czechs as the dominant element in Czechoslovakia.

³ German: *mit Brachialgewalt*.

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deprived of their right of self-determination. In economic life these seven and a half millions are being systematically ruined and thus devoted to a slow process of extermination. This misery of the Sudeten Germans is indescribable. It is sought to annihilate them. As human beings they are oppressed and scandalously treated in an intolerable fashion. When three and a half million members of a people which numbers nearly eighty millions may not sing a song they like simply because it does not please the Czechs, or when they are beaten until the blood flows solely because they wear stockings the sight of which offends the Czechs, or when they are terrorized and ill-treated because they use a form of greeting which the Czechs dislike, although they use it only in greeting each other and not in greeting Czechs, when they are hunted and harried like helpless wild-fowl for every expression of their national sentiment—this may perhaps cause the worthy representatives of our democracies no concern: they may possibly welcome it since in this case only some three and a half million Germans are in question; but I can only say to the representatives of these democracies that this *does* concern us, and that if these tortured creatures can of themselves find no justice and no help they will get both from us. The depriving of these people of their rights must come to an end. I already expressed this clearly in my speech of 22 February.¹ It was a short-sighted arrangement which the statesmen of Versailles devised for themselves when they called into being that monstrous formation—Czechoslovakia. Its commission—to do violence to the masses of other nationalities, to ill-treat these millions—could be carried into execution only so long as the brother nationalities had themselves still to suffer under the consequences of the general

¹ Read 20 Feb. 1938. See p. 1404 *supra*.

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world-ill-treatment. To believe, however, that such a régime could continue to sin without limit and for all time is to surrender oneself to a blindness which is hardly conceivable. In my speech of 22 February¹ before the German Reichstag I stated that the Reich would not tolerate any further oppression and persecution of these three and a half million Germans, and I would ask the statesmen of foreign countries to be convinced that this is no mere form of words."

"The National Socialist State has taken upon itself very heavy sacrifices in the cause of European peace—very heavy national sacrifices. It has not only not fostered any thought of revenge but on the contrary has banished any such thought from the whole alike of its public and private life. In the course of the seventeenth century in the midst of a period of profound peace France slowly took away from the old German Reich Alsace and Lorraine. In 1870-1, after severe warfare which was forced upon her, Germany demanded back and received these territories. After the great World War they were once more lost. For us Germans the Cathedral of Strassburg meant very much. If in spite of that we have here drawn a final line, that was done in order for the future to serve the cause of the peace of Europe. No one could compel us to surrender voluntarily such claims to the revision of frontiers, if we had not been willing to surrender them!"

"We have surrendered them because it was our determination to end the eternal quarrel with France once and for all. On other frontiers, too, the Reich has taken the same decisive measures and adopted the same attitude. We have voluntarily taken upon ourselves the heaviest sacrifices through surrendering claims of ours in order to maintain peace for Europe in the future and

¹ Read 20 Feb., 1938. See p. 1405 *supra*.

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above all to smoothe the way for a reconciliation of the peoples. That way should start from us. In so doing we have acted more than loyally. Neither in the Press nor in the film nor on the stage has any propaganda been permitted which ran counter to this decision. Not even in literature was any exception allowed."

"It was this same spirit which led me to make offers towards the lessening of tension in Europe—offers which met with a rejection on grounds which for us to-day are still incomprehensible. We have even voluntarily limited our power in one important sphere in the hope that we might never again have to cross arms with the State in question. That was not done because we were unable to build ships above the limit of 35 per cent.; it was done in order to make a contribution to the final relieving of tension and to the pacification of European conditions. Since in Poland a great statesman and patriot was ready to conclude an agreement with Germany, we forthwith took the matter up and have brought into force a Pact which means more for the peace of Europe than all the speechifying in the Temple of the League of Nations at Geneva taken together."

"On many sides Germany to-day has frontiers where peace is completely secure and she is determined, and has given assurances to the effect, that she will accept and regard these frontiers henceforth as unalterable and final in order to give to Europe the feeling of security and peace. This self-limitation and self-restraint have apparently been interpreted by many as merely weakness on Germany's part. For this reason I should like to-day to correct this mistake."

"I believe that it cannot benefit the cause of European peace that anyone should be left in doubt on the point: the German Reich is not willing in general to express a lack of interest in all European questions and

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in particular it is not prepared to remain indifferent to the suffering and the life of a sum-total of three and a half million Germans or to take no further part in their misfortune. We understand it when England or France champion their interests throughout an entire world. But I would like to assure statesmen in Paris and London that there are also German interests which we are determined to safeguard and that, too, in all circumstances. I would like to remind them of a speech delivered before the Reichstag in the year 1933 in which for the first time I declared before the world that there can be national questions where our way is clearly marked out and that then I would rather take upon myself every distress, every danger, and every hardship rather than fail in the fulfilment of such steps as were necessary. No European State has done more for peace than Germany! None has made greater sacrifices! But it must be understood that at some point even these sacrifices have their limits, that the National Socialist State must not be confused with the Germany of the Bethmann-Hollwegs or the Hertlings."

"If I make these statements in this place that is because in the course of the present year an event has taken place which compels us all henceforth to alter our general attitude in some respects. As you know, comrades, in the present year in Czechoslovakia after a succession of innumerable postponements of any popular vote there were to be held elections at least in the communes. Even in Prague folk were now convinced that the Czech position was untenable. Folk were afraid of common action on the part of the German and the other nationalities. It was therefore thought that resort must be had to special measures in order through the exercise of pressure upon the conduct of the elections to be able to influence the result of the voting. With this end in view

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the Czech Government came to think that the sole effective means which could be considered was brutal intimidation. As likely to produce this intimidation a demonstration of the forces of the Czech State suggested itself. The Sudeten Germans in particular were to be shown the brutality of Czech violence so as to warn them from championing their national interests and voting in their support. In order, however, to give plausibility to this demonstration in the eyes of the world the Czech Government, Mr. Beneš, invented the lie that Germany had mobilized her troops and was on the point of marching into Czechoslovakia."

"On that I have to make the following statement: the production of such lying assertions is nothing new. About a year previously the Press in another country concocted the false report that 20,000 German soldiers had landed in Morocco. The Jewish inventor of this Press lie hoped thereby to be able to provoke a war. At that time it sufficed to give a short statement to the French Ambassador and the infamous fabrication was banished from the world. This time, too, assurances were given to the Ambassador of another Great Power that there was not a word of truth in this Czech assertion. This assurance was repeated and was also immediately communicated to the Czech Government. But the Prague Government needed this fraud, and needed it badly,¹ as an excuse for their terroristic pressure and influence upon the elections. At this point I can here give the further assurance that, in the first place, at this time not a single additional German soldier was called to the colours beyond those who were already serving in the army, and, in the second place, that no regiment or any other formation marched to the frontier; I can go

¹ German: *die Prager Regierung brauchte diesen Betrug ja als Vorwand. . . .*

further: at this time there was not a soldier who was not in his peace-time garrison: on the contrary, orders were given to avoid on our side even the slightest appearance of pressure upon Czechoslovakia."

"In spite of this there now took place that infamous campaign in which the whole of Europe was organized with the sole object of serving the criminal ends of a Government which intended to put an election under military pressure in order to intimidate the citizens and to nullify their voting-right and which for that purpose needed some form of moral justification. Thus in its complete lack of scruple it did not hesitate to cast suspicion upon a great State and to throw all Europe into a state of alarm, and was even prepared to take the risk of driving Europe into a bloody war. Since Germany was nursing no schemes, but on the contrary was convinced that it was precisely these communal elections which would confirm the rights of the Sudeten Germans, no action was taken on the part of the Government of the Reich. But this fact was now made the ground for the assertion that, since nothing happened, Germany had given way before the resolute attitude of the Czechs and the first interventions of England and France. You will understand, my comrades, that a Great Power cannot for a second time suffer such an infamous encroachment upon its rights. I have therefore taken care that the necessary consequences should be drawn. I am a National Socialist and as such I am accustomed on every attack to hit back immediately. I know, too, quite well that through forbearance one will never reconcile so irreconcilable an enemy as are the Czechs: they will be but provoked to still further presumption. The old German Reich can in this be a warning to us. In its love of peace it went so far as to surrender its own self and still in the end it could not stop the War."

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"With this in mind on 28 May I took very serious measures."

"1. The increases already announced both of the army and the air force were on my orders extraordinarily extended and forthwith put into execution and carried out."

"2. I ordered the immediate completion of our line of fortifications in the West."

"I can give you the assurance that there since 28 May the most gigantic fortification-line of all times is being completed. For this purpose I have given to Dr. Todt, the General Inspector of German Street-Construction, a fresh commission. Within the compass of the works planned by the Inspectors of Fortress Construction through the force of his genius for organization he has brought to completion one of the most mighty achievements of all time."

Hitler then proceeded to give some figures to illustrate his statement: under Todt there had been 278,000 workmen, beyond these 84,000 other workmen; 100,000 men from the Labour Service of the Reich together with numerous pioneer battalions and infantry divisions. The German State Railway also brought 8,000 wagon-loads of material daily. The fortifications are erected three lines deep, in some cases four lines deep where the total depth of the fortified area runs to a depth of 50 kilometres.

"I have made this mightiest effort of all times in the service of peace. But in no circumstances am I willing to look on calmly for ever at a further oppression of German fellow-countrymen in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Beneš plays his tactical game: he makes speeches, he wishes to organize negotiations, after the fashion of Geneva he wishes to clear up the question of procedure and to make little appeasement-presents. But in the long run that is not good enough! This is no matter of a form of words: here right is in question and violated

right at that. What the Germans demand is the right of self-determination which every other people also possesses: they do not want mere phrases. Mr. Beneš has no presents to give to these Sudeten Germans: they have the right to claim a life of their own just as every other people. But if the democracies should be of the conviction that in this case, if need be, they must support with every means the oppression of the Germans, then this decision will have serious consequences!"

"I believe that I shall serve peace best if I leave no doubt upon this point. I have not put forward the demand that Germany may oppress three and a half million Frenchmen or that, for instance, three and a half million of the English should be given up to us for oppression: my demand is that the oppression of three and a half million Germans in Czechoslovakia shall cease and that its place shall be taken by the free right of self-determination. We should be sorry if, through this, our relation to the other European States should be troubled or suffer damage. But in that case the fault would not lie with us. Besides, it is the business of the Czechoslovak Government to discuss matters with the representatives of the Sudeten Germans and in one way or another to bring about an understanding. My business, the business of us all, my fellow-countrymen, is to take care that here from a right there does not come a denial of right.¹ For it is with German fellow-countrymen that we are concerned. I am in no way willing that here in the heart of Germany through the dexterity of other statesmen a second Palestine should be permitted to arise. The poor Arabs are defenceless and perhaps deserted. The Germans in Czechoslovakia are neither defenceless nor are they deserted, and folk should take notice of that fact."

¹ German: *daß hier nicht aus Recht Unrecht wird.*

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"I feel that I must express this thought at the Parteitag at which for the first time the representatives of our German-Austrian shires (*Gaue*) take part. They know best how bitter a thing it is to be separated from the Motherland. They will be the first to recognize the significance of what I have been saying to-day. They will be the most ready to agree with me when I state before the entire people that we should not deserve to be Germans if we were not prepared to adopt this attitude and in one way or another to bear the consequences which follow from it."

"When we consider the unheard-of imputations which in these last months even a small State thought that it could level at Germany, we can explain this only by its reluctance to see in the German Reich a State that is anything more than a pacifist upstart."

"When in the spring of this year I stood in Rome I became inwardly conscious to what an extent the history of humanity is viewed in too small periods and as a result is conceived on too small a scale. A thousand years, a millennium and a half, embrace only a small series of generations. That which in such a period grows weary can in the same period raise itself up afresh. The Italy and the Germany of to-day form a speaking witness to this truth. They are regenerated nations which in this sense one can perhaps call new nations, but this youth does not rest upon a new territory but upon old historic soil. The Roman Empire begins to breathe again. But Germany, though historically immensely younger, is also as a State no new birth. I have caused the insignia of the old German Empire to be brought to Nuremberg in order that not only our own German people but also a whole world may bethink themselves that more than half a millennium before the discovery of the New World already a mighty Germanic-

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German Reich was in existence. Dynasties came and passed, external forms have changed. The people has renewed its youth, but in its substance it has remained eternally the same. The German Reich has slumbered long. The German people is now awakened and has offered itself as wearer of its own millennial crown. For us, the historical witnesses of this resurrection, there lies in that fact a proud happiness, a humble gratitude before the Almighty. For the rest of the world this should be alike spur and lesson—a spur to study history once again from a higher watch-tower: a lesson: not to fall into the mistakes of the past.”

“The new Italian-Roman Reich just as the new Germanic-German Reich are in truth ancient institutions. There is no call to love them: but no Power in the world will any longer remove them.”

The speech closed with Hitler's farewell to all those present at the Parteitag: “Comrades, National Socialists, you have the right now once again proudly to carry high the German head. All of us have the duty never again to bow the head beneath an alien will. Let that be our vow. So help us God!”¹

Note

It may be of service at this point to tabulate a few dates: night of 13–14 Sept. Daladier suggests to Chamberlain that it would be useful if diplomatic *démarches* were superseded by personal contacts.

15 Sept. Chamberlain meets Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Hitler demands an immediate assurance that the British Government accepts the principle of self-determination in Czechoslovakia: he consents to postpone hostilities until the British Cabinet can consider the demand.

16 Sept. Chamberlain returns to London: Lord Runciman comes to London and reports to the Cabinet.

18 Sept. Daladier and Bonnet fly to London. The principle

¹ *V.B.*, 14 Sept. 1938.

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of self-determination is accepted and of this decision the Czechoslovak Government is informed.

20 Sept. Czechoslovak Government suggests that the Sudeten dispute should be submitted to arbitration under the German-Czechoslovak Treaty of 1926. On pressure by British and French ministers in Prague on

21 Sept. Czechoslovak Government accepts the Anglo-French proposals.

22 Sept. Czechoslovak Government resigns: General Syrový heads a new Government of National Concentration.

Chamberlain meets Hitler at Godesberg; conversation is continued by written statements.

23 Sept. Further interview with Hitler: German Memorandum is handed to Chamberlain.

24 Sept. Chamberlain returns to London.

25 Sept. Czechoslovak Government rejects the terms of the German Memorandum.

Bonnet and Daladier confer with the British Cabinet in London.

26 Sept. Chamberlain sends to Hitler a personal message by Sir Horace Wilson. Roosevelt's telegram to Hitler. Hitler's speech in Berlin.

27 Sept. Hitler replies to Roosevelt's telegram. Further conversations of Sir Horace Wilson with Hitler. Chamberlain receives Hitler's reply. Chamberlain sends to Hitler a last appeal and writes to Mussolini. Mussolini writes to Hitler: meeting at Munich arranged.

29 Sept. The Munich Agreement.

On 17 September 1938 Mr. G. Ward Price had an interview with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. He asked Hitler whether Chamberlain's visit had improved the chances of a peaceful settlement of the Sudeten issue. Hitler replied: "I am convinced of Mr. Chamberlain's sincerity and goodwill."

"The Czechs say they cannot hold a plebiscite because such a measure is not provided for in their constitution. To me, their constitution seems to provide for one thing

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only—which is that 7,000,000 Czechs shall oppress 8,000,000 of minority peoples.”

“This Czech trouble has got to be ended once and for all, and ended now. It is a tumour which is poisoning the whole European organism. If it were allowed to go on, it would continue to infect international relations until they broke down in fatal collapse.”

“This condition has lasted for twenty years. No one can calculate what it has cost the peoples of Europe in that time.”

“It was the existence of Czechoslovakia as an ally of Soviet Russia, thrust forward into the very heart of Germany, that compelled me to create a great German Air Force.”

“That in turn led to France and Britain increasing their own air fleets.”

“I have doubled the German Air Fleet once already because of the situation now prevailing in Czechoslovakia. If we failed to settle the crisis now, Field-Marshal Goering would soon be asking me to order it to be doubled again, and then the British and French would redouble, and so the mad race would go on.”

“Do you think I like being obliged to stop with my great building development schemes all over the country in order to send half a million German workmen to construct at top speed a huge system of defence works along our western frontier?”

“I would rather they could be employed in constructing workers’ settlements, splendid motor roads, new schools, and public welfare institutions than in raising unproductive fortifications.”

“But while Czech oppression of a German minority keeps Europe at fever heat I have to be ready for whatever may come.”

“I have studied the Maginot Line, and learned much

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from it, but we have built something according to our own ideas which is better still, and which will stand against any force in the world, if in the event of our being attacked we chose to remain on the defensive."

"All this is madness, for no one in Germany dreams of attacking France."

"We harbour no resentment against France; on the contrary there is a strong feeling of sympathy in Germany towards her. Nor does any German want war with Britain either."

"*'Herr Gott', exclaimed the Führer, raising his voice to an indignant shout, "what couldn't I do in Germany and for Germany if it were not for this infernal Czech tyranny over a few million Germans. But it must stop. It shall stop!"*

"That French Ministers should hitherto have promised to stand by Czechoslovakia, *argued Herr Hitler*, was a contradiction of their own past actions. France had allowed the Saar territory to vote itself out of French control, though the Saar had for France great economic, political, and strategical importance."

"Yet now some people talked of bringing about a world war for a country where they had no economic or other direct interests at stake, and did so solely in order to enable the Czechs to deny to the Sudetens what the French themselves had conceded to the Saarlanders."

"In the same way England had let the Southern Irish have their complete autonomy, and a hundred years ago Holland gave the Belgians their independence."

"The Czechs had never been an independent people until the Peace Treaties raised them to an undeserved and artificial mastery over minorities more numerous than themselves. In the Middle Ages they had been a German principality. Two hundred years before Queen Elizabeth there had been a German university in Prague."

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"Modern German had been created by the diplomatic language used in the German Emperor's government offices in that city, which he made for a time his capital."

"Once, indeed, during the Hussite wars the Czechs had gained a temporary independence. They used it like the Bolsheviks, burning and ravaging, until the Germans rose and crushed them."

"The creation of this heterogeneous Czechoslovak Republic after the war was lunacy," *exclaimed the Führer.*

"It has none of the characteristics of a nation, whether from the standpoint of ethnology, strategy, economics, or language."

"To set an intellectually inferior handful of Czechs to rule over minorities belonging to races like the Germans, Poles, Hungarians, with a thousand years of culture behind them, was a work of folly and ignorance."

"The Sudeten Germans have no respect for the Czechs and will never accept their rule. After the War the Allied Powers declared that Germany was unworthy to govern blacks, yet at the same time they set second-rate people like the Czechs in authority over 3½ million Germans of the highest character and culture."

"If a powerful Germany had existed then, this would have been impossible, and as soon as Germany grew strong again the Sudetens began to assist themselves. The Czech Government is desperately trying to get the great European Powers divided, for otherwise the Czech State cannot go on. But it is impossible to maintain so unnatural an institution by political and diplomatic cunning."

Herr Hitler spoke with bitter resentment of the Czech Government's warrant for the arrest of Herr Henlein.

"If Henlein is arrested, I myself shall become the Leader of the Sudeten Germans," *he exclaimed,* "and

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I should be glad to see how long after that Dr. Beneš would be able to issue his decrees. I hope he won't issue a warrant for my arrest!"

"If the Czechs had possessed a great statesman he would long ago have let the Sudeten Germans join the Reich, and been content thereby to ensure that continuance of autonomy for the Czechs themselves. But Dr. Beneš is a politician, not a statesman."¹

On 26 September 1938 President Roosevelt sent a telegram to Hitler and the other European statesmen asking that negotiations should not be broken off; to that telegram Hitler replied on 27 September 1938, as follows:

"Your Excellency in your telegram which reached me on 26 September has addressed to me an appeal in the name of the American people asking me in the interest of the maintenance of peace not to break off the negotiations over the disputed question² which has arisen in Europe and to endeavour to reach a peaceful, honourable, and constructive settlement of this question. Rest assured that I can appreciate the generous motive which prompts your remarks and that in every respect I share your view of the incalculable consequences of a European war. For this very reason I can and must refuse to accept any responsibility on the part of the German people and its leaders if it should happen that future developments, in spite of all my efforts, should in fact lead to the outbreak of hostilities."

"In order to form a just judgement on the problem of the Sudeten Germans which is at present under discussion it is essential to consider the circumstances in which in the last resort the rise of this problem and its dangers have their cause. In 1918 the German people laid down its arms in the sure confidence that the conclusion of

¹ *Daily Mail*, 19 Sept. 1938.

² German: *Streitfrage*.

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peace with those who were then its enemies would realize the principles and ideals solemnly proclaimed by President Wilson and as solemnly recognized as binding by all the Powers which were engaged in the war. Never in history has the confidence of a people been more shamefully abused than at that time. The peace conditions which were forced upon the defeated nations in the treaties concluded in a suburb of Paris fulfilled not one of the promises which had been given. Rather they have created in Europe a political régime which made of the conquered nations the outlawed¹ pariahs of the world and which must from the first have been recognized by every intelligent person as indefensible."

"One of the points in which the character of the 'Diktats' of 1919 stood most clearly revealed was the foundation of the Czechoslovak State, and the delimitation of its frontiers which took no account of history or nationality. Within these frontiers was also included the Sudeten territory, although this district had always been German and although its inhabitants after the destruction of the Hapsburg Monarchy had unanimously declared their wish to be united with the German Reich. Thus the right of self-determination which President Wilson had proclaimed as the most important foundation of the life of peoples was simply refused to the Sudeten Germans."

"But that was not enough. In the treaties of 1919 definite, and according to the wording of the documents far-reaching, obligations towards this German element² were imposed upon the Czechoslovak State. These obligations from the outset were not observed. The League of Nations charged with safeguarding the execution of these obligations failed completely. Since that time the

¹ German: *entrechteten*.

² German: *gegenüber dem deutschen Volkstum*.

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Sudeten territory has been engaged in a bitter struggle to maintain its German character."

"It was a natural and unavoidable development that after the growth in strength of the German Reich and after the reunion of Austria with the Reich the passion of the Sudeten Germans for the preservation of their cultural life and for closer association with Germany did but increase. In spite of the loyal attitude of the Sudeten German Party and its leaders, opposition to the Czechs grew ever stronger. From day to day it became clearer that the Government in Prague was not prepared in fact to take any account of the most elementary rights of the Sudeten Germans. Rather it sought by methods which grew more and more violent to effect the 'Czechization' of the Sudeten territory. It was unavoidable that this action continuously led to greater and more serious tension."

"At first the German Government did not intervene in this development in any way and it still maintained its attitude of calm reserve when in May of this year the Czechoslovak Government proceeded to a mobilization of its army under the completely false pretext of German troop-concentrations. The refusal on the part of Germany at that time to take any military counter-measures did but serve to increase the intransigence of the Government in Prague. That was proved by the course of the negotiations conducted between the Sudeten German Party and the Government with a view to a peaceful settlement. These negotiations produced the conclusive proof that the Czechoslovak Government was very far from any real and fundamental grasp of the Sudeten problem and from any attempt to bring it to a just solution."

"As a consequence during the last few weeks conditions in the Czechoslovak State, as is generally known,

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have become intolerable. Political persecution and economic oppression have plunged the Sudeten Germans into indescribable misery. In order to illustrate these conditions it will suffice to refer to the following facts:"

"At the present moment there are 214,000 German refugees who have been forced to leave house and hearth in their hereditary homeland and have escaped over the German frontier because they saw in this the last and only possibility of escaping from the hideous Czechoslovak rule of violence and bloody terrorism. Unnumbered dead, thousands of wounded, tens of thousands who have been arrested and imprisoned, deserted villages—such are the witnesses which bring their charge before a world public, witnesses of that outbreak of hostilities, begun long ago on the part of the Prague Government, which you in your telegram justly fear, to say nothing of the destruction of the economic life of the Sudeten German area which has been systematically pursued by the Czech Government for twenty years. Already that economic life carries with it all those features of disorganization which you foresee as the consequence of the outbreak of war."

"These are the facts which compelled me in my speech at Nuremberg on 12 September to declare before the whole world that this outlawry¹ of three and a half million Germans in Czechoslovakia must come to an end and that these folk if they can of themselves find no justice and no help must receive both from the German Reich. But in order to make a last attempt to reach the goal by peaceful means I have made concrete proposals for the solution of the problem in a memorandum which was handed to the British Prime Minister on 23 September. These proposals have since then been made known to the public. After the Czechoslovak Govern-

¹ German: *Rechtlosmachung*.

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ment had previously declared to the British and French Governments that it agreed that the area of Sudeten German settlement should be separated from the Czechoslovak State and united to the German Reich the proposals of the German memorandum have no other aim than to secure a rapid, certain, and just execution of that Czechoslovak promise."

"I am convinced, Mr. President, that, when you review the whole development of the Sudeten German problem from its beginnings down to the present day, you will recognize that the German Government has in truth failed neither in patience nor in its honest wish for a peaceful understanding. It is not the fault of Germany that there is a Sudeten German problem at all or that from that problem the present insupportable conditions have arisen. The fearful fate of the victims of this problem does not admit of any further postponement of its solution. The possibilities of reaching a just settlement through agreement are thus exhausted with the proposals of the German memorandum. It does not now rest with the German Government, but solely with the Government of Czechoslovakia to decide whether it wishes peace or war.

ADOLF HITLER."¹

On 26 September Hitler delivered his famous speech in the Sportpalast, Berlin, setting forth his view of the Czechoslovak crisis. He said:

"German fellow-countrymen and fellow-countrywomen, on 20 February before the members of the German Reichstag I expressed for the first time a fundamental demand of an absolute character.² At that time the whole nation heard me and it understood me. One statesman failed to share in this understanding. He has been removed and the promise which I made at that

¹ V.B., 29 Sept. 1938.

² German: *unabdingbarer Art.*

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time has been fulfilled. Then for the second time I spoke on this same demand before the Parteitag of the Reich. And again the nation heard this demand. To-day I now come before the nation and for the first time I speak before the people itself, just as I did in the time of our great fight, and you know what that means. For the world there is no longer room for any doubt: now it is not a leader or one man who speaks: now the German people speaks."

"If I am now the spokesman of this German people, then I know: At this second the whole people in its millions agrees word for word with my words, confirms them, and makes them its own oath!¹ Let the other statesmen ask themselves whether that is also true in their case!"

"The question which in these last months and weeks has moved us so profoundly has long been familiar to us: it is not so much Czechoslovakia: it is rather Mr. Beneš. In this name is concentrated all that which to-day moves millions, which causes them to despair or fills them with a fanatical resolution."

"But why was it that this question could rise to such significance? I wish, my fellow-countrymen, quite briefly to explain to you once again the character and the aims of German foreign policy."

"In contradistinction to the many democratic States German foreign policy is fixed and conditioned by a *Weltanschauung*. The *Weltanschauung* of this new Reich is directed to maintaining and to securing the existence of our German people. We have no interest in oppressing other peoples. We wish to seek our blessedness after our own fashion:² the others can do so in their own

¹ The text in *V.B.* reads *macht sie zu meinem eigenen Schwur*: the sense demands *zu seinem*.

² German: *Wir wollen nach unserer Fassung selig werden*: the Frederician phrase.

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way. This view, which in our *Weltanschauung* is racially conditioned, leads to a limitation of our foreign policy: that is to say the aims of our foreign policy are not unlimited, they are not determined by chance, but they are grounded on the determination to serve the German people alone, to maintain it in our world and to safeguard its existence."

"What is then the position to-day? You know that formerly under the watchword "The Right of the Peoples to Self-Determination" the German people, as well as others, was filled with a belief in super-State help and therefore allowed itself to the last extreme to renounce any resort to its own strength. . . . You know that this trust of those days was most shamefully betrayed! The result was the Treaty of Versailles and of the frightful consequences of this Treaty you are all aware. You all still remember how our people was first robbed of its arms and how the unarmed people was later ill-treated! You know the frightful fate which fell upon us and pursued us for a decade and a half. And you also know that if, in spite of this, Germany has once more become great, free, and strong, then for this she has to thank only her own strength. The world about us has contributed nothing to that result."

"On the contrary the world has tried to keep us down and oppress us so long as it was possible, until at length from the German people itself there grew up the strength to put an end to this unworthy existence and once more to pursue the path which befits a free and great nation."

"Although now to-day through our own efforts we have once more become free and strong, yet we are not moved by any hatred against other nations. We bear no grudge. What happened we know: the peoples are not to be held responsible for that, but only a small conscienceless clique of international profit-makers seeking

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their business ends, who do not hesitate, if necessary, to let whole nations go to ruin if only their despicable interests are served. Therefore we nurse no hatred against neighbouring peoples and that we have also proved."

"We had hardly begun the restoration of Germany to equality of rights when, as the clearest sign of our renunciation of a policy of 'Revanche' upon the rest of the world, I proposed a series of agreements which were intended to lead to a limitation of armaments. My first proposal was: Germany in any event demands equality of rights, but she is prepared to renounce any further use of defensive forces or arms if the other peoples will follow suit: that is to say, general disarmament, if necessary, down to the last machine-gun! This proposal was not even taken as a basis for discussion."

"I made a second proposal: Germany is ready to limit her army to 200,000 men on condition the other States also disarm to the same level. That proposal, too, was rejected."

"I made yet another proposal: Germany is ready, if the others wish it, to renounce the use of all heavy arms, the so-called 'weapons of aggression', tanks, bombing aeroplanes—even if necessary to renounce the use of aeroplanes all together—heavy and the heaviest artillery. Once more the proposal was rejected. I went further and now proposed an international regulation binding all European States with the maintenance in each State of an army of a strength of 300,000 men. This proposal also was rejected."

"I brought forward still further proposals: limitation of air-fleets, abolition of bombing, absolute abolition of poisoned gas-warfare, protection of districts not lying in the fighting-line, abolition at least of the heaviest artillery, abolition of the heaviest tanks. That too was rejected. It was all in vain!"

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"When thus for two years I had made to the world offer on offer and when these offers always met with rejection and then once more rejection, I gave orders that the German army should be brought to the best attainable condition. And now I can proudly admit: we did then certainly complete an armament such as the world has never yet seen. I have offered disarmament (*Waffenlosigkeit*) as long as it was possible. But when that was rejected then I formed, I admit, no half-hearted decision. I am a National Socialist and an old German front-line soldier!"

"If they do not wish the world to be without arms, good: then, German people, do you, too, now carry your arms!"

"I have in fact armed in these five years. I have spent milliards on this armament: that the German people must now know! I have seen to it that a new army should be provided with the most modern armament known. I have given to my friend Goering the order: Make me now an air-arm which can protect Germany in the face of any conceivable attack. Thus we have built up a military force (*Wehrmacht*) of which to-day the German people can be proud and which the world will respect if at any time it makes its appearance."

"We have created for our protection the best air-defence, the best tank-defence which is to be found on earth. In these five years day and night work has been carried on. Only in one single sphere have I succeeded in bringing about an understanding. To this subject I shall return. But in spite of this I have continued to follow up the ideas of the limitation of armaments and of a policy of disarmament. I have really in these years pursued a practical peace policy. I have approached all the apparently impossible problems with the firm resolve to solve them peacefully even when there was the danger

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of making more or less serious renunciations on Germany's part. I myself am a front-line soldier and I know how grave a thing war is. I wanted to spare the German people such an evil. Problem after problem I have tackled with the set purpose to make every effort to render possible a peaceful solution."

"The most difficult problem which faced me was the relation between Germany and Poland. There was a danger that the conception of a 'hereditary enmity' might take possession of our people and of the Polish people. That I wanted to prevent. I know quite well that I should not have succeeded if Poland at that time had had a democratic constitution. For these democracies which are overflowing with phrases about peace are the most bloodthirsty instigators of war. But Poland at that time was governed by no democracy but by a *man*. In the course of barely a year it was possible to conclude an agreement which, in the first instance for a period of ten years, on principle removed the danger of a conflict. We are all convinced that this agreement will bring with it a permanent pacification. We realize that here are two peoples which must live side by side and that neither of them can destroy the other. A State with a population of thirty-three millions will always strive for an access to the sea. A way to an understanding had therefore to be found. It has been found and it will be ever further developed. The decisive point is that both Governments and all reasonable and intelligent folk in both peoples and countries should have the firm determination continuously to improve relations. It was a real achievement in the cause of peace which is of more value than all the chatter in the Palace of the League of Nations at Geneva."

"At this time I also sought gradually to establish good and lasting relations with the other nations. We

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have given guarantees for the States in the West, and to all those States bordering on our frontiers we have given assurances of the inviolability of their territory so far as Germany is concerned. These are no mere words. That is our sacred determination. We have no interest in breaking the peace."

"These German offers also met with a growing understanding. Gradually ever more peoples are freeing themselves from that insane infatuation of Geneva which, I might say, serves no policy of an obligation to peace but rather a policy of obligation to war. They are freeing themselves, and they begin to see the problems soberly: they are ready for understanding and for peace."

"I went further and offered the hand to England. I have voluntarily renounced the idea of ever again entering upon a competition in fleet-building in order to give to the British Empire the feeling of security. And that I have not done because I was not able to build above the limit fixed: let no one have any illusions on that score: I acted thus solely in order to maintain a lasting peace between the two peoples. But it must be admitted that here one condition must be observed; it will not do that one party should say: I am determined never again to wage war and to this end I offer you a voluntary limitation of my armaments at 35 per cent., while the other party declares: If it suits me I shall wage war again from time to time. Such an agreement is morally justified only when both peoples solemnly promise that they are determined never again to wage war with each other. Germany has this determination. We all desire to hope that amongst the English people those who share this determination may gain the upper hand!"

"I went further. Directly after the restoration of the Saar territory which was decided by a plebiscite I declared to France that there were now absolutely no

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differences outstanding between us. I said that for us the Alsace-Lorraine question no longer existed. It is a frontier district. The people of this country during the most recent decades has never really been asked for its own opinion. We have the feeling that the inhabitants of this province will be happiest if they are not fought over again. All of us do not wish for any war with France. We want nothing from France—positively nothing! And when the Saar territory had returned to the Reich thanks to the loyal execution of the treaties by France—that I desire to reaffirm in this place—I solemnly declared: for the future all territorial differences between France and Germany have been removed. To-day I cannot any longer see any difference between us. Here are two great peoples who both wish to work and live. And they will live their lives best if they work together.”

“After this irrevocable renunciation, made once for all, I turned to a further problem which was easier to solve than others because here the common *weltanschaulich* basis forms a favourable condition for a readier mutual understanding—the problem of the relation of Germany to Italy.”

“It is true that the solution of this problem is only in part to be put to my credit, in part it is due to the rare genius of that great man whom the Italian people has the good fortune to be able to possess as its Leader. This relation has long ago overstepped the sphere of a pure economic or political expediency: it has passed beyond treaties and alliances and has become a true, strong union of hearts. Here an axis has been formed represented by two peoples who both have come to be united, alike in ideology¹ and in politics, in a close indissoluble friendship.”

¹ German: *weltanschaulich*.

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"Here, too, I have taken a final step—once and for all—fully conscious of my responsibility before my fellow-countrymen. I have banished from the world a problem that from henceforth simply does not exist for us. However bitter that may be for the individual, with us in the last resort it is the interest of the people as a whole which stands above everything. And this interest is: to be able to work in peace! This whole work for peace, my fellow-countrymen, is no mere empty phrase, but this work is reinforced through deeds which no lying mouth can destroy."

"Two problems still remained. Here I was bound to make a reservation. Ten million Germans found themselves beyond the frontiers of the Reich in two great self-contained areas of settlement, Germans who wished to return to their Reich as their homeland. This number—ten millions—is no small affair: here it is a question of a quarter as many people as make up the population of France. And if for over forty years France never gave up her claim to the few millions of the French population of Alsace-Lorraine, then we had a right before God and the world to maintain our claim to these ten million Germans. My fellow-countrymen, there is a point at which concession must cease because otherwise it would become ruinous weakness. I should have no right to take my stand before the history of Germany had I been willing in simple indifference to sacrifice these ten millions. I should then also have no moral right to be the leader of this people. I have taken upon myself sacrifices and renunciations enough: here was the limit beyond which I could not go!"

"How true that was has been proved through the plebiscite in Austria. At that time a glowing profession of faith was made, a profession of faith such as the rest of the world had certainly not expected. But we know

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by experience: a plebiscite for the democracies is superfluous or even harmful the moment it does not lead to the result that they themselves expect. In spite of this, this problem was solved to the satisfaction of the whole great German people."

"And now before us stands the last problem that must be solved and will be solved. It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is the claim from which I will not recede and which, God willing, I will make good."

"The history of the problem is as follows: in 1918 under the watchword 'The Right of the Peoples to Self-determination' Central Europe was torn in pieces and was newly formed by certain crazy so-called 'statesmen'. Without regard for the origin of the peoples, without regard for either their wish as nations or for economic necessities Central Europe at that time was broken up into atoms and new so-called States were arbitrarily formed. To this procedure Czechoslovakia owes its existence. This Czech State began with a single lie and the father of this lie was named Beneš. This Mr. Beneš at that time appeared in Versailles and he first of all gave the assurance that there was a Czechoslovak nation. He was forced to invent this lie in order to give to the slender number of his own fellow-countrymen a somewhat greater range and thus a fuller justification. And the Anglo-Saxon statesmen, who were, as always, not very adequately versed in respect of questions of geography or nationality, did not at that time find it necessary to test these assertions of Mr. Beneš. Had they done so, they could have established the fact that there is no such thing as a Czechoslovak nation but only Czechs and Slovaks and that the Slovaks did not wish to have anything to do with the Czechs but . . ." *(the rest of the sentence was drowned in a tumultuous outburst of applause).*

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"So in the end through Mr. Beneš these Czechs annexed Slovakia. Since this State did not seem fitted to live, out of hand three and a half million Germans were taken in violation of their right to self-determination and their wish for self-determination. Since even that did not suffice, over a million Magyars had to be added, then some Carpathian Russians, and at last several hundred thousand Poles."

"That is this State which then later proceeded to call itself Czechoslovakia—in violation of the right of the peoples to self-determination, in violation of the clear wish and will of the nations to which this violence had been done. When I speak to you here it goes without saying that I should sympathize with the fate of all these oppressed peoples, with the fate of Poles, Hungarians, and Ukrainians. I am naturally spokesman only for the fate of my Germans."

"At the time that Mr. Beneš lied this State into being, he gave a solemn pledge to divide it on the model of the Swiss system into cantons, for amongst the democratic statesmen there were some who still had some twinges of conscience. We all know how Mr. Beneš has redeemed his pledge to introduce this cantonal system. He began his reign of terror. Even at that time the Germans already attempted to protest against this arbitrary violence. They were shot down. After that a war of extermination began. In these years of the 'peaceful' development of Czechoslovakia nearly 600,000 Germans had to leave Czechoslovakia. This happened for a very simple reason: otherwise they would have had to starve!"

"The whole development from the year 1918 up to 1938 showed one thing clearly: Mr. Beneš was determined slowly to exterminate the German element. And this to a certain extent he has achieved. He has hurled countless people into the profoundest misery. He has

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managed to make millions of people fearful and anxious. Through the continuous employment of his methods of terrorism he has succeeded in reducing to silence these millions while at the same time it also became clear what were the 'international' duties of this State."

"No longer was any secret made of the fact that this State was intended, if necessary, to be employed against Germany. A French Minister for Air, Pierre Cot, has expressed this wish quite soberly: 'We need the State,' he said, 'because from this State German business life and German industry can be most easily destroyed with bombs.' And then Bolshevism uses this State as the gateway through which it can find entry. It is not we who have sought this contact with Bolshevism, but Bolshevism uses this State in order to possess a canal leading into Central Europe."

"And now the shameless part of this story begins. This State whose Government is in the hands of a minority compels the other nationalities to co-operate in a policy which will oblige them one of these days to shoot at their own brothers. Mr. Beneš demands of the German: 'if I wage war against Germany, then you have to shoot against the Germans. And if you refuse to do this, you are a traitor against the State and I will have you yourself shot.' And he makes the same demand of Hungary and Poland. He demands of the Slovaks that they should support aims to which the Slovak people are completely indifferent. For the Slovak people wishes to have peace—and not adventures. Mr. Beneš thus actually turns these folk either into traitors to their country or traitors to their people. Either they betray their people, are ready to fire on their fellow-countrymen, or Mr. Beneš says: 'You are traitors to your country and you will be shot for that by me.' Can there be anything more shameless than to compel folk of

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another people, in certain circumstances, to fire on their own fellow-countrymen only because a ruinous, evil, and criminal Government so demands it? I can here assert: when we had occupied Austria, my first order was: no Czech needs to serve, rather he must not serve, in the German Army. I have not driven him to a conflict with his conscience."

"But he who opposes Mr. Beneš is also sent to his death in the economic sphere. This fact the democratic world-apostles cannot lie away. In this State of Mr. Beneš the consequences for the nationalities have been appalling. I speak only for the Germans. It is they who have the highest death-rate of all the German tribes, their poverty in children is the highest, their unemployment is the most frightful. How long is such a condition to last? For twenty years the Germans in Czechoslovakia have had to watch these conditions and the German people in the Reich has had to look on these conditions, not because it was at any time prepared to accept this state of affairs but simply because it was powerless and in the world of democracies could not help itself in face of these torturers. Yes, when anywhere a traitor to his country is imprisoned, when a man who from the pulpit hurls down his abuse is taken into custody, then there is excitement in England and indignation in America. But when hundreds of thousands are driven into exile, when tens of thousands come into prison, and thousands are butchered that does not move these true-blue world democrats in the slightest degree. We have learned much in these years. For them we feel a profound contempt."

"There is but a single Great Power and one man at its head who have understanding for the distress of our people. And that is—I may, I think, give his name—my great friend, Benito Mussolini. What he has done

at this time and the attitude taken up by the Italian people—this we shall not forget! And if some time the hour of a similar distress should come for Italy then I will stand before the German people and call upon it to take the same attitude. And even then it will not be two States which act in self-defence but a *bloc*!”

“In the Reichstag on 20 February of this year I stated that in the life of the ten million Germans beyond our frontiers there must come a change. Mr. Beneš has now taken a different course. He instituted a still more ruthless oppression. He set on foot a still greater terrorism. There began a period of disbanding of associations, of vetos, confiscations, and the like. This continued until at last 21 May came. And you cannot deny, my fellow-countrymen, that we have exhibited a truly unexampled patience. This 21 May was intolerable. I have given its history at the Parteitag of the Reich. In Czechoslovakia at last an election was to take place which could not be postponed any longer. Then Mr. Beneš invented a way to intimidate the Germans in Czechoslovakia: the military occupation of the [Sudeten] districts.”

“This military occupation even now he intends to continue for the future in the hope that no one will venture to oppose him so long as his myrmidons are in the country. It was that insolent lie of 21 May—that Germany had mobilized—that now had to serve to cover the Czech mobilization, to excuse it, and to supply a motive. What followed you know: an infamous international world-wide agitation.”

“Germany had not called a man to the colours: it never thought for a moment to solve this problem by military intervention. Still I always hoped that the Czechs at the last minute would realize that this tyranny could not be maintained any longer. But Mr. Beneš adopted the standpoint that, protected by France and

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by England, one could do anything with Germany with impunity—nothing could happen to him. And above all: when all other strings failed, behind him stood Soviet Russia."

"And so the answer of this man was now more than before: Shoot down, arrest, imprison—the fate of all those who in any way failed to please him. Thus it was that there came my demand in Nuremberg. This demand was quite clear: for the first time I there expressed the claim that now at last—almost twenty years since the statements of President Wilson—for these three and a half millions the right of self-determination must come into force. And once again Mr. Beneš gave his answer: more deaths, more imprisonments, more arrests. The Germans began perforce to flee."

"And then came England. I have told Mr. Chamberlain quite distinctly what we regard now as the sole possibility of a solution. It is the most natural solution that there can be. I know that *all* nationalities no longer wish to remain with Dr. Beneš, but I am in the first place spokesman of the Germans, and for these Germans I have now spoken and asserted that I am no longer willing to look on calm and inactive and see how this madman in Prague thinks that he can undisturbed ill-treat three and a half million human beings."

"And I have left him in no doubt that now at last German patience has really come to an end: I have left him in no doubt that, though it is a characteristic of our German mentality to bear something for a long time and again and again to raise no protest, yet one day the moment comes when it has to stop! And now England and France have sent to Czechoslovakia the only possible demand—to set free the German area and to surrender it to the Reich."

"We are now accurately informed on the conversations

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which Dr. Beneš conducted at that time. Faced by the declaration of England and of France that they would no longer support Czechoslovakia if at last the fate of these peoples was not changed and the areas liberated Mr. Beneš found a way of escape. He conceded that these districts must be surrendered. That was what he stated, but what did he do? He did not surrender the area but the Germans he now drives out! And that is now the point at which the game comes to an end. Mr. Beneš had hardly spoken when he began his military subjugation afresh—only with still greater violence. We see the appalling figures: on one day 10,000 fugitives, on the next 20,000, a day later, already 37,000, again two days later 41,000, then 62,000, then 78,000: now 90,000, 107,000, 137,000 and to-day 214,000. Whole stretches of country were depopulated, villages are burned down, attempts are made to smoke out the Germans with hand-grenades and gas. Mr. Beneš, however, sits in Prague and is convinced: 'Nothing can happen to me: in the end England and France stand behind me.' "

"And now, my fellow-countrymen, I believe that the time has come when one must mince matters no longer. If anyone for twenty years has borne such a shame, such a disgrace, such a misfortune as we have done, then in very truth it cannot be denied that he is a lover of peace. When anyone has the patience which we have shown then in very truth it cannot be said that he is bellicose. For in the last resort Mr. Beneš has seven million Czechs, but here there stands a people of over seventy-five millions."

"I have now placed a memorandum containing a last and final German proposal in the hands of the British Government. This memorandum contains nothing save the putting into effect of what Mr. Beneš has already promised. The content of this proposal is very simple:"

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"That area which in its people is German and has the wish to be German comes to Germany and that, too, not only when Mr. Beneš has succeeded in driving out perhaps one or two million Germans, but now, and that immediately! I have here chosen that frontier which on the basis of the material which has existed for decades on the division of people and language in Czechoslovakia is the just frontier-line. But in spite of this I am more just than Mr. Beneš and I have no wish to exploit the power which we possess. I have therefore laid it down from the outset that this area will be placed under German supremacy (*Oberhoheit*) because it is essentially settled by Germans, the final delimitation of the frontier, however, I then leave to the vote of our fellow-countrymen themselves who are in the area! I have therefore laid down that in this area there must then be held a plebiscite. And in order that no one can say that the procedure of the plebiscite might be unjust, I have chosen as the basis for this plebiscite the Statute that governed the Saar Plebiscite."

"Now I am and was prepared, so far as I am concerned, to allow a plebiscite to be held throughout the area. But Mr. Beneš and his friends objected. They wished that a plebiscite should be allowed only in certain parts of the area. Good, I have yielded the point. I was even prepared to allow the plebiscite to be subject to the inspection of international Commissions of Control."

"I went even further and agreed to leave the delimitation of the frontier to a German-Czech Commission. Mr. Chamberlain suggested: might it not be an international Commission? To this, too, I agreed. I even wished during this period of the plebiscite to withdraw again the troops, and I have to-day declared my readiness to invite for this period the British Legion, which offered me its services, to go into these districts and there main-

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tain calm and order. And I was further ready to allow the international Commission to fix the final frontier and to hand over all details of procedure to a Commission composed of Germans and Czechs."

"The content of this memorandum is nothing else than the practical execution of what Mr. Beneš has already promised and that too under the most complete international guarantees. Mr. Beneš now says that this memorandum is 'a new situation'. And in what in fact does this 'new situation' consist? It consists in this: that this time—exceptionally—the promise made by Mr. Beneš must also be kept! That is for Mr. Beneš the 'new situation'. What is there that Mr. Beneš has not promised at some time in his life? And no promise has been kept! Now for the first time he has got to keep to something."

"Mr. Beneš says: 'We cannot go back from this area.' Mr. Beneš has then understood the transfer of this area to mean that the legal title is recognized as belonging to the German Reich but the area is still to be subject to the violence of the Czechs. That is now past!"

"I have demanded that now after twenty years Mr. Beneš should at last be compelled to come to terms with the truth. On 1 October he will have to hand over to us this area."

"Mr. Beneš now places his hopes on the world! And he and his diplomats make no secret of the fact. They state: it is our hope that Chamberlain will be overthrown, that Daladier will be removed, that on every hand revolutions are on the way. They place their hope on Soviet Russia. He still thinks then that he will be able to evade the fulfilment of his obligations."

"And then I can say only one thing: now two men stand arrayed one against the other: there is Mr. Beneš and here stand I. We are two men of a different make-up. In the great struggle of the peoples while Mr. Beneš

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was sneaking about through the world, I as a decent German soldier did my duty. And now to-day I stand over against this man as the soldier of my people!"

"I have only a few statements still to make: I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his efforts. I have assured him that the German people desires nothing else than peace, but I have also told him that I cannot go back behind the limits set to our patience. I have further assured him, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there is for Germany no further territorial problem in Europe. And I have further assured him that at the moment when Czechoslovakia solves her problems, that means when the Czechs have come to terms with their other minorities, and that peaceably and not through oppression, then I have no further interest in the Czech State. And that is guaranteed to him! We want no Czechs!"

"But in the same way I desire to state before the German people that with regard to the problem of the Sudeten Germans my patience is now at an end! I have made Mr. Beneš an offer which is nothing but the carrying into effect of what he himself has promised. The decision now lies in his hands: Peace or War! He will either accept this offer and now at last give to the Germans their freedom or we will go and fetch this freedom for ourselves. The world must take note that in four and a half years of war and through the long years of my political life there is one thing which no one could ever cast in my teeth: I have never been a coward!"

"Now I go before my people as its first soldier and behind me—that the world should know—there marches a people and a different people from that of 1918!"

"If at that time a wandering scholar was able to inject into our people the poison of democratic catchwords—the people of to-day is no longer the people that it was

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then. Such catchwords are for us like wasp-stings: they cannot hurt us: we are now immune."

"In this hour the whole German people will unite with me! It will feel my will to be its will. Just as in my eyes it is its future and its fate which give me the commission for my action."

"And we wish now to make our will as strong as it was in the time of our fight, the time when I, as a simple unknown soldier, went forth to conquer a Reich and never doubted of success and final victory."

"Then there gathered close about me a band of brave men and brave women, and they went with me. And so I ask you my German people to take your stand behind me, man by man, and woman by woman."

"In this hour we all wish to form a common will and that will must be stronger than every hardship and every danger."

"And if this will is stronger than hardship and danger then one day it will break down hardship and danger."

"We are determined!"

"Now let Mr. Beneš make his choice!"¹

On 28 September 1938 there was issued as a White Paper Cmd. 5847 the "Correspondence Respecting Czechoslovakia" with the letters which passed between Chamberlain and Hitler. I have not thought it necessary to include a translation of Hitler's letters in this book as an English version is readily accessible. The correspondence is reproduced in "The Times" of 29 September 1938.

29 September 1938. Conclusion of the Munich Agreement between Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. German text: "Frankfurter Zeitung", 1 October 1938; English text: "The Times", 1 October 1938; French text: "Le Temps", 1 October 1938.

¹ V.B., 28 Sept. 1938.

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On 30 September 1938 in Munich a declaration was signed by Hitler and Chamberlain: "We have had a further conversation to-day and we are agreed in recognizing that the question of German-English relations is of the highest importance for both countries and for Europe."

"We regard the Agreement which was signed last evening¹ and the German-English Naval Agreement² as symbolic of the wish of our two peoples never again to wage war against each other."

"We are determined to treat other questions which concern our two countries also through the method of consultation and further to endeavour to remove possible causes of difference of opinion in order thus to contribute towards assuring the peace of Europe."³

2 October 1938. Hitler's "Erlaß" for the administration of the Sudeten German districts. Text: "Frankfurter Zeitung", 3 October 1938.

There followed a succession of speeches delivered by Hitler in the occupied Sudeten German territory. On 3 October Hitler spoke in Eger; he said: "Through me the whole German people greets you. . . . This greeting is also a vow: never shall this land in the future be torn from the Reich! Over this Great German Reich lies for protection the German shield and guarding it the German sword. You yourselves are a part of this protection. From henceforth like all other Germans you will have to bear your part of the burden. For it is the pride of us all that every son of Germany takes his share not only in the joys of Germany but also in our duties, and if necessary in our sacrifices."

"For you the nation was ready to draw the sword.

¹ The Munich Agreement.

² Of 18 June 1935.

³ *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, vi (1939), Teil i, p. 109.

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You will be just as ready to do so if ever German soil or German people is threatened. . . ."

"Now begin your march which leads into the great German future. In this hour we wish to render thanks to the Almighty that He has guarded us on our path in the past, and we would implore Him that in the future, too, He would go with us and prosper our way."¹

*There are no full reports in the German Press of the speeches delivered in Rumburg on 6 October 1938, in Friedland on the same day, and in Jägerndorf on 7 October 1938. In his speech at Rumburg Hitler said that "every foot of German earth on which the flag of the German Reich has been planted remains for ever German"; at Friedland he said: "The standard which to-day flies over all Germany must be the eternal standard of the German people, and the nation shall be its eternal standard-bearer." At Jägerndorf he said that the Sudeten territory was irrevocably a Reichsgau of the German nation.*²

*On 4 October 1938 Hitler spoke in Karlsbad on similar lines:*³

"It was a hard decision which brought me to this place. Behind this decision stood the will, if necessary, to call force to my aid in order to make you free. We wish to be only the happier and the more thankful that this last and gravest appeal was not necessary to procure for us our rights. . . ."

"I did not know how or by what way I should one day come here. But that I would stand here one day, that I knew! If I now stand before you here, it is not only you who have to thank me, but I would also thank you

¹ *F.Z.*, 4 Oct. 1938.

² I take these sentences from *Die Reden des Führers nach der Machtübernahme. Eine Bibliographie*, Berlin, Eher, 1939, pp. 172-3.

³ See the quotation from the speech in *The Times*, 5 Oct. 1938.

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for your loyalty, your affection, and your readiness for sacrifice."¹

In his speech in Berlin at the opening of the Winter-help Campaign (5 October 1938) Hitler spoke of the significance for Germany's foreign policy of the country's domestic unity: "When six years ago I took over the leadership of the Reich one of our so-called 'statesmen' of that day said: 'Now this man has taken the decisive step. Up to now he has been popular, because he has been in opposition. Now he must govern and we shall see in six or eight weeks how his popularity will look'! Six years—not six weeks only—have passed and I believe that they have been the most decisive years for German history. The most characteristic feature of this period is the close unity of the German people. What I have achieved in these six years was possible only because I had standing behind me the whole German people. The problems which faced us no single man could solve unaided: only when he could speak and, if necessary, also act in the name of the whole German people could he master these questions. We have realized this perhaps most vividly in the months, weeks, and days which lie behind us. On 28 May I set before myself a great purpose. It was at that time a difficult decision. I believed that it could become accomplished fact and I could believe that because I knew: behind me stands the whole German people and it is ready to answer every demand upon it." And this unity is based upon the conception of the German Volksgemeinschaft—the community of the people. . . . "During the last few months and weeks I have had in my foreign policy a great helper, and previously, in my last speech in this hall [the Sportpalast], I expressed my thanks to the man who took his

¹ *V.B.*, 6 Oct. 1938.

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stand in support of Germany as a true, great friend, Benito Mussolini. He has thrown into the scale of a just solution the entire force not only of his own genius (*Ingeniums*) but of the power which stands behind him. I must also thank the two other great statesmen who at the last minute recognized the historic hour, declared themselves ready to give their support to the solution of one of Europe's most burning problems and who thereby made it possible for me, too, to offer the hand towards an understanding. But above all my thanks fly to the German people which in these long months has never deserted me. . . . I am proud of my German people! I hope that in a few days the problem of the Sudeten Germans will be finally solved. By 10 October we shall have occupied all the areas which belong to us. Thus one of Europe's most serious crises will be ended, and all of us, not only in Germany but those far beyond our frontiers, will then in this year for the first time really rejoice at the Christmas festival. It should for us all be a true Festival of Peace."

"Above us all stands the motto (*Gebot*): 'no one in the world will help us if we do not help ourselves.' This programme of self-help is a proud and manly programme. It is a different programme from that of my predecessors who continually ran round through the world, going a-begging now in Versailles, then in Geneva, now in Lausanne or at some Conference or other elsewhere. It is a prouder thing that to-day we Germans are determined to solve our own problems and to help ourselves."

Hitler then thanked all the workmen who had been forced to leave their homes to work on Germany's western defences. Now through all these sacrifices "we have been witnesses of a great turning-point in history. At this moment we must bethink ourselves, too, of those who

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through twenty years in an apparently hopeless state still nursed a fanatical faith in Germany and never surrendered their *Deutschtum*—their life as Germans. It is so easy here in the heart of the Empire to profess one's belief in Germany.¹ But it is inexpressibly difficult, in the face of an unceasing persecution, not to allow oneself to be drawn away from this faith—to remain fanatically true to it, as though redemption were coming the next day. But now the hour of redemption has come. I have just had my first sight of these areas and what moved me so profoundly was two impressions. First: I have often known the jubilation and the enthusiasm of joy, but here for the first time I have seen hundreds of thousands shedding tears of joy. And secondly I saw appalling distress. When in England a Duff Cooper or a Mr. Eden say that injustice has been done to the Czechs, then these men should just for once see what in reality has happened there. How can one so pervert the truth! I have seen here whole villages undernourished, whole towns reduced to ruin. My fellow-countrymen, you have a great debt of honour to pay! . . . I expect of you that the Winter Help Contribution of 1938-9 shall correspond with the historic greatness of this year."

"In the history of our people the year 1938 will be a great, incomparable, proud year. . . . Later historians will show that the German nation found its way back again to the position of an honourable great nation—that our history has once more become a worthy history. . . . We know that all human activity needs for its final success the blessing of Providence, but we also know that this Providence gives its approval only to those who show that they are worthy of it."²

On 9 October 1938 Hitler spoke in Saarbrücken. The

¹ German: *sein Deutschtum zu bekennen*. ² *V.B.*, 7 Oct. 1938.

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people of the Saar knew from their own experience what it meant to be separated from the Reich: they could understand the joy of the Sudeten Germans. "At the beginning of this, the twentieth year after our collapse, I formed the resolution to lead back into the Reich the ten million Germans who still stood outside our frontiers. I was fully aware that this return could be enforced only through our own strength. The rest of the world had neither seen nor wished to see that in opposition to the so-called right of self-determination of peoples ten million Germans were separated from the German Reich and were oppressed because of their loyalty to Germany.¹ And this outside world had neither understood nor wished to understand that these folk had only a single great longing: Back to the Reich! These international citizens of the world, who have indeed pity for every criminal who is called to account in Germany, were deaf to the suffering of ten million Germans. And still to-day this world is filled with the spirit of Versailles. Let no man tell us that they have freed themselves. No! it is Germany which has freed herself from that spirit!"

"A hard decision had to be made: even with us there were weaklings who perhaps had failed to understand that. But it is a matter of course that at all times it was for real statesmen an obligation of honour to accept such a responsibility. There were a number of necessary conditions if this solution were to be effected:"

"1. The internal unity of the nation. I was convinced when I formed my decision that I was the leader of a manly people. I know what perhaps [? many] in the rest of the world and individuals also in Germany do not seem to know: that the people of 1938 is not the people of 1918. Nobody can overlook the mighty educational

¹ German: *wegen ihres Deutschthums*.

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work which our *Weltanschauung* has achieved. To-day a community of the people has arisen of a force and a strength such as Germany has never yet known. That was the first condition for the success of such a struggle as this."

"2. The second was national armament to which I have fanatically devoted my energies for nearly six years.¹ I am of the opinion that it is cheaper to arm oneself before the event than unarmed to fall a victim to events and then pay tribute."

"3. The third condition was the safeguarding of the Reich. You yourselves in this place are witnesses of a vast work which is being brought to completion in your immediate neighbourhood. I do not need to say anything on that point in detail. I have only to express one conviction: that no power in the world will ever succeed in breaking through this wall."

"4. We have also won friends abroad. That axis which in other lands people at times thought that they could ridicule has not only, in the last two and a half years, proved its permanence but has shown that it holds even in the worst hours."

"We are fortunate that this work of the year 1938—the reincorporation of ten million Germans and of some 110,000 square kilometres into the Reich—could be achieved without bloodshed. When I mention the co-operation of the rest of the world in this peaceful solution, I must once more speak first of all of the one true friend whom we possess to-day—Benito Mussolini. We all know what we owe to this man. I would also call to mind the two other statesmen who exerted themselves to find a way to peace and who with us have concluded that agreement which for many millions of Germans

¹ German: *für die ich mich nun seit bald sechs Jahren fanatisch eingesetzt habe*. Note the words *seit sechs Jahren*.

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has secured their rights and for the world has safeguarded peace. But it is precisely the experiences of the last eight months which can and must only strengthen us in our decision to be cautious and to neglect nothing which must be done for the protection of the Reich."

"The statesmen who are opposed to us wish for peace—that we must believe of them. But they govern in countries whose domestic organization makes it possible that at any moment they may lose their position to make place for others who are not very anxious for peace. And those others are in fact there. It only needs that in England instead of Chamberlain Mr. Duff Cooper or Mr. Eden or Mr. Churchill should come to power, and then we know quite well that it would be the aim of these men immediately to begin a new World War. They make no secret of the fact: they admit it openly. We know further that now, as in the past, there lurks in the background the menacing figure of that Jewish-international foe who has found a basis and a form for himself in a State turned Bolshevik. And we know further the power of a certain international Press which lives only on lies and slanders. That obliges us to be watchful and to remember the protection of the Reich. At any time ready for peace, but at every hour also ready to defend ourselves!"

"I have therefore decided, as I announced in my speech at Nuremberg, to continue the construction of our fortifications in the West with increased energy. I shall now also bring within the line of these fortifications the two large areas which up to the present lay in front of our fortifications—the district of Aachen and the district of Saarbrücken. I am happy, further, to state that during the next few days I shall be able to revoke those measures which we had to introduce during the months and weeks of crisis. Then, I am glad to say, all

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the hundreds of thousands of our men will be able to return once more to their homes and our reservists can be discharged. I thank them for the way in which they carried out their service and did their duty. In particular I thank the hundreds of thousands of German workmen, engineers, and the like—of whom ten thousand are standing in your midst to-day—who have worked here on our fortifications. You have played your part in helping Germany to safeguard peace". . . .

"As a powerful State we are at any time ready for a policy of understanding with our neighbours. We have no demands to make of them. We want nothing but peace. There is only one thing that we want and that applies particularly to our relations with England. It would be a good thing if in Great Britain people would gradually drop certain airs¹ which they have inherited from the Versailles epoch. We cannot tolerate any longer the tutelage of governesses! Inquiries of British politicians concerning the fate of Germans within the frontiers of the Reich—or of others belonging to the Reich—are not in place. We for our part do not trouble ourselves about similar things in England. The outside world might often have reason enough to concern itself with its own national affairs or, for instance, with affairs in Palestine. We at any rate leave that to those who feel themselves ordained by the good God to solve these problems, and we can only observe with astonishment how pat they are with their solutions. We would like to give to all these gentlemen the advice that they should busy themselves with their own affairs and leave us in peace! That, too, is part of the safeguarding of world-peace. We have great tasks before us. Vast cultural and economic problems must be solved. No people has greater need of peace than we, but no people knows

¹ German: *Allüren*.

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better than we what it means to be weak, to be delivered over to the favour or disfavour of others."

"My fellow-countrymen, in this year a great national work of unification has been completed: the re-establishment of a proud, strong, and free German Reich. You yourselves here have had to share in so much suffering that you will understand my anxiety for the future of this Reich—will understand why I call upon the whole German people always to be on their guard and ready for whatever may come. It is like a miracle that in so few years we should be able to experience a new German resurrection. It might have been so different. We want always to remember that; it should reinforce our resolution to serve this people. Every man of us and every woman must subordinate all personal interests the moment that the greater interest of our people and Reich demands the sacrifice."

Hitler closed the speech with the words: Together with the millions of Germans who have returned to the Reich "all of us wish to join in a profession of faith, a profession of allegiance to our glorious united German Reich: Germany, Sieg Heil!"¹

On 18 October 1938 François-Poncet, the French Ambassador, had an interview with Hitler at Berchtesgaden at which Ribbentrop was present. At the time it was desired to keep strictly secret what had been said by Hitler at this interview. On 30 October M. Lucien Lamoureux, Radical Socialist deputy for the Allies and four times a French Cabinet minister, published an account of the interview in "Le Bourbonnais Républicain" and of this account a summary was given in "The Times" for 31 October 1938 (cf. the "News Chronicle" for 1 November 1938). We now have the reports of that interview sent by François-

¹ F.Z., 10 Oct. 1938.

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Poncet to Bonnet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, the first in a telegram dated 19 October 1938, the second in a long and vivid dispatch dated 20 October 1938.

From the former a passage may be cited:

Évoquant l'accord de Munich, M. Hitler a exprimé son regret que les lendemains eussent laissé subsister une tension dangereuse entre les grandes Puissances et n'eussent pas répondu à son espoir. A l'égard de la France, il s'est livré à des appréciations assez indulgentes, mais il a relevé en revanche avec amertume l'attitude anglaise dans laquelle il craignait, disait-il, de voir la manifestation d'un antagonisme foncier.

Le Chancelier s'est, pour l'essentiel, déclaré disposé à rechercher les moyens qui pourraient amener une amélioration des conditions présentes et à développer les virtualités que l'accord de Munich semblait contenir en lui en vue d'un apaisement et d'un rapprochement.

1° M. Hitler accepterait de signer un accord par lequel la France et l'Allemagne reconnaîtraient réciproquement leurs frontières et exprimeraient leur volonté de ne pas y porter atteinte.

2° Il concevrait que ce texte fût accompagné d'un engagement de consultation mutuelle pour toutes les questions qui seraient de nature à exercer des répercussions sur les rapports entre les deux pays.

3° *Effleurant le problème de la limitation des armements, M. Hitler a paru très irrité et vivement frappé par les mesures d'ordre militaire annoncées en Angleterre et aux États-Unis. Il estime qu'en raison des difficultés pratiques que rencontrerait, si on voulait l'aborder directement, l'établissement d'un programme de limitation des armements, il serait plus judicieux et plus opportun de commencer par un programme d'humanisation de la guerre (bombardement des villes ouvertes, etc.).*

4° *Abordant les questions économiques*, éventualité par exemple d'une stabilisation des monnaies, M. Hitler en reconnaît à la fois l'intérêt et les complications. Toutefois, peu versé, *déclare-t-il*, en ce domaine, il ferait volontiers en ce cas appel aux services des techniciens."

At the close of the interview Hitler asked Ribbentrop to study the suggestions examined in the course of the interview et de faire préparer en ce sens des projets plus ou moins poussés. Les textes ainsi rédigés nous seraient communiqués pour examen, corrections et critiques éventuelles.¹

From the latter some citations may also be made:

Adolphe Hitler est déçu par les lendemains de l'accord de Munich. Il pensait que la rencontre des Quatre, en éloignant le spectre de la guerre, marquerait le début d'une ère de rapprochement et de meilleures relations entre les peuples. Il ne constate rien de pareil. La crise n'a pas pris fin; elle risque, si la situation ne se modifie pas, d'éclater de nouveau, à brève échéance. L'Angleterre retentit de paroles menaçantes et d'appels aux armes. C'est pour le Chancelier l'occasion de prononcer contre elle, contre son égoïsme et la naïve idée qu'elle a de ses droits supérieurs à ceux des autres, un de ces réquisitoires qu'il a déjà fait entendre à plusieurs reprises en public. . . . Quant à la Tchécoslovaquie il n'est pas vrai qu'il l'ait maltraitée: il n'a revendiqué que les droits du peuple allemand, qui avaient été foulés aux pieds. . . .

En ce qui concerne l'hypothèse d'une reconnaissance écrite par la France et l'Allemagne de leurs frontières mutuelles et d'un engagement de consultation réciproque

¹ *Le Livre jaune français. Documents diplomatiques 1938-1939. Pièces relatives aux événements et aux négociations qui ont précédé l'ouverture des hostilités entre l'Allemagne d'une part, la Pologne, la Grande-Bretagne et la France d'autre part*, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1939, No. 17. Cf. *ibid.*, No. 26.

dans tous les cas pouvant affecter les relations des deux pays il se déclare prêt à s'y rallier immédiatement et c'est au fond ce qui le séduit le plus. Il souligne les difficultés que peut faire surgir une formule de non-agression, si elle doit être accompagnée de réserves relatives au Covenant de la Société des Nations ou à l'existence de pactes conclus avec des tiers. Il souhaite que ces difficultés soient levées ou tournées et ne demande à aucun instant que la France renonce à son pacte avec la Russie des Soviets.

On the subject of the limitation of armaments Hitler urged that Germany situated in the centre of Europe and exposed to simultaneous attacks on several flanks can attain to real equality only if she possesses a superiority over each of the States which are in a position to attack her. Il craint aussi que s'il parle de limitation des armements, l'opposition anglaise ne prétende qu'il recule devant l'énergie britannique; sa pensée demeure flottante.

With regard to the claims of Hungary he frankly admitted that les Hongrois ont des prétentions qu'il juge excessives. Il ajoute, il est vrai, que les cessions et les concessions des Slovaques sont trop maigres. Pour lui le seul criterium est l'ethnographie, la race; c'est le seul dont il se soit réclamé vis-à-vis des Tchèques pour le tracé des nouvelles frontières; les Hongrois, les Polonais n'ont qu'à s'y tenir, eux aussi; visiblement l'effort de ceux-ci pour se doter d'une frontière commune ne lui est pas sympathique. Le Chancelier se vante d'avoir fait échouer le recours, proposé par la Hongrie, aux quatre Puissances de Munich. Il croit avoir, de la sorte, écarté un péril certain." "Une telle conférence, dit-il, nous aurait placés devant deux thèses éloignées l'une de l'autre. J'aurais été obligé, quelle que fût mon opinion intime, de me prononcer pour les Hongrois et les Polonais, à cause des liens politiques qui nous unissent à eux;

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Mussolini aurait agi de la même façon. Vous, cependant, et les Anglais, pour des raisons analogues, vous auriez défendu les Tchèques. Ainsi trois semaines après l'accord de Munich, nous aurions eu de nouveau un conflit, qui cette fois ne se fût pas arrangé. J'ai rendu service à l'Europe en l'évitant. J'ai préféré exercer une pression sur les Hongrois et les Tchèques et les persuader de renouer les pourparlers interrompus, en se montrant, les uns et les autres, moins intransigeants. Mussolini m'a aidé. J'espère qu'une transaction interviendra. Mais toute l'affaire est dangereuse. On voit à cette occasion combien la France et l'Angleterre ont eu tort d'accorder à la Tchécoslovaquie la garantie de ses frontières, avant même que celles-ci ne fussent clairement définies. Il en peut sortir encore les plus fâcheuses complications."

*En ce qui concerne l'Espagne le Chancelier me répète qu'il n'a jamais eu l'intention de s'y procurer un établissement durable. Il s'y est assuré quelques avantages économiques; mais il les aurait obtenus de toute manière. Il ne songe nullement, déclare-t-il, à se servir de l'Espagne comme d'une menace permanente contre la France. L'Espagne elle-même a besoin d'avoir avec la France de bonnes relations. L'attitude du Général Franco pendant la crise de septembre l'a clairement démontré. Qu'on retire donc tous les volontaires étrangers et qu'on laisse face à face les deux partis espagnols, Franco finira dans ces conditions par l'emporter, et la France n'aura pas à s'en plaindre.*¹

Hitler's speech at Krumau in occupied South Bohemia (20 October 1938) does not add much: they had been able, he said, in 1938 to secure for all time the addition of ten million fellow-countrymen to the German Reich: "and

¹ Ibid., No. 18.

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¹ Ibid., No. 18.

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that we have done without the necessity of staking our all. But our success was possible only because we were armed for this last venture and were prepared to stake everything on the issue."¹

*On 26 October Hitler addressed a large concourse at Znaim in the occupied area of Southern Moravia. His tour through the newly recovered districts, he said, he had undertaken as the representative of the whole German people to demonstrate that the power of the Reich would never more depart from this land. "You can all be proud to belong to the greatest and strongest Reich of Europe." He said that "from the first the decision had been irrevocable: in one way or another they had been determined to march into the Sudetenland on 2 October. . . . He only would secure his rights who was strong enough to fight for them." The one essential thing was the co-operation of the entire community: "the decisive point was that each should have the consciousness that this Germany was his Germany, that Germany belonged to him and to his children and that he for his part belonged body and soul to this Germany."*²

*To this report of the speech in the German Press the "Manchester Guardian" adds: "The German troops occupied this territory on 2 October. They would have done it even if an agreement had not been reached at Munich, for the Reich was ready to envisage all eventualities and the German people had decided to make justice triumphant whatever the cost."*³

In the final speech of this tour, delivered in the occupied territory at Nikolsburg (Southern Moravia) on 27 October 1938, Hitler said: "If every German has learned first

¹ *V.B.*, 21 Oct. 1938.

² *F.Z.*, 27 Oct. 1938.

³ *M.G.*, 27 Oct. 1938.

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and always to be a German, then this Reich, mighty and secure, will tower into eternity."¹

By an order issued by Hitler on 30 October 1938 Sudetenland was constituted a "Gau" of the NSDAP. with Konrad Henlein as deputy Gauleiter, acting for Karl Hermann Frank. Under this order Hess issued a decree whereby the Sudeten German Party was merged as from 5 November 1938 in the NSDAP.²

In a speech at a meeting of the NSDAP. held at Weimar on 6 November 1938 Hitler described the early growth of the Movement: "What seems to us almost a miracle as we look back upon it is nothing else than the reward for infinite and unwearying labour. . . . And now for that labour we have received from Providence our reward, just as the Germany of 1918 received its reward." At that time Germany shared in those blessings which we think of under the collective idea "Democracy". "But Germany has learned that democracy in practice is a different thing from democracy in theory. If to-day at times in foreign countries Parliamentarians or politicians venture to maintain that Germany has not kept her treaties, then we can give as our answer to these men: The greatest breach of a treaty that ever was was practised on the German people. Every promise which had been made to Germany in the Fourteen Points—those promises on the faith of which Germany had laid down her arms—was afterwards broken. In 1932 Germany was faced with final collapse. The German Reich

¹ *V.B.*, 28 Oct. 1938. Hitler had chosen Nikolsburg for his last speech in the recovered territory because in that town in 1866 there had been signed the peace that brought to a close the Austro-Prussian War.

² The German text of Hitler's order and of the decree of Hess is printed in *V.B.*, 2 Nov. 1938.

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and people both seemed lost. And then came the German resurrection. It began with a change of faith. While all the German parties before us believed in forces and ideals which lay outside of the German Reich and outside of our people, we National Socialists have resolutely championed belief in our own people, starting from that watchword of eternal validity: God helps only those who are prepared and determined to help themselves. In the place of all those international factors—Democracy, the Conscience of Peoples, the Conscience of the World, the League of Nations, and the like—we have set a single factor—our own people.”

Hitler once more spoke of the power of the single community of the people and of the Movement which was the support of that unity, the NSDAP. “We were all convinced that a true community of the people is not produced overnight—it is not attained through theories or programmes—but that through many decades, yes, and perhaps always and for all time the individual must be trained for this community. This work of education we have carried through ever since the Party was founded and especially since we came into power. But nothing is perfect in this world and no success can be felt to be finally satisfying. And so, even to-day, we have no wish to maintain that our achievement is already the realization of our ideal. We have an ideal which floats before our minds and in accordance with that ideal we educate Germans, generation after generation. So National Socialism will continually be transformed from a profession of political faith into a real education of the people.”

And our second task was the selection of leaders of a new type: “the umbrella-carrying types of our former *bourgeois* world of parties are extinguished and they will never return.” . . .

And the third task was the creation of our new army.

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"From the very first day I have proclaimed as a fundamental principle: 'the German is either the first soldier in the world or he is no soldier at all.' No soldiers at all we cannot be, and we do not wish to be. Therefore we shall be only the first. As one who is a lover of peace I have endeavoured to create for the German people such an army and such munitions as are calculated to convince others, too, to seek peace."

"There are, it is true, people who abuse the hedgehog because it has spines. But they have only got to leave the animal in peace. No hedgehog has ever attacked anyone unless he was first threatened. That should be our position, too. Folk must not come too near us. *We* want nothing else than to be left in peace; we want the possibility of going on with our work, we claim for our people the right to live, the same right which others claim for themselves. And that the democratic States above all others should grasp and understand, for they never stop talking about equality of rights. If they keep talking about the rights of small peoples, how can they be outraged if in its turn a great people claims the same right? Our National Socialist army serves to secure and guarantee this claim of right."

"It is with this in view that in foreign policy also I have initiated a change in our attitude and have drawn closer to those who like us were compelled to stand up for their rights."

"And when to-day I examine the results of this action of ours, then I am able to say: Judge all of you for yourselves: Have we not gained enormously through acting on these principles?"

"But precisely for this reason we do not wish that we should ever forget what has made these successes of ours possible. When certain foreign newspapers write: 'But all that you could have gained by the way of negotiation',

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we know very well that Germany before our day did nothing but negotiate continuously. For fifteen years they only negotiated and they lost everything for their pains. I, too, am ready to negotiate but I leave no one in any doubt that neither by way of negotiation nor by any other way will I allow the rights of Germany to be cut down. Never forget, German people, to what it is you owe your successes—to what Movement, to what ideas, and to what principles! And in the second place: always be cautious, be ever on your guard!"

"It is very fine to talk of international peace and international disarmament, but I am mistrustful of a disarmament in weapons of war so long as there has been no disarmament of the spirit."

"There has been formed in the world the curious custom of dividing peoples into so-called 'authoritarian' States, that is disciplined States, and democratic States. In the authoritarian, that is, the disciplined States, it goes without saying that one does not abuse foreign peoples, does not lie about them, does not incite to war. But the democratic States are precisely 'democratic', that is, that all this can happen there. In the authoritarian States a war-agitation is of course impossible, for their Governments are under an obligation to see to it that there is no such thing. In the democracies, on the other hand, the Governments have only one duty: to maintain democracy, and that means the liberty, if necessary, even to incite to war."

Hitler said that he had recently named three of these agitators: Mr. Churchill had stated his view publicly, namely that the present régime in Germany must be overthrown with the aid of forces within Germany which would gladly co-operate. "If Mr. Churchill would but spend less of his time in émigré circles, that is with traitors to their country maintained and paid abroad, and

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more of his time with Germans, then he would realize the utter madness and stupidity of his idle chatter. I can only assure this gentleman, who would appear to be living in the moon, of one thing: there is no such force in Germany which could turn against the present régime. In Germany there is only one force, the force of the German nation in its leadership and in those who follow that leadership, in its army and in its arms (*in Wehr und in Waffen*)."

"I will not refuse to grant to this gentleman that, naturally, we have no right to demand that the other peoples should alter their constitutions. But, as leader of the Germans, I have the duty to consider this constitution of theirs and the possibilities which result from it. When a few days ago in the House of Commons the Deputy Leader of the Opposition declared that he made no secret of the fact that he would welcome the destruction of Germany and Italy, then, of course, I cannot prevent it if perhaps this man on the basis of the democratic rules of the game should in fact with his party in one or two years become the Government. But of one thing I can assure him: I can prevent him from destroying Germany. And just as I am convinced that the German people will take care that the plans of these gentlemen so far as Germany is concerned will never succeed, so in precisely the same way Fascist Italy will, I know, take care for itself!"

"I believe that for us all these international hopes can only teach us to stand firm together and to cling to our friends. The more that we in Germany form a single community, the less favourable will be the prospects of these inciters to war, and the closer we unite ourselves in particular with the State which is in a position similar to ours, with Italy, the less desire they will have to pick a quarrel with us!"

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The year 1938 as they looked back on its course could fill them with the greatest pride and joy. "Germany has become greater by the most natural way, by a way which could not be more morally unassailable." The consequence of the experience of this year must be a resolution never more to desert this successful path. "When the rest of the world speaks of disarmament, then we, too, are ready for disarmament, but under one condition: the war-agitation must first be disarmed!"

"So long as the others only talk of disarmament, while they infamously continue to incite to war, we must presume that they do but wish to steal from us our arms in order once more to prepare for us the fate of 1918-19. And in that case my only answer to Mr. Churchill and his like must be: That happens once only and it will not be repeated!"

. . . My faith in the German people has been wonderfully justified: I am so proud and happy that I can be your leader. "In these last weeks our German people has displayed just as splendid a picture of resolute determination as that which I came to know in the critical periods of the War: no nervousness, no haste, no uncertainty, no feeling of despair, but confidence, and loyal following of its leaders. Every single man and every single woman knew that Fate might demand of us the supreme hazard. To this unity and to this calm we owe it that we were spared this supreme hazard. Fate did not call us into the lists because it knew that we were strong. That knowledge we would take with us as our lesson for all time. Then nothing can harm our loved Germany—not now, nor for all eternity. Germany, Sieg Heil!"¹

At the reception of the new French Ambassador, Robert Coulondre, at Berchtesgaden on 22 November 1938 Hitler welcomed the expression of an intention "to contribute

¹ V.B., 7 Nov. 1938.

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towards the creation of stable relations of confidence between Germany and France"—"I agree that our peoples have every reason to foster good-neighbourly relations in mutual respect, to complement each other both in the cultural (*geistig*) and the economic sphere, and honourably to co-operate."

"Peaceful competition of our two peoples, between which to-day those far-reaching points of dispute on the delimitation of frontiers which have so often burdened the past no longer exist, can—I, too, am convinced—only contribute to a many-sided¹ enrichment, not only of our two countries, but of the whole of Europe."²

Of this interview the report sent by Coulondre to Bonnet, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 23 November 1938 has now been published. According to this report Hitler, speaking of Franco-German relations, said: "Ces relations je désire qu'elles soient pacifiques et bonnes, et je n'aperçois pas de raisons pour qu'elles ne le soient pas. Il n'y a aucun motif de conflit entre l'Allemagne et la France." Me regardant, writes Coulondre, avec insistance mais sans aucune dureté, il a ajouté: "J'espère en tout cas que si jamais des difficultés s'élevaient, vous vous emploieriez à les aplanir, dans le même esprit que votre prédécesseur et avec la même sincérité."

Coulondre referred to Hitler's words to François-Poncet (see p. 1537 supra). Hitler replied qu'il était désireux pour sa part de traduire sans retard dans les faits les dispositions qu'il avait marquées à mon prédécesseur et il a répété qu'aucune question territoriale ne restait en suspens entre la France et l'Allemagne. . . .

"Je suis un ancien combattant, je sais ce que c'est que la guerre, je veux en épargner les épreuves à mon peuple; même une modification de frontière entre nos

¹ The German text has *zur einseitigen Bereicherung*; I can make no sense of this: read *vielseitigen*.

² *F.Z.*, 23 Nov. 1938.

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deux pays ne suffirait pas à justifier les sacrifices qui devraient être consentis. Voilà mon avis et je sais que c'est aussi celui du Président Daladier."

On saying Good-bye Hitler added: "Nous sommes des anciens combattants; si jamais des difficultés surgissent, nous saurons les régler pacifiquement."¹

At a later date (29 April 1939) Coulondre reporting to Bonnet wrote: *Seule compte pour lui (Hitler) la force des armes: . . . je me permets de rappeler les paroles que M. Hitler m'a dites lors de notre première rencontre:* "Ne croyez pas que l'Alsace-Lorraine ne représente rien pour moi: c'est parce qu'il faudrait verser trop de sang allemand pour reprendre Strasbourg que je me suis décidé à clore la querelle franco-allemande."²

On 8 November 1938—the anniversary of the "Putsch" of 1923—Hitler spoke in the Bürgerbräukeller at Munich. He spoke of the use which international Jewish parasites had made of social differences in Germany: what happened in the years 1914 to 1918 was nothing but the slow working out of these rifts in social life. It became no longer a question of a defensive war waged by the German nation but of a struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat. The German people in its infatuation transformed its domestic social struggle into a civil war. "I believe that I have the right to declare that if at that time Fate had placed me at the head of the State this collapse would not have come. One collapse there would certainly have been—the collapse of our ruinous parties. Just as they were destroyed in 1933, I would already have destroyed them then. And just as since then Germany has at once risen again, so then Germany would not have first been overthrown."

¹ See the report of Coulondre to Bonnet, *French Yellow Book*, No. 23.

² *Ibid.*, No. 108.

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"The outside world knows well enough why it sheds tears for the passing of democratic ideas. If to-day once more an English leader of the Opposition says that we Germans should show our friendliness towards the world by liberating the imprisoned enemies of the State, then I say: I have myself once been an imprisoned enemy of the State. But I have never observed that the English Opposition leaders ever once put in their word for me. I know well why they support these German enemies of the State: for these enemies of the State were then, and they are to-day, the allies of the outside world."

Hitler then considered the principles which had previously governed the selection of political leaders—capacity in the economic sphere had been taken to be synonymous with a gift for political leadership,¹ while a supposed "knowledge"² was the determining factor. A clean sweep of the old system had to be made: the Party found its earliest adherents mainly amongst the masses. "There instinct is supreme and from instinct comes faith. Our few everlasting critics judge from the standpoint of their own intellectualism. They are therefore, even as building-stones, unusable in the community of the people. Not even to-day can they be turned to use! They are no missionaries (*Glaubensträger*); they are not imperturbable, and above all they cannot be relied upon in moments of crisis and danger. For while the healthy common folk instinctively close their ranks forthwith to form a community of the people, the intellectuals run this way and that like hens in a poultry-yard. With them it is impossible to make history: they cannot be used as elements supporting a community."

¹ Cf. p. 471 *supra*.

² German: *das sogenannte vermeintliche "Wissen" entscheidend sein sollte.*

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Hitler then defended himself against those who said that the "Putsch" of 1923 had been a mistake: out of the blow which he then suffered the Movement had emerged only the stronger. "The deed at that time suffered shipwreck, but in that shipwreck it brought more blessing than to-day we dream. If we had not acted, if Kahr and his fellows had then succeeded in their separatist schemes, I do not know what path Germany's fate would then have taken." Hitler quoted Clausewitz at considerable length; the statement of the latter's belief closed with the words:

"I believe that in most conditions a people in its courageous fight for its freedom is unconquerable;"

"I believe that even the ruin of this freedom after a bloody and honourable fight secures the people's rebirth and is the seed of life from which a new tree strikes its bitter root;"

"and I declare and affirm to the world and to posterity that I regard the false cleverness which seeks to withdraw itself from danger as the most ruinous thing which fear and terror can impart."

"I declare and affirm," Hitler continued, "to the world and to posterity that I for my part in 1923 acted on this conviction, and from the collapse of those days sprang in fact that tree which we call Great Germany." . . . The bourgeois parties have failed to understand that "the greatest things in history have very often had their beginnings in bloodshed." Now to-day we can look back upon a great historic success. "It is very seldom granted to a generation to fight so mighty a fight and yet to live to see its triumph. That is a special reward of Providence for us all. As we look back on this past we wish to-day more than ever to resolve not to desert our old principles and virtues! That means: we wish to be watchful, to take heed. Our experience has been too

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bitter, too full of pain, that we should ever be able lightly to put our faith in anyone who lets his siren tones come to our ears from the world without. I believe only in the rights which we ourselves are able and determined to take under our own protection. And in the second place I believe only in the reward which one earns for oneself. Nothing in this world will a people receive as a gift. You know that just now in a certain quarter the attempt is once more being made to speculate upon the credulity and good nature of our people in the hope that still there may be found in the German people certain stirrings of sentimentality. You, my old fighters, will understand me if in the face of these attempts I remain quite cool and reserved."

"It would be very fine if the world would bethink itself and would take a new path, a path of general, peaceful justice. We should be happy if we were to observe any signs of such a change of outlook. But for the moment I see only one thing: on every hand a world of menace and a world which is arming itself. People say: 'We have now found a new basis for a peaceful development: it is for that reason that we must arm.' I personally do not quite understand this solution, although I raise no protest against it. But nowhere must I be misunderstood. When I read every day in the foreign newspapers that our armament profoundly disturbs the world about us, then I can assert one thing only: 'The one thing which would disturb me would be the German nation's failure to arm! The armaments of the others do not disturb me!' But on this point there can be no doubt: if the world clothes itself in armour, the German people will not be the only one to wander about the earth armed with nothing but a palm-branch of peace. In that case we shall do everything which is necessary to secure peace for ourselves. When people

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complain that we give such little credence to their peaceful assurances, then I must revert to my most recent speeches. It is not as though we desired to be presumptuous and to lecture others on the form of their Constitutions. I have no desire at all that others should adopt National Socialist principles. Let them keep their democracy and we will keep our National Socialism. But as a German statesman I am myself obliged in the interest of my people to study the measures adopted by the others, to examine the questions arising from such measures, and to consider possible dangers. And here I am not prepared to receive instructions from a member of the British Parliament. When someone says 'We meant always that the dictatorships should be destroyed—not the German or the Italian people', the only answer which I can give him is: That sort of talk was possible before November 1918, but not after. Then the same circles stated that it was only a matter of overthrowing 'Prussian militarism', only a matter of overthrowing the dynasty, it was only the house of Hohenzollern that was in question and not the German people. After that the German people would be led to its freedom within the framework of international democracy. Then we got to know what this 'freedom' meant. The German people learned its lesson. A collapse such as Germany then experienced through its credulity will not repeat itself in the next thousand years. On that point I can assure all those who believe that they can kindle a war-agitation against the German people. One can no longer delude Germany with phrases such as these. As responsible leader I will direct the attention of the nation to dangers, and I see a danger in the fact that in other countries there is a continuous incitement to war. He who does not wish to believe that has only to look at certain very recent happenings. It is no long time since

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in the English House of Commons questions of civil aviation were being discussed and a new civil aeroplane was said to be especially useful and serviceable. On that occasion a member of the Opposition called out 'It is to be hoped that it can also carry bombs to Berlin.' We know what that means! Perhaps someone may reply: 'Yes, but that is only a member of the Opposition.' And my answer is: 'According to the constitution of the democracies the Opposition of to-day may be the Government of to-morrow. In general that is in fact the rule.' "

"We are very thankful when in France and England the leading men will have nothing to do with such ideas and wish to live in good relations¹ with Germany. We have more than once stated that we want nothing from these countries save the return of our former colonies— unjustly taken from us. But I have always affirmed that that is, of course, no occasion for war. It is, let us say, a question of justice and of a real desire to make it possible for nations to live together. Otherwise we have no demands to make of these countries and we ask nothing from them. We wish only to carry on business with them, that is to say, we wish to trade with them. So when people talk of 'understandings', we do not know on what we should come to an understanding."

"But there is one thing I must keep in view. In France and England there are certainly men at the helm who wish for peace, but there are others who make no secret of the fact that they want war with Germany. I am compelled to state this quite soberly before the nation and to draw the consequences which arise from that fact. To-morrow Mr. Churchill may be Prime Minister. And when a British leader of the Opposition explains: we do not wish to destroy the German people,

¹ German: *auf gutem Fuße*.

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only the régime, the two are precisely identical, for nobody can destroy the régime without destroying the German people. When someone declares that he wishes to liberate the German people from the régime, then I would say to him: 'For the German people you are not the competent authority!' If there is anyone at all who is the competent authority for the German people, then, gentlemen of the British Parliament, that person is myself! The régime in Germany is a domestic affair of the German people, and we would beg to be spared every form of schoolmasterly supervision! Besides, I have an idea that we have more achievements to our credit than all these gentlemen, above all, we have set our State in order, which cannot be said of all countries in the world."

"I am therefore compelled to consider also the outlook of those who to-day are not in the Government, but who may be in the Government to-morrow and who leave no doubt of what they are thinking in their own minds.¹ The German people will understand why I utter this warning and why I myself am determined to take all measures so as to be safeguarded from every attack. And I can further give the assurance: the German people is in no fear that bombs may fall upon it from Mars, let us say, or from the moon. Here, too, as is the way of Germans, we shall keep within limits. But I am determined to strengthen the defences of the Reich to the utmost extent, and I know that in this the whole German people will agree with me. That, doubtless, means sacrifices. But it is better that we should accept these sacrifices than that we should one day make them in favour of the outside world in the form of contribu-

¹ On the difficulty of concluding treaties with countries the foreign policy of which may rapidly change cf. Heinrich Rogge, *Kollektivsicherheit, Bündnispolitik, Völkerbund* (Berlin, Junker & Dünhaupt, 1937), p. 303, n. 1; R. W. Seton-Watson, *Britain and the Dictators* (Cambridge University Press, 1938), p. 22.

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tions or, as they were called in the past, of reparations. For us there can be only the one decision, that which I expressed at Saarbrücken: at any time we are ready for peace: we have not broken the peace. But also at any time we are ready to defend ourselves and that, too, with manliness and resolution."

"Then if anyone says to me: 'You wish to make history not by the way of right but by the way of force', I can only say: The Germany of to-day has not refused to gain its rights by the way of negotiation. Year after year we have sought to attain our rights by the way of negotiation. Especially members of the English Parliament have no reason to doubt that, for it is by the way of negotiation that we concluded a treaty with England.¹ If the others refused to co-operate, we cannot help that. But people must note one fact: National Socialist Germany will never go to Canossa! We have no need to do so. If the rest of the world obstinately bars the way against any attempt to let rights be recognized as rights by the way of negotiation, then there should be no surprise that we secure for ourselves our rights by another way if we cannot gain them by the normal way."

"When these British advocates for world-democracy now declare that in one year we have destroyed two democracies, then I can only ask, What is democracy then after all? Who has the right to speak in the name of democracy? Has the good God handed over to Mr. Churchill and Mr. Duff Cooper the key to democracy? Is this inscribed on tables of the law which are in the possession of the British Opposition? Democracy in our eyes is a régime that is supported by the will of the people. Formerly I became Chancellor in Germany under the rules of Parliamentary Democracy—and that, too, as the leader of by far the strongest party. Under

¹ The Naval Agreement.

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the rules of Parliamentary Democracy I obtained the absolute majority of votes and to-day—of course Mr. Churchill can doubt it—I have the unanimous support of the German people. In this year I have not overthrown two democracies but, I might almost say, as Arch-Democrat, I have overthrown two dictatorships—the dictatorship of Herr Schuschnigg and the dictatorship of Mr. Beneš. I have, it is true, endeavoured to persuade these two dictatorships to introduce for their subjects the right of self-determination by the way of Democracy. In this endeavour I failed. Only then was the strength of the great German people thrown into the scale in order to establish Democracy in these countries, that is, to give freedom to the oppressed.”

“The gentlemen of the English Parliament can assuredly be quite at home in the British World-Empire, but not in Central Europe. Here they lack all knowledge of the conditions of events, and of relationships. They will not and must not regard this statement of fact as an insult, we for our part are in the last resort not so well informed on India or Egypt, not to speak of Palestine. But I could wish that these gentlemen would at this moment concentrate the prodigious knowledge which they possess and the infallible wisdom which is their peculiar property on, let us say, precisely Palestine. What is taking place there has a damnably strong smell of violence and precious little of democracy. But all that I merely cite as an example, in no way as criticism, for after all I am only the representative of my German people, not an advocate for the cause of others. And that is where I differ from Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, who are advocates for the entire world.”

“I am only the representative of my people. As such I do everything I consider to be necessary, and if Mr. Churchill says to me: ‘How can the Head of a State

cross swords with a member of the British Parliament?' I answer: Mr. Churchill, you should feel only the more honoured. From the fact that in Germany even the Head of the State is not afraid to cross swords with a member of the British Parliament you can judge how high is the prestige of a member of the British Parliament with the German people. And besides, I am not the Head of the State in the sense of being either Dictator or Monarch: I am the Leader of the German People! I could have given to myself—of that folk may be convinced—quite other titles. I have kept my old title and I will keep it so long as I live, because I do not wish to be anything else and never think of becoming anything else. The old title contents me. Mr. Churchill and these gentlemen are delegates of the English people and I am delegate of the German people—the only difference lies in the fact that only a fraction of the English votes were cast for Mr. Churchill, while I can say that I represent the whole German people."

"My old fellow-fighters, if I summon you and, together with you, the whole German people to watchfulness, I have a holy right to do so. During these few years I have won great successes for the nation. The nation must understand that I am always anxious for its security. I would not, at the end of my days, have to close my eyes with the same sombre prophecies on my lips as was the case with Bismarck. I would wish that what has been won with so much labour should be preserved for ever through the mighty strength of the whole German nation. Thereby the legacy which our dead have bequeathed to us finds its fulfilment. . . . To-day fifteen years after their death [in the "Putsch" of 1923] with heads held high we can come before their sepulchres and say to them:"

" 'Dear Comrades, what you then longed and hoped

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for is now fulfilled, and, beyond that, what then you never thought was possible that, too, is accomplished fact. Not only is the Germany of those days united, but now there stands before you Great Germany with her new strong army. You have had your share in the success of this work. As its first martyrs you have rendered possible the later way which the Movement went: you enabled me then to steer the legal course, while despite our legality we could still be regarded as a manly Movement. You are the beginning of that great line of martyrs whom we reverence, fighters who have fallen on the field in the struggle for the community of the people; you are of those whose death, we know, has had its share in the creation of the Reich of to-day.' ”

“Thus I can only beg you ever fervently, in the fight for our Reich, to believe in our people, this eternal German people. These great masses of our working people were once the support of our battle, they are to-day the support of our Reich, and in the future, too, it is they who will sustain Germany. Our Germany, Sieg Heil!”¹

For the negotiations leading up to the Franco-German Declaration of 6 December 1938 (containing a mutual guarantee of the frontiers of the two States and a promise of consultation in the event of international difficulties) see *The French Yellow Book*, Nos. 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27. For the French text: *ibid.*, No. 28; for the German text: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges* (= Auswärtiges Amt 1939, Nr. 2), p. 222, and see *ibid.*, Nr. 330-2, *The French Yellow Book*, Nos. 29-35. For the interpretation of the Agreement: *ibid.*, Nos. 163, 168.

1939

In his New Year proclamation to the German people on 1 January 1939 Hitler said: “The tasks of the future are

¹ *F.Z.*, 10 Nov. 1938.

as follows: The first task is and remains—as in the past so now and always—the education of our people into the National Socialist community. The second task consists in the building up and the strengthening of our army. The third task we see in the execution of the Four Years Plan, in the solution of the problem of labour shortage, and, above all, in the economic incorporation of the new territories of the Reich. In foreign policy, Germany's position is fixed and definite. The obligations arising from our friendship with Fascist Italy are for us clear and inviolable. Our sympathy with the historic role played by Mussolini in the service of the maintenance of peace during the past year compels us to feel profound gratitude. But we are grateful also to the other statesmen who in this year undertook with us to seek and to find ways to a peaceful solution of urgent problems. In world policy, our political attitude is conditioned by the Anti-Comintern Pact. For the rest, we have always only one wish, that in the coming year, too, we may succeed in contributing to the general pacification of the world. May the blessing of Almighty God go with our German people on its path of destiny!"¹

At Berchtesgaden on 5 January 1939 Beck had an interview with Hitler; in his memorandum on that interview he wrote:

Dans un long discours, le Chancelier expliqua comment on en est arrivé à l'arbitrage de Vienne,² et il en rejeta

¹ F.Z., 1 Jan. 1939. For a report of Hitler's state of mind in January 1939 see the letter of de Montbas, French Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, to Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs, *The French Yellow Book*, No. 36.

² For the arbitration (in the frontier dispute between Hungary and Czechoslovakia) conducted by Germany and Italy and the award of 2 Nov. 1938 cf. *The Bulletin of International News* xv, No. 23 (19 Nov. 1938), pp. 14-18 (with maps).

la faute sur la tactique du Gouvernement hongrois, le Gouvernement de Budapest n'ayant pas réalisé le postulat relatif à la Ruthénie Subcarpathique.

Le Chancelier fit observer qu'il tendait d'une manière continue à entretenir avec la Pologne une politique inaugurée par l'accord de 1934.¹ La communauté des intérêts de l'Allemagne et de la Pologne en ce qui touche la Russie était à son avis complète. Pour l'Allemagne, la Russie, qu'elle soit tsariste ou bolchéviste, était tout aussi dangereuse. La Russie bolchéviste est peut-être pire, étant donné la propagande communiste. Par contre, la Russie tsariste était plus dangereuse, militairement, et plus impérialiste. C'est pour ces raisons qu'une Pologne forte était purement et simplement une nécessité pour l'Allemagne. Ici, le Chancelier fit observer que chaque division polonaise, engagée contre la Russie, épargnait une division correspondante allemande.

Le Chancelier constata ensuite qu'il s'intéressait à l'Ukraine du point de vue économique, mais qu'il n'y avait aucun intérêt d'ordre politique.

En passant aux questions dantzikoises, le Chancelier fit observer que Dantzig, en tant que ville allemande, devra tôt ou tard faire retour au Reich. Il fit observer qu'à son avis on pourrait, par voie d'entente commune, trouver quelque issue à la situation et aussi une modalité de garantir les justes intérêts aussi bien de la Pologne que de l'Allemagne. Si, dans cette question, on réussissait à aboutir à une entente, on pourrait écarter toutes les difficultés entre les deux États. Il insista sur ce que, en ce cas, il serait prêt à faire une déclaration analogue à celle qu'il fit à la France au sujet de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine, et à l'Italie au sujet du Brenner. Enfin, sans le préciser, il attira l'attention sur la nécessité d'une plus grande liberté de communication entre le Reich et la Prusse Orientale.

¹ i.e. the Declaration of 26 Jan. 1934.

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M. Beck répondit au Chancelier que le problème de Dantzig était des plus épineux. Il ajouta que, dans la suggestion du Chancelier, il ne voyait aucun équivalent et, que, à ce sujet, l'opinion polonaise, non seulement ceux qui s'occupaient de politique, mais toutes les couches de la population, se montrait extrêmement susceptible.

En réponse, le Chancelier déclara que, dans l'affaire dantzikoise, il conviendrait de rechercher quelque chose de tout à fait nouveau, une nouvelle forme qu'il appela la 'Körperschaft', laquelle, d'une part, garantirait les intérêts de la population allemande et, de l'autre, les intérêts polonais. Le Chancelier affirma de plus que le Ministre pourrait être complètement tranquille, qu'il ne se produirait à Dantzig aucun fait accompli et que rien ne serait entrepris qui pût rendre difficile la situation du Gouvernement polonais.¹

There is another account of this interview of 5 January 1939 in the German White Book: I have translated this in so far as it reports what Hitler said: I have not thought it relevant to translate the lengthy report of what Beck said at this interview.

Hitler in reply to Beck said that "in order to clear up all existing differences the first thing necessary was to revert to the fundamental tendencies of the relation between Germany and Poland. On the German side he could stress the fact that there had been not the slightest alteration in Germany's attitude to Poland: it remained that which was represented by the Non-Aggression Declaration of 1934. So far as concerned the Carpatho-Ukrainian question, in view of the intentions attributed to Germany in the world-Press, he could state that Poland

¹ *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques, &c.*, pp. 78-9; and see further on this interview the report given by Léon Noël, the French Ambassador at Warsaw, of Beck's account of this interview in *The French Yellow Book*, No. 37.

had nothing whatever to fear in this respect. Germany had no interests beyond the Carpathians, and it was immaterial to him what countries which were interested in these areas did there. The attitude taken up by Germany, in connexion with the Vienna award,¹ in the Ukrainian question which had perhaps led in Poland to certain misunderstandings was to be explained from the historical development of this matter. This award had been put into execution, after hearing both parties, on the basis of the Hungarian claims. His (the Führer's) wish not to give any ground for an international conflict had been in the last resort the factor which determined his attitude in the Ukrainian question."

"So far as the details of the relation between Germany and Poland were concerned he wished to repeat once more that since 1934 there had been no change in the German position. In order finally to clear up the questions which were still in suspense between the two countries one must not restrict oneself to the more negative agreement of the year 1934 but must seek to bring the individual problems to a final settlement by mutual agreement. On the German side apart from the question of Memel, which would find its settlement in the way which the Germans desired (it looked as though the Lithuanians were willing to co-operate in a reasonable solution), so far as the relation between Germany and Poland was concerned there was the very difficult problem for German susceptibilities of the Corridor and Danzig: for that a solution must be found. In his view, in this case solutions were to be sought along quite new paths, and traditional forms must be abandoned. One could, for example, in the case of Danzig conceive of a settlement by which this city in accordance with the wish of its population might be restored so far as its

¹ Cf. note 2, p. 1561 *supra*.

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political position was concerned to the German community; in any such arrangement Polish interests, especially in the sphere of economics, must of course be fully and completely safeguarded. That would undoubtedly be also in Danzig's interest, for Danzig in economics could not live without a *hinterland*, and thus he, the Führer, could imagine a formula by which Danzig could politically form part of the German community, while in the economic sphere it remained Polish."

"Danzig is German, will always remain German, and sooner or later will come to Germany."

"As concerned the Corridor which for Germany, as he had already said, presented a difficult psychological problem the Führer pointed out that for the Reich the connexion with East Prussia was of vital interest just as was for Poland the connexion with the sea. Perhaps here, too, one could do justice to the interests of both parties through seeking a solution by the use of completely new methods."

"If on this reasonable basis the individual questions could be successfully and finally cleared up, provided always of course that justice was done to the rights of each of the two parties, then the time would have come in the case of Poland, too, to add to the more negative Declaration of 1934 in a positive sense, as had been done in the case of the agreements with France, by Germany's giving to Poland a clear guarantee of her frontiers which would be defined in a treaty. Poland would then gain the great advantage of having its frontier with Germany including the Corridor secured by treaty. The Führer once more stressed the psychological difficulty of this problem and the fact that only he could effect such a solution. It was not for him (the Führer) a very simple matter to give such a guarantee of the Corridor—he

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would undoubtedly be considerably criticized, especially by the *bourgeoisie*. But as a *Realpolitiker*—one who looked facts in the face—he believed in spite of this that some such solution would be best. Just as folk no longer talked of South Tyrol or Alsace-Lorraine, so one would hear just as little about the Polish Corridor when once Germany had given her guarantee.”¹

*There may be added from a later report of Coulondre to Bonnet (dated 9 May 1939) the statement: “Lorsque le Chancelier Hitler a reçu M. Beck à Berchtesgaden, il aurait étalé devant lui une carte d’Europe modifiée de sa main. Sur cette carte, Dantzig et le Corridor étaient rattachés au Reich; la Pologne annexait, quant à elle, la Lithuanie et recevait le port de Memel. M. Beck aurait été profondément surpris de ce spectacle.”*²

For Hitler’s reply to Mgr. Cesare Orsenigo, doyen of the Diplomatic Corps in Berlin, on 12 January 1939, see p. 656 supra.

20 January 1939. Dr. Schacht is removed from the Presidency of the Reichsbank and his place is taken by Walther Funk, Minister of Economics. The official communiqué stated that “the complete fulfilment of the economic tasks necessary for the reconstruction of Great Germany demands a unified control of economic policy, the money market and the market for capital. For this reason the Führer has ordered that the control of the Reich Ministry of Economics and of the Reichsbank should be unified.”

In a letter to Dr. Funk Hitler stated that “his tasks would be

(i) to guarantee, as before, the unconditional stability

¹ *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges* (= Auswärtiges Amt 1939, Nr. 2), Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1939, pp. 127–8.

² *The French Yellow Book*, No. 124.

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of wages and prices and thus to preserve the value of the mark;

- (ii) to open up the capital market to an increased extent and to place it at the disposal of private money requirements; and
- (iii) to bring to a conclusion the conversion—inaugurated by the law of 10 February 1937—of the Reichsbank, formerly removed by the Dawes Plan from Reich sovereignty, into a German bank of issue unconditionally subject to the sovereignty of the State, a conversion which is in accordance with National Socialist principles.”¹

In his speech delivered in the Reichstag on 30 January 1939 Hitler said:

“I will now in a few sentences give you the facts of the historic events of the memorable year 1938.”

“Among the fourteen points which President Wilson promised Germany in the name of all the Allies as the basis on which a new world peace was to be established when Germany laid down her arms was the fundamental principle of the self-determination of peoples. The peoples were not simply to be transferred like chattels from one sovereignty to another by the arts of diplomacy, but in the name of the most sacred natural rights were to determine for themselves the course of their lives and their political existence.”

“The proclamation of this principle might have been of fundamental importance. Actually, during the following period the Allied Powers of the day also applied these theories when they could make them serve their own selfish purposes. Thus they refused to return Ger-

¹ Text of the letter in *F.Z.*, 21 Jan. 1939. For the significance of Dr. Funk's appointment see *The Times* and *Daily Telegraph* of the same date.

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many's colonial possessions, alleging that it would be wrong to return the native inhabitants of the colonies to Germany against their will. But of course in 1918 no one took the trouble to find out what their will was. But while the Allies thus upheld the right of self-determination for primitive negro tribes, they refused in 1918 to grant to a highly civilized nation like the Germans the rights of man which had previously been solemnly promised to them. Many millions of German citizens were torn from the Reich against their will, or prevented from uniting with it. Indeed, in sharpest contrast to the solemn promise of the right of self-determination, the Peace Treaty of Versailles even forbade the union of the Germans of the Ostmark with the Reich at a moment when efforts were being made in Austria to give effect to the right of self-determination through plebiscites."

"All efforts to bring about a change in the situation through the normal method of reasonable revision had hitherto failed, and were bound to fail in the future, in view of the well-known attitude of the Versailles Powers. Indeed, all the articles dealing with revision in the Covenant of the League of Nations had only a Platonic significance."

"I myself, as a son of the Ostmark, was filled with the sacred wish to solve this problem, and thus lead my homeland back to the Reich. In January 1938 I finally resolved that in the course of that year, in one way or another, I would fight for and win the right of self-determination for the six and a half million Germans in Austria."

"(1) I invited Herr Schuschnigg, then Chancellor of Austria, to an interview at Berchtesgaden, and made it clear to him that the German Reich would no longer inactively tolerate any further oppression of these German comrades. I therefore suggested that he should

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approach a final solution of this problem by means of a reasonable and equitable agreement. I left no doubt in his mind that otherwise freedom, in accordance with the principles of the right of self-determination, would be forcibly obtained for those six and a half million Germans by other suitable means. The result was an agreement which permitted me to hope for a solution of this difficult problem by means of a general understanding."

"(2) In my Reichstag speech of 22 February¹ I stated that the Reich could no longer be indifferent to the fate of the ten million Germans in Central Europe who were separated from the motherland against their will. I stated that, above all, further oppression and mistreatment of these Germans would lead to the most energetic counter-measures."

"A few days later Herr Schuschnigg decided to violate in a glaring manner the agreement which he had entered into at Berchtesgaden. His idea was by means of a faked plebiscite to destroy the legal basis of the national right of self-determination and will of these six and a half million Germans. On the evening of Wednesday, 9 March, I learned of this intention through Schuschnigg's speech at Innsbruck. That night I ordered the mobilization of a certain number of infantry and mechanized divisions, with orders to cross the frontier on Saturday, 12 March, at 8 a.m. in order to liberate the Ostmark. On the morning of Friday, 11 March, the mobilization of these Army and S.S. units was completed; they took up their positions during the course of the day. Meanwhile, in the afternoon, owing to the pressure of all the events and the rising of the citizens in the Ostmark, Schuschnigg resigned."

"On Friday night I was asked to order the German troops to march into Austria, in order to prevent grave

¹ Speech of 20 Feb. 1938; see p. 1376 *supra*.

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internal disorders in that country. Toward 10 p.m. troops were already crossing the frontier at numerous points. At 6 a.m. the next morning the main body began to march in. They were greeted with tremendous enthusiasm by the population, which was thus at last free. On Saturday, 13 March, at Linz, through the two laws which are known to you, I decreed the incorporation of the Ostmark in the Reich and caused the members of the former Austrian Army to swear allegiance to me as the Commander-in-Chief of the German Forces. Two days later the first great military parade took place in Vienna."

"All this had happened with truly breath-taking rapidity. Our faith in the speed and efficiency of the new German forces was not disappointed. Our expectations were exceeded. The conviction of the great value of this excellent instrument had been confirmed in the course of a few days."

"The first election to the Greater German Reichstag, which took place on 10 April, expressed the overwhelming approval of the German nation. Approximately 99 per cent. showed by their vote that they approved of what had been done."

"A few weeks later, influenced by the international campaign of hate carried on by certain newspapers and individual politicians, Czechoslovakia began an intensified oppression of the Germans within her borders."

"Close upon three and a half millions of our fellow-countrymen live there in self-contained settlements which for the most part adjoined the boundaries of the Reich. Together with the Germans who were driven out during the twenty odd years by the Czech reign of terror, this makes a total of over four million persons who were retained in this State against their will and were ill treated to a greater or less degree. No world Power with

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any sense of honour would have watched such a state of affairs permanently. The man responsible for this development, which gradually made Czechoslovakia the exponent of all hostile intentions directed against the Reich, was Dr. Beneš, at that time President of the State. It was he who, at the suggestion and with the co-operation of certain foreign circles, carried through the Czech mobilization in May of last year, which had the aim of (1) provoking the German Reich, and (2) lowering the international prestige of the Reich. Despite a declaration twice given to the Czechoslovakian President, Mr. Beneš, in my name that Germany had not mobilized a single soldier, despite the same assurances [which] it was possible to make to the representatives of foreign Powers, the fiction was maintained and disseminated that Czechoslovakia for her part had been forced to mobilize in consequence of the German mobilization, and that Germany had thus had to countermand her own mobilization and to renounce her plans. Mr. Beneš caused the version to be spread abroad that it was through his resolute measures that the German Reich had been kept in her proper place. But now, since Germany had neither mobilized nor had the slightest intention of attacking Czechoslovakia, this development had inevitably to lead to a serious loss of prestige for the Reich. In view of this intolerable provocation, which was further intensified by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of our fellow countrymen living in those territories, I therefore resolved to solve once for all, and this time radically, this Sudeten German question. On 28 May, I ordered:

(1) that preparation should be made for military action against this State by 2 October;

(2) that the construction of our Western defences should be greatly extended and speeded up."

"For the purpose of settling with Mr. Beneš and to

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protect the Reich against other attempts to influence or even to threaten it, the immediate mobilization of ninety-six divisions was planned to begin with, and arrangements were made whereby these could be supplemented in a short time by a larger number."

"Developments late in the summer and the plight of the Germans in Czechoslovakia showed that these preparations were justified."

"The various stages of the final settlement of this problem are a matter of history. Once more the military preparations, which affected the whole of the services and some S.S. and S.A. units, as well as numerous police, as in the case of Austria, were completely successful. In the west, the mobilization of Dr. Todt's organization, headed by its brilliant leader, achieved, thanks to the devotion of all the officers, soldiers, Labour Service men, and labourers who participated in that work, a unique result, which history in the past could never have believed possible."

"If certain newspaper and politicians in the rest of the world now allege that Germany thus threatened other nations by military blackmail it can only be as a result of crude distortion of the facts. Germany restored the rights of self-determination to 10 million of her fellow-countrymen in a territory where neither the British nor any other Western nation have any business. By so doing she threatened no one, she merely offered resistance to attempted interference by a third party. And I need not assure you, Gentlemen, that in the future as well we shall not tolerate the Western States' attempting to interfere in certain matters which concern nobody but ourselves in order to hinder natural and reasonable solutions by their intervention. We were all happy therefore when, thanks to the initiative of our good friend Benito Mussolini, and thanks also to the highly appreciated readiness

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of Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier, it became possible to find the elements of an agreement which not only allowed of the peaceful settlement of a matter which admitted no further delay, but could moreover be looked upon as an example of the possibility of a general and sensible treatment and settlement of certain vital problems."

"All the same we should not have achieved such agreement among the big Powers in Europe without the firm determination to settle this problem one way or another."

"The Sudeten German people have for their part also had an opportunity of sanctioning the process of their incorporation into the Greater German Reich by an individual and free expression of their will."

"They expressed their consent with the same overwhelming majority that the election of the first Greater German Reichstag exhibited."

"We thus have before us to-day a representation of the German nation which can claim to be regarded as a truly constituent assembly."¹

In the same speech Hitler said:

"The great colonial possessions, which the Reich once acquired peacefully by treaties and by paying for them, have been stolen,² contrary indeed to the solemn assurances given by President Wilson which were the basic condition on which Germany laid down her arms."

"The objection that these colonial possessions are of no importance in any case should only lead to their being returned to us with an easy mind. But the objection that this is not possible because Germany would not know what to do with them, since she did not do anything with

¹ Authorized English translation (as above) in pamphlet form published by Müller & Sohn, Berlin, pp. 6 sqq.

² Cf. Sir Nevile Henderson, *The Failure of a Mission. Berlin 1937-1939*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1940, p. 64.

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them before, is ridiculous. Germany, who was late in acquiring her colonial possessions, had only a relatively short time to develop them, and before the War was not faced by the same acute needs as to-day. This objection is consequently just as foolish as if anybody were to question a nation's capacity to build a railway because it had no railway a hundred years ago."

"The further objection that her colonial possessions cannot be returned to her because Germany would thus acquire a strategic position is a monstrous attempt to deny general rights to a nation and a people *a priori*."

"For this can be the only reason. Germany was in any case the only State which set up no colonial army, since she trusted to the terms of the Congo Acts which were afterwards broken by the Allies. Germany does not require her colonial possessions at all in order to set up armies there—she has a sufficiently large German population for this purpose at home—but to relieve her economic difficulties. But even if this be not believed, it is wholly immaterial and in no way affects our rights. Such an objection would only be justified if the rest of the world wished to give up its military bases and were only forced to maintain them if Germany were to be given back her colonies."

"The fact remains that a nation of 80 millions will not be willing permanently to be assessed differently from other nations. The fallacy and poverty of these arguments clearly show that at bottom it is only a question of power, in which common sense and justice receive no consideration."¹

Later in the same speech Hitler spoke of the cold rejection of Germany's claim for the restoration of her former colonies: "If these gifted statesmen and politicians in the other countries draw up an account of the net profits

¹ Authorized English translation, pp. 28-9.

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which have accrued to them from the military and colonial inequality and therefore the general legal inequality for which they have so persistently contended, then they will perhaps hardly be able to contest that they have already paid far too much for their supposed military superiority, and the wonderful colonial possessions they took from Germany. Economically it would have been wiser to have reached a reasonable and prudent agreement with Germany in regard to the colonies and European politics, rather than to have taken a course which perhaps yields enormous dividends to the international armament profiteers, but at the same time forces the gravest burdens on the nations. I estimate that the three million square kilometres of German colonial possessions which have fallen to England and France, together with the refusal to accept Germany on a basis of political and military equality, will in a short time have cost England alone 20 milliard gold marks; and I am afraid that in the not too distant future this sum will increase at an even greater rate. With the result that, so far from yielding golden profits, the former German colonies cost a great deal. The objection could be raised that this would also apply to Germany. Granted, it is no great pleasure for us either; there is one difference between us: we are struggling for a vital right, without which we cannot in the long run live; whereas the others are struggling to uphold an injustice which is only a burden to them and yields no profit whatsoever.”¹

“Germany has no territorial demands against England and France, apart from that for the return of our colonies. While the solution of this question would contribute greatly to the pacification of the world, it is in no sense a problem which could cause a war.”²

In his review of Germany's relations with other Powers

¹ Authorized English translation, p. 35. ² Ibid., p. 50.

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Hitler spoke of the alliance with Italy and of the incalculable service performed by Fascism towards the preservation of civilization. In the imagination of countless individuals of every race the belief in a new renaissance in our day is linked with Italy and Germany. "The solidarity of these two régimes is therefore more than a matter of egoistic expediency. On this solidarity is founded the salvation of Europe from its threatened destruction by Bolshevism. For this reason Germany stood by Italy when she fought her heroic struggle for her vital rights in Abyssinia. In 1938 Fascist Italy repaid us abundantly for this act of friendship. Let no one in the world make any mistake as to the resolve which National Socialist Germany has made as far as this friend is concerned. It can only serve the cause of peace if it is quite clearly understood that a war waged against the Italy of to-day will, once it is launched and regardless of its motives, call Germany to the side of her friend. . . . As regards National Socialist Germany, she is well aware of the fate that awaits her if ever an international Power, whatever its motive, should succeed in overcoming Fascist Italy. We realize the consequences which would follow upon such an event and face them unflinchingly. The fate of Prussia in 1805 and 1806 will not be repeated a second time in German history. . . . The National Socialist State realizes the danger and is determined to take all steps to counteract it."

"I know, too, that not only our own Defence Forces but also Italy's military power are equal to the severest military requirements. . . . National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy are strong enough to safeguard peace against everyone and to end resolutely and successfully any conflict which irresponsible elements lightly start."¹

¹ Authorized English translation, pp. 48-9.

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To these passages two others may be added; Hitler in the same speech said:

"We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be any difference of opinion to-day among the true friends of peace with regard to the value of this agreement. One only needs to ask oneself what might have happened to Europe, if this agreement, which brought such relief, had not been entered into five years ago. In signing it the great Polish Marshal and patriot rendered his people just as great a service as the leaders of the National-Socialist State rendered the German people. During the troubled months of the past year the friendship between Germany and Poland was one of the reassuring factors in the political life of Europe."¹

"Yugoslavia is a State which has increasingly attracted the attention of our people since the War. The high regard which the German soldiers then felt for this brave people has since been deepened and has developed into genuine friendship. Our economic relations with this country are undergoing constant development and expansion, just as is the case with the friendly countries of Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, and Turkey. The essential reason for this is to be found in the natural conditions which make it possible for these countries and Germany to complement each others' economic systems."

"Germany is happy to-day in the possession of peaceful frontiers in the West, South, and North."

"Our relations with the Western and Northern States Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic States become all the more satisfactory with the increasing tendency in these countries to turn away from certain articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which involve danger of

¹ Authorized English translation, p. 51.

war. No country appreciates better than Germany the value of genuinely friendly and neutral States on its frontiers. May Czechoslovakia, too, succeed in re-establishing internal order in a manner which will exclude any possibility of a relapse into the tendencies of the former President, Dr. Beneš."¹

On the interview of Chvalkovsky, Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, with Hitler see the latter's statement in his speech to the Reichstag on 28 April 1939 (p. 1620 infra) and cf. the report sent from Prague (dated 7 February 1939) by de Lacroix (representing France in Prague) of the account given to him by Chvalkovsky of this interview.² Hitler and Ribbentrop refused to guarantee the frontiers of any State which would not undertake to eliminate the Jews:

"N'imitez pas la sentimentalité et la lenteur que nous avons montrées dans le règlement de ce problème", auraient déclaré les deux hommes d'État. "Notre bonté a été de la faiblesse et nous la regrettons. Il faut supprimer cette vermine. Les Juifs sont nos ennemis jurés et il n'y aura plus un Juif en Allemagne à la fin de cette année. Ce ne sont ni les Français, ni les Américains, ni les Anglais qui sont responsables des difficultés que présentent nos relations avec Paris, Londres ou Washington. Les responsables, ce sont les Juifs. Nous donnerons des avis semblables en Roumanie, en Hongrie, etc. L'Allemagne cherchera à constituer un bloc d'États antisémites, car elle ne saurait traiter en amis les États où les Juifs, soit par leur activité économique, soit par leurs hautes fonctions publiques, conserveraient une influence quelconque."

Le second point sur lequel le Chancelier du Reich aurait insisté au cours de sa conversation avec M. Chvalkovsky,

¹ Authorized English translation, p. 52; German text: *V.B.*, 1 Feb. 1939.

² *The French Yellow Book*, No. 45.

tant au point de vue de la garantie qu'à celui des relations générales entre l'Allemagne et la Tchécoslovaquie, serait la question des droits à accorder à la minorité allemande de nationalité tchécoslovaque: droit de faire donner l'enseignement suivant l'idéologie nationale-socialiste dans les écoles allemandes dont les professeurs juifs ont été expulsés; droit de s'organiser suivant les principes nationaux-socialistes; droit pour les membres de la minorité allemande de porter les insignes nationaux-socialistes. M. Chvalkovsky a remarqué, à ce propos, que les sociaux-démocrates de la minorité allemande s'étaient fondus comme cela était le cas en Allemagne dans la masse nationale-socialiste. Quelques centaines d'individus trop compromis pour oser retourner en Allemagne gardent seuls leur caractère original.

Enfin les hommes d'État allemands auraient demandé la réduction de l'armée tchécoslovaque dans une plus forte proportion que la réduction du territoire et de la population. D'après M. Chvalkovsky qui s'est exprimé d'une manière assez imprécise, aucune mise en demeure n'aurait été faite; il aurait été toutefois indiqué que le Reich était disposé à donner sa garantie à un État neutre, étant entendu qu'un pareil État n'avait aucun besoin d'entretenir une armée importante.

The speech which Hitler delivered in Hamburg on 14 February 1939 at the launch of the warship "Bismarck" is interesting for his estimate of the achievement of Bismarck who "through his inner development was transformed from a politician into the smith who forged the Reich". Not only so: it was he who created the conditions which rendered possible the formation of Great Germany. In spite of all obstacles he laid the foundation stone for the National Socialist unified State, for he began that conquest over the psychological prejudices

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and interests of tribes and States which of necessity was bound to continue. Bismarck failed, for he did not possess the instrument which was essential for the realization of his aims. "His dismissal and the later attitude of some hostile political circles form a shameful chapter of national ingratitude. But Providence proved more just than were the men of his day. Those who opposed him—princes and dynasties, priests of the Centrum dabbling in politics and Social Democracy, Liberalism, the diets of the German States, the parties of the Reichstag—they exist no longer. All of them outlived his death by but a few decades. But National Socialism in its Movement and in the community of the German people has created in the sphere of the mind, in its *Weltanschauung* and its organization, those elements which are capable of annihilating the enemies of the Reich henceforth and for all time."¹

*On 23 February General Franco sent to Hitler the greeting of himself and his army after German troops had marched together with the Spanish forces into Barcelona. Hitler replied: "Germany and her armed forces are happy that German volunteers were able to fight in your young and glorious army side by side with their Italian comrades and thus make a modest contribution towards the liberation of your country and the re-establishment of a proud, national Spain."*²

In a speech delivered at Munich on 24 February 1939 Hitler, addressing the "Old Guard" of the Party, said that against the whole war-agitation of shrieking foreigners he set his own proud confidence which nothing could shake. "You will not regard that, my old comrades, as arrogance. How could a man think otherwise, who twenty years ago began as a man without a name, who

¹ *F.Z.*, 15 Feb. 1939.

² *F.Z.*, 24 Feb. 1939.

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nineteen years ago stood for the first time in this place before a crowd which was still partly hostile and vociferating against him—stood there utterly lonely,¹ who with a few dozen others entered on a fight to win a great Reich, who went on this inconceivably difficult way—how can one think for a second that such a man, now in possession of power, could have any fear of the threats of others? I had no fear then and I should be ashamed of myself and unworthy to be the leader of the German nation if I had any fears to-day. They will not terrify us with their threats. But should they ever really bring the peoples to the madness of a conflict, then surely we would not capitulate. The year 1918 will never be repeated in German history.”²

*13 March 1939. Hitler summoned Mgr. Tiso to Berlin: an interview followed in the afternoon. Hitler is reported to have said “qu’il voulait une Slovaquie entièrement libre et que, quant au reste, c’était au peuple slovaque qu’il appartenait de déterminer lui-même sa destinée”.*³

*“Mgr. Tiso est convoqué à Berlin. Le Führer lui notifie l’invasion prochaine de la Bohême et de la Moravie et l’invite, sous peine de voir la Slovaquie subir le même sort, à provoquer la séparation immédiate et complète de celle-ci d’avec Prague.”*⁴

15 March 1939. 1.10 a.m. Hacha, President of Czechoslovakia, and Chvalkovsky in Berlin are received by Hitler.

¹ German: ganz mutterseelenallein.

² From the short summary of a long speech as reported in *F.Z.*, 26 Feb. 1939.

³ *The French Yellow Book*, No. 62. Report of Coulondre dated 14 Mar. 1939. Cf. No. 66.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 79. On the whole question of an international guarantee of the frontiers of Czechoslovakia, the refusal of Germany to join in such a guarantee, the declaration of independence on the part of Slovakia, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany cf. *ibid.*, No. 35 and Part III of *The French Yellow Book*.

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*"On ne peut dire qu'il y ait eu négociation entre les Ministres tchèques et allemands. Le Führer a fait savoir, dès le début, que sa décision était prise et que quiconque chercherait à résister serait brisé. Les Ministres tchèques ont été informés que l'encaisse-or de la Banque d'émission tchèque devait être mise à la disposition des autorités du Reich. Il en est de même de la totalité d'or et des devises appartenant à des particuliers tchèques."*¹ *Hitler was reported to have declared to the Czechoslovak Ministers "qu'il serait procédé à une terrible répression si la moindre résistance était opposée à l'entrée des troupes allemandes."*² *For this amazing interview there does not appear to be any German report: Goering and Ribbentrop were both present: "Sur un ton brutal le Führer indique qu'il ne s'agit pas de négociations. Les hommes d'État tchèques sont invités à prendre connaissance des décisions arrêtées par Berlin et à s'y conformer. Toute velléité de résistance sera brisée. Toute tentative de s'opposer à la marche des troupes allemandes sera réprimée par l'entrée en action de l'aviation de bombardement. Le Reich a résolu d'annexer la Bohême et la Moravie. Prague sera occupée le lendemain à 10 heures. Le Président Hacha, d'un âge très avancé et qui se trouve dans un état de grande dépression physique, s'effondre et perd connaissance. Les médecins personnels de M. Goering interviennent et le raniment avec des piqûres. Le vieillard signe alors le document qu'on lui présente et en vertu duquel le Gouvernement tchèque remet, "plein de confiance", les destinées de la Bohême et de la Moravie dans les mains du Führer."*³

Coulondre in a report to Bonnet dated 17 March 1938 wrote:

Dès leur arrivée, M. Hacha et son Ministre, qui avaient été reçus avec les honneurs militaires, ont été conduits à la

¹ *The French Yellow Book*, No. 67. Report of Coulondre dated 15 Mar. 1939. ² *Ibid.*, No. 71. ³ *Ibid.*, No. 73.

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Chancellerie où les attendaient le Führer, M. Goering, M. de Ribbentrop et M. Keppler.

Le document à signer se trouvait sur la table, dans sa rédaction définitive, ainsi qu'un mémoire relatif au futur statut administratif de la Bohême et de la Moravie.

Le Führer a exposé très brièvement que l'heure n'était pas aux négociations, mais que les Ministres tchèques avaient été convoqués pour prendre acte des décisions de l'Allemagne, que ces décisions étaient irrévocables, que Prague serait occupée le lendemain dès 9 heures, la Bohême et la Moravie intégrées dans le Reich et érigées en protectorat, et que quiconque chercherait à résister "serait foulé aux pieds" (zerreten). Là-dessus, le Führer a apposé sa signature et est parti. Il était environ minuit et demi.

Une scène tragique s'est alors déroulée entre les Ministres tchèques et leurs trois interlocuteurs allemands.

Pendant des heures entières, MM. Hacha et Chvalkovsky ont protesté contre la violence qui leur était faite, déclaré qu'ils ne pouvaient apposer leur signature sur le document qu'on leur présentait, fait valoir que, s'ils donnaient leur acquiescement, ils seraient à tout jamais maudits par leur peuple. M. Hacha s'est élevé, avec toute l'énergie dont il était capable, contre le statut de protectorat que l'on entendait imposer aux Tchèques et a fait remarquer qu'aucun peuple de race blanche n'était réduit à une telle condition.

Les Ministres allemands se sont montrés impitoyables. Ils ont littéralement pourchassé M. Hacha et M. Chvalkovsky autour de la table sur laquelle se trouvaient étendus les documents, les ramenant toujours devant eux-ci, leur mettant la plume en main et ne cessant de leur répéter que s'ils persévéraient dans leur refus, la moitié de Prague serait détruite dans deux heures par les avions allemands, et que cela ne serait qu'un commencement. Des centaines de bom-

bardiers n'attendaient qu'un ordre pour partir, et cet ordre, ils le recevraient à 6 heures du matin, si la signature n'était pas intervenue d'ici là.

M. Hacha était dans un tel état d'épuisement qu'à plusieurs reprises, il a dû recourir à l'intervention de médecins, qui se trouvaient d'ailleurs à pied d'œuvre dès le début de la scène. Les Ministres tchèques ayant allégué qu'ils ne pouvaient prendre une pareille décision sans l'assentiment du Gouvernement de Prague, on leur a répondu qu'une ligne téléphonique directe existait avec le Conseil des Ministres siégeant actuellement à Prague et qu'ils pouvaient entrer immédiatement en conversation. Effectivement, une telle ligne avait été établie en territoire tchèque, à l'insu des autorités, par les membres de la minorité allemande.

A 4 heures 1/2 du matin, M. Hacha accablé, n'étant plus soutenu que par des piqûres, s'est résigné, la mort dans l'âme, à donner sa signature. En quittant la Chancellerie, M. Chvalkovsky a déclaré: "Notre peuple nous maudira, et pourtant nous avons sauvé son existence. Nous l'avons préservé d'un horrible massacre."¹

On 15 March 1939 Dr. Hacha, President of Czechoslovakia, "in order to secure calm, order and peace in this part of Central Europe" and "in order to reach a final pacification, in full confidence placed the destiny of the Czech people and country in the hands of the Leader of the German Reich. The Führer has accepted this declaration and has expressed his determination to take the Czech people under the protection of the German Reich and to secure for it an autonomous development of its life as a people which shall correspond with its own individual character."²

¹ The French Yellow Book, No. 77.

² German: und ihm eine seiner Eigenart gemäße autonome Entwicklung seines völkischen Lebens gewährleisten. I do not find it easy to render this into English. Text of the agreement: V.B., 16 Mar. 1939.

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On the same day Hitler issued a Proclamation to the German people:

"Germany a few months ago was compelled, in face of the intolerable terrorist régime of Czechoslovakia, to take under its protection German fellow-countrymen living in self-contained areas of settlement;¹ during the last few weeks similar features have reappeared with increasing frequency. In an area in which so many nationalities live side by side this must lead to an intolerable state of affairs."

"As a reaction against these renewed attacks upon the freedom and life of the national groups, these latter have now separated themselves from Prague. Thereby Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist."

"Since Sunday violent excesses have occurred in many places, and numerous Germans have once more fallen victims to this violence. Every hour the appeals for help from the sufferers and the persecuted become more frequent. From the populous islands of German speech which the magnanimity of Germany last autumn allowed to remain as part of Czechoslovakia there begins to flow once more into the Reich a stream of fugitives who have been driven from house and home."

"A continuance of these conditions must lead to the complete destruction of all order in a territory where German interests are vitally concerned, a territory which for over a thousand years did in fact belong to the German Reich."

"In order henceforth finally to put a stop to this threat to peace and to create the conditions necessary for the requisite new regulation of life in this area I have determined to allow German troops to march into Bohemia and Moravia. They will disarm the terrorist bands and the Czech forces which are supporting them,

¹ German: *in geschlossenen Siedlungsgebieten.*

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they will protect all those whose lives are threatened, and they will thus secure the basis for the introduction of a fundamental settlement which will do justice to the traditions formed by a thousand years of history and to the practical needs of the German and Czech peoples."¹

On 16 March 1939 in Prague Hitler signed the following Proclamation:

"For a millennium the territories of Bohemia and Moravia belonged to the living-space (*Lebensraum*) of the German people. Violence and stupidity (*Unverstand*) tore them arbitrarily from their ancient historic setting and at last through their inclusion in the artificial construction of Czechoslovakia created a hotbed of continual unrest. Year by year the danger grew ever greater that from this area, as had already happened once in the past, there might arise a new, vast menace to the peace of Europe. For the Czechoslovak State and its authorities had not been able to organize on a reasonable basis the common life of the groups of peoples arbitrarily united within it and thus to awaken and maintain the interest of all concerned in the preservation of the State of which they all were members. The Czechoslovak State has thus proved its inability to live its own internal life and in consequence has now in fact fallen into dissolution."

"But the German Reich cannot tolerate permanent disturbances in these territories which are of such decisive importance, alike for its own calm and security, as well as for the general welfare and the general peace."

"Sooner or later the Power which through its history and its geographical position is most intimately interested and affected would be bound to suffer the most serious

¹ *V.B.*, 16 Mar. 1939.

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consequences. It is therefore but to obey the dictate of self-preservation if the German Reich is resolved decisively to intervene in order to restore the foundations of a reasonable Central European order and to issue such regulations as are the natural result of such a decision, for through the history of its millennial past the Reich has already proved that thanks to the greatness and also to the characteristics of the German people it alone is qualified to solve these problems."

"Filled with an earnest desire to serve the true interests of the peoples dwelling in this living-space, to secure alike to the German and to the Czech people its own national life and to promote the peace and the social welfare of all, in the name of the German Reich as foundation for the future common life (*Zusammenleben*) of the inhabitants of these territories I order as follows:"

The articles creating the Constitution of the Protectorate were then published: the German text of these is appended to the Proclamation.¹

In an interview on 21 March 1939 of Ribbentrop with Lipski the former said: "The Führer has always worked for an agreement with Poland and a peaceful settlement ('Befriedung'). The Führer is still to-day pursuing the same goal. But increasingly the Führer is filled with surprise at the Polish attitude. . . . No former Government has been in the position to surrender German claims without being swept away by the Reichstag within forty-eight hours. The Führer has other views on the problem of the Corridor. He recognizes the justification for the Polish claim for a free access to the sea. He is the only German statesman who could proclaim a final surrender of claims to the Corridor. But the condition for this surrender is the return to the Reich of the purely German city of Danzig, as well as the creation

¹ F.Z., 17 Mar. 1939.

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of an extra-territorial railway and motor communication between the Reich and East Prussia. Only so will the thorn in the flesh be removed which the existence of the Corridor creates for the German people."¹

On the same day Lipski sent to Beck his report of the interview with Ribbentrop in which Ribbentrop had given an account of his conversation with Hitler on 20 March 1939: "il a constaté que le Führer continuait à être disposé au maintien de bonnes relations avec nous et qu'il lui avait exprimé le désir de voir s'engager un entretien de principe qu'aurait pour objet nos relations communes, entretien qui aurait lieu avec vous [Beck]."²

For the Treaty between Germany and Lithuania under which Memel was restored to the Reich (dated 22 March 1939) see "*Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*" (= *Auswärtiges Amt* 1939 Nr. 2), pp. 228-9.

On 23 March 1939 Hitler arrived in Memel on the torpedo-boat "Leopard" and later addressed the Germans of Memel from the balcony of the Municipal Theatre. He said:

"In the name of the whole German people I greet you to-day, and I rejoice to receive you into our Great German Reich. By this act I bring you back into that homeland which you have not forgotten and which has never forgotten you."

He thanked the Memel-Germans for their brave, manly, and indomitable persistence in maintaining their rights and their allegiance to the German Reich. "You have returned into a mighty new Germany, that once again knows conceptions of honour, whom nothing can overthrow, a

¹ *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges* (= *Auswärtiges Amt* 1939, Nr. 2), Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1939, p. 131.

² *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques*, &c., p. 87.

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Germany who does not wish to entrust her destiny to foreigners and will not do so, a Germany determined to be the mistress of her own destiny and herself to fashion that destiny, even if that should not please the world without. For this new Germany to-day over eighty million Germans take their stand."

Theirs was a border-land and they would realize what it meant to have behind them a mighty Reich, a great united nation. "From distress and suffering a new community has now arisen. That that community shall never more be broken, that is our wish and our determination, and that no other Power in the world shall ever break or bend it, that is our oath. Twenty years of misery and suffering shall be for us a warning and a lesson for all time. What we have to expect from the rest of the world, that we know. For that misery we have no intention to inflict suffering on the world, but the suffering which the world has inflicted on us must come to an end."

*The speech closed with an appeal to the Memel Germans to "express their love, their devotion, their readiness for sacrifice, their faith, their loyalty, and their confidence in the battle-cry 'Our People and our German Reich, Sieg Heil!'"*¹

On 26 March 1939 Hitler sent a telegram to Mussolini: "On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the Fascist fighting forces I think with cordial and faithful friendship of you, the victorious creator of the proud new Italy. Inspired by the same ideals, the German people stands by the side of the Italian people which has been tested through conflict, both of us united in self-defence against all the manœuvres of hatred and incomprehension whose aim it is to

¹ *F.Z.*, 24 Mar. 1939.

suppress the legitimate desire to live of our two peoples and to imperil the peace of the world."¹

*On 28 March 1939 Hitler sent to Franco a telegram in which he said: "I congratulate you most heartily on the occasion of the entry of your troops into Madrid and the final victory thereby won by National Spain over nation-destroying Bolshevism."*²

On 1 April 1939 Hitler spoke in front of the Rathaus in Wilhelmshafen. He said:

"He who would measure the fall and rise of Germany must consider the development of such a town as Wilhelmshafen. But a short time ago a dead place, almost without justification for its existence, without prospects for the future—to-day once more filled with the hum of work and creative activity."

The early prosperity of the town rose together with the rise of the Reich after its struggles for unity. "This Germany was a Germany of peace. While the so-called peace-loving, virtuous nations were waging a whole series of wars, the Germany of that day knew only one aim—to preserve the peace, to work in peace, to raise the prosperity of her people, and thus to contribute to human civilization and culture (*Gesittung*). This Germany of the peace-time with infinite industry, with creative genius, and with persistence had sought to build up her life at home and, through participation in the peaceful competition of peoples, had sought abroad to secure for herself the place in the sun which was her due."

"Despite the fact that for decades this Germany was

¹ I have not the German text of this telegram; I have translated the Italian version published in *Il Giornale d'Italia*, 28 Mar. 1939.

² I have not the German text for this telegram; I cite from the English Press of 29 Mar. 1939.

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the surest guarantee of peace and devoted herself only to her peaceful activities, this did not prevent other peoples, and in particular their statesmen, from following up this rise of Germany with envy and hatred and to it their final answer was war."

"We know to-day from historical documents how at that time a policy of encirclement was systematically pursued by England. We know from numerous statements and publications that in England the view prevailed that it was essential to overthrow Germany by military action, since her destruction would secure for every British citizen a higher measure of the good things of life."

"Assuredly Germany at that time made mistakes. Her most fatal mistake was that, though she saw this policy of encirclement, she failed to take in good time any measures of self-defence. The only guilt with which we can charge the Government of that day is that, though it had full knowledge of the devilish plan of an assault upon the Reich, it could not summon up sufficient resolution to take measures to repel this attack while there was yet time, but allowed this encirclement to ripen until the hour when the catastrophe broke upon us."

"In this war—although its armament was none of the best—the German people fought heroically. No people can claim for itself the glory of having forced us to our knees, least of all that people whose statesmen now talk the biggest. Germany at that time remained unbeaten and unconquered on land, at sea, and in the air. And yet we lost the war. We know the power which conquered Germany. It was the power of lies, the poison of a propaganda which recoiled before no perversion, before no untruth, and, faced with that propaganda, the German Reich, because it was totally unprepared for this attack, stood utterly defenceless."

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There followed the familiar criticism of the Treaty of Versailles and of the breach of those solemn promises on the faith of which Germany had laid down her arms. "Not a single human being in this democratic world cared for the suffering of our people. In the war hundreds of thousands fell, not through the arms of the enemy, but through the starvation-blockade. And when the war came to an end, this blockade was still continued for months in order to extort yet more from our people. Even the German prisoner of war had still to remain a prisoner for unending periods of time. The German colonies were stolen from us, German securities abroad were simply confiscated, our merchant ships were taken from us."

"Added to that there came a financial plundering, such that the world had never seen its like. Upon the back of the German people were piled sums which ran into astronomical figures, sums of which an English statesman said that they could be met only if the whole German people reduced its standard of living enormously and worked fourteen hours a day."

"That which the spirit and the industry of Germany had taken decades to create, that which it had stored in savings, was lost in a few years. Millions of Germans were torn from the Reich, others were prevented from returning to the Reich. The League of Nations became, not the instrument of a policy of a just understanding, but the guarantor of the basest 'Diktat' that had ever been devised by men."

"Thus was violence done to a great people: it was reduced to a misery which you all know. Through a broken pledge a great people had been robbed of its rights and its existence rendered practically impossible."

"To all this a French statesman gave sober expression

when he said: "There are twenty million Germans too many living in the world."¹

"There were Germans who took their own lives in despair, others sank into lethargy before an ineluctable fate, others again thought that everything must be destroyed, others ground their teeth and clenched their fists in helpless rage, others yet again believed that one must re-create the past, restore it as it was. Each one took up one position or another, and then, as an unknown soldier of the World War, I took up my position. . ."
(see p. 120 *supra*).

"If other statesmen say that Right must be supreme in this world, then they can be told: your crime is no Right, your 'Diktat' is neither Right nor Law, but above this 'Diktat' stand the eternal vital rights of the peoples. The German people was not created by Providence obediently to observe a law which suits either Englishmen or Frenchmen: it was created in order to champion its own vital Right. It is for that that we are here!"

"I was determined to take up this struggle for the championship of Germany's vital rights. First, within the nation. In place of a multitude of parties, ranks, and associations there has now come the community of the German people. To realize that and to make it ever deeper, that is the task of us all. At this time I had to cause pain to many. But I believe that the happiness in which to-day the whole nation shares must fully compensate the individual for the sacrifice of that which was precious to himself. All of you have sacrificed your parties, your unions, and your associations, but in their place you have gained a great and powerful Reich."

"And this Reich to-day, thank God, is strong enough to take your rights under its protection. We are no longer dependent on the favour or disfavour of the other

¹ A remark attributed to Clemenceau.

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States or of their statesmen." When six years ago I took over the Government my sole capital was—not foreign currency or gold-reserves—but my faith and your work. "We have now founded a new economic system—a system which is based on this conviction: Capital is work-power and the cover for money lies in our production. We have founded a system which rests upon the noblest of all principles: Fashion yourself your own life. Work out for yourself your existence. Help yourself and then God will help you! Thus we began a gigantic work of reconstruction, supported by the nation's trust, filled with faith and confidence in the nation's eternal values. In a few years we have snatched Germany from this despair, but in our work the world has not helped us!"

"When to-day an English statesman is of the opinion that one can and must solve all problems through frank conversations and negotiations, then to this statesman I would only reply: Before our time you had fifteen years for that! When to-day the world says that one must divide peoples into virtuous nations and those which are not virtuous—and that to the virtuous nations belong in the first place the English and the French and to the not virtuous belong the Germans and the Italians—then all that we can say is: the judgement whether a people is virtuous or not—that a mere man can hardly pronounce—that must be left to the good God."

"Perhaps this same British statesman may then reply: 'God has already pronounced judgement, since He has given to the virtuous nations a quarter of the world and has taken everything away from those which are not virtuous.' And on that one may be permitted to ask: 'By what means then have the virtuous nations gained for themselves this quarter of the world?' And the answer to that question must be: 'They have not been

virtuous methods.' For 300 years this England has acted only as the least virtuous of nations in order now in her old age to talk of virtue! Thus it was that in this period when England was not virtuous 46 millions of English folk conquered almost a quarter of the world, while 86 million Germans because of their virtue had to live 140 to the square kilometre."

"Yes, and only twenty years ago the question of virtue was still not completely cleared up for British statesmen so far as ideas of property were concerned. At that time it was still thought to be compatible with virtue simply to take from another people the colonies which that people had acquired only through treaties or purchase—because one had power to do so—that power which to-day, certainly, is to be regarded as abominable, a thing deserving nothing save men's abomination.¹ To these gentlemen I have one thing only to say: We do not know whether they themselves believe this or not. We presume that they do *not* believe it, for if we were to suppose that they themselves really believed it, then we should lose all respect for them."

"For fifteen years Germany patiently endured its lot and its fate. I, too, at first sought to solve every problem through conversations. In every case I made offers, and every time they were rejected. There can be no doubt that every people has sacred interests, for the simple reason that they are identical with its life and its right to live. When to-day a British statesman demands that every problem which lies in the midst of Germany's vital interests should first be discussed with England, then I could with just as much reason require that every British problem should first be discussed with us. Certainly these Englishmen might answer: 'In

¹ German: *jene Macht, die jetzt allerdings als etwas Abscheuliches und Verabscheuungswürdiges gelten soll.*

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Palestine the Germans have nothing to seek'—and what is more, we do not want to seek anything in Palestine. But just as little as we Germans have anything to seek in Palestine, precisely so little has England anything to seek in our German living-space (*Lebensraum*)."

"And if anyone goes on to explain that these are general questions of Right and Law, I should be prepared to admit this only if they were regarded as of general obligation. We are told that we had no right to do this or that. What right—merely to take a single example—what right has England to shoot down Arabs in Palestine solely because they support the cause of their homeland? Who gives to England the right? In Central Europe at least we have not slaughtered thousands, but we have settled our problems in calm and order."

"There is indeed one thing I wish to state here:"

"The German people of to-day, the German Reich of to-day, they are not prepared to sacrifice their vital interests, and they are not prepared to meet the dangers which arise without taking any action."

"When one day the allies without regard for expediency, for right, for tradition, or even for reason altered the map of Europe we had not the power to stay them. When, however, they expect from the Germany of to-day that she shall patiently leave alone client States, whose sole function it is to be used against Germany, until the day when this function is called into action, then they are confusing the Germany of to-day with the Germany of the period before the War. He who declares himself prepared to pull the chestnuts out of the fire on behalf of these Great Powers must expect to have his fingers burned."

"We have really no hatred for the Czech people: we have lived with each other for many a year. That

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English statesmen do not know. They have no idea that the Hradschin [the Palace in Prague] was built by a German—not by an Englishman—and that similarly the Cathedral of St. Vitus was erected, not by Englishmen, but by German hands.”

“Frenchmen, too, were not active there. They do not know that already, at a time when England was still very small, homage was paid on this height to a German Emperor, that a thousand years before me the first German king stood there and received the homage of this people. This Englishmen do not know, this they cannot know, and have no need to know. It is enough that we know it, and that this territory has lain in the living-space of the German people for a thousand years.”

“But despite this fact we should have had nothing to say against an independent Czech State if (i) it had not oppressed Germans and (ii) if it had not been intended to be the instrument of an attack which was to be launched against Germany.” *Hitler referred once more to the remark of Pierre de Cot (see p. 1519).* “It would have lain with England and France to defend this air-force basis: with us it lay in any event to stop any such attack being made.”

“I thought that this could be attained by a natural and simple method. Only when I saw that every such attempt was doomed to failure and that the elements hostile to Germany would once more win the upper hand and when, further, I saw that this State in its composition had long ago lost any capacity for life, that it had already broken down, only then did I reassert the ancient German right and reunited what through its history, its geographical position, and all the rules of reason had to be united. Not in order to oppress the Czech people: the Czech people will have more freedom than the down-trodden peoples of the virtuous nations!”

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"I have thus, I believe, done a great service to the cause of peace, for I have betimes made worthless an instrument which was destined to be effective in war against Germany. When folk now say that this is the signal proving that Germany now wished to attack the whole world I do not believe that anyone seriously means this: that could be only the expression of an extremely bad conscience. Perhaps it is anger at the failure of a far-reaching plan, or is it perhaps that thereby it is hoped to create the tactical condition necessary for the new encirclement policy? However that may be, I am convinced that in acting thus I have done a great service to the cause of peace."

"And arising from this conviction three weeks ago I decided to give to the coming *Parteitag* the name 'The *Parteitag* of Peace'. For Germany has no thought of attacking other peoples. But what we are unwilling to surrender is the development of our economic relations. There we have right on our side, and I refuse to receive instructions in this sphere from any European or non-European statesman."

"The German Reich is not only a great producer, it also consumes a vast amount."

"As consumers we are an irreplaceable trade partner, and in the same way, as producers, we can pay honestly in goods for that which we consume. We have no thought of going to war with other peoples, always under the condition that they leave us in peace. But the German Reich is in any event not prepared in the long run to tolerate a policy of intimidation or encirclement."

"Some time ago I concluded an agreement with England—the Fleet Agreement. That is based upon the fervent desire which we all possess never to be forced to enter into a war with England. But this wish must be

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shared by both parties. If this wish is no more present in England, then the practical condition for this agreement is destroyed. Germany would accept that too quite calmly! We are so sure of ourselves because we are strong, and we are strong because we are united and besides that because we have eyes to see!"

"And especially in this town there is only one request which I would make of you, my fellow-countrymen: Look with open eyes at the world and at all that is happening around us. Do not deceive yourselves on that which is the most important condition that there is in life: the necessity for having strength of one's own. He who does not possess power loses the right to live. For fifteen years we experienced that. That is why I have made Germany strong again, why I have raised up a military force—on land, at sea, and in the air. When folk in other countries say that now they are arming and that they will continuously increase their armaments, then to these statesmen I have one thing only to say: 'Me you will never tire.' I am determined to continue to march on this path and I am convinced that we shall advance on this path faster than will the others."

"No Power in the world whatever phrases it may use will ever again charm our weapons from our hands. But if anyone should really wish with violence to pit his strength against ours, then the German people is in the position at any time to accept the challenge: it is ready, too, and resolved."

"And our friends think precisely as we do, especially the State with which we are most closely united and with which we march now, and in all circumstances, and for all time."

"This axis is the most natural political instrument there can be in this world. It is a political combination which owes its origin not merely to the deliberations of

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reason and the wish for justice but also to the force of idealism. This construction will last longer than those momentary associations of bodies lacking in homogeneity which are formed on the other side. For if anyone says to me to-day that between England and Soviet Russia there exist no *weltanschaulich* or ideological differences, then I can only say 'I congratulate you, gentlemen'."

"I believe that the time is not far distant when it will appear that the *weltanschaulich* community between Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany is after all different from that between democratic Great Britain and the Bolshevist Russia of Stalin. But should it prove that here in truth there is no ideological difference, then I can only say: How right is my attitude towards Marxism and Communism and towards Democracy. Why two different forms, if after all the content of both is the same?"

"We are experiencing in these days a 'very great triumph and a profound inner satisfaction. A country that had in its turn been laid waste by Bolshevism, in which hundreds of thousands, women and men, children and greybeards, had been massacred, has freed itself, freed itself in spite of all the ideological friends of Bolshevism who have their home in Great Britain, in France, and other countries. We can understand this Spain in its fight only too well and we greet her and congratulate her on her success. That congratulation we Germans can to-day express with special pride, for many young German men have done their duty there. As volunteers they have helped together with others to break a tyrannical Government and to restore to a people its right of self-determination. We rejoice to mark how quickly, how extraordinarily quickly, here, too, has come the *weltanschaulich* conversion of the Red merchants in war-materials, how fully and how suddenly in that

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country people are now coming to understand national Spain, how ready they are to carry on if not *weltanschaulich* at least economic traffic with this national Spain. That, too, is a sign in which direction the development is moving. For, my fellow-countrymen, I believe that all States are faced with the same problems as those which formerly faced us. State after State will either fall a victim to the Jewish-Bolshevist plague or must take measures for self-protection. That is what we have done and we have now raised up a national German people's State. This people's State wishes to live in peace and friendship with every other State, but henceforth it will never again allow itself to be subdued by any State. Whether the world will be Fascist, I know not! That it will be National Socialist I do not believe. But that in the end this world will protect itself from this Bolshevist menace, the gravest menace imaginable, of that I am most profoundly convinced."

"And this is the reason why I believe in a final understanding amongst the peoples which will come sooner or later. Only when this Jewish bacillus infecting the life of peoples¹ is destroyed can one hope to bring about a co-operation of the nations founded on a permanent understanding. To-day we must depend upon our own strength. And we have cause to be content with the results of this reliance upon ourselves—both in our domestic life and in foreign policy. When I came to power, my fellow-countrymen, Germany in her domestic life was torn asunder and powerless; abroad she was the plaything of the will of the foreigner. To-day at home order has returned, and our economic life is flourishing. Abroad we are not perhaps loved, but folk pay heed to us and respect us, and that is the decisive point! And beyond all else we have given to millions of

¹ German: *dieser jüdische Völkerspaltpilz*.

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our fellow-countrymen the greatest happiness that man can give—the return home into our great German Reich.”

“And, in the second place, we have given to Central Europe a great blessing—peace—the peace which is protected by the might of Germany. And this might no force in the world shall ever break: let that be our pledge! And thus we realize that it was not in vain that two million of our fellow-countrymen fell in the Great War. Their sacrifices have helped to bring to birth the new Great German Reich. Their sacrifices have helped to call into being this strong, young Reich of the German people and have helped to maintain its life. And as we think of these sacrifices we, too, if it ever became necessary, would shrink from no sacrifice.”

“They may conclude Pacts, they may put forth their declarations, as many as they wish: I do not set my confidence in papers, but in you, my fellow-countrymen! On us they have practised the greatest breach of faith of all time: let us see to it that our people’s life shall never again crumble from within, and then no one in the world will be able ever to threaten us. Then will peace either remain preserved for our people or, if necessary, it will be enforced. And then will our people thrive and flourish. It will be able to devote its genius, its skill, its industry and its perseverance to the works of peace and human civilization. That is our wish: that is our hope: on that we set our faith.”

“Twenty years ago the Party was founded as a very small thing. Consider the way which has led us from that day to this. Consider the miracle that has been wrought upon us. And remembering this wondrous way have faith also in that way which shall lead the German people into its great future which is to come. Deutschland: Sieg Heil!”¹

¹ *V.B.*, 3 Apr. 1939.

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For the attitude of Poland towards the German proposals see "*Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques*," &c., pp. 90-5.

Ribbentrop in his interview with Lipski on 26 March 1939 said "*que le Chancelier avait dit qu'au point de vue militaire Dantzig n'avait pas d'importance*". He told Lipski that he would communicate the Polish reply to Hitler who was then in Bavaria but that he himself would be bound to adopt towards that reply a critical attitude. "*Il craint*", wrote Lipski to Beck, "*que le Chancelier n'arrive à se convaincre qu'il ne peut parvenir à une entente avec la Pologne*."¹

Danzig: Crisis in March: the SS. and SA. prepare for a "Putsch" on 29 March.

28 March. The President of the Senate, Greiser, with others, flies to Berlin "*et obtenait de la direction du parti que des ordres formels fussent aussitôt adressés aux formations dantziçoises à l'effet d'interdire toute agitation*".²

On the disagreement between the Senate, representing the Government of Danzig, and the National Socialists, led by Gauleiter Forster, M. de la Tournelle, French Consul at Danzig, reported to his Government that at the beginning of April "*Himmler a dû venir ici secrètement . . . il s'est efforcé d'arbitrer le différend, très vif depuis le voyage à Berlin de M. Greiser, à l'effet de faire avorter le putsch préparé par l'entourage de M. Forster. Il aurait été fort mécontent de l'indiscipline régnant dans le district de Dantzig et aurait à son retour dans le Reich proposé le rappel du Gauleiter.*"

¹ *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques*, &c., pp. 92-5. On this cf. the interview of Lipski with Weizsäcker on 6 Apr. 1939, *ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

² From report of M. de la Tournelle (French Consul at Danzig) dated 5 Apr., *The French Yellow Book*, No. 91.

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Il reste à savoir si le Führer, ami personnel de ce dernier, y consentira."¹

5 April. M. de Vaux Saint-Cyr, French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, reports that "dans les milieux officiels la perspective d'une intervention anglo-française en faveur de la Pologne suscite les plus sérieuses appréhensions. Elle exaspère le Fuehrer qui ne décolère pas ces derniers temps."² At the interview at Berlin with the Slovak deputation headed by Mgr. Tiso (5 April 1939) Ribbentrop faisant allusion aux relations entre la Pologne et l'Allemagne a déclaré, à peu près textuellement, au Chef du Gouvernement de Bratislava: Le Führer ne veut pas la guerre. Il ne s'y résoudra qu'à contre-cœur. Mais ce n'est pas de lui qui dépend la décision en faveur de la guerre ou de la paix. Elle dépend de la Pologne. Sur certaines questions d'un intérêt vital pour le Reich, la Pologne doit céder et faire droit à des revendications auxquelles nous ne pouvons renoncer. Si elle s'y refuse, c'est sur elle que retombera la responsabilité d'un conflit, et non sur l'Allemagne.³

7 April 1939. *The German Press adopts towards Poland a tone of menace and intimidation.*⁴

13 April 1939. Daladier makes a declaration to the Press. "La France et la Pologne se garantissent immédiatement et directement contre toute menace directe ou indirecte qui porterait atteinte à leurs intérêts vitaux."⁵

On 23 April 1939 at a meeting at Windhoek Dr. Lierau,

¹ The French Yellow Book No. 104, under date 25 Apr. 1939.

² Ibid., No. 92.

³ Report of de Vaux Saint-Cyr dated 6 Apr. 1939, *ibid.*, No. 93.

⁴ Ibid., No. 94.

⁵ Ibid., No. 99. For the speech of Mussolini delivered in Rome on 20 April: English translation in *International Conciliation. Documents for the year 1939* (New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), pp. 346-7.

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*the new German Consul-General, said that before he left Germany Hitler had asked him to deliver a special message to the Germans of South-West Africa thanking them for their past loyalty to him and expressing the hope that this would continue. Petty strife, personal animosities and differing views were to be set aside and harmony and concord were to rule them. Germans living in South-West Africa were to live hand in hand in full National Socialist brotherhood.*¹

*For Hitler's proposals to Poland cf. the report sent by Coulondre to Bonnet on 22 May 1939 of Ribbentrop's views, a report "recueilli de bonne source": Ribbentrop "considère comme absolument inouï que la Pologne ait rejeté les propositions du Führer. Celles-ci étaient l'œuvre personnelle de M. Hitler. En ce qui le concerne M. de Ribbentrop ne leur aurait jamais donné son approbation. A son avis ils étaient incompréhensibles dans 'leur clémence et leur générosité'. Il était inconcevable que M. Hitler se fût montré à la fois aussi modeste dans ses prétentions et aussi large pour les contre-parties."*²

On 14 April 1939 Roosevelt sent to Hitler and Mussolini his Peace Appeal: the text of this Appeal was published in the English Press on 17 April 1939; it is reproduced in "International Conciliation. Documents for the year 1939" (New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), pp. 293-6.

Hitler summoned the Reichstag for 28 April 1939 in order that the members of the Reichstag "might have an opportunity of hearing my answer first and of either confirming that answer or rejecting it". In his speech he said: "Since the day on which I entered politics I have

¹ I have no German text for this; I quote from the English Press of 25 Apr. 1939.

² *The French Yellow Book*, No. 127; cf. No. 163.

been moved by no other idea than that of winning back the freedom of the German nation, restoring the power and strength of the Reich, overcoming the internal disruption of the nation, remedying its isolation from the rest of the world, and safeguarding the maintenance of its independent economic and political existence."

"I have worked only to restore that which others once broke by force, I have desired only to make good that which Satanic malice or human unreason destroyed or demolished. I have therefore taken no step which violated the rights of others, but have only restored that justice which was violated twenty years ago. The present Greater German Reich contains no territory which was not from the earliest times a part of this Reich, not bound up with it or subject to its sovereignty. Long before an American Continent had been discovered—to say nothing of settled—by white people, this Reich existed, not merely in its present extent, but with the addition of many regions and provinces which have since been lost."

There followed the familiar retrospect with its criticism of the Treaty of Versailles. "One of the most shameful acts of oppression ever committed is the dismemberment of the German nation and the political disintegration of her living space—which has, after all, been hers for thousands of years—provided for in the Dictate of Versailles."

"I have never, Gentlemen, left any doubt that in point of fact it is scarcely possible anywhere in Europe to arrive at a harmony of State and national boundaries which will be satisfactory in every way. On the one hand the migration of peoples which gradually came to a standstill during the last few centuries, and the development of large communities on the other have brought about a situation which, whatever way they look at it, must necessarily be considered unsatisfactory by those

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concerned. It was, however, the very way in which these national and political developments were gradually stabilized in the last century which led many to consider themselves justified in cherishing the hope that in the end a compromise would be found between respect for the national life of the various European peoples and the recognition of established political structures—a compromise by which, without destroying the political order in Europe and with it the existing economic basis, nationalities could nevertheless be preserved. This hope was abolished by the Great War. The Peace-Dictate of Versailles did justice neither to the one principle nor to the other. Neither the right of self-determination nor yet the political, let alone the economic, necessities and conditions for the European development were respected. Nevertheless I never left any doubt that—as I have already emphasized—even a revision of the Treaty of Versailles would also find its limit somewhere. And I have always said so with the utmost frankness—not for any tactical reasons but from my innermost conviction. As the national leader of the German people I have never left any doubt that, wherever the higher interests of the European comity were at stake, national interests must, if necessary, be relegated to second place in certain cases. And—as I have already emphasized—this is not for tactical reasons; for I have never left any doubt that I am absolutely earnest in this attitude of mine. For quite a number of territories which might possibly be disputed I have therefore come to final decisions which I have proclaimed not only to the outside world, but also to my own people, and have seen to it that they should abide by them.” Thus while recognizing the cession of Alsace-Lorraine he had always insisted on the return to the Reich of the Saar territory: “I have never changed my attitude nor will I ever do so. . . . The return of the Saar

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territory has done away with all territorial problems in Europe between France and Germany. . . . I have confirmed this attitude to France as an expression of an appreciation of the necessity to attain peace in Europe instead of sowing the seed of continual uncertainty and even tension by making unlimited demands and continually asking for revision. If this tension has nevertheless now arisen, the responsibility does not lie with Germany, but with those international elements which systematically produce such tension in order to serve their capitalist interests."

"I have given binding declarations to a large number of States. None of these States can complain that even a trace of a demand contrary thereto has ever been made to them by Germany. None of the Scandinavian statesmen, for example, can contend that a request has ever been put to them by the German Government or by German public opinion which was incompatible with the sovereignty and integrity of their State."

"I was pleased that a number of European States availed themselves of these declarations by the German Government to express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neutrality. This applies to Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, &c. I have already mentioned France. I need not mention Italy, with whom we are united in the deepest and closest friendship, Hungary and Yugoslavia, with whom we as neighbours have the fortune to be on very friendly terms. On the other hand I have left no doubt from the first moment of my political activity that there existed other circumstances which represent such a mean and gross outrage of the right of self-determination of our people that we can never accept or endorse them. I have never written a single line or made a single speech displaying a different attitude towards the above-mentioned States. On the other hand

with reference to the other cases I have never written a single line or made a single speech in which I have expressed any attitude contrary to my actions."

"1. Austria. The oldest Eastern March of the German people was once the buttress of the German nation on the south-east of the Reich. The Germans of this country are descended from settlers from all the German tribes, even though the Bavarian tribe did contribute the major portion. Later this Ostmark became the crown lands and the nucleus of a five-century-old German Empire, with Vienna as the capital of the German Reich of that period. This German Reich was finally broken up in the course of a gradual dissolution by Napoleon the Corsican but continued to exist as a German Federation, and not so long ago fought and suffered in the greatest war of all time as an entity which was the expression of the national feelings of the people, even if it was no longer one united State. I myself am a child of this Ostmark. Not only was the German Reich destroyed and Austria split up into its component parts by the criminals of Versailles, but Germans were also forbidden to acknowledge that community which they had confessed for more than a thousand years. I have always regarded the elimination of this state of affairs as the highest and most sacred task of my life. I have never failed to proclaim this determination. And I have always been resolved to realize these ideas, which haunted me day and night. I should have sinned against my call by Providence had I failed by my own endeavour to lead my native country and my German people of the Ostmark back to the Reich and thus to the community of the German people."

"In doing so, moreover, I have wiped out the most disgraceful side of the Treaty of Versailles. I have once more established the right of self-determination, and done

away with the democratic oppression of seven and a half million Germans. I removed the ban which prevented them from voting on their own fate, and carried out this vote before the whole world. The result was not only what I had expected, but also precisely what had been anticipated by the Versailles democratic oppressors of peoples. For what else did they forbid the plebiscite on the question of *Anschluss*?"

"2. Bohemia and Moravia. When in the course of the Migrations of the Peoples Germanic tribes began, for reasons inexplicable for us, to migrate out of the territory which is to-day Bohemia and Moravia, a foreign Slav people made its way into this territory and made a place for itself between the remaining Germans. Since that time the living space of this Slav people has been enclosed in the form of a horseshoe by Germans. From an economic point of view an independent existence is in the long run impossible for these countries except on the basis of a relationship with the German nation and German economy. But apart from this, nearly four million Germans lived in this territory of Bohemia and Moravia. A policy of national annihilation which set in particularly after the Treaty of Versailles, under pressure of the Czech majority, combined too with economic conditions and the rising tide of distress, led to the emigration of these German elements, so that the Germans left in the territory were reduced to approximately 3.7 million. The population of the fringe of the territory is uniformly German, but there are also large German linguistic enclaves in the interior. The Czech nation is in its origins foreign to us. But in the thousand years in which the two peoples have lived side by side Czech culture has in the main been formed and moulded by German influences. Czech economy owes its existence to the fact of having been part of the great German

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economic system. The capital of this country was for a time a German Imperial City, and it contains the oldest German University. Numerous cathedrals, town halls, and palaces of the nobility and citizen class bear witness to the influence of German culture. The Czech people itself has in the course of centuries alternated between close and more distant contacts with the German people. Every close contact resulted in a period in which both the German and the Czech nations flourished, every estrangement was calamitous in its consequences. We are familiar with the merits and values of the German people. But the Czech nation, with the sum total of its skill and ability, its industry, its diligence, its love of its native soil and of its own national heritage, also deserves our respect. There were in actual fact periods in which this mutual respect for the qualities of the other nation was a matter of course. The democratic peacemakers of Versailles can take the credit for having assigned to this Czech people the special role of a satellite State, capable of being used against Germany. For this purpose they arbitrarily adjudicated foreign national property to the Czech State, which was utterly incapable of survival on the strength of the Czech national unit alone; that is, they did violence to other nationalities in order to give a firm basis to a State which was to incorporate a latent threat to the German nation in Central Europe. For this State, in which the so-called predominant national element was actually in a minority, could be maintained only by means of a brutal assault on the national units which formed the major part of the population. This assault was possible only in so far as protection and assistance were granted by the European democracies. This assistance could naturally be expected only on condition that this State was prepared loyally to take over and play the role which it had been assigned at birth. But the purpose of

this role was no other than to prevent the consolidation of Central Europe, to provide a bridge to Europe for Bolshevik aggression, and above all to act as a mercenary of the European democracies against Germany. Everything else followed automatically. The more this State tried to fulfil the task it had been set, the greater was the resistance put up by the national minorities. And the greater the resistance, the more it became necessary to resort to oppression. This inevitable hardening of the internal antitheses led in its turn to an increased dependence on the democratic European founders and benefactors of the State. For they alone were in a position to maintain in the long run the economic existence of this unnatural and artificial creation. Germany was primarily interested in one thing only, and that was to liberate the nearly four million Germans in that country from their unbearable situation, and to make it possible for them to return to their home country and to the thousand-year-old Reich. It was only natural that this problem immediately brought up all the other aspects of the nationalities problem. But it was also natural that the removal of the different national groups should deprive what was left of the State of all capacity to survive—a fact of which the founders of the State had been well aware when they planned it at Versailles, since it was for this very reason that they decided on the assault on the other minorities and had forced these against their will to become part of this amateurishly constructed State.”

“I have likewise never left any doubt about my opinion and attitude. It is true that, as long as Germany herself was powerless and defenceless, this oppression of almost four million Germans could be carried out without the Reich offering any practical resistance. However, only a child in politics could have believed that the German nation would remain for ever in the state it was in in 1919.

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Only as long as the international traitors supported from abroad held the direction of the German State could people rely on these disgraceful conditions being patiently put up with. From the moment when after the victory of National Socialism these traitors had to transfer their domicile to the place whence they had received their subsidies, the solution of this problem was only a question of time. Moreover, it was exclusively a question affecting the nationalities concerned, not one concerning Western Europe. It was certainly understandable that Western Europe was interested in the artificial State brought into being in its interest. But that the nationalities surrounding this State should regard this interest as a determining factor for them was a false conclusion which was perhaps regrettable for many. In as far as this interest was only directed to the financial establishment of this State, Germany could have had nothing to say if this financial interest had not been subjected exclusively to the political aims of the democracies. The financial requirements of this State followed but one guiding idea, namely, the creation of a military State armed to the teeth with a view to forming a bastion extending into the German Reich, which promised to be a starting-point for military operations in connexion with invasions of the Reich from the West, or at any rate an air base of undoubted value. . . . It is therefore comprehensible that the German Government in their turn decided to destroy this aerodrome for bombing planes. They did not come to this decision because of hatred of the Czech people. Quite the contrary. For in the course of the thousand years during which the German and Czech people had lived together there had often been periods of close co-operation lasting hundreds of years, and between these, it is true, only short periods of tension. In such periods of tension the passions of the

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people struggling together in the front trenches of the national position can very easily dim the feeling of justice and thus lead to a wrong total impression. This is a feature of every war. It was solely in the long epochs of living together in harmony that the two peoples agreed that they were both entitled to advance a sacred claim to deference for, and respect of, their nationality. But in these years of struggle my own attitude towards the Czech people was never anything else than that of the guardian of a unilateral national and Reich interest combined with feelings of respect for the Czech people. One thing is certain: if the democratic midwives of this State had succeeded in attaining their ultimate goal, the German Reich would certainly not have been destroyed, although we might have sustained heavy losses. No! The Czech people, by reason of its size and position, would presumably have had to put up with much more dreadful and—I am convinced—catastrophic consequences. I feel happy that it has proved possible, even to the annoyance of democratic interests, to avoid this catastrophe in Central Europe thanks to our own moderation and also to the good judgement of the Czech people."

"That which the best and wisest Czechs have struggled for decades to attain is as a matter of course granted to this people in the National-Socialist German Reich, namely, the right to their own nationality and the right to foster this nationality and to revive it."¹

"National-Socialist Germany has no notion of ever betraying the racial principles of which we are proud. They will be beneficial not only to the German nation, but to the Czech people as well. But we do demand the

¹ On the manner in which this promise has been kept see *Two Years of German Oppression in Czechoslovakia*, published by the Department of Information of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1941.

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recognition of a historical necessity and of an economic exigency in which we all find ourselves."

"When I announced the solution of this problem in the Reichstag on 22 February 1938,¹ I was convinced that I was obeying the necessity of a Central European situation. As late as March 1938 I believed that by means of a gradual evolution it might prove possible to solve the problem of minorities in this State and at one time or another by means of mutual co-operation to achieve a common platform which would be advantageous to all interests concerned, politically as well as economically. It was not until Mr. Beneš, who was completely in the hands of his democratic-international financiers, turned the problem into a military one and unleashed a wave of suppression over the Germans, at the same time attempting by that mobilization of which you all know to inflict an international defeat upon the German State and to damage its prestige, that it became clear to me that a solution by these means was no longer possible. For the false report of a German mobilization was quite obviously inspired from abroad and suggested to the Czechs in order to cause the German Reich such a loss of prestige."

"I do not need to repeat once more that in May of the past year Germany had not mobilized one single man, although we were all of the opinion that the very fate of Herr Schuschnigg should have shown all others the advisability of working for mutual understanding by means of a more just treatment of national minorities. I for my part was at any rate prepared to attempt this kind of peaceful development with patience and, if need be, in a process lasting some years. However, it was exactly this peaceful solution which was a thorn in the flesh of the agitators in the democracies. They hate us Germans, and

¹ For the speech of 20 Feb. 1938 see pp. 1376 sqq.

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would prefer to eradicate us completely. What are the Czechs to them? They regard them merely as a means to an end. And what do they care for the fate of a small and valiant nation, why should they worry about the lives of hundreds of thousands of brave soldiers who would have been sacrificed for their policy? These Western European peacemongers were not concerned to work for peace but to cause bloodshed, so as in this way to set the nations against one another and thus cause still more blood to flow. For this reason they invented the story of German mobilization and humbugged Prague public opinion with it. It was intended to provide an excuse for the Czech mobilization. And then by this means they hoped to be able to exert the desired military pressure on the elections in Sudeten Germany, which could no longer be avoided."

"According to their view there remained only two alternatives for Germany: either to accept this Czech mobilization and with it a disgraceful blow to her prestige, or the settling of accounts with Czechoslovakia, a bloody war, and thus perhaps the possibility of mobilizing the nations of Western Europe, who had no interest in these matters, thereby involving them in the inevitable blood-lust so as to immerse humanity in a new catastrophe in which some would have the honour of losing their lives, and others the pleasure of making war profits."

"You are acquainted, Gentlemen, with the decisions I made at the time:

1. The solution of this question, and what is more by 2 October 1938, at the latest;
2. The preparation of this solution with all the means necessary to leave no doubt that any attempt at intervention would be met by the united force of the whole nation."

"It was at this juncture that I decreed and ordered the

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construction of the Western fortifications. On 25 September 1938 they were already in such a condition that their power of resistance was thirty to forty times as great as that of the old Siegfried Line in the Great War. They have now been practically completed and are at the present moment being enlarged by the new lines outside Aachen and Saarbrücken which I ordered later. These too are very largely ready for defence. In view of the condition of these, the greatest fortifications ever constructed, the German nation may feel perfectly assured that no power in this world will ever succeed in breaking through this front." . . .

"If the cry of '*Never another Munich*' is raised in the world to-day, this simply confirms the fact that the peaceful solution of the problem appeared to be the most fatal thing that ever happened in the eyes of those warmongers. They are sorry no blood was shed—not their blood, of course: for these agitators are, of course, never to be found where shots are being fired, but only where money is being made! No, it is the blood of many nameless soldiers. Moreover, there would have been no necessity for the Munich Conference, for that Conference was only made possible by the fact that the countries which had at first incited those concerned to resist at all costs, later on, when the situation pressed for a solution in one way or another, were compelled to try and secure for themselves a more or less respectable retreat; for without Munich, that is to say without the interference of the countries of Western Europe, a solution of the entire problem—if it had ever grown so acute—would very likely have been the easiest thing in the world."

"The decision of Munich led to the following result:

"1. The return of the most essential parts of the German border settlements in Bohemia and Moravia to the Reich.

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"2. The keeping open of the possibility of a solution of the other problems of that State, i.e. a return or separation of the existing Hungarian and Slovak minorities.

"3. There still remained the question of guarantees. As far as Germany and Italy were concerned, the guarantee of this State had from the first been made dependent upon the consent of all interested parties bordering on Czechoslovakia, that is to say the guarantee was coupled with the actual solution of problems concerning the parties mentioned, which were still unsolved. The following problems were still left open:—

1. The return of the Magyar districts to Hungary;
2. The return of the Polish districts to Poland;
3. The solution of the Slovak question;
4. The solution of the Ukrainian question."

"As you know, the negotiations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia had scarcely begun, when both the Czechoslovak and the Hungarian negotiators requested Germany and Italy, the country which stands side by side with Germany, to act as arbitrators in defining the new frontiers between Slovakia, the Carpatho-Ukraine, and Hungary. The countries concerned made no use themselves of the possibility of appealing to the four Powers; on the contrary they expressly renounced this possibility, that is, they declined it."

"And this was only natural. All the people living in this territory desired peace and quiet. Italy and Germany were prepared to answer the call. Neither England nor France raised any objection to this arrangement, which actually constituted a formal departure from the Munich Agreement, nor was it possible for them to do so; it would have been madness for Paris or London to have protested against an action on the part of Germany or Italy, which had been undertaken solely at the request of the countries concerned."

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"The decision arrived at by Germany and Italy proved—as always in such cases—not entirely satisfactory to either party. From the very beginning the difficulty was that it had to be voluntarily accepted by both parties. Thus when the decision came to be put into effect, violent protests were raised immediately following on the acceptance by two States. Hungary, prompted by general and particular interests, demanded the Carpatho-Ukraine, while Poland demanded a direct means of communication with Hungary. It was clear that in such circumstances even the remnant of the State which Versailles had brought into being was predestined to extinction. It was a fact that perhaps only one single state was interested in the preservation of the *status quo*, and that was Rumania; the man best authorized to speak on behalf of that country told me personally how desirable it would be to have a direct line of communication with Germany perhaps via the Ukraine and Slovakia. I mention this as an illustration of the feeling of being menaced by Germany from which the Rumanian Government—according to the American clairvoyants—are supposed to be suffering. But it was now clear that it could not be Germany's task permanently to oppose a development or actually to fight for the maintenance of a state of affairs for which we could never have made ourselves responsible. The stage was thus reached at which in the name of the German Government I decided to make a declaration to the effect that we had no intention of any longer incurring the reprobation of opposing the common wishes of Poland and Hungary as regards their frontiers, simply in order to keep open a road of approach for Germany to Rumania. Since moreover the Czech Government resorted once more to its old methods, and Slovakia also gave expression to its desire for independence, the further existence of the State was

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out of the question. The construction of Czechoslovakia worked out at Versailles had had its day. It broke up, not because Germany desired its break-up, but because in the long run it is impossible to construct and uphold around the conference table artificial States which are incapable of survival."

"Consequently, in reply to a question regarding the guarantee, which was submitted by England and France a few days before the dissolution of this State, Germany refused this guarantee, since all the conditions for it laid down at Munich were lacking.¹ On the contrary when the whole structure of the State had begun to break up and practically speaking had already dissolved itself—the German Government finally decided also to intervene; it did this only in fulfilment of an obvious duty. For the following point should be noted: on the occasion of the first visit of the Czech Foreign Minister, M. Chvalkovsky, in Munich, the German Government plainly expressed their views on the future of Czechoslovakia. I myself assured M. Chvalkovsky on that occasion that provided loyal treatment was meted out to the large German minorities remaining in the Czech territory, and provided a general appeasement of the whole State was attained, we would guarantee a loyal attitude on the part of Germany, and would for our part place no obstacles in the way of the State. But I also made it clear beyond all doubt that if the Czechs were to undertake any steps in line with the political tendencies of Dr. Beneš, the former President, Germany would not put up with any development along such lines, but would stifle it in its earliest stages. I also pointed out at that time that the maintenance of such a tremendous military arsenal in Central Europe for no reason or purpose could only be regarded as a focus of danger. Later developments proved

¹ Cf. *The French Yellow Book*, Nos. 47-50.

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how justified my warning had been. A continuous and rising tide of underground propaganda, and a gradual tendency on the part of Czech newspapers to relapse into the old style of writing made it finally clear even to the greatest simpleton that the old state of affairs would soon be restored. The danger of a military conflict was all the greater as there was always the possibility that some madman or other might get control of the vast stores of munitions. This involved the danger of immense explosions."

Hitler then gave an account of the armament confiscated since the German occupation of Czechoslovakia and continued:

"I believe that it is a good thing for millions and millions of people that I, thanks to the last minute insight of responsible men on the other side, succeeded in averting such a catastrophe, and found a solution which I am convinced has finally abolished this problem of a source of danger in Central Europe."

"The contention that this solution is contrary to the Munich Agreement can neither be supported nor confirmed. This Agreement could under no circumstances be regarded as final, because it admitted that other problems required and remained to be solved. We cannot really be reproached for the fact that the parties concerned—and this is the deciding factor—did not turn to the four Powers but only to Italy and Germany; nor yet for the fact that the State as such finally split up of its own accord and there was consequently no longer any Czechoslovakia. It was, however, understandable that long after the ethnographic principle had been made invalid Germany should take under her protection her interests dating back a thousand years, which are not only of a political but also of an economic nature."

"The future will show whether the solution which Ger-

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many has found is right or wrong. However, it is certain that the solution is not subject to English supervision or criticism. For Bohemia and Moravia as the remnants of former Czechoslovakia have nothing more whatever to do with the Munich Agreement. Just as English measures in say Northern Ireland, whether they be right or wrong, are not subject to German supervision or criticism this is also the case with these old German Electorates."

"However, I entirely fail to understand how the Agreement reached between Mr. Chamberlain and myself at Munich can refer to this case, for the case of Czechoslovakia was settled in the Munich protocol of the four Powers as far as it could be settled at all at that time. Apart from this, provision was merely made that if the interested parties should fail to come to an agreement they should be entitled to appeal to the four Powers, who had agreed in such a case to meet for further consultation after the expiration of three months. However, these interested parties did not appeal to the four Powers at all, but only to Germany and Italy. That this was fully justified, moreover, is proved by the fact that neither England nor France has raised any objections thereto, but have themselves accepted the decision given by Germany and Italy. No, the agreement reached between Mr. Chamberlain and myself did not relate to this problem but exclusively to questions which refer to the mutual relationship between England and Germany. This is clearly shown by the fact that such questions are to be treated in future in the spirit of the Munich Agreement and of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, that is in a friendly spirit by way of consultation. If, however, this agreement were to be applied to every future German activity of a political nature, England, too, should not take any step, whether in Palestine or elsewhere, without first consulting Germany. It is obvious that we

do not expect this; likewise we refuse to gratify any similar expectation of us. Now if Mr. Chamberlain concludes from this that the Munich Agreement is for this reason annulled, as if we had broken it, then I shall take cognizance of the fact and proceed accordingly."

"During the whole of my political activity I have always expounded the idea of a close friendship and collaboration between Germany and England. In my Movement I found innumerable others of like mind. Perhaps they joined me because of my attitude in this matter. This desire for Anglo-German friendship and co-operation conforms not merely with sentiments which result from the racial origins of our two peoples, but also to my realization of the importance for the whole mankind of the existence of the British Empire. I have never left room for any doubt of my belief that the existence of this Empire is an inestimable factor of value for the whole of human cultural and economic life. By whatever means Great Britain has acquired her colonial territories—and I know that they were those of force and often brutality—nevertheless I know full well that no other Empire has ever come into being in any other way, and that in the final resort it is not so much the methods that are taken into account in history as success, and not the success of the methods as such, but rather the general good which the methods yield. Now there is no doubt that the Anglo-Saxon people have accomplished immeasurable colonizing work in the world. For this work I have a sincere admiration. The thought of destroying this labour appeared and still appears to me, seen from a higher human point of view, as nothing but the effluence of human wanton destructiveness. However, this sincere respect of mine for this achievement does not mean foregoing the securing of the life of my own people. I regard it as impossible to achieve a lasting friendship between

the German and Anglo-Saxon peoples if the other side does not recognize that there are German as well as British interests, that not only is the preservation of the British Empire the meaning and purpose of the lives of Britishers, but also that for Germans the freedom and preservation of the German Reich is their life purpose. A genuine, lasting friendship between these two nations is only conceivable on the basis of mutual regard. The English rule a great Empire. They built up this Empire at a time when the German people were internally weak. Previously Germany had been a great Empire. At one time she ruled the Occident. In bloody struggles and religious dissensions, and as a result of internal political disintegration, this empire declined in power and greatness and finally fell into a deep sleep. But as this old empire appeared to have reached its end, the seeds of its rebirth were springing up. From Brandenburg and Prussia there arose a new Germany, the second Reich, and out of it has grown at last the German People's Reich. And I hope that all English people understand that we do not possess the slightest feeling of inferiority to Britishers. Our historical past is far too great for that!" . . . "We Germans do not feel in the least inferior to the British Nation. Our self-esteem is just as great as that of an Englishman for England. In the history of our people, now of approximately two thousand years' standing, there are occasions and actions enough to fill us with sincere pride."

"Now if England cannot understand our point of view, thinking perchance she may look upon Germany as a vassal State, then our love and friendly feelings have indeed been wasted on her. We shall not despair or lose heart on that account, but—relying on the consciousness of our own strength and on the strength of our friends—we shall then find ways and means to secure our independence without impairing our dignity."

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"I have heard the statement of the British Prime Minister to the effect that he is not able to put any trust in German assurances. Under the circumstances I consider it a matter of course that we no longer wish to expect him or the British people to bear the burden of a situation which is only conceivable in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. When Germany became National Socialist and thus paved the way for her national resurrection, in pursuance of my unswerving policy of friendship with England, of my own accord I made the proposal for a voluntary restriction of German naval armaments. That restriction was, however, based on one condition, namely, the will and the conviction that a war between England and Germany would never again be possible. This wish and this conviction are alive in me to-day."

"I am, however, now compelled to state that the policy of England is both unofficially and officially leaving no doubt about the fact that such a conviction is no longer shared in London, and that, on the contrary, the opinion prevails there that no matter in what conflict Germany should some day be entangled, Great Britain would always have to take her stand against Germany. Thus a war against Germany is taken for granted in that country. I most profoundly regret such a development, for the only claim I have ever made, and shall continue to make, on England is that for a return of our colonies. But I always made it very clear that this would never become the cause of a military conflict. I have always held that the English, to whom those colonies are of no value, would one day understand the German situation and would then value German friendship higher than the possession of territories which, while yielding no real profit whatever to them, are of vital importance to Germany."

"Apart from this, however, I have never advanced

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a claim which might in any way have interfered with British interests or have become a danger to the Empire and thus have meant any kind of damage to England. I have always kept within the limit of such demands as are intimately connected with Germany's living space and thus the eternal property of the German nation. Since England to-day, both through the Press and officially, upholds the view that Germany should be opposed under all circumstances, and confirms this by the policy of encirclement known to us, the basis for the Naval Treaty has been removed. I have therefore resolved to send to-day a communication to this effect to the British Government. This is to us not a matter of practical material importance—for I still hope that we shall be able to avoid an armaments race with England—but an action of self-respect. Should the British Government, however, wish to enter once more into negotiations with Germany on this problem, no one would be happier than I at the prospect of still being able to come to a clear and straightforward understanding."

"Moreover, I know my people—and I rely on them. We do not want anything that did not formerly belong to us, and no State will ever be robbed by us of its property; but whoever believes that he is able to attack Germany will find himself confronted with a measure of power and resistance compared with which that of 1914 was negligible."

*Hitler then turned to consider the fate of the Germans in Memel which since 1923 when the territory had been occupied by Lithuania had been a veritable martyrdom.*¹

"In the course of the reincorporation of Bohemia and Moravia within the framework of the German Reich, it was also possible for me to come to an agreement with the Lithuanian Government which allowed the return of

¹ Cf. p. 1236 *supra*.

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this territory to Germany without any act of violence and without shedding blood. Also in this instance I have not demanded one square mile more than we formerly possessed and which was stolen from us. This means therefore that only that territory has returned to the German Reich which had been torn from us by the madmen who dictated peace at Versailles. But this solution, I am convinced, will only prove advantageous to the relations between Germany and Lithuania, seeing that Germany, as our behaviour has proved, has no other interest than to live in peace and friendship with this State and to establish and foster economic relations with it. In this connexion I wish to make one point perfectly clear: The significance of economic agreements with Germany lies not only in the fact that Germany is able as exporter to meet almost all industrial requirements, but that she, being a very large consumer, is at the same time also a purchaser of numerous products which alone enable other countries to participate in international trade at all. We are interested not only in retaining these economic markets, but especially in promoting good relations with them, because the existence of our people is based to a large extent thereon. So-called democratic statesmen look upon it as one of their greatest political achievements to exclude a nation from its markets, for example by boycott, so as, I presume, to starve it out. I need not assure you that I am convinced that a nation would fight rather than starve under such circumstances. As far as Germany is concerned, she is in any case determined not to allow certain economically important markets to be stolen from her by terroristic intervention or threats. This, however, is not only in our own interest but also in the interest of our trade partner. Here, as in every business, it is not a one-sided but a mutual dependency. How often do we have the pleasure of reading in the amateurish economic

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articles of our democratic newspapers that Germany, because she maintains close economic relations with a country, makes that country dependent upon her. This is sheer hair-raising Jewish nonsense. For if Germany supplies an agrarian country to-day with machinery and receives foodstuffs in payment, the Reich, as consumer of foodstuffs, is at least as dependent, if not more dependent, on the agrarian country as the latter is dependent on us, from whom it receives industrial products in payment. Germany regards the Baltic States as one of its most important trade partners. And for this reason it is in our interest that these countries should lead an independent, ordered national life of their own. This is in our opinion the necessary condition for that internal economic development which is again the condition upon which the exchange of goods depends. I am therefore happy that we have been able to dispose also of the point of dispute between Lithuania and Germany. For this does away with the only obstacle in the way of a policy of friendship which can prove its worth—as I am convinced it will—not in political compliments, but in practical economic measures. The democratic world was, it is true, once more extremely sorry that there was no bloodshed—that 175,000 Germans were able to return to the homeland which they loved above everything else, without a few hundred thousand others having to be shot for it! This grieved the apostles of humanitarianism deeply. It was therefore no wonder that they immediately began to look out for new possibilities of bringing about a thorough disturbance of the European atmosphere after all. And so, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, they again resorted to the assertion that Germany was taking military steps, that is, was supposedly mobilizing. This mobilization was said to be directed against Poland."

"There is little to be said as regards German-Polish

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relations. Here, too, the Peace Treaty of Versailles—of course intentionally—inflicted a most severe wound on Germany. The strange way in which the Corridor giving Poland access to the sea was marked out was meant above all to prevent for all time the establishment of an understanding between Poland and Germany. This problem is—as I have already stressed—perhaps the most painful of all problems for Germany. Nevertheless I have never ceased to uphold the view that the necessity of a free access to the sea for the Polish State cannot be ignored, and that as a general principle, valid for this case too, nations which Providence has destined or, if you like, condemned to live side by side would be well advised not to make life still harder for each other artificially and unnecessarily. The late Marshal Pilsudski, who was of the same opinion, was therefore prepared to go into the question of clarifying the atmosphere of German-Polish relations, and finally to conclude an Agreement whereby Germany and Poland expressed their intention of renouncing war altogether as a means of settling the questions which concerned them both. This Agreement contained one single exception which was in practice conceded to Poland. It was laid down that the pacts of mutual assistance already entered into by Poland—this applied to the pact with France—should not be affected by the Agreement. But it was obvious that this could apply only to the pact of mutual assistance already concluded beforehand, and not to whatever new pacts might be concluded in the future. It is a fact that the German-Polish Agreement resulted in a remarkable lessening of the European tension. Nevertheless there remained one open question between Germany and Poland, which sooner or later quite naturally had to be solved—the question of the German city of Danzig. Danzig is a German city and wishes to belong to Germany. On the other

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hand, this city has contracts with Poland, which were admittedly forced upon it by the dictators of the Peace of Versailles. But since, moreover, the League of Nations, formerly the greatest stirrer-up of trouble, is now represented by a High Commissioner—incidentally a man of extraordinary tact—the problem of Danzig must in any case come up for discussion, at the latest with the gradual extinction of this calamitous institution. I regarded the peaceful settlement of this problem as a further contribution to a final loosening of the European tension. For this loosening of the tension is assuredly not to be achieved through the agitations of insane war-mongers, but through the removal of the real elements of danger. After the problem of Danzig had already been discussed several times some months ago, I made a concrete offer to the Polish Government. I now make this offer known to you, Gentlemen, and you yourselves will judge whether this offer did not represent the greatest imaginable concession in the interests of European peace. As I have already pointed out, I have always seen the necessity of an access to the sea for this country and have consequently taken this necessity into consideration. I am no democratic statesman, but a National-Socialist and a realist."

"I considered it, however, necessary to make it clear to the Government in Warsaw that just as they desire access to the sea, so Germany needs access to her province in the East. Now these are all difficult problems. It is not Germany who is responsible for them, however, but rather the jugglers of Versailles, who either in their maliciousness or their thoughtlessness placed a hundred powder barrels round about in Europe, all equipped with hardly extinguishable lighted fuses. These problems cannot be solved according to old-fashioned ideas; I think, rather, that we should adopt new methods. Poland's access to the sea by way of the Corridor, and on the other

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hand a German route through the Corridor have no kind of military importance whatsoever. Their importance is exclusively psychological and economic. To accord military importance to a traffic route of this kind would be to show oneself completely ignorant of military affairs. Consequently I have had the following proposal submitted to the Polish Government:

"1. Danzig returns as a Free State into the framework of the German Reich.

"2. Germany receives a route through the Corridor and a railway line at her own disposal possessing the same extra-territorial status for Germany as the Corridor itself has for Poland. In return Germany is prepared:

"1. to recognize all Polish economic rights in Danzig;

"2. to ensure for Poland a Free Harbour in Danzig of any size desired which would have complete free access to the sea;

"3. to accept at the same time the present boundaries between Germany and Poland and to regard them as final;

"4. to conclude a 25 years non-aggression treaty with Poland, a treaty therefore which would extend far beyond the duration of my own life,; and

"5. to guarantee the independence of the Slovak State by Germany, Poland, and Hungary jointly—which means in practice the renunciation of any unilateral German hegemony in this territory."

"The Polish Government has rejected my offer and has only declared that it is prepared to:

1. negotiate concerning the question of a substitute for the Commissioner of the League of Nations; and

2. to consider facilities for the transit traffic through the Corridor."

"I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish Government but that alone is not the

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decisive fact; the worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia a year ago, believes, under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up troops, although Germany on her part has not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in any way against Poland. As I have said, this is in itself very regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was really right to refuse this suggestion made this once by me. This—as I have said—was an endeavour on my part to solve a question which intimately affects the German people by a truly unique compromise, and to solve it to the advantage of both countries. According to my conviction Poland was not a giving party in this solution at all but only a receiving party, because it should be beyond all doubt that Danzig will never become Polish. The intention to attack on the part of Germany which was merely invented by the international Press, led, as you know, to the so-called guarantee offer and to an obligation on the part of the Polish Government for mutual assistance, which would also, under certain circumstances, compel Poland to take military action against Germany in the event of a conflict between Germany and any other power and in which England, in her turn, would be involved. This obligation is contradictory to the agreement which I made with Marshal Pilsudski some time ago, seeing that in this agreement reference is made exclusively to existing obligations, that is to those at that time, namely to the obligations of Poland towards France of which we were aware. To extend these obligations subsequently is contrary to the terms of the German-Polish non-aggression pact. Under these circumstances I should not have entered into this pact at that time, because what sense can non-aggression pacts have if one partner in practice leaves open an enormous number of exceptions."

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"Either we have collective security, that is collective *insecurity* and continuous danger of war, or clear agreements which, however, exclude fundamentally any use of arms between the contracting parties. I therefore look upon the agreement which Marshal Pilsudski and I concluded at the time as having been unilaterally infringed by Poland and thereby no longer in existence."

"I have sent a communication to this effect to the Polish Government. However, I can only repeat at this point that my decision does not constitute a modification of my attitude in principle with regard to the problems mentioned above. Should the Polish Government wish to come to fresh contractual arrangements governing its relations with Germany, I can but welcome such an idea, provided, of course, that these arrangements are based on an absolutely clear obligation binding both parties in equal measure. Germany is perfectly willing at any time to undertake such obligations and also to fulfil them."

"If for these reasons fresh unrest has broken out in Europe during the last few weeks the responsibility therefor lies solely in the propaganda in the service of the international war-mongers, which we know well and which, conducted by numerous organs of the democratic States, endeavours, by continually increasing nervousness and inventing continual rumours, to make Europe ripe for a catastrophe, that catastrophe from which it is hoped to achieve what has not yet been brought about, namely the Bolshevik destruction of European civilization."

Hitler then spoke of the victory of Nationalist Spain and of the part played by German and Italian volunteers (see p. 1671 infra). This victory has but intensified the activity of the international war-mongers whose real purpose "is to prepare public opinion to regard the English policy of

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encirclement as necessary, and consequently to support it should the worst come to the worst".

"The German people, on the other hand, can go about their business with perfect tranquillity. Their frontiers are guarded by the best army in the history of Germany, the air above is protected by the most powerful air fleet, and our coasts are rendered unassailable by any enemy Power. In the West the strongest fortifications of all times have been built. But the deciding factors are the unity of the German nation as a whole, the confidence of all Germans in one another and in their fighting forces and—I may say—the faith of all in their leadership."

"But the trust of the leader and the people in our friends is not less. And outstanding is that State which is closest to us in every respect as a result of the common destinies which unite us. This year Fascist Italy has shown again the greatest understanding for vital German interests. No one need be surprised if we for our part have the same feelings towards the Italian necessities for existence. The bond which unites the two peoples is unbreakable. Any attempt to throw doubt on this fact appears to us ridiculous. In any case it is best illustrated and explained in an article which appeared a few days ago in a leading democratic newspaper, which stated that it should no longer be regarded as possible to separate Italy and Germany so as to destroy them separately."

"Thus the German Government in full understanding appreciate the right of the action taken by their Italian friend in Albania, and have therefore welcomed it. Yes, it is not only the right but also the duty of Fascism to secure, in the living space undoubtedly allotted to Italy by nature and history, the maintenance of an order on which alone a really flourishing human civilization appears to be based and secured. After all there can be just as little doubt in the rest of the world concerning the

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civilizing work of Fascism as there is about that of National-Socialism. In both instances indisputable facts are testimony against the unfounded brag and unproved statements of the other side. To create still closer relations between Germany, Italy, and Japan is the constant aim of the German Government. We regard the existence and maintenance of the freedom and independence of these three Great Powers as the strongest factor in the future making for the preservation of a true human culture, a practical civilization and a just order in the world."

"The world on the 15 April 1939 was informed of the contents of a telegram which I myself did not see until later. It is difficult to classify this document or to arrange it in any known scheme. I will therefore endeavour before you, Gentlemen, and thus before the whole German people, to analyse the necessary answers in your name and in that of the German people."

"I. Mr. Roosevelt is of the opinion that I too must realize that throughout the world hundreds of millions of human beings are living in constant fear of a new war or even a series of wars. This, he says, is of concern to the people of the United States, for whom he speaks, as it must also be to the peoples of the other nations of the entire western hemisphere."

"In reply to this it must be said in the first place that this fear of war has undoubtedly existed among mankind from time immemorial, and justifiably so. For instance, after the Peace Treaty of Versailles fourteen wars were waged between 1919 and 1938 alone, in none of which Germany was concerned, but in which States of the 'western hemisphere', in whose name President Roosevelt also speaks, were indeed concerned. In addition there were in the same period twenty-six violent interventions and sanctions carried through by means of

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bloodshed and force. Germany also played no part whatever in these. The United States alone has carried out military interventions in six cases since 1918. Since 1918 Soviet Russia has engaged in ten wars and military actions involving force and bloodshed. Again, Germany was concerned in none of these, nor was she the cause of any of these events. It would therefore be a mistake in my eyes to assume that the fear of war inspiring European and non-European nations can at this present time be directly traced back to actual wars at all. The reason for this fear lies simply and solely in an unbridled agitation on the part of the Press, an agitation as mendacious as it is base, in the circulation of vile pamphlets about the heads of foreign States, and in an artificial spreading of panic which in the end goes so far that interventions from another planet are believed possible and cause scenes of desperate alarm. I believe that as soon as the responsible Governments impose upon themselves and their journalistic organs the necessary restraint and truthfulness as regards the relations of the various countries to one another, and in particular as regards internal happenings in other countries, the fear of war will disappear at once, and the tranquillity which we all desire so much will become possible."

"2. In his telegram Mr. Roosevelt expresses the belief that every major war, even if it were to be confined to other continents, must have serious consequences while it lasts, and also for generations to come."

"Answer: No one knows this better than the German people. For the Peace Treaty of Versailles imposed burdens on the German people which could not have been paid off even in a hundred years, although it has been proved precisely by American teachers of constitutional law, historians, and professors of history that Germany was no more to blame for the outbreak of the War

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than any other nation. But I do not believe that every conflict must have disastrous consequences for the whole surrounding world, that is for the whole globe, provided the whole world is not systematically drawn into such conflicts by means of a network of nebulous pact obligations. For since in past centuries and—as I pointed out at the beginning of my answer—also in the course of the last decades, the world has experienced a continuous series of wars, if Mr. Roosevelt's assumption were correct, humanity would already have a burden, in the sum total of the outcome of all these wars, which it would have to bear for millions of years to come."

"3. Mr. Roosevelt declared that he had already appealed to me on a former occasion on behalf of a peaceful settlement of political, economic, and social problems without resort to arms."

"Answer: I myself have always been an exponent of this view and, as history proves, have settled necessary political, economic, and social problems without force of arms, i.e., without resort to arms."

"Unfortunately however this peaceful settlement has been made more difficult by the agitation of politicians, statesmen and newspaper representatives who were neither directly concerned nor even affected by the problems in question."

"4. Mr. Roosevelt believes that the 'tide of events' is once more bringing the threat of arms with it, and that if this threat continues a large part of the world is condemned to a common ruin."

"Answer: As far as Germany is concerned I know nothing of this kind of threat to other nations, although I read in the democratic newspapers every day lies about such a threat. Every day I read of German mobilizations, of the landing of troops, of extortions—all this in regard to States with whom we are not only living in

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deepest peace, but also with whom we are, in many cases, the closest friends."

"5. Mr. Roosevelt believes, further, that in case of war victorious, vanquished, and neutral nations will all suffer."

"Answer: As a politician I have been the exponent of this conviction for twenty years, at a time when unfortunately the responsible statesmen in America could not bring themselves to make the same admission as regards their participation in the Great War and its issue."

"6. Mr. Roosevelt believes lastly that it lies with the leaders of the great nations to preserve their peoples from the impending disaster."

"Answer: If that is true, then it is a punishable neglect, to use no worse word, if the leaders of nations with corresponding powers are not capable of controlling their newspapers which are agitating for war, and so to save the world from the threatening calamity of an armed conflict. I am not able to understand, further, why these responsible leaders, instead of cultivating diplomatic relations between nations, make them more difficult and indeed disturb them by recalling ambassadors, etc. without any reason."

"7. Mr. Roosevelt declared finally that three nations in Europe and one in Africa have seen their independent existence terminated."

"Answer: I do not know which three nations in Europe are meant. Should it be a question of the provinces re-incorporated in the German Reich I must draw the attention of Mr. Roosevelt to an historical error. It is not now that these nations sacrificed their independent existence in Europe, but rather in 1918 when they, contrary to solemn promises, were separated from their communities and made into nations which they never wished to be and never were, and when they had forced upon them an independence which was no independence but at the most

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could only mean dependence upon an international foreign world which they hated."

"As for the fact, however, that one nation in Africa is alleged to have lost its freedom—that too is but an error; for it is not a question of one nation in Africa having lost its freedom—on the contrary practically all the previous inhabitants of this continent have been made subject to the sovereignty of other nations by bloody force, thereby losing their freedom. Moroccans, Berbers, Arabs, negroes, &c., have all fallen a victim to foreign might, the swords of which, however, were not inscribed 'Made in Germany', but 'Made by democracies'."

"8. Mr. Roosevelt then speaks of the reports which admittedly he does not believe to be correct, but which state that further acts of aggression are contemplated against still other independent nations."

"Answer: I consider every such unfounded insinuation as an offence against the tranquillity and consequently the peace of the world. I also see therein something which tends to frighten smaller nations or at least make them nervous. If Mr. Roosevelt really has any specific instances in mind in this connexion I would ask him to name the States who are threatened with aggression and to name the aggressor in question. It will then be possible to refute these monstrous general accusations by brief statements."

"9. Mr. Roosevelt states that the world is plainly moving towards the moment when this situation must end in catastrophe unless a rational way of guiding events is found."

"He also declares that I have repeatedly asserted that I and the German people have no desire for war and that if this is true there need be no war."

"Answer: I wish to point out firstly that I have not conducted any war, secondly that for years past I have

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expressed my abhorrence of war and, it is true, also my abhorrence of war-mongers, and thirdly that I am not aware for what purpose I should wage a war at all. I should be thankful to Mr. Roosevelt if he would give me some explanation in this connexion."

"10. Mr. Roosevelt is finally of the opinion that the peoples of the earth could not be persuaded that any governing Power has any right or need to inflict the consequences of war on its own or any other people save in the cause of self-evident home defence."

"Answer: I should think that every reasonable human being is of this opinion, but it seems to me that in almost every war both sides claim a case of unquestionable home defence, and that there is no institution in this world, including the American President himself, which could clear up this problem unequivocally. There is hardly any possibility of doubt, for example, that America's entry into the Great War was not a case of unquestionable home defence. A research committee set up by President Roosevelt himself has examined the causes of America's entry into the Great War, and reached the conclusion that the entry ensued chiefly for exclusively capitalistic reasons. Nevertheless no practical conclusions have been drawn from this fact. Let us hope then that at least the United States will in the future itself act according to this noble principle, and will not go to war against any country except in the case of unquestionable home defence."

"11. Mr. Roosevelt says further that he does not speak from selfishness nor fear nor weakness, but with the voice of strength and friendship for mankind."

"Answer: If this voice of strength and friendship for mankind had been raised by America at the proper time, and if above all it had possessed some practical value, then at least there could have been prevented that treaty

which has become the source of the direst derangement of humanity and history, namely the Dictate of Versailles."

"12. Mr. Roosevelt declares further that it is clear to him that all international problems can be solved at the council table."

"Answer: Theoretically one ought to believe in this possibility, for common sense would correct demands on the one hand and show the compelling necessity of a compromise on the other."

"For example, according to all common sense logic, and the general principles of a higher human justice indeed according to the laws of a Divine will, all peoples ought to have an equal share of the goods of this world. It ought not then to happen that one people needs so much living space that it cannot get along with fifteen inhabitants to the square kilometre, while others are forced to nourish 140, 150, or even 200 on the same area. But in no case should these fortunate peoples curtail the existing living space of those who are, as it is, suffering, by robbing them of their colonies, for instance. I would therefore be very happy if these problems could really find their solution at the council table. My scepticism, however, is based on the fact that it was America herself who gave sharpest expression to her mistrust in the effectiveness of conferences. For the greatest conference of all time was without any doubt the League of Nations. This authoritative body representing all the peoples of the world created in accordance with the will of an American President, was supposed to solve the problems of humanity at the council table. The first State, however, that shrank from this endeavour was the United States—the reason being that President Wilson himself even then nourished the greatest doubts of the possibility of really being able to solve decisive international problems at the conference table."

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"We honour your well-meant opinion, Mr. Roosevelt, but opposed to your opinion stands the actual fact that in almost twenty years of the activity of the greatest conference in the world, namely, the League of Nations, it has proved impossible to solve one single decisive international problem. Contrary to Wilson's promise Germany was hindered for many years by the Peace Treaty of Versailles from participating in this great world conference. In spite of the most bitter experience one German Government believed that there was no need to follow the example of the United States, and that they should therefore take their seat at this conference table. It was not till after years of purposeless participation that I resolved to follow the example of America and likewise leave the largest conference in the world. Since then I have solved the problems concerning my people, which like all others were, unfortunately, not solved at the conference table of the League of Nations—and also without recourse to war in any case. Apart from this, however, as already mentioned, numerous other problems have been brought before world conferences in recent years without any solution having been found. If however, Mr. Roosevelt, your belief that every problem can be solved at the conference table is true, then all nations, including the United States, have been led in the past 7,000 or 8,000 years either by blind men or by criminals. For all of them, including the statesmen of the United States and especially her greatest, did not make the chief part of their history at the conference table but with the aid of the strength of their people. The freedom of North America was not achieved at the conference table any more than the conflict between the North and the South was decided there. I will say nothing about the innumerable struggles which finally led to the subjugation of the North American continent as a whole. I mention all this

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only in order to show that your view, Mr. Roosevelt, although undoubtedly deserving of all honour, finds no confirmation in the history either of your own country or of the rest of the world."

"13. Mr. Roosevelt continues that it is no answer to the plea for peaceful discussion for one side to plead that, unless they receive assurances beforehand that the verdict will be theirs, they will not lay aside their arms."

"Answer: Do you believe, Mr. Roosevelt, that when the final fate of nations is in the balance, a Government or the leaders of a people will lay down their arms or surrender them before a conference, simply in the blind hope that in their wisdom or, if you like, their discernment, the other members of the conference will arrive at the right conclusion? Mr. Roosevelt, there has been only one country and one government which have acted according to the recipe extolled in such glowing terms, and that country was Germany. The German nation once, trusting in the solemn assurances of President Wilson and in the confirmation of these assurances by the Allies, laid down its arms and thus went unarmed to the conference table. It is true that as soon as the German nation had laid down its arms it was not even invited to the conference table but, in violation of all assurances, was made to suffer the worst breaking of a word that had ever been known. Then one day, instead of the greatest confusion known in history being resolved around the conference table, the cruellest dictated treaty in the world brought about a still more fearful confusion. But the representatives of the German nation, who, trusting to the solemn assurances of an American President, had laid down their arms and therefore appeared unarmed, were not received, even when they came to accept the terms of the dictated treaty, as the representatives of a nation which at all events had held out with infinite

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heroism against a whole world for four years in the struggle for its liberty and independence; they were subjected to greater degradations than those inflicted on the chieftains of Sioux tribes. The German delegates were insulted by the mob, stones were thrown at them, and they were dragged like prisoners, not to the council table of the world, but before the tribunal of the victors; and there, at the pistol's point, they were forced to undergo the most shameful subjection and plundering that the world had ever known. I can assure you, Mr. Roosevelt, that I am steadfastly determined to see to it that not only now, but for all future time, no German shall ever enter a conference defenceless, but that at all times and for ever every German negotiator should and shall have behind him the united strength of the German nation, so help me God."

"14. The President of the United States believes that in conference rooms as in courts, it is necessary that both sides enter in good faith, assuming that substantial justice will accrue to both."

"Answer: German representatives will never again enter a conference that is for them a tribunal. For who is to be the judge there? At a conference there is no accused and no prosecutor, but only two contending parties. And if their own good sense does not bring about a settlement between the two parties, they will never surrender themselves to the verdict of disinterested foreign Powers."

"Incidentally the United States itself declined to enter the League of Nations and to become the victim of a Court which was able by a majority vote to give a verdict against individual interests. But I should be grateful to President Roosevelt if he would explain to the world what the new World Court is to be like. Who are the judges here, according to what procedure are they

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selected, and on what responsibility do they act? And above all, to whom can they be made to account for their decisions?"

"15. Mr. Roosevelt believes that the cause of world peace would be greatly advanced if the nations of the world were to give a frank statement relating to the present and future policy of their governments."

"Answer: I have already done this, Mr. Roosevelt, in innumerable public speeches. And in the course of this present meeting of the German Reichstag I have again—as far as this is possible in the space of two hours—made a statement of this kind."

"I must, however, decline to give such an explanation to anyone else than to the people for whose existence and life I am responsible, and who on the other hand alone have the right to demand that I account to them. However, I give the aims of the German policy so openly that the entire world can hear it in any case. But these explanations are without significance for the outside world as long as it is possible for the Press to falsify and suspect every statement, to question it or to cover it with fresh lying replies."

"16. Mr. Roosevelt believes that, because the United States as one of the nations of the western hemisphere is not involved in the immediate controversies which have arisen in Europe, I should therefore be willing to make such a statement of policy to him, as the head of a nation so far removed from Europe."

"Answer: Mr. Roosevelt therefore seriously believes that the cause of international peace would really be furthered if I were to make to the nations of the world a public statement on the present policy of the German Government."

"But how does Mr. Roosevelt come to expect of the head of the German State above all to make a statement

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without the other governments being invited to make such a statement of their policy as well? I certainly believe that it is not feasible to make such a statement to the head of any foreign State, but rather that such statements should preferably be made to the whole world, in accordance with the demand made at the time by President Wilson for the abolition of secret diplomacy. Hitherto I was not only always prepared to do this, but, as I have already said, I have done it only too often. Unfortunately the most important statements concerning the aims and intentions of German policy have been in many so-called democratic States either withheld from the people or distorted by the Press. If, however, President Roosevelt thinks that he is qualified to address such a request to Germany or Italy of all nations because America is so far removed from Europe, we on our side might with the same right address to the President of the American Republic the question as to what aims American foreign policy has in view in its turn, and on what intentions this policy is based—in the case of the Central and South American States for instance. In this case Mr. Roosevelt would, rightly, I must admit, refer to the Monroe Doctrine and decline to comply with such a request as interference in the internal affairs of the American Continent. We Germans support a similar doctrine for Europe—and above all for the territory and the interests of the Greater German Reich.”

“Moreover I would obviously never presume to address such a request to the President of the United States of America, because I assume that he would probably rightly consider such a presumption tactless.”

“17. The American President further declares that he would then communicate information received by him concerning the political aims of Germany to other nations now apprehensive as to the course of our policy.”

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"Answer: How has Mr. Roosevelt learned which nations consider themselves threatened by German policy and which do not?"

"Or is Mr. Roosevelt in a position, in spite of the enormous amount of work which must rest upon him in his own country, to recognize of his own accord all these inner spiritual and mental impressions of other peoples and their governments?"

"18. Finally Mr. Roosevelt asks that assurances be given him that the German Armed Forces will not attack, and above all not invade, the territory or possessions of the following independent nations. He then names those as most likely: Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, the Arabias, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran."

"Answer: I have first of all taken the trouble to ascertain from the States mentioned whether they feel themselves threatened, and secondly and above all, whether this inquiry by the American President was addressed to us at their suggestion or at any rate with their consent."

"The reply was in all cases negative, in some instances strongly so. It is true that I could not cause inquiries to be made of certain of the States and nations mentioned because they themselves—as for example Syria—are at present not in possession of their freedom, but are occupied and consequently deprived of their rights by the military agents of democratic states."

"Thirdly, apart from this fact, all States bordering on Germany have received much more binding assurances and above all suggestions¹ than Mr. Roosevelt asked from me in his curious telegram."

¹ German: *viel bündigere Vorschläge*.

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"Fourthly, should there be any doubt as to the value of these general and direct statements which I have so often made, then any further statement of this kind, even if addressed to the American President, would be equally worthless. For ultimately it is not the value which Mr. Roosevelt attaches to such statements which is decisive, but the value attached to these statements by the countries in question."

"Fifthly, I must also draw Mr. Roosevelt's attention to one or two historical errors. He mentions Ireland, for instance, and asks for a statement to the effect that Germany will not attack Ireland. Now I have just read a speech delivered by Mr. De Valera, the Prime Minister of Eire, in which strangely enough, and contrary to Mr. Roosevelt's opinion, he does not charge Germany with oppressing Ireland, but reproaches England with subjecting Ireland to continuous aggression at her hands. With all due respect to Mr. Roosevelt's insight into the needs and cares of other countries, it may nevertheless be assumed that the Eire Prime Minister will be more familiar with the dangers which threaten his country than the President of the United States."

"In the same way the fact has obviously escaped Mr. Roosevelt's notice that Palestine is at present occupied not by German troops but by the English; and that the country is having its liberty restricted by the most brutal resort to force, is being robbed of its independence and is suffering the cruellest maltreatment for the benefit of Jewish interlopers. The Arabs living in that country will therefore certainly not have complained to Mr. Roosevelt of German aggression, but they do voice a continuous appeal to the world, deploring the barbarous methods with which England is attempting to suppress a people which loves its freedom and is but defending it."

"This, too, is perhaps a problem which according to the

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American President would have to be solved at the conference table, that is, in the presence of a just judge, and not by physical force, military means, mass executions, burning down villages, blowing up houses and so on. For one fact is undoubtedly certain: in this case England is not defending herself against a threatened Arab attack, but as an interloper, and, without being called upon to do so, is endeavouring to establish her power in a foreign territory which does not belong to her. A whole series of similar errors which Mr. Roosevelt has made might be pointed out, quite apart from the difficulty of military operations on the part of Germany in States and countries, some of which are 2,000 and 5,000 kilometres away from us. In conclusion, however, I have the following statement to make:"

"The German Government is nevertheless prepared to give each of the States named an assurance of the kind desired by Mr. Roosevelt on the condition of absolute reciprocity, provided that the State wishes it and itself addresses to Germany a request for such an assurance together with appropriate proposals. Regarding a number of the States included in Mr. Roosevelt's list, this question can probably be accepted as settled from the very start, since we are already either allied with them or at least united by close ties of friendship. As for the duration of these agreements, Germany is willing to make terms with each individual State in accordance with the wishes of that State."

"But I should not like to let this opportunity pass without giving above all to the President of the United States an assurance regarding those territories which would, after all, give him most cause for apprehension, namely the United States itself and the other States of the American continent."

"And I here solemnly declare that all the assertions

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which have been circulated in any way concerning an intended German attack or invasion on or in American territory are rank frauds and gross untruths. Quite apart from the fact that such assertions, as far as the military possibilities are concerned, could have their origin only in a stupid imagination."

"19. The American President then goes on to declare in this connexion that he regards the discussion of the most effective and immediate manner in which the peoples of the world can obtain relief from the crushing burden of armaments as the most important factor of all."

"Answer: Mr. Roosevelt perhaps does not know that this problem, in so far as it concerns Germany, has already been completely solved on one occasion." The Allied Commissions had expressly confirmed the fact that between 1919 and 1923 Germany had completely disarmed. *Of the extent of that disarmament Hitler gave details and then continued:* "According to the solemn pledges once given Germany, pledges which found their confirmation even in the Peace Treaty of Versailles, all this was supposed to be an advance contribution which would then make it possible for the rest of the world to disarm without danger. In this point, as in all others where Germany believed that a promise would be kept, she was disgracefully deceived. All attempts to induce the other States to disarm, pursued in negotiations at the conference table over many years, came, as is well known, to nothing. This disarmament would have been but the execution of pledges already given, and at the same time just and prudent. I myself, Mr. Roosevelt, have made any number of practical proposals for consultation and tried to bring about a discussion of them in order to make possible a general limitation of armaments to the lowest possible level. I proposed a maximum strength for all armies of 200,000, similarly the abolition of all offensive

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weapons, of bombing planes, of poison gas, &c., &c. It was not possible, however, to carry out these plans in the face of the rest of the world, although Germany herself was at the time completely disarmed. I then proposed a maximum of 300,000 for armies. The proposal met with the same negative reception. I then submitted a great number of detailed disarmament proposals—in each case before the forum of the German Reichstag and consequently before the whole world. It never occurred to anyone even to discuss the matter. The rest of the world began instead to increase still further their already enormous armaments. And not until 1934, when the last of my comprehensive proposals—that concerning 300,000 as the maximum size of the army—was ultimately turned down, did I give the order for German rearmament, which was now to be very thorough. Nevertheless I do not want to be an obstacle in the way of disarmament discussions, at which you, Mr. Roosevelt, intend to be present. I would ask you, however, not to appeal first to me and to Germany, but rather to the others; I have a long line of practical experience behind me, and shall remain sceptically inclined until reality has taught me to know better.”

“20. Mr. Roosevelt gives us his pledge, finally, that he is prepared to take part in discussions to establish the most practical manner of opening up avenues of international trade so that every nation of the world may be enabled to buy and sell on equal terms in the world's market, as well as to possess assurances of obtaining the raw materials and products of peaceful economic life.”

“Answer. It is my belief, Mr. Roosevelt, that it is not so much a question of discussing these problems theoretically, as of removing in practice the barriers which exist in international trade. The worst barriers, however, lie in the individual States themselves.

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Experience so far shows at any rate that the greatest world economic conferences have come to nothing, simply because the various countries were not able to maintain order in their domestic economic systems; or else because they infected the international capital market with uncertainty by currency manipulation, and, above all, by causing continual fluctuations in the value of their currencies to one another. It is likewise an unbearable burden for world economic relations that it should be possible in some countries for some ideological reason or other to let loose a wild boycott agitation against other countries and their goods and so practically to eliminate them from the market. It is my belief, Mr. Roosevelt, that it would be a great service if you with your great influence would remove these barriers to a genuinely free world trade beginning with the United States. For it is my conviction that if the leaders of nations are not even capable of regulating production in their own countries or of removing boycotts pursued for ideological reasons which can damage trade relations between countries to so great an extent, there is much less prospect of achieving by means of international agreements any really fruitful step towards the improvement of economic relations. The equal right for all of buying and selling in the world's market can only be guaranteed in this way. Further, the German people have made in this regard very concrete claims, and I would appreciate it very much if you, Mr. Roosevelt, as one of the successors to the late President Wilson, were to devote yourself to seeing that the promises be at last redeemed, on the basis of which Germany once laid down her arms and gave herself up to the so-called victors. I am thinking less of the innumerable millions extorted from Germany as so-called reparations than of the territories stolen from Germany. In and outside Europe Germany lost approxi-

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mately three million square kilometres of territory, and that in spite of the fact that the whole German Colonial Empire, in contrast to the colonies of other nations, was not acquired by way of war, but solely through treaties or purchase."

"President Wilson solemnly pledged his word that the German colonial claims, like all others, would receive the same just examination. Instead of this, however, the German possessions were given to nations who have always had the largest colonial empires, while our people was exposed to a great anxiety, which is now—as it will continue to be in the future—particularly pressing."

"It would be a noble act if President Franklin Roosevelt were to redeem the promises made by President Woodrow Wilson. This would in the first place be a practical contribution to the moral consolidation of the world and consequently to the improvement of its economic conditions."

"21. Mr. Roosevelt also stated in conclusion that the heads of all great Governments are in this hour responsible for the fate of humanity. They cannot fail to hear the prayers of their peoples to be protected from the foreseeable chaos of war. And I, too, would be held accountable for this."

"Mr. Roosevelt! I fully understand that the vastness of your nation and the immense wealth of your country allow you to feel responsible for the history of the whole world and for the history of all nations. I, Sir, am placed in a much more modest and smaller sphere. You have 130 million people on 9.5 million square kilometres. You possess a country with enormous riches in all mineral resources, fertile enough to feed half a billion people and to provide them with all necessities."

"I once took over a State which was faced by complete ruin, thanks to its trust in the promises of the rest of the

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world and to the bad régime of democratic governments. In this State there are roughly 140 people to each square kilometre—not 15 as in America. The fertility of our country cannot be compared with that of yours. We lack numerous minerals which nature has placed at your disposal in unlimited quantities. The billions of German savings accumulated in gold and foreign exchange during many years of peace were squeezed out of us and taken from us. We lost our colonies. In 1933 I had in my country seven million unemployed, a few million workers on half time, millions of peasants sinking into poverty, destroyed trade, ruined commerce; in short, general chaos.”

“Since then, Mr. Roosevelt, I have only been able to fulfil one simple task. I cannot feel myself responsible for the fate of a world, as this world took no interest in the pitiful fate of my own people. I have regarded myself as called upon by Providence to serve my own people alone and to deliver them from their frightful misery. Consequently, during the past six and a half years I have lived day and night for the single task of awakening the powers of my people in view of our desertion by the whole of the rest of the world, of developing these powers to the utmost, and of utilizing them for the salvation of our community. I have conquered chaos in Germany, re-established order, enormously increased production in all branches of our national economy, by strenuous efforts produced substitutes for numerous materials which we lack, smoothed the way for new inventions, developed traffic, caused mighty roads to be built and canals to be dug, called into being gigantic new factories and at the same time endeavoured to further the education and culture of our people. I have succeeded in finding useful work once more for the whole of the seven million unemployed who so appeal to the hearts of us all, in keeping the German peasant on his soil in spite of all difficulties,

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and in saving the land itself for him, in once more bringing German trade to a peak and in assisting traffic to the utmost. As a precaution against the threats of another world not only have I united the German people politically, but have also rearmed them; I have also endeavoured to destroy sheet by sheet that treaty which in its 448 articles contains the vilest oppression which peoples and human beings have ever been expected to put up with. I have brought back to the Reich the provinces stolen from us in 1919, I have led back to their native country millions of Germans who were torn away from us and were in misery, I have re-established the historic unity of the German living space and, Mr. Roosevelt, have endeavoured to attain all this without spilling blood and without bringing to my people and consequently to others the misery of war. I, who twenty-one years ago was an unknown worker and soldier of my people, have attained this, Mr. Roosevelt, by my own energy, and can therefore in the face of history claim a place among those men who have done the utmost which can be fairly and justly demanded from a single individual. You, Mr. Roosevelt, have a much easier task in comparison. You became President of the United States in 1933 when I became Chancellor of the Reich. In other words, from the very outset you stepped to the head of one of the largest and wealthiest States in the world. You have the good fortune to have to feed scarcely fifteen people per square kilometre in your country. You have at your disposal the most unlimited mineral resources in the world. As a result of the large area covered by your country and the fertility of your fields, you are enabled to ensure for each individual American ten times the amount of commodities possible in Germany. Nature has in any case enabled you to do this. In spite of the fact that the population of your country is scarcely one

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third greater than the number of inhabitants in Greater Germany, you possess more than fifteen times as much living space. Conditions prevailing in your country are on such a large scale that you can find time and leisure to give your attention to universal problems. Consequently the world is undoubtedly so small for you that you perhaps believe that your intervention and action can be effective everywhere. In this sense therefore your concerns and suggestions cover a much larger and wider area than mine, because my world, Mr. Roosevelt, in which Providence has placed me and for which I am therefore obliged to work, is unfortunately much smaller, although for me it is more precious than anything else, for it is limited to my people! I believe, however, this is the way in which I can be of most service to that for which we are all concerned, namely, the justice, well-being, progress and peace of the whole human community.”¹

¹ An authorized English translation (which is reproduced above) was published in pamphlet form by Müller & Sohn, Berlin; German text *V.B.*, 29 Apr. 1939. There is an English translation of the speech in *The Times* and in the *Daily Telegraph* for 29 Apr. 1939—The Memorandum of the German Government of 28 Apr. 1939—declaring that the British Government “by its policy of encirclement has unilaterally removed the basis of the Naval Treaty of 18 June 1935 and thereby rendered this Treaty as well as the supplementary mutual declaration of 17 July 1937 null and void”—is reproduced in an authorized English translation in *International Conciliation. Documents for the Year 1939* (New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), pp. 348-9; the Memorandum of the German Government to the Polish Government of 28 Apr. 1939—declaring that “the Polish Government has undertaken political obligations to another State which are irreconcilable not only with the spirit but also with the letter of the German-Polish Declaration of 26 Jan. 1934” and “has thereby deliberately and unilaterally rendered this Declaration null and void”—is reproduced in an authorized English translation, *ibid.*, pp. 350-4. There are also translated Beck’s speech of 5 May 1939 (pp. 355-60) and the text of the Polish Memorandum to Germany of the same date (pp. 361-5).

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*For the speech of 28 April 1939 cf. the report dated 1 June 1939 of Coulondre to Bonnet: "On est convaincu à la Wilhelmstrasse que, dans l'esprit du Führer, Dantzig est un moyen, mais non une fin. On souligne que, dans son discours du 28 avril, celui-ci a parlé de l'Alsace avec quelque réticence."*¹

For the use made of Hitler's speech by Goebbels in his speech at Danzig on 17 June 1939 see the report in V.B., 19 June 1939 and the report by Coulondre to Bonnet dated 20 June 1939.² Cf. further on the significance of this speech the report sent by the French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Bonnet on 25 July 1939.³

In a speech delivered in Berlin on May Day 1939 Hitler said:

"The foundation of a people's life does not lie in doctrines and theories but in its own *Lebensraum*, i.e. in what the earth gives it for its living. Therefore the *Lebensraum*—the space from which a people can draw its livelihood—is not to be separated from the standard of life of a people. But to this *Lebensraum* there must be added—and this in itself is a revolutionary view—the industry, the energy, the capacity with which a people on its *Lebensraum* produces the most that it can possibly produce. And still there remains that which must be realized above everything else, for through this realization there follows the necessity for a community of the people even if the necessity for this were not already sufficiently clear from considerations of blood alone. My fellow-countrymen, no leader can bring to his task more force than is given him by his followers: what am I without you? What you do not give me that I can never use for your benefit. If you refused me your unity of spirit,

¹ *The French Yellow Book*, No. 132.

² *Ibid.*, No. 138.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 171.

what should I do? I am a single individual: I may possess the best will in the world, it is of no more value for you than your will is worth for me. Before this fact how small are all the other differences in life. And yet, my fellow-countrymen, what airs individual men do give themselves! One is set up about one thing and one about another. One is proud because perhaps he is 10 centimetres taller than the other: another congratulates himself, because, as he believes, he is better-looking since his ancestors should have been better-looking. But that remains unproven! Another thinks that he has the advantage because for the moment his purse is rather fuller—I say 'for the moment', because it is a common experience that money comes—and goes! Yet another says 'I have taken a few more classes than you have: have you got as many certificates as I have?' 'No.' 'Then I am more valuable than you are. I can prove it by my certificates.' And so on. So everyone has very important support and foundation for his personal conceit. But how ridiculous it all is when set against the common destiny which rises peremptorily above us all. What significance has all this when compared with the fact that either we begin our life-struggle in common with others or else we all perish in common? . . . For better or for worse we must hold together. And if anyone should fail to understand this—I do not know where he is to be found!—then he cannot but realize it by the attitude of the rest of the world. How do they stand towards us? What have we after all to expect from them? Are not the old Encirclement-politicians active once more—some of them folk who in 1914 knew only hatred? It is the same international clique of war-mongers who already in 1914 were at their dirty game. What can we expect from them, my fellow-countrymen? I believe it to be essential that all Germans should banish

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these ridiculous prejudices so far as they still exist and that they should draw close together in the conviction that we are equal for any danger if we stand united side by side, but that divided we are bound to succumb. That is the view to which we would educate our people. And often when some old narrow-minded fellow perhaps drives me to despair then I have only to look on his boy and I take fresh hope. What one cannot hope to mend in these few old grumblers, that Youth, thank God! has already left behind. In our youth a race is growing up of the kind that we picture to ourselves for the future—that shall come one day."

"We do all that man can do to give to youth this education. Often admittedly we disregard the so-called freedom of the individual. I can imagine one or another saying—or rather: he would say if he could, only now he can't say it—'I cannot see why my son must now go to the compulsory Labour Service. After all, he was born to something better than that! Why should he now go about with a spade? Couldn't he be employed somehow intellectually, be given some intellectual work?' What an odd idea, my dear friend, you have of the intellect! If your boy has worked for six months for Germany on the fortification of our Western front, he has perhaps done more practical good than all your intellect could do for Germany its whole life through. And above all: he has contributed to destroy one of the worst intellectual aberrations there is—the internal divisions within a people. We cannot of course say: 'If he doesn't want to, then he need not work.' Does anyone fancy perhaps that work, for instance, in a chemical factory with a very nasty smell is something so wonderful, so splendid, in a democracy? Don't let anyone say to me: 'Yes, but that is the charm of work that here gives forth its perfume.' Not in the least! That is a

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stench, my honoured sirs! But a hundred thousand workmen have to put up with that, and put up with it they do. Therefore it follows that the other can carry a spade, and carry it he will."

"And with that I come to the problem of freedom in general. Freedom, yes! So far as the interest of the community of the people gives the individual freedom, it is given him. But at the point where his freedom harms the interests of the community of the people, at that point the freedom of the individual ceases and the freedom of the people steps into its place. And besides in no State is intellectual achievement more highly valued than with us. I believe that one can see that even in the leadership. We fancy that in Germany there are, after all, men at the head of the State who in intellect can stand comparison with the representatives of other States. But high above all the freedom of the individual there is the freedom of our people, the freedom of our Reich: and the security of the German *Lebensraum* is for us the supreme law. That we love peace I do not need to stress. I know that a certain type of international journalist pours forth his lies day after day, and covers us with his suspicions and his slanders. That does not surprise me, for I know these creatures: some of them were in Germany. They are also an article of export, but only as the spoiled goods of the German nation. In the American Union a boycott of German exports was organized; it would have been more sensible, I feel, to have imported German goods rather than these most inferior German blackguards. We can at least be glad to be rid of these goods! How the others will get free of them, that is their affair. That they shall not be a danger to us, we shall take care: for that I have already taken care. I do at least know my political 'Friends' from the time before we came into power, folk who at that time were

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always declaring that they knew no Fatherland. That, too, is true, for they are Jews and therefore have nothing to do with us. Naturally these folk now only confirm their former views, their old confession of faith. They agitate against Germany by every means in their power, and I—arm with every means in my power.”

“That I love peace appears perhaps most clearly from my work: in that lies the difference between me and these war-mongers. What am I creating and what do these creatures do? I have here a great people and for it I am responsible. I try to make this people great and happy. Vast works are being created here, mighty industries are arising, great buildings are being called into life for the invigoration of the people, mighty architectural proofs of what our civilization can produce have been begun not only here in Berlin but in a great number of other German cities. What have we not created this year? What have we not begun this year? And how many of these works will need ten or twenty years before they are completed! I have then good reason enough to wish for peace. But these agitators have no use for peace; since they create nothing for peace, they are not working for peace. I do not need to mention any names: we know quite well these¹ international scribblers. They are so monstrously clever! They know positively everything. Only one thing they did not know—that I was coming to power. That they did not know even in January 1933. They did not know one thing more: that I should stay in power: that they did not believe even in February 1933. They did not know that I would set Germany free: they did not believe that—no, not even in 1935 or 1936. They did not know further that I should set free our German fellow-

¹ In *V.B.* report: *die uns bekannten*; in *F.Z.* *die unbekannten*. I think the *V.B.* report must be right.

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countrymen and bring them back into their homeland: that they did not know even in 1937 and 1938. That I should liberate the few Germans who yet remained to be liberated, that they did not know even in February of this year. They have not known that I should end the unemployment of seven millions: they did not know that three years ago: they never believed it two years ago. That I should carry through a Four Years Plan in Germany they did not know. They knew absolutely nothing, but apart from that they know everything!"

"I don't know how it is: these folk have always been parasites, but sometimes it really almost seems as if they must be a special breed of brain-parasites—they know for instance precisely what is going on in my brain. What I would say, for example, in the speech which I am making before you now, they already knew that down to the smallest detail yesterday. Even before I knew myself, they already knew it, these vessels of wisdom! There is nothing which these creatures do not know. And they have the brazen impudence as soon as their assertions have been proved to be lies straightway to produce new ones in their place. That is an old trick of the Jew! It does not give men any time to think over the last lie. For if men were given time to consider their former prophecies and how things fell out far otherwise then they would never again give them a penny for their thoughts—their lying reports. But that is precisely their strategy, their trick: hardly has one prophecy been falsified before they cap it with three new ones. And thus lie follows lie on a snowball system—one to-day, another lie to-morrow, a third the next day. The most recent lie at the moment is that the 20,000 Germans who previously should have landed in Morocco have now landed in Liberia. Those who should have landed in Morocco were to have been conveyed in part by aero-

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plane: clearly they have spent the whole interval flying round in the air until they finally came down in Liberia. In a week of course it will be discovered that there are no Germans in Liberia: and then they will say: 'It was not Liberia, but Madagascar where they wanted to go.' And if it is not that, then it is —. I have only recently told you of all that is threatened: you have heard that in the Reichstag. These war-mongers who produce nothing, who in any event cannot come before the world and say 'I have created this or that'—it is they who want to scourge the peoples once more into ruin. And you will understand if I do not rely on any declarations or assurances of people who are the agents of this war-mongering—if I rely only on my German people, on you! All respect to a declaration of the League of Nations, but the German fortification of the western front is for me an even surer guarantee of our freedom." . . .

Hitler closed his speech with the words: "On this First of May I look with unbounded confidence on the German future: that our people shall be rightly trained my Movement is the pledge! That it shall be bravely defended the German army is my security. That it never shall fall again into domestic chaos the community of the German people is my guarantee and within that community all the millions of Germany in town and country whom I greet at this moment. Our Great German Reich and our people from East and West and North and South, Sieg Heil!"¹

*For the first hints of a German agreement with the U.S.S.R. see Coulondre's report to Bonnet dated 7 May 1939.*²

In the middle of the month of May Hitler conducted a

¹ V.B., 2 May 1939.

² *The French Yellow Book*, No. 123.

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*tour of inspection of the fortifications on the Western front. At the end of his six days' tour, in the railway-station at Efringen in Baden Hitler said that he had been profoundly impressed by the carriage and the spirit of every individual soldier of the frontier force and of every workman on the fortifications. In these days he had discovered afresh a 100 per cent. confirmation of the conviction which he had always had that this Western fortification was impregnable. "With me," he said in an order to the troops, "the German people thanks those who in ungrudging toil have in the shortest period fashioned in concrete and in steel the foundation for Germany's security."*¹

*On 19 May 1939 Franco celebrated in Madrid the "Day of Victory". Hitler sent to Franco a telegram: "To-day, the day on which through the great parade of your battle-trying troops the victory of national Spain over all forces of blind destruction² is celebrated I and the German people think of you and all the companies of your proud army in heart-felt sympathy. Under your strong leadership may there be granted to the Spanish people a long period of peaceful reconstruction."*³

On the signing of the Pact of Friendship and Alliance between Italy and Germany Hitler telegraphed to King Victor Emanuel: "In this historic hour I desire to express to Your Majesty my profound satisfaction that our two

¹ *F.Z.*, 20 May 1939. Cf. Rudolf T. Kühne, *Der Westwall. Unbezwingbare Abwehrzone von Stahl und Beton an Deutschlands Westgrenze. Mit 50 Abbildungen und Plänen*. Munich, Berlin, Lehmann, 1939 (Preface dated Aug. 1939); Joseph Pöchlinger, *Das Buch vom Westwall*. Berlin, Leipzig, Vienna, Otto Elsner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1940 (illustrated).

² Cf. the message to Franco of 28 Mar. 1939 (p. 1590 *supra*) and note that in the present telegram there is no direct reference to Bolshevism.

³ *F.Z.*, 20 May 1939.

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peoples should be bound one to the other by an unbreakable friendship and community of destinies." *To Mussolini he sent the message:* "Duce, in this historic hour in which, amidst the enthusiastic rejoicing of the whole German people, the Italo-German Pact of Friendship and Alliance is signed I feel that I must express to Your Excellency my great joy that the indissoluble community of Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany should be henceforth also consecrated through a solemn Treaty. By this the world will recognize that all hopes of weakening the Berlin-Rome axis are vain. Germany and Italy, united in a block of 150 millions, will always stand together to defend the sacred inheritance of civilization and to secure a peace founded upon justice."¹

On 1 June 1939 in the course of an evening reception in Berlin during the visit to Germany of Prince Paul, the Regent of Yugoslavia, Hitler said:

"The friendship of Germany towards the Yugoslav people is not only spontaneous: it has gained its depth and permanence in the midst of the tragic confusions of the World War. The German soldier then learned to prize and respect his extraordinarily courageous foe. I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual respect is strengthened through common political, cultural, and economic interests. So, your Royal Highness, in your present visit we see only a living proof of the justice of our view and from it at the same time we form the hope that the German-Yugoslav friendship may also in the future further develop and ever grow closer."

"In your presence here, your Royal Highness, we see also a welcome opportunity for a frank and friendly

¹ I have not the German text of this telegram; I translate from the Italian version published in *Il Giornale d'Italia*, 23 May 1939.—Note the absence of any express reference to Bolshevism.

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exchange of opinion which, I am convinced, for both our peoples and States can only be profitable.¹ I believe this all the more strongly since a relation of firmly founded confidence on the part of Germany towards Yugoslavia—inasmuch as through events of recent history we have become neighbours with common frontiers firmly defined for all time—will not merely secure a lasting peace between our two peoples and countries, but over and above that can also represent an element of appeasement for our nervously excited continent. And this peace is the aim of all those who wish to achieve really constructive work.”²

On 4 June 1939 on the occasion of the “Großdeutscher Reichskriegertag 1939”—the “Day of the Soldiers of the Great German Reich”—Hitler in a speech delivered at Kassel said that he greeted the soldiers as “Leader representing the German people in the name of all the millions of Germans who have entrusted to me, not merely on the basis of a constitutional right but as the expression of their confidence, the destiny of their own lives and thus of the German Reich”. And “he also greeted them as an old soldier with the feeling of a comradeship which in its deepest sense is disclosed only to one who experienced the noblest transfiguration of this conception in the War. For the glorious sense of a brave companionship reveals itself in its most compelling force only to him who has seen that companionship hold under this severest test of man’s courage and loyalty.”

Hitler looked back a quarter of a century—“the time which the soldiers of the old army regarded as the

¹ What the precise meaning of *in diesem Sinne* may be in this sentence I do not know.

² I translate from the text reproduced in *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges* (= *Auswärtiges Amt* 1939 Nr. 2), Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1939, p. 228.

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greatest period of their own existence and which still holds them under its spell"—*he looked back twenty years to the time of the "Diktat" which "was in theory designed to give to the world a new order but which in practice was doomed to destroy every reasonable order based upon the recognition of the most natural of vital rights". He spoke of the change by which the Reich was snatched from destruction and was led to a new greatness "which we believe to be better and above all more permanently based than any similar advance in our earlier German history. . . . For me as Leader of the nation, as I think myself back into the war years and consider the past, one thing which always recurs to me is a question, a question which I regard as of enormous importance not only for our fortunes at that time but for the due moulding of our future—could what happened then have been avoided or was it unavoidable?"*

Hitler spoke of the German admission of war-guilt extorted from a miserable Government by force—a signature which he had solemnly blotted out and thereby, even so far as form went, had restored its honour to truth.

But, beyond that, war-guilt is indissolubly connected with war-aims. "No people and no Government will wage war for war's own sake. Only in the brain of perverse Jewish littérateurs can the idea be entertained that anyone can make war from sheer joy in killing or bloodshed." The fault of the German Government was that neither in 1914 nor during the war had it any clearly defined war-aim. The Treaty of Versailles on the other hand demonstrated what had in truth been the war-aims of English and French "Encirclement politicians": "the theft of the German colonies, the annihilation of German trade, the destruction of the foundations of the existence, the life, of all Germans, the overthrow of German pres-

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tige and German power—precisely the same aims as are now pursued by the British and French Encirclement politicians.” There were those in Germany at that time who thought that they must accept the necessity for those aims. But the World War and the “Diktat” of Versailles have taught the German nation a different lesson. “What formerly apparently irresponsible politicians had proclaimed as the creation of their own fancy or their own hatred had been in fact the aim of British policy.”

And it is well for us to remember that the German Government of that day met these aims without an aim or, unfortunately, a will of its own. There were not even adequate measures of defence. “The worst war-guilt of Germany lay in the fact that through a criminal neglect of German armament it was actually made the easier for the world around us to propagate the idea of the destruction of Germany and in the end to turn that idea into a reality.” *Hitler spoke of the refusal by the Reichstag of credits in 1912: of the failure to train recruits so that when men were called up a large proportion had to pay for their inexperience the price of death.*

“It is not German statesmanship on which we look back with pride but on that instrument which in its essential value was unique—the German army of that day, the navy and later the air force, in numbers often outmatched many times over, but in its worth never equalled.”

“As we look back and remember this great period, my comrades, the effect must be to strengthen in us a conviction and a decision. (1) The conviction that the German people can look back on its past only with the greatest pride, and that is particularly true of the years of the World War. As leader of the German nation I can never for a moment grant, as a former fighter, that

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anyone in the ranks of our Western foes could have any right to feel himself to be or to regard himself as something better than we Germans are. Therefore I do not suffer in the smallest degree from any inferiority complex. I see, on the contrary, in the memory of the four years of the War, which I myself thanks to the favour of Providence had the good fortune to share, only a ground for the proudest confidence in my German people and, as a soldier, in my own person. These years make me in the depths of my being wishful for peace, since I recognize the frightful horrors of war, but also at the same time resolute in my conviction of the value of the German soldier in the defence of our rights. Threats, therefore, from whatever side they come, do not impress me. (2) Further, both I and all of us remembering this time must form the decision that we will not with such criminal levity neglect the interests of our Reich and of the nation as was the case before 1914. And there is an assurance that I wish now to give you, my old comrades: if the British policy of encirclement has remained the same as before the war, the German defence policy has fundamentally changed. It is in itself a change that to-day, at the head of the Reich, affairs are conducted not by a civilian dressed up as a major but by a soldier who perhaps at times wears civilian dress. In the German Government of to-day there are no more Bethmann-Hollwegs. I have seen to it that anyone who has to do in any way with the Government can be only a 100 per cent. man and soldier. If I should ever notice that the conduct of any man fails to stand the test when he is faced with responsibility in a crisis I shall immediately remove any such person, whoever he may be, from his position."

"The Peace 'Diktat' of Versailles did not come into existence by chance. It was the goal of those who for

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years had sought to encircle Germany and had at last reached their goal. We have no right to doubt that to-day the same policy is being pursued only to attain the same goal. We have therefore the duty to tell the unvarnished truth to the nation and to encourage them to the highest degree in their will to defence and their defensive strength. In this I believe that I am acting also in the spirit of those comrades who once—unfortunately apparently to no purpose—had to give their lives for Germany. . . . It is at least something to have made good the crimes which weakness, lack of purpose, and disunity once committed.”

“I expect therefore that this strengthening of the defensive strength of Germany, particularly amongst old soldiers, will not merely be welcomed but fanatically supported. But this policy cannot see its goal in temporarily clothing a year’s recruits from civilian life in military uniform, but its aim must be on principle to educate the whole nation to be soldiers and to bring them to a soldierly frame of mind. It is no chance that National Socialism was born in the Great War. For it is nothing else than the penetration of our entire life with the spirit of the true fighter for people and Reich.”

“Of one thing none of us can doubt: only when in all spheres the German people possesses a heroic leadership, only then in its own attitude will it resemble this leadership. It is my unalterable decision to see to it that the highest political and military leaders of the nation both think and act just as courageously as the honest rifleman must do who unconditionally has to surrender and does surrender his life when this sacrifice is demanded by his orders or by necessity. The heroic leadership of a nation is always founded on that conscience which receives its orders through putting to

itself the question of the survival or the destruction of a people."¹

On 6 June 1939 Hitler addressed the soldiers of the Condor Legion on their return from the war in Spain: "I am so happy to see you before me and above all I am so proud of you! And at this hour the entire German people shares my feeling. . . . In the summer of 1936 Spain seemed lost. International forces in that country fanned the flame of a revolution destined to lay not merely Spain but Europe in dust and ashes. The Christian democracies, too, would not be stopped from sending for this purpose arms, combustibles, and so-called 'volunteers'. A frightfully menacing fate threatened our continent. The European countries possessing the oldest civilizations seemed endangered. From Spain ten thousand Germans were forced to flee when house and home were given over to destruction. Many were murdered. What Germans in a laborious, long, honest struggle for life had built up there as the foundation of their livelihood was in a few weeks destroyed and annihilated."

"German warships which I sent in answer to the appeal of our fellow-countrymen sought to help: at least, so far as they could they undertook the protection of life and limb and rendered possible the transport of our fellow-countrymen back to their homeland. And then in 1936 there arose ever more clearly one man who seemed called, under the behest of his own conscience, to act on his people's behalf. Franco began his struggle for the salvation of Spain. Arrayed against him there stood a conspiracy fed from all parts of the world. In July 1936 I had just determined to answer the call for help which this man sent to me: I would help him to

¹ *F.Z.*, 5 June 1939.

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the extent that and as long as the rest of the world should give its support to the domestic foes of Spain."

"From that time National Socialist Germany began to take an active part, under the leadership of this man, in the struggle for the restoration of a national and independent Spain. I gave this order in the realization that I might thus be able to safeguard not only Europe but also our own Fatherland from a later catastrophe of the same character."

"I did this also from a deep feeling of sympathy for the life of a country which formerly in the World War, despite all the attempts at compulsion made by England, had remained friendly in its neutrality. By so doing I have returned the thanks of the German nation."

"Further, this was done in complete agreement with Italy. For Mussolini, inspired by the same idealistic considerations, had also formed the decision to allow the help of Italy to be given to the saviour of Spain in his fight against the internationally organized annihilation of his country. Thus for the first time there resulted a common practical demonstration of the *weltanschaulich* unity of our two countries."

"These idealistic motives the international plutocracies were neither able to comprehend nor were they prepared to admit. For years British and French journals lied to their readers representing that Germany and Italy intended to conquer Spain, to partition her, and above all to rob her of her colonies—lines of thought which certainly seem less unnatural in the representatives of these countries than with us, since the theft of the colonies of other peoples has of old been counted amongst the permitted and well tried methods of these democracies."

"Thus we all remember the infamous assertions which one day were spread abroad—that Germany had landed

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20,000 men in Morocco in order to occupy the country and in this way take it from Spain. It is with these libels that the politicians and journalists of the democracies have carried on their agitation amongst their peoples and have sought time and again to use Spain as the place from which that catastrophe might take its rise which these encirclement-politicians, war-agitators, and war-profiteers most passionately desire—the new great European war of the peoples.”

“And now you, my comrades, have returned from Spain. This day—this festival of your reception in the capital of the Reich—is at once the close and the liquidation of all these lying democratic impostures.”

“For I sent you out to help a country in misfortune, to support a heroic man who, as a glowing patriot, wished to rescue his people from annihilation and who has in fact gloriously rescued it. You have now returned having bravely executed my commission. I should like at this moment to tell the entire German nation what good reason it has to be grateful to you. You have undertaken every service to which you were called as German soldiers mindful of your honour and your duty, courageous and loyal and above all modest. The high praise which the hero of Spanish freedom has given to you can but make the German people specially proud of you.”

“It was painful for us all to have to keep silence on your fight year after year. But from the first I had the intention, after the end of this war, to give you in the homeland the reception which brave, victorious soldiers deserve. . . . The German people thanks those, too, who, as soldiers, have had to lose limb, life, or health in the service of this commission and it thanks lastly those who to-day mourn the loss of their brave husbands and sons. They have fallen, but their death and their suffer-

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ing will give life to countless other Germans in the future. . . . Your example, my comrades, will above all else only heighten the self-confidence of the German people, it will strengthen the ties of comradeship which link us to our friends, and will leave the world in no doubt that—if the international war-agitators should ever wish to realize their plan of attacking the German Reich—this their attempt will meet with a resistance from the German people and the German armed forces such as the encirclement propagandists of to-day would still appear unable rightly to conceive. In this respect, too, your fight in Spain, as a lesson for our foes, was a fight for Germany." . . . You, now you have returned, are particularly fitted to be the example and teacher of the young soldiers of our new Army: "You have thus helped to strengthen confidence in the new German army and in the excellence of our new weapons."

Hitler then spoke of the Italian soldiers who had risked their lives "in this fight of civilization against destruction": *he spoke of* "the proud people, which they had come to know, which for nearly three years had fought resolutely, boldly, heroically to save its freedom, its independence and therewith its existence"; *he spoke of the good fortune of the legionaries to have served* "under the orders of a general who from the force of his own determination, with an unfaltering faith in victory, had become the saviour of his country. At this moment we have all only the sincere and heart-felt wish that henceforth it may be granted to the noble Spanish people under this man's brilliant leadership to rise proudly to a new prosperity."¹

In reply to a telegram of greeting sent by Franco in the

¹ *F.Z.*, 7 June 1939. This speech is highly significant: the attack, it will be observed, is not directed against Bolshevism but against the democracies.

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*name of the National Council of the Spanish Traditionalist Falange (9 June 1939) Hitler telegraphed his thanks: "In the sure conviction that the battle which we have waged in common against Bolshevism,¹ the destroyer of culture and of peoples, has formed a tie of indissoluble community between the German and the Spanish peoples, I most heartily respond to your message with the sincere wishes of myself and the German people for a happy future for Spain."*²

*It may be noted that in his speech at the celebration of the Festival of the Summer Solstice Goebbels said: "Germany intends to recover all the territories which have belonged to her in the course of history." This sentence was not reported in the German Press.*³

*On 26 June 1939 in the interview granted by Hitler to the retiring Ambassador of the Argentine: "M. Hitler lui a dit plus ou moins nettement qu'il n'avait pas l'intention d'attaquer la Pologne."*⁴

On 19 July 1939 Forster, Gauleiter of Danzig, reported to the High Commissioner on his interview with Hitler in Berchtesgaden. "D'après M. Forster, M. Hitler serait toujours résolu à obtenir l'autorisation de construire à travers le Corridor une autostrade exterritoriale, ainsi que le retour de Dantzig au Reich; mais il ne voudrait pas recourir à la guerre pour s'assurer ces avantages; si la Pologne s'abstient de toute provocation, des mesures de démobilisation seront prises, d'ici quelques semaines, dans la Ville Libre. Un violent article polonophobe publié

¹ This relapse into the earlier style is interesting (cf. pp. 1590, 1664 *supra*); was it an oversight? ² *F.Z.*, 10 June 1939.

³ *The French Yellow Book*, No. 143. Report of Coulondre to Bonnet, dated 22 June 1939. Cf. *ibid.*, No. 144.

⁴ From report of Coulondre to Bonnet dated 27 June 1939. *The French Yellow Book*, No. 145.

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par le Gauleiter mettrait un point final à la campagne actuelle."¹

*At a second interview with the High Commissioner (24 July 1939) Gauleiter Forster "a confirmé à M. Burckhardt que M. Hitler saurait attendre le temps nécessaire pour amener un règlement pacifique de la question de Dantzig".*²

*With the beginning of August there follows the embittered dispute over the Polish customs officers in Danzig.³ German claims are no longer confined to Danzig but are extended to include "the Corridor and the other territories arbitrarily detached from the Reich."*⁴

*But on 10 August 1939 the Gauleiter of Danzig informed the High Commissioner that Hitler had ordered him, "afin de ne pas compliquer les choses d'éviter à Dantzig tout nouvel incident".*⁵ *This was the result of an interview with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 8 August 1939.*⁶

But on the evening of the same day Forster spoke at Danzig "au cours d'une manifestation organisée pour illustrer la volonté de la population dantzicoise d'être réintégrée au Reich. Dans ce discours, rédigé sur les instructions reçues à Obersalzberg, il exprimait la conviction que le Führer saurait réaliser le vœu unanime de la population dantzicoise de rentrer dans le sein de la Patrie allemande. Deux jours plus tard, après être revenu en Allemagne, il

¹ *The French Yellow Book*, No. 166. From a report of the French Consul at Danzig to Bonnet. Cf. *ibid.*, No. 170: report of Dr. Bömer's statement of German foreign policy (21 July 1939) on the instructions of the Secretary of State, Dietrich, who had just returned from seeing Hitler in Berchtesgaden. This statement is, however, too indirect to insert here as though it were made by Hitler himself. On Dr. Bömer's statement cf. *ibid.*, No. 171.

² *Ibid.*, No. 172. On this change of tone beginning about the middle of July see *ibid.*, No. 176. It gives place in the German Press at the end of July to statements that Germany has no need to fear "un conflit même généralisé". Hitler, as in May, once more visits the German fortifications in the West.

³ Cf. *ibid.* Nos. 177 et seq.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 184; cf. No. 192.

⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 188.

⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 189.

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prononçait à Fürth, sa ville natale, une harangue dans laquelle on a voulu reconnaître le style du Führer et il s'écriait: Quoi qu'il arrive, Dantzig finira bien par revenir un jour au Reich." . . . M. Forster n'a pas seulement formulé les revendications allemandes concernant Dantzig; il a fait le procès de l'État polonais lui-même comme on faisait l'an dernier le procès de l'État tchécoslovaque. Il a refusé à la Pologne le droit d'exister en tant qu'État indépendant."¹

9 August. The German Secretary of State sends a communication to the Polish Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin on the Note addressed by the Polish Government to the Senate of the Free City of Danzig concerning the activity of Polish Customs officials.²

10 August. Polish Government's reply.³

11, 12, 13 August 1939. Ciano confers with Hitler and Ribbentrop.⁴ Interview with Hitler on 12 August.

12 August. Burckhardt, High Commissioner at Danzig, has an interview with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. "Les propos qu'il (Hitler) aurait tenus à M. Burckhardt lors de la visite . . . sembleraient indiquer qu'il n'a pas depuis lors (i.e. his speech on 28 April 1939) modifié sa position. Aucun de ses lieutenants n'a prononcé non plus de paroles décisives."⁵

¹ Coulondre in a report dated 15 Aug. 1939, *The French Yellow Book*, No. 195.

² Text: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, p. 284; English translation: *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, &c. p. 87.

³ Text: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, *ibid.*; English translation: *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, &c., pp. 87-8.

⁴ For the doubts at this time of the result of these conversations cf. *The French Yellow Book*, No. 195. The dominant impression at Berlin was that "l'Italie a essayé de jouer le rôle modérateur, de freiner le Reich". Cf. Sir Neville Henderson, *The Failure of a Mission. Berlin 1937-1939*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1940, pp. 252-3. "It seems probable that Ciano there proposed . . . some form of international conference."

⁵ *The French Yellow Book*, No. 195.

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20 August. "*Dans les milieux de la Wilhelmstrasse . . . on considère que le Chancelier Hitler est résolu à 'régler la question de Dantzig' avant le 1^{er} septembre.*"¹

22 August. Garreau, French Consul-General at Hamburg, learns from a "serious source" "*que le Gouvernement allemand espère, par une agression militaire foudroyante, venir à bout de la Pologne avant la fin du mois.*"²

23 August. Non-aggression Pact between Germany and Russia signed.³

On this day Sir Nevile Henderson presents Chamberlain's letter to Hitler. Text of letter: "*Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*", *Ec.* pp. 96-8.

Sir Nevile Henderson was received shortly after 1 p.m. In his report of the interview sent to Lord Halifax he wrote:

During the whole of this first conversation Herr Hitler was excitable and uncompromising. He made no long speeches but his language was violent and exaggerated both as regards England and Poland. He began by asserting that the Polish question would have been settled on the most generous terms if it had not been for England's unwarranted support. I drew attention to the inaccuracies of this statement, our guarantee having been given on 31st March and Polish reply on 26th March. He retorted by saying that the latter had been inspired by a British press campaign, which had invented a German threat to Poland the week before. Germany had not moved a man any more than she had

¹ Report of Léon Noël, French Ambassador at Warsaw, to Bonnet, *ibid.*, No. 203. (Cf. *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, *Ec.*, p. 91.)

² *Ibid.*, No. 211.

³ Text: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, pp. 233-4: English translation: *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, *Ec.*, pp. 104-5.

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done during the similar fallacious press campaign about Czecho-Slovakia on the 20th May last year.

He then violently attacked the Poles, talked of 100,000 German refugees from Poland, excesses against Germans, closing of German institutions and Polish systematic persecution of German nationals generally. He said that he was receiving hundreds of telegrams daily from his persecuted compatriots. He would stand it no longer, &c. I interrupted by remarking that while I did not wish to try to deny that persecutions occurred (of Poles also in Germany) the German Press accounts were highly exaggerated. He had mentioned the castration of Germans. I happened to be aware of one case. The German in question was a sex-maniac, who had been treated as he deserved. Herr Hitler's retort was that there had not been one case but six.

His next tirade was against British support of Czechs and Poles. He asserted that the former would have been independent to-day if England had not encouraged them in a policy hostile to Germany. He insinuated that the Poles would be to-morrow if Britain ceased to encourage them to-day. He followed this by a tirade against England, whose friendship he had sought for twenty years only to see every offer turned down with contempt. The British Press was also vehemently abused. I contested every point and kept calling his statements inaccurate but the only effect was to launch him on some fresh tirade.

He did not desire war but would not shrink from it if it was necessary; his people were much more behind him than last September.

I replied that I hoped and was convinced that some solution was still possible without war and asked why contact with the Poles could not be renewed. Herr Hitler's retort was that, so long as England gave Poland

a blank cheque, Polish unreasonableness would render any negotiation impossible. *I denied the "blank cheque" but this only started Herr Hitler off again, and finally it was agreed that he would send or hand me his reply in two hours' time.*¹

The German report of the interview does not add much to this: the "atmosphere", Hitler said, had been poisoned by England; had it not been for England he would in 1938 have come to a peaceful agreement with Czechoslovakia just as in the present year he would certainly have come to an agreement with Poland. His fair offer to Poland had been sabotaged by the Western Powers whose military attachés, just as in the case of Czechoslovakia, had spread false reports of a German mobilization. If England or France took any further military measures, he would order a general mobilization in Germany. England had made a foe of the man who wished to be her greatest friend. England had preferred any course to co-operation with Germany: in her determination to annihilate Germany she had turned to France, to Turkey and to Moscow. England's attitude was "rather war than any profit for Germany". Hitler quoted the German proverb: for love there must always be two parties.

Later in the day Sir Neville Henderson was recalled to Berchtesgaden. In his telegraphic report of the second conversation he said that Hitler was quite calm this time: the conversation lasted from 20 minutes to half an hour; it produced little new save that Hitler was far more categorical than in his written reply as to his determination to attack Poland if "another German were ill-treated in Poland".

England, Hitler said, was determined to destroy and exterminate Germany. He was 50 years old: he preferred war now to when he would be 55 or 60. I told

¹ *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations, &c.* pp. 98-100.

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him that it was absurd to talk of extermination. Nations could not be exterminated and peaceful and prosperous Germany was a British interest. His answer was that it was England who was fighting for lesser races whereas he was fighting only for Germany: the Germans would this time fight to the last man: it would have been different in 1914 if he had been Chancellor then.

He spoke several times of his repeated offers of friendship to England and their invariable and contemptuous rejection. I referred to Prime Minister's efforts of last year and his desire for co-operation with Germany. He said that he had believed in Mr. Chamberlain's good will at the time, but, and especially since encirclement efforts of last few months, he did so no longer. I pointed out fallacy of this view, but his answer was that he was now finally convinced of the rightness of views held formerly to him by others that England and Germany could never agree.

In referring to Russian non-aggression pact he observed that it was England which had forced him into agreement with Russia. He did not seem enthusiastic over it, but added that once he made agreement it would be for a long period.

Herr Hitler's attitude was that it was England's fault and that nothing short of complete change of her policy towards Germany could now ever convince him of British desire for good relations.¹

¹ For these two interviews see *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, &c., pp. 98-101; cf. the report of Coulondre to Bonnet, *The French Yellow Book*, No. 217, and for the German version *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, pp. 290-1. Cf. further: Sir Nevile Henderson, *Failure of a Mission*, &c. (see p. 1677, n. 4), pp. 256-7. "In the midst of one of his tirades against the Poles in Aug. 1939, Sir Nevile Henderson interrupted Hitler to observe that he seemed to forget how useful the agreement with Pilsudski had been to him in 1934. Hitler's answer was that it had never been of any use whatsoever and that it had merely made him unpopular with his own people." Ibid., p. 62.

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Hitler's reply to Chamberlain's letter was as follows:

"Your Excellency,

"The British Ambassador has just handed to me a communication in which your Excellency draws attention in the name of the British Government to a number of points which in your estimation are of the greatest importance."

"I may be permitted to answer your letter as follows:

"1. Germany has never sought conflict with England and has never interfered in English interests. On the contrary, she has for years endeavoured—although unfortunately in vain—to win England's friendship. On this account she voluntarily assumed in a wide area of Europe the limitations on her own interests which from a national-political point of view it would have otherwise been very difficult to tolerate."

"2. The German Reich, however, like every other State possesses certain definite interests which it is impossible to renounce. These do not extend beyond the limits of the necessities laid down by former German history and deriving from vital economic pre-requisites. Some of these questions held and still hold a significance both of a national-political and a psychological character which no German Government is able to ignore."

"To these questions belong the German City of Danzig, and the connected problem of the Corridor. Numerous statesmen, historians and men of letters even in England have been conscious of this at any rate up to a few years ago. I would add that all these territories lying in the aforesaid German sphere of interest and in particular those lands which returned to the Reich eighteen months ago received their cultural development at the hands not of the English but exclusively of the Germans and this, moreover, already from a time dating back over a thousand years."

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"3. Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig and of the Corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegations disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization against Poland, the assertion of aggressive designs towards Roumania, Hungary, &c., as well as the so-called guarantee declarations which were subsequently given had, however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate on a basis of this kind which would have been tolerable for Germany also."

"4. The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland that she would render assistance to that country in all circumstances regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring, could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement thenceforward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German inhabitants living in Poland. The atrocities which since then have been taking place in that country are terrible for the victims, but intolerable for a Great Power such as the German Reich which is expected to remain a passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has been guilty of numerous breaches of her legal obligations towards the Free City of Danzig, has made demands in the character of ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic strangulation."

"5. The Government of the German Reich therefore recently caused the Polish Government to be informed that it was not prepared passively to accept this development of affairs, that it will not tolerate further addressing of notes in the character of ultimata to Danzig, that it will not tolerate a continuance of the persecutions of the German minority, that it will equally not tolerate the extermination of the Free City of Danzig by economic measures, in other words, the destruction of the vital

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bases of the population of Danzig by a kind of Customs blockade, and that it will not tolerate the occurrence of further acts of provocation directed against the Reich. Apart from this, the questions of the Corridor and of Danzig must and shall be solved."

"6. Your Excellency informs me in the name of the British Government that you will be obliged to render assistance to Poland in any such case of intervention on the part of Germany. I take note of this statement of yours and assure you that it can make no change in the determination of the Reich Government to safeguard the interests of the Reich as stated in paragraph 5 above. Your assurance to the effect that in such an event you anticipate a long war is shared by myself. Germany, if attacked by England, will be found prepared and determined. I have already more than once declared before the German people and the world that there can be no doubt concerning the determination of the new German Reich rather to accept, for however long it might be, every sort of misery and tribulation than to sacrifice its national interests, let alone its honour."

"7. The German Reich Government has received information to the effect that the British Government has the intention to carry out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures other than those of a defensive character against England or France, and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended, and does not in the future intend, to attack England or France, it follows that this announcement as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a contemplated act of menace directed against the Reich. *I therefore inform*

your Excellency that, in the event of these military announcements being carried into effect, I shall order immediate mobilization of the German forces."

[*Sir Nevile Henderson asked Hitler what this italicized sentence meant: his answer was confused as was the actual German text, "But the gist was that if the French and British mobilizations convinced Herr Hitler that the Western Powers meant to attack him he would mobilize in self-defence. . . . The sentence was more particularly intended as a warning to France and . . . the French Government was being or would be so informed."*]¹

"8. The question of the treatment of European problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany but primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Versailles Dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of the responsible Powers can there be any real change in the relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by British diplomacy—at any rate up to the present—has, however, convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be any change in this respect in the future nobody could be happier than I."

"ADOLF HITLER."²

23 August. *A decree of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig enacts: "The Gauleiter of Danzig is the Head of the State ('Staatsoberhaupt') of the Free City of Danzig."*³

¹ *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, &c., p. 101.

² English translation of letter: *ibid.*, pp. 102-4. German text: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, pp. 292-3. Cf. *The French Yellow Book*, No. 221.

³ For a translation of the letter of the President of the Senate to Forster and Forster's reply (both of 24 Aug.) see *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, &c., pp. 105-6; for the Polish Note to the Danzig Senate see translation, *ibid.*, p. 106.

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24 August. Polish Ambassador in Berlin has an interview with Goering.¹

25 August. Anglo-Polish Treaty signed.²

25 August. Hitler handed to Sir Neville Henderson a supplementary verbal communication at an interview at 1.30 p.m. on 25 August: this communication was as follows:

"By way of introduction the Führer declared that the British Ambassador had given expression at the close of the last conversation to the hope that, after all, an understanding between Germany and England might yet be possible. He (the Führer) had therefore turned things over in his mind once more and desired to make a move as regards England which should be as decisive as the move as regards Russia which had led to the recent agreement. Yesterday's sitting in the House of Commons and the speeches of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax had also moved the Führer to talk once more to the British Ambassador. The assertion that Germany affected to conquer the world was ridiculous. The British Empire embraced 40 million square kilometres, Russia 19 million square kilometres, America 9½ million square kilometres, whereas Germany embraced less than 600,000 square kilometres. It is quite clear who it is who desires to conquer the world."

"The Führer makes the following communication to the British Ambassador:

"1. Poland's actual provocations have become intolerable. It makes no difference who is responsible. If the Polish Government denies responsibility, that only goes to show that it no longer itself possesses any influence over its subordinate military authorities. In the

¹ Report of Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw) to Viscount Halifax, op. cit., p. 119. Cf. *The French Yellow Book*, No. 230.

² French translation: *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques*, &c., pp. 128-30; German translation: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, pp. 294-6.

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preceding night there had been a further twenty-one new frontier incidents; on the German side the greatest discipline had been maintained. All incidents had been provoked from the Polish side. Furthermore, commercial aircraft had been shot at. If the Polish Government stated that it was not responsible, it showed that it was no longer capable of controlling its own people."

"2. Germany was in all the circumstances determined to abolish these Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier and, what is more, to do so in the interests of quiet and order, but also in the interests of European peace."

"3. The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved.—The British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and incalculable war between Germany and England. Such a war would be bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast to the last war Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts. Agreement with Russia was unconditional and signified a change in foreign policy of the Reich which would last a very long time. Russia and Germany would never again take up arms against each other. Apart from this, the agreements reached with Russia would also render Germany secure economically for the longest possible period of war."

"The Führer had always wanted an Anglo-German understanding. War between England and Germany could at the best bring some profit to Germany but none at all to England."

"The Führer declared that the German-Polish problem must be solved and will be solved. He is, however, prepared and determined after the solution of this problem to approach England once more with a large

comprehensive offer. He is a man of great decisions, and in this case also he will be capable of being great in his action. He accepts the British Empire and is ready to pledge himself personally for its continued existence and to place the power of the German Reich at its disposal if—

“(1) His colonial demands which are limited and can be negotiated by peaceful methods are fulfilled and in this case he is prepared to fix the longest time limit.”

“(2) His obligations towards Italy are not touched; in other words, he does not demand that England gives up her obligations towards France and similarly for his own part he cannot withdraw from his obligations towards Italy.”

“(3) He also desires to stress the irrevocable determination of Germany never again to enter into conflict with Russia. The Führer is ready to conclude agreements with England which, as has already been emphasized, would not only guarantee the existence of the British Empire in all circumstances as far as Germany is concerned, but also if necessary an assurance to the British Empire of German assistance regardless of where such assistance should be necessary. The Führer would then also be ready to accept a reasonable limitation of armaments which corresponds to the new political situation, and which is economically tolerable. Finally, the Führer renewed his assurances that he is not interested in Western problems and that a frontier modification in the West does not enter into consideration. Western fortifications which have been constructed at a cost of milliards were final Reich frontier on the West.”

“If the British Government would consider these ideas, a blessing for Germany and also for the British Empire might result. If it rejects these ideas there will be war. In no case would Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war proved this.”

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"The Führer repeats that he is a man of *ad infinitum* decisions by which he himself is bound and that this is his last offer. Immediately after solution of the German-Polish question he would approach the British Government with an offer."¹

Sir Nevile Henderson sent an account of this interview by telegram to Viscount Halifax: in this telegram he stated that Hitler began by saying that he had always desired and still desired good relations with Great Britain and his conscience compelled him to make this final effort to secure them. It was his last attempt. He suggested that I should fly to England myself in order to put the case to His Majesty's Government. Hitler refused to guarantee a negotiated settlement of the Polish question on the ground that Polish provocation might at any moment render German intervention to protect German nationals inevitable.

To the suggestion that Beck and Ribbentrop should meet somewhere and discuss the way out Hitler replied that he had invited Beck to come and talk the matter over last March, only to have his invitation flatly refused.

To the repeated assertion that it was essential that the offer should mean a peaceful settlement with Poland Hitler said: "If you think it useless, then do not send my offer at all." Beck and Lipski were well-intentioned but they had no control over what was happening in Poland. The only signs of excitement on Hitler's part occurred when he referred to the Polish persecutions.

Among various points mentioned by Herr Hitler were: that the only winner of another European war would be Japan; that he was by nature an artist not a politician,

¹ German text: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, pp. 293-4; English translation: *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, &c., pp. 120-2. Cf. *The French Yellow Book*, No. 245, 246, 248.

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and that once the Polish question was settled he would end his life as an artist and not as a warmonger; he did not want to turn Germany into nothing but a military barracks and he would only do so if forced to do so; that once the Polish question was settled he himself would settle down: that he had no interest in making Britain break her word to Poland; that he had no wish to be small-minded in any settlement with Poland and that all he required for an agreement with her was a gesture from Britain to indicate that she would not be unreasonable.¹

For this interview see also the telephonic reports sent to Paris by Coulondre after seeing Sir Neville Henderson:² to the account given above add:

"Je veux," a déclaré le Chancelier, "faire encore une tentative en vue du rétablissement de bonnes relations entre nos pays et de la sauvegarde de la paix. Je suis disposé à envisager dans certaines limites un programme de désarmement. Je veux toujours des colonies, mais je puis attendre trois, quatre ou même cinq ans; ce ne sera pas là une cause de guerre. D'ailleurs, il ne s'agirait pas nécessairement des anciennes colonies allemandes. L'essentiel pour moi est de trouver des corps gras ainsi que du bois."

M. Hitler a dit hier à mon collègue anglais qu'il était décidé à faire disparaître la faiblesse qui existait à sa frontière de l'est du fait de la présence des minorités allogènes. Sir Neville Henderson lui a demandé s'il envisageait de procéder, comme pour le Tyrol, à un

¹ *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations, &c.*, pp. 122-3. See *The French Yellow Book*, Nos. 248, 257.

² *The French Yellow Book*, No. 245, dated 26 Aug. 1939: in this Coulondre says: "Au cours d'un entretien avec Sir Neville Henderson, M. Hitler a fait aujourd'hui à mon collègue la communication dont voici la substance. . . ." The report is apparently wrongly dated, since the interview in question must, it would seem, be that of 25 Aug.

échange de populations et le Führer n'a répondu ni oui ni non."¹

25 August. Coulondre has an interview with Hitler; of that interview he gave an account in a telephonic report to Bonnet: *Je rapporte en substance ses propos.*

"En présence de la gravité de la situation, *m'a-t-il dit*, je veux vous faire une déclaration que je vous prie de transmettre à M. Daladier. Je n'ai, comme je le lui ai déjà dit, aucune hostilité envers la France; j'ai personnellement renoncé à l'Alsace-Lorraine et j'ai reconnu la frontière franco-allemande. Je ne veux pas de conflit avec votre pays, et je ne demande qu'à entretenir de bons rapports avec lui. Aussi la pensée que je pourrais, à cause de la Pologne, avoir à combattre la France m'est-elle très pénible. Or les provocations polonaises ont créé pour le Reich une situation qui ne peut pas se prolonger."

"J'ai fait, il y a plusieurs mois, des propositions extrêmement raisonnables à la Pologne, en demandant le retour au Reich de Dantzig ainsi qu'une étroite bande de territoire reliant cette ville allemande à la Prusse orientale. Mais la garantie donnée par le Gouvernement britannique a suscité l'intransigeance polonaise. Non seulement le Gouvernement de Varsovie a repoussé mes propositions, mais il a infligé les pires traitements aux minorités allemandes, nos frères de race, et il a pris des mesures de mobilisation."

"J'avais tout d'abord, *a poursuivi M. Hitler*, prescrit à la presse du Reich de ne rien publier des sévices subis par les Allemands de Pologne. Mais la situation passe à présent toute mesure tolérable. Savez-vous, *a-t-il marqué*, qu'il y a eu des cas de castration? que, dans nos camps d'accueil, il y a plus de 70.000 réfugiés? Sept

¹ *The French Yellow Book*, No. 246, dated 26 Aug. 1939. For the suggestion that an exchange of populations might be proposed by Poland to Germany see *ibid.*, Nos. 246, 259, 278.

Allemands ont été hier encore tués par la police polonaise à Bielitz et trente réservistes allemands ont été mitraillés à Lodz. Nos avions ne peuvent plus, sans être canonnés, voler entre l'Allemagne et la Prusse orientale; leur itinéraire a été modifié, mais ils sont actuellement attaqués au-dessus de la mer. C'est ainsi que l'avion qui transportait le Secrétaire d'État Stuckart a subi le feu de bâtiments polonais, fait nouveau que je n'avais pu signaler ce matin à Sir Nevile Henderson."

Enflant la voix, M. Hitler a poursuivi: "Il n'est pas un pays digne de ce nom qui pourrait supporter semblables affronts. La France ne le tolérerait pas plus que l'Allemagne. Ces choses ont assez duré et je répondrai par la force à de nouvelles provocations. Je tiens à le dire une fois encore: je désire éviter un conflit avec votre pays. Je n'attaquerai pas la France, mais si elle entre dans le conflit, j'irai jusqu'au bout. Je viens, vous le savez, de conclure avec Moscou un accord qui n'est pas seulement théorique, mais, dirais-je, positif. Je vaincrai, je pense, et vous pensez que vous vaincrez; ce qui est sûr, c'est que ce sont surtout le sang allemand et le sang français qui couleront, le sang de deux peuples également courageux. Je le dis à nouveau, il m'est très pénible de penser que nous pouvons en venir là. Dites cela au Président Daladier, je vous prie, de ma part."...

"Pourquoi," *asked Hitler*, "avoir donné à la Pologne un chèque en blanc?"...

"Quant aux événements de mars dernier, il était vrai, *ajouta-t-il*, qu'il avait pris sous sa protection la Bohême et la Moravie, mais il avait maintenu aux habitants de ces territoires leur liberté et il en coûterait cher de toucher à un cheveu de leur tête, c'était là pour le Reich un point d'honneur. La minorité polonaise en ces régions n'aurait à subir aucun sévice; en Sarre d'ailleurs, pas un Français n'avait eu à se plaindre. "Il m'est très

pénible de penser, a répété encore le Chancelier, que je pourrais avoir à combattre votre pays; mais cela ne dépend pas de moi. Je vous prie de le dire à M. Daladier."¹

25-26 August. For the view that Hitler had originally given orders for the German advance into Poland on 25 or 26 August see Sir Nevile Henderson, "The Failure of a Mission" (cf. p. 1677, n. 4), pp. 254, 258; "The French Yellow Book", No. 315.

26 August. Daladier's letter to Hitler.² On the evening of that day Hitler states orally to the French Ambassador at Berlin that he cannot accept Daladier's suggestion for a last attempt at a peaceful agreement with Poland.³

27 August. Hitler replied to Daladier's letter.⁴ In that reply Hitler wrote:

"I understand the misgivings which you express. I, too, have never overlooked the high responsibility which is laid upon those who are placed in charge of the destiny of peoples. As an old soldier of the front line I know, as you do, the horrors of war. It is from this outlook and knowledge that I, too, have honestly striven to remove all grounds for conflict between our two peoples. One thing I stated quite frankly to the French people: that the condition for this would be the return of the Saar district. After this return I at once solemnly affirmed my surrender of any further claims which could affect France. The German people has approved this attitude of mine. As you could convince yourself during your last visit to Germany the German people, conscious of its own attitude, felt and still feels towards its former

¹ *The French Yellow Book*, No. 242. Cf. No. 257 *apud init.*

² Text: *ibid.*, No. 253; German translation: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, pp. 296-7.

³ *The French Yellow Book*, No. 271.

⁴ Text: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, pp. 297-8; French translation: *The French Yellow Book*, No. 267.

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brave enemy no kind of animosity, much less hatred. On the contrary. So soon as peace was established on our western frontier there arose a growing sympathy, at least on the side of the German people—a sympathy which on many occasions was shown in a positively demonstrative fashion. The building of the great western fortifications, which has absorbed and still absorbs many milliards, represents for Germany at the same time an evidence of the acceptance and final delimitation of the frontier of the Reich. Thereby the German people has surrendered its claim to two provinces which once belonged to the old German Reich, were later conquered through much bloodshed and were finally defended at the cost of far greater bloodshed. This surrender, as you, your Excellency, must admit, was no diplomatic attitude merely displayed to the outside world, but a decision which found its logical confirmation in all our measures. You will, Mr. Prime-Minister, be unable to adduce a single instance in which, if it were but through a single line or a speech, there was anything which contravened this final delimitation of the frontier of the German Reich on the West. I thought that through this surrender and through this attitude I had removed every conceivable ground of conflict between our two peoples which could lead to a repetition of the tragedy of the years 1914 to 1918. This voluntary limitation of the vital claims (*Lebensansprüche*) of Germany in the West cannot, however, be interpreted as an acceptance of the 'Diktat' of Versailles extending to all other spheres. I have in fact tried year after year by the way of negotiation to effect a revision of at least the most impossible and most intolerable provisions of this 'Diktat'. This proved impossible. That revision must come was clearly realized by many intelligent persons from all nations. Whatever may be adduced against my method, whatever criticisms it is believed

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must be brought against it, it must not be overlooked or contested that through this method it was possible without fresh bloodshed in many cases to find solutions which did not satisfy Germany alone but that through the character of my action the statesmen of other peoples were relieved of the obligation, which would often have been for them an impossible obligation, to have to answer for this revision before their own peoples; for one thing in any event your Excellency must grant me: Revision had to come. The 'Diktat' of Versailles was intolerable. No honourable Frenchman not even yourself, Monsieur Daladier, would in a like position have acted otherwise than I have done. It is in this spirit, too, that I have now sought to banish from the world the most unreasonable of the provisions of the 'Diktat' of Versailles. I have made an offer to the Polish Government which has shocked the German people. No other than I could possibly have dared to come before the public with such an offer. It could therefore be made only once for all. I am profoundly convinced that if at that time, especially from England, instead of launching a wild campaign against Germany in the Press, instead of spreading reports of a German mobilization, Poland had been counselled to be reasonable, Europe to-day and for twenty-five years after could have enjoyed a condition of the most profound peace. It was only through this lie of German aggression that public opinion in Poland was inflamed, it became more difficult for the Polish Government to make its own necessary, clear decisions, while, above all, through the promise of the guarantee which followed, men's vision of the limits of practical possibilities was clouded. The Polish Government rejected the proposals. Polish public opinion, in the certain conviction that now assuredly England and France would fight in Poland's support, began to raise claims which one might call ludicrous insanity if they were not

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so intensely dangerous. Then there began an intolerable terrorism, a physical and economic oppression of the Germans, who still numbered over one and a half millions, in the areas which had been separated from the Reich. I will not speak here of the atrocities which have been perpetrated. But even Danzig, through the continual excesses of the Polish authorities, became increasingly conscious that it was given over, apparently without hope of relief, to a force which was alien to the national character of the city and its population."

"May I now ask you, Monsieur Daladier, how would you as a Frenchman act if through some unfortunate issue of a brave fight one of your provinces was cut off by a corridor which was occupied by an alien Power, if a great city, let us say Marseilles, was prevented from expressing its loyalty to France and if the Frenchmen living in this district were to be persecuted, beaten, ill-treated, even bestially murdered? You are a Frenchman, Monsieur Daladier, and therefore I know how you would act. I am a German. Monsieur Daladier, do not doubt that my feeling of honour, that my consciousness of duty would compel me to act in precisely the same way. If you had the misfortune which we have, would you, Monsieur Daladier, in that case understand it if Germany, without any justification, were to insist that the corridor through France should remain, that the stolen territories must not return, that the restoration of Marseilles to France was forbidden? I cannot at least imagine, Monsieur Daladier, that on this ground Germany would fight against you, for I and every one have surrendered the claim to Alsace-Lorraine in order to avoid further bloodshed. And so much less would we shed blood to perpetuate an injustice which for you would of necessity be as intolerable as for us it would be insignificant. Everything

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which you write in your letter I feel precisely as you do. Perhaps it is just we old soldiers of the front line who can most easily understand each other on many questions: but I would ask you to understand this also: that for a nation conscious of its honour it is impossible to give up nearly two million souls and watch them being ill-treated on its own frontiers. I have therefore put forward a clear demand: Danzig and the Corridor must come back to Germany. The Macedonian conditions on our Eastern frontier must come to an end. I see no way here by which I can induce Poland, which now under the protection of its guarantees, feels itself invulnerable, to adopt a peaceful solution. But I should despair of any honourable future for my people if in such conditions we were not determined, in one way or another, to solve this question. If now, through this, fate should once more compel our two peoples to fight, there would still be a difference in our motives. I, Monsieur Daladier, should then, with my people, fight for the reparation of an injustice imposed upon us, the others would fight for its retention. That is the more tragic since many of the most outstanding men even of your own people have recognized the senselessness of the solution of 1919 just as they have realized the impossibility of permanently maintaining it. I see quite clearly the serious consequences which such a conflict brings with it. But I believe that the most serious consequence of all would have to be borne by Poland, for whatever might be the issue of a war fought on this question the Polish State of to-day would, in one way or another, be lost."

"That on this question our two peoples should have to enter on a fresh, bloody war of annihilation is not only for you, Monsieur Daladier, but also for me very painful. But, as I said before, I see no way in which we can influence Poland so that she should see reason and be

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prepared to rectify a situation which for the German people and the German Reich is intolerable."

ADOLF HITLER.¹

*German troops enter Slovakia: Slovak radio in face of the Polish danger calls on the Slovak population to treat the Germans as good friends.*²

*28 August. Hitler receives from Sir Nevile Henderson at 10.30 p.m. the Reply of the British Government to his Communications of 23 and 25 August 1939.*³

At Sir Nevile Henderson's interview with Hitler in reply to the statement that the British Government offered friendship but only on the basis of a peaceful and freely negotiated solution of the Polish question Hitler said that he would be willing to negotiate, if there was a Polish Government which was prepared to be reasonable and which really controlled the country. He expatiated on misdoings of the Poles, referred to his generous offer of March last, said that it could not be repeated and asserted that nothing else than the return of Danzig and the whole of the Corridor would satisfy him, together with a rectification in Silesia, where 90 per cent. of the population had voted for Germany at the post-war plebiscite but where, as a result of Haller-Korfanti coup, what the Plebiscite Commission had allotted had nevertheless been grabbed by Poland.

To the statement that the Corridor was inhabited almost entirely by Poles Hitler replied that "this was only true because a million Germans had been driven out of that district since the war". . . . His original offer had been contemptuously refused and he would not make it

¹ *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, pp. 297-8.

² *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques*, &c., p. 136. Cf. p. 138.

³ *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, &c., pp. 126-8; German translation: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, pp. 299-300; French translation: *The French Yellow Book*, No. 277.

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again Poland could never be reasonable: she had England and France behind her and imagined that even if she were beaten she would later recover, thanks to their help, more than she might lose. He spoke of annihilating Poland. The British were incapable of inducing Poland to be reasonable. . . . He had to satisfy the demands of his people, his army was ready and eager for battle, his people were united behind him and he could not tolerate further ill-treatment of Germans in Poland, &c.

Hitler stated that he was ready to discuss the question of an exchange of populations; when asked whether he was willing to negotiate direct with the Poles he said he could not give me an answer until after he had carefully considered the reply of the British Government. . . .

*Later in the interview Hitler asked whether England would be willing to accept an alliance with Germany. "Speaking personally," Sir Neville Henderson said, "I did not exclude such a possibility provided the development of events justified it. Hitler promised to give a written reply the next day: 'there was no time to wait.'"*¹

In the course of this interview Hitler insisted that he was not bluffing and that people would make a great mistake if they believed that he was. He realized that England was not bluffing either. He suggested that Great Britain might offer something at once in the way of colonies as evidence of her good intentions.²

With this compare the account of the interview sent by Coulondre to Paris on 29 August: Le Führer est revenu tout au long de l'entretien sur ses revendications à l'égard de la Pologne Aujourd'hui ce qu'il veut, c'est Dantzig, le Corridor et des rectifications territoriales en Silésie polonaise. Hitler's answer to the question "Seriez-vous

¹ *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations, &c.*, pp. 128-31 (from a telegraphic report).

² *Ibid.*, p. 131.

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*disposé à envisager pour le règlement des questions des minorités un échange de populations?" is given in the form "C'est là une formule qui peut être favorable."*¹

29 August, 7.15 p.m. *Hitler's Reply to the British Communication is presented to Sir Neville Henderson: the Reply was as follows:*

"The British Ambassador in Berlin has submitted to the British Government suggestions which I felt bound to make in order—

- (1) to give expression once more to the will of the Reich Government for sincere Anglo-German understanding, co-operation and friendship;
- (2) to leave no room for doubt as to fact that such an understanding could not be bought at the price of a renunciation of vital German interests, let alone the abandonment of demands which are based as much upon common human justice as upon the national dignity and honour of our people."

"The German Government have noted with satisfaction from the reply of the British Government and from the oral explanations given by the British Ambassador that the British Government for their part are also prepared to improve the relationship between Germany and England and to develop and extend it in the sense of the German suggestion."

"In this connexion, the British Government are similarly convinced that the removal of the German Polish tension, which has become unbearable, is the pre-requisite for the realization of this hope."

"Since the autumn of the past year, and on the last occasion in March, 1939, there were submitted to the Polish Government proposals, both oral and written, which, having regard to the friendship then existing between Germany and Poland, offered the possibility

¹ *The French Yellow Book*, No. 287.

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of a solution of the questions in dispute acceptable to both parties. The British Government are aware that the Polish Government saw fit, in March last, finally to reject these proposals. At the same time, they used this rejection as a pretext or an occasion for taking military measures which have since been continuously intensified. Already in the middle of last month Poland was in effect in a state of mobilization. This was accompanied by numerous encroachments in the Free City of Danzig due to the instigation of the Polish authorities; threatening demands in the nature of ultimata, varying only in degree, were addressed to that City. A closing of the frontiers, at first in the form of a measure of customs policy but extended later in a military sense affecting also traffic and communications, was imposed with the object of bringing about the political exhaustion and economic destruction of this German community."

"To this were added barbaric actions of maltreatment which cry to Heaven, and other kinds of persecution of the large German national group in Poland which extended even to the killing of many resident Germans or to their forcible removal under the most cruel conditions. This state of affairs is unbearable for a Great Power. It has now forced Germany, after remaining a passive onlooker for many months, in her turn to take the necessary steps for the safeguarding of justified German interests. And indeed the German Government can but assure the British Government in the most solemn manner that a condition of affairs has now been reached which can no longer be accepted or observed with indifference."

"The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the revision of the Versailles Treaty in regard to this territory which has always been recognized as being necessary: viz., return of Danzig and the Corridor to

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Germany, the safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in the territories remaining to Poland."

"The German Government note with satisfaction that the British Government also are in principle convinced that some solution must be found for the new situation which has arisen."

"They further feel justified in assuming that the British Government too can have no doubt that it is a question now of conditions, for the elimination of which there no longer remain days, still less weeks, but perhaps only hours. For in the disorganized state of affairs obtaining in Poland, the possibility of incidents intervening which it might be impossible for Germany to tolerate, must at any moment be reckoned with."

"While the British Government may still believe that these grave differences can be resolved by way of direct negotiations, the German Government unfortunately can no longer share this view as a matter of course. For they have made the attempt to embark on such peaceful negotiations, but, instead of receiving any support from the Polish Government, they were rebuffed by the sudden introduction of measures of a military character in favour of the development alluded to above."

"The British Government attach importance to two considerations: (1) that the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation, and (2) that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded in the economic and political sphere by means of international guarantees."

"On this subject the German Government makes the following declaration:—

"Though sceptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the

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English proposal and to enter into direct discussions. They do so, as has already been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made upon them by the written statement received from the British Government that they too desire a pact of friendship in accordance with the general lines indicated to the British Ambassador."

"The German Government desire in this way to give the British Government and the British nation a proof of the sincerity of Germany's intentions to enter into a lasting friendship with Great Britain."

"The Government of the Reich felt, however, bound to point out to the British Government that in the event of a territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate in guarantees without the U.S.S.R. being associated therewith."

"For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government have never had any intention of touching Poland's vital interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish State. The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept the British Government's offer of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this Emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August, 1939."

"The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator."¹

On the statement in this Reply that the German Government counts on the arrival of a Polish plenipotentiary to-

¹ Text: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, pp. 300-2; English translation: *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, &c., pp. 135-7; French translation: *The French Yellow Book*, No. 299. For Coulondre's opinion of this Reply cf. *ibid.*, No. 300.

morrow, i.e. Wednesday 30 August, Sir Nevile Henderson objected that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum: both Hitler and Ribbentrop gave assurances that "it was only intended to stress urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilized armies were standing face to face".¹ To the question whether if such Polish plenipotentiary did come "he would be well received and discussions conducted on footing of complete equality" Hitler replied: "Of course."²

Hitler during the course of a stormy interview kept saying that he wanted British friendship more than anything in the world, but he could not sacrifice Germany's vital interests therefor, and that for his Majesty's Government to make a bargain over such a matter was an unendurable proposition. He reiterated the statement that direct negotiations with Poland, though accepted by him, would be bound to fail.²

With this compare the account of this interview sent by Coulondre to Paris: Hitler said: "La situation actuelle ne saurait se prolonger. Les armées polonaise et allemande mobilisées sont en présence; les incidents continuent; il y a eu encore cinq tués aujourd'hui, mais de cela, l'Angleterre se moque."³ Hitler renewed his claims: il veut Dantzig et le Corridor. Il veut aussi la suppression de toute possibilité d'incidents avec la Pologne. Il tiendra prêt pour demain sur ce dernier point un projet d'ordre économique.³

And see further the report sent by the French Ambassador in London to Paris: "Le Chancelier a donné clairement à comprendre, après qu'il eut ajouté la Silésie à ses revendications précédentes, que ce qui resterait de la Pologne ne pourrait compter sur un avenir indépendant."

"En formules sonores, le Chancelier allemand a insisté

¹ *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations, &c.*, p. 138; cf. Sir Nevile Henderson, *Failure of a Mission, &c.*, p. 265.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 138-9.

³ *The French Yellow Book*, No. 291.

sur les perspectives d'avenir qu'ouvrirait un rapprochement anglo-allemand. Un âge d'or ne pourrait manquer d'en résulter pour l'humanité. . . . Il a laissé entendre qu'il ne négocierait avec la Pologne que s'il était sûr à l'avance que le Gouvernement polonais acceptât toutes ses volontés."¹

30 August 1939 midnight. Sir Nevile Henderson presents the British reply² to Ribbentrop who "produced a lengthy document which he read out in German at top speed". To the request for a text of the German proposals Ribbentrop replied that "it was now too late as Polish representative had not arrived in Berlin by midnight".³

31 August. Poland accepts the principle of direct negotiation.⁴ 6.30 p.m. Lipski calls on Ribbentrop.⁵

Communication from German Government (containing the terms read by Ribbentrop on 30 August) presented to Sir Nevile Henderson at 9.15 p.m.⁶

1 September. At dawn German troops invade Poland.

¹ Op. cit., No. 293. On this interview cf. the report sent to Paris by the French Ambassador at Warsaw, *ibid.*, No. 297.

² Text of the Reply of the British Government: *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, &c., pp. 142-3.

³ Cf. Sir Nevile Henderson, *Failure of a Mission*, &c., pp. 269 sqq.; *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, &c., pp. 145-6; *The French Yellow Book*, No. 315. For the attitude of the German Press on 30 Aug. see report of Coulondre, *ibid.*, No. 302. For the German report of the interview: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, p. 302.

⁴ *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques*, &c., pp. 147-8; *The French Yellow Book*, Nos. 307, 313, 314.

⁵ *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, &c., p. 155; *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques*, &c., pp. 148-9; *The French Yellow Book*, Nos. 315, 319, and 320.

⁶ Text of German Communication: *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, pp. 304-5; English translation: *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations*, &c., pp. 149-53; French translation: *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques*, &c., pp. 149-53. Cf. *The French Yellow Book*, No. 317, and see Sir Nevile Henderson, *The Failure of a Mission*, &c., p. 217.

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p. 1. *Hitler as orator.* Hitler to Philippe Barrès: "Voyez-vous, il faut savoir parler aux gens. La masse des hommes est simple. Il faut les gagner simplement. Moi, je sais toujours en face de qui je me trouve et je parle pour qui est en face de moi. . . . La valeur d'un orateur n'a qu'une mesure, en fin de compte: son efficacité. Rien ne sert de parler au peuple avec des tournures intellectuelles. . . . Peut-être que, parfois, les intellectuels se demandent pourquoi je répète une idée simple, pourquoi je la renforce d'une image encore plus simple. C'est que je ne m'adresse pas alors à des intellectuels. L'immense erreur des partis bourgeois est de s'être entêtés à parler au peuple le langage des intellectuels. Il fallait savoir distinguer les publics différents. Il y a des orateurs qui ne peuvent toucher que les intellectuels; il y en a d'autres qui ne peuvent parler qu'au peuple. L'orateur véritable sait agir sur les uns et sur les autres." Philippe Barrès, "Hitler et l'Autriche", *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 8^{me} Période, xliv (1938), at p. 546.

p. 1. *Early Speeches.* Hitler to Philippe Barrès in Nuremberg at the *Parteitag* of 1934: "Voyez-vous, il y a quinze ans, cette ville était la plus communiste de Bavière, communiste marxiste au fond. La première fois que je vins parler ici on m'a dit: 'Vous trouverez une section locale du parti.' J'ai trouvé une horde de communistes autour de cinq ou six nationaux-socialistes pâles comme des spectres. C'est une des pires réunions que j'aie connues. À peine si j'ai réussi à dire quelques mots. L'an suivant je suis revenu. Ce fut pire, car ils avaient appris entre-temps que j'étais un danger. Deux heures durant, j'ai subi leurs quolibets et leurs injures. Pendant deux heures on m'a appelé assassin. Je me voyais, à chaque instant, volant par la fenêtre, surtout quand ils hissèrent sur la tribune un aveugle de guerre qui commença à déblatérer contre tout ce que les hommes ont pu vénérer dans le monde. Mais, voyez-vous ce qu'est la foule. La chance a voulu que j'aie été, moi aussi, aveugle de guerre pendant quelque temps. Alors j'ai dit à cette meute: 'Je connais ce que sent cet homme; moi aussi, j'ai été affolé comme lui, et

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plus que lui j'ai blasphémé dans mon cœur, mais un jour j'ai retrouvé la lumière.' J'ai dit encore beaucoup de choses comme ça qui les ont apaisés. . . . Mais qu'il en a fallu du temps et des discours et des tracts de propagande, et encore des tracts, et encore des discours, pour arriver à gagner cette ville!"

Hitler regarde, au loin, l'horizon d'Allemagne et murmure: "Tout ça ne s'est pas fait tout seul." Philippe Barrès, "Hitler et l'Autriche", *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 8^{me} Période, xlv (1938), pp. 545-6.

p. 17 (cf. pp. 68, 259, 440, 504, 733, 821, 918, 1372). *The Jews as the ferment or leaven of decomposition*: the phrase occurs in Theodor Mommsen's *History of Rome*: Mommsen wrote: "In the ancient world, also, Judaism was an effective leaven of cosmopolitanism and of national decomposition, and to that extent a specially privileged member in the Caesarian State, the polity of which was really nothing but a citizenship of the world and the nationality of which was really nothing but humanity" (English translation by W. P. Dickson, London, Bentley, 1866, vol. iv, part 2, pp. 539-40). It may be of service to quote the German text: "Auch in der alten Welt war das Judentum ein wirksames Ferment des Kosmopolitismus und der nationalen Decomposition, und insofern ein vorzugsweise berechtigtes Mitglied in dem cäsarischen Staate dessen Politie doch eigentlich nichts als Weltbürgertum, dessen Volkstümlichkeit im Grunde nichts als Humanität war" (*Römische Geschichte*, 5th edn., Berlin, 1869, p. 535).

It is a peculiar irony of history that Mommsen should be cited as a champion of anti-Semitism. His noble protest against the anti-Semitic agitation of von Treitschke should have saved him from such a fate. His pamphlet—*Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum* (reprinted in his *Reden und Aufsätze*. Berlin, 1905), 3. Abdruck, Berlin, Weidmann, 1880—would to-day repay an attentive re-reading; in the light of National Socialist fanaticism it has acquired a new relevance and a fresh significance. "With the Jews", he wrote, "light and shadow mingle and whether light or shadow predominates no one who is not a Court-preacher would venture to determine. Without doubt, just as formerly within the Roman State the Jews were an element of national decomposition, so in Germany they are an element of decomposition within the tribes, and this accounts for the fact that in the

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German capital where these tribes are much more intermixed than anywhere else the Jews occupy a position which is envied by Jews living in other districts. Processes of decomposition are often necessary, but they are never pleasant, and they bring in their train unavoidably a long series of inconveniences: with us the process has not such serious effects as with Rome, since the German nation is by no means such a pale formality as was the citizenship of the Roman Empire in the time of Caesar. I myself am not so alienated from my own homeland as not often to be bitterly conscious of that which I enjoyed but which my children will miss. But the happiness of the child must give place to the pride of the man. Conditions absolutely demand that the tribes should lose something of their individuality by rubbing one against the other, that a German nationality should be created which corresponds to no one of the divisions of our countryside, and the great cities, Berlin first of all, are the natural leaders in this process. That the Jews have for generations intervened effectively in this direction I do not in any way regard as a misfortune, and I am of the opinion that Providence, far better than Herr Stöcker, has understood why a percentage of Israel had to be added to the German metal when it was being shaped" (pp. 9-10).

I had always wondered whether Hitler had really read Mommsen's *History of Rome*: I now find that the passage cited by Hitler occurs in the preface to the eighth edition of the German translation (by Gottfried zur Beek) of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* published in 1923, p. 28 [Gottfried zur Beek (= Hauptmann a. D. Müller), *Die Geheimnisse der Weisen von Zion*. Charlottenburg, Verlag "Auf Vorposten", originally published in 1919]. This book is at present for me inaccessible: I owe the reference to Alexander Stein, *Adolf Hitler, Schüler der "Weisen von Zion"*, Karlsbad, Graphia, 1936, p. 102.

p. 19. Hugo Graf von Lerchenfeld was Prime Minister of Bavaria in 1921-2; the mention of the name roused general laughter in Hitler's audience, "for the Count with his democratic sympathies was in the eyes of nationalist (*völkisch*) Bavaria certainly no great man" (comment of the editor of Hitler's early speeches). Cf. Count Hugo Lerchenfeld, "Present Political and Economic Crises in Germany", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Philadelphia), vol. cviii (July 1923), pp. 27-32.

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p. 50. "*The three hundred Rathenaus.*"—In an article entitled "Geschäftlicher Nachwuchs" published in the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna of 25 Dec. 1909 and reprinted in his book *Zur Kritik der Zeit* (in the edition of 1922 at p. 207), Berlin, Fischer, 1912, Walther Rathenau wrote: "In the impersonal democratic field of economics . . . three hundred men, all of whom know one another, direct the economic destinies of the continent (Europe) and choose their successors from amongst their own circle." The German text is: "Drei hundert Männer, von denen jeder jeden kennt, leiten die wirtschaftlichen Geschicke des Kontinents und suchen sich Nachfolger aus ihrer Umgebung." National Socialist writers have substituted the word "Jews" for "men" in their citation of the sentence. In Wilhelm Meister's work *Judas Schuldbuch* (Judah's Book of Guilt) (published in 1919, Munich, Deutscher Volksverlag), advertised as the principal work on anti-Semitism and indispensable to every National Socialist library, the "three hundred men" became "three hundred sages of Zion" (on the authority of Marvin Lowenthal, *The Jews of Germany*—English edition—London, Lindsay Drummond, 1939, pp. 340-1. Meister's work I have not seen.) But even when Rathenau's original text was correctly cited, the use made of his statement can be illustrated from Otto Hauser's *Geschichte des Judentums*, Weimar, Duncker, 1921, p. 496: after quoting Rathenau's words Hauser proceeds: "Damit ist von einem Wissenden . . . offen gesagt, worauf es diesen äußerst begabten und scharfsichtigen *Juden* ankam: auf die Rolle von Weltgeschicklenkern. So weit reichte die Rassekraft nicht, daß aus ihnen ein Napoleon hervorgegangen wäre, der als einzelner sich zum Weltherrn gemacht hätte, aber als Klüngel von dreihundert Männern konnten sie wohl die Weltherrschaft übernehmen."

On this perversion of his meaning, in a letter (dated 3 October 1921) to the teacher Stern of Kallowitz, Rathenau wrote of his article: "Der darauf" (i.e. after the sentence quoted above) "folgende Satz: 'Die seltsamen Ursachen dieser seltsamen Erscheinung, die in das Dunkel der künftigen sozialen Entwicklung einen Schimmer wirft, stehen hier nicht zur Erwägung' beweist, daß ich der Erscheinung der Wirtschaftsplutokratie mit der größten Sorge entgegensehe, und es ist wohl in der Geschichte der Fälschungen so ziemlich das Unerhörteste, wenn jemand, der vor einer Erscheinung gewarnt hat, für diese Erscheinung verantwortlich gemacht wird."

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"Daß es sich bei den 'Dreihundert' nicht um Juden handelte, sondern um Führer des internationalen Wirtschaftslebens, brauche ich nicht mehr besonders zu erwähnen." Walther Rathenau, *Briefe*, vol. ii, Dresden, Reissner, 1926, pp. 332-3.—For an interesting plea of justification for the assassination of Rathenau by one of his assailants see E. W. Techow, "*Gemeiner Mörder —?!*" *Das Rathenau-Attentat*. Leipzig, Schroll & Co., no date [?1934]; for Rathenau and the menace of assassination see Hellmut von Gerlach, *Von Rechts nach Links*, Zürich, Europa-Verlag, 1937, pp. 259-60. Cf. Harry Graf Kessler, *Walther Rathenau. Sein Leben und sein Werk mit zweiunddreißig Abbildungen in Kupfertiefdruck*. Berlin-Grunewald, Verlagsanstalt Hermann Klemm, 1928; English version under the title *Walther Rathenau. His Life and Work*. Translated by W. D. Robson-Scott and Lawrence Hyde: revised by the author with notes and additions for English readers (only 8 illustrations). London, Gerald Howe, 1929; see further Imre Révész, *Walther Rathenau und sein ökonomisches Werk*. Dissertation of the Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät of the University of Zürich, 1926.

p. 54. *Ballin*: cf. Bernhard Huldermann, *Albert Ballin*. Translated from the German by W. J. Eggers. London, New York, Toronto, Melbourne, Cassell, 1922; for a fine study of Ballin see Theodor Wolff, *Through two Decades* (translated by E. W. Dicks), London, Toronto, Heinemann, 1936, pp. 173-220.

p. 102. *The Programme of the Party*. In a speech delivered during the election campaign of 1930 Hitler said: "Mon but est mon peuple, son pain, sa liberté, son honneur. Je remplace le simulacre du patriotisme bourgeois par la fermeté nationale de mon parti et le simulacre du socialisme marxiste par la justice sociale du même parti. Tandis que l'Allemagne parlementaire tombe en ruines, une nouvelle Allemagne naît. Guidé par de nouveaux étandards et de nouvelles idées, conduit par des têtes froides et des cœurs chauds, le peuple allemand se lève pour remplir sa mission qui sera celle du xx^e siècle." I have no German text for this: I cite from Frédéric Hirth, *Hitler ou le Guerrier Déchaîné* (Paris, Éditions du Tambourin, 1930), p. 29.

"Germany", Hitler has said, "has not collapsed from lack of programmes, but because there were too many programmes and

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too few men of action." Hermann Goering, *Germany Reborn* (London, Elkin Matthews & Marrot, 1934), p. 58.

p. 131. There is a revised edition of Heinz's book published in 1938; for his account of the German Day at Coburg see pp. 131 sqq.

p. 161. *Legality*. In May 1931 Litten was presenting in court the claim of two workmen who had been stabbed at a New Year party by National Socialists of the notorious Storm Troop 33:

Litten: "Did not Goebbels once declare that adversaries must be crushed to pulp?"

Hitler: "That, of course, is not to be taken literally."

Litten quoted Goebbels: "We must proceed from the revolution of words to the revolution of deeds and at the fitting moment lay violent hands on power."

Hitler: "Our Party is recruited from all strata of the German people. Those who came to us from the Communist camp still have bits of the Communistic egg-shell sticking to them and those who come to us from the *bourgeois* camp have bits of *bourgeois* egg-shell. That does not affect a man's capacity, and it does not affect his desire to work for Germany's greatness and her future. The main thing is that he stands on the basis of legality. The straight line of legality must be observed by all Party officials; whoever departs from it is degraded or expelled from the Party." Irmgard Litten, *A Mother fights Hitler* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1940), pp. 2-3.

Hitler in his New Year Proclamation to the Party on 1 Jan. 1932 said: "Je n'exige de vous rien d'illégal, rien de ce qui pourrait mettre votre conscience en conflit avec la loi, mais j'exige que vous liez votre destin au mien et vous suiviez fidèlement dans la voie que la légalité concède et que me trace ma conscience. Le chemin menant de 7 hommes à 15 millions d'hommes a été plus dur que celui menant de 15 millions d'hommes à la nation allemande." I have no German text for this: I cite from *Le Temps*, 1 Jan. 1932. In August 1932 Hitler was interviewed at Berchtesgaden by a representative of the Associated Press when he ridiculed the rumour that he intended to march on Berlin. "The question is not", he said, "whether I shall march on Berlin, but rather who will have to march out of Berlin. My Storm Troopers are the best disciplined body and

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will not attempt an illegal march. Why should I march on Berlin when I am there already. We hold strong positions in the Presidency of the Prussian Diet and will capture others legally." *M.G.*, 20 Aug. 1932. Before the election of 6 Nov. 1932 Mr. Vernon Mackenzie asked Hitler "Are you planning a march on Berlin?" Hitler denied this vigorously and said he would never assume office except by constitutional methods (Vernon Mackenzie, *Through Turbulent Years*, London, Bles, 1938, p. 56). And cf. Hermann Goering, *Germany Reborn* (London, Elkin Matthews & Marrot, 1934), pp. 69-76; Hans Wendt, *Die Märzrevolution von 1933* (Oldenburg, Stalling, 1933), pp. 7-26.

p. 169. *The SA*. Of the SA. Hitler said in a speech at Detmold in January 1933: "Where would the *Bourgeoisie* be to-day were it not for this brown army, this brown rampart, this brown wall?" (*V.B.*, 6 Jan. 1933).

When talking to Miss Rosita Forbes Hitler said: "Most countries dislike soldiering. Drilling seems to them a childish waste of time, but the German loves a uniform. He likes to be part of a disciplined mass striving for a definite purpose. All he wants is to obey orders and to feel himself strongly governed. . . . The German feels bigger and happier, more efficient and more sure of himself if he wears a uniform. . . . The right and the purpose of democracy is to choose the best leader and follow him to the end." Rosita Forbes, *These Men I knew*, London, Melbourne, Hutchinson [1940], pp. 15, 16.

p. 209. *The Model Revolution*. For a confidential report of Goering's speech to the heads of the administrative districts of Berlin see *Why I left Germany*, by a Jewish Scientist, translated by Margaret Goldsmith (London, Dent, 1934), pp. 52-3, and cf. Hermann Goering, *Germany Reborn* (London, Elkin Matthews & Marrot, 1934), pp. 119-43, especially at pp. 125, 129.

On 16 Feb. 1934 in the course of an interview with Mr. Ward Price Hitler, speaking of the internal condition of Germany, said that tens of thousands of people who had been sent to concentration camps had been released already and that he hoped to release many more. "They were interned not from motives of political revenge such as inspired the Austrian Government's action but so that these adversaries should not interfere with Germany's restoration to political health. They have been given time to

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modify their views, and as soon as they are prepared to pledge themselves to abandon their hostile attitude they will be released" (*Daily Mail*, 17 Feb. 1934). In the course of the same interview Hitler said: "The total of our opponents killed in riots has been 27 and the number of wounded 150. Among them was not a solitary woman or child, nor has any house been destroyed or any shops plundered."

p. 287. *Roehm Purge*. On 3 July 1934 the Government approved and published a law which consisted of a single article: "The measures employed on 30 June, 1 and 2 July 1934 for the suppression of treasonable attacks are declared to be legal as taken in defence of the State." Signed by the chancellor of the Reich, Adolf Hitler, by the Minister for the Interior, Frick, and by the Minister for Justice, Gürtner. The German text of the law runs as follows: "Die zur Niederschlagung hoch- und landesverräterischer Angriffe am 30. Juni, 1. und 2. Juli 1934 vollzogenen Maßnahmen sind als Staatsnotwehr rechters", *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, ii (1936), p. 22.

For the speech of von Papen delivered in the University at Marburg on 17 June 1934 cf. Otto Strasser, *Die deutsche Bartolomäusnacht* (5th edn., Reso-Verlag, Zürich, 1935), pp. 64-70; Sidney B. Fay, "Nazi against Nazi", *Current History*, Aug. 1934, pp. 607-20. The speech was immediately suppressed by the National Socialists and even the publication of abridged versions was prohibited. An English translation of the speech is to be found in Oswald Dutch, *The Errant Diplomat. The Life of Franz von Papen* (London, Arnold, 1940), pp. 191-209.

For a defence of the "Purge" see the speech delivered by Hess at Königsberg on 8 July 1934: this was coupled with a peace appeal addressed to Front-line Fighters in other nations. Of this latter part of the speech (German text, *F.Z.*, 9 July 1934) an English version was published in Berlin, "printed for private circulation" under the title *Germany and Peace. A Soldier's Message*. In the Introduction to this pamphlet (pp. 2-4) is given the official explanation of the "Purge". For a translation of a considerable part of this appeal and the use made of the appeal by the German Government see James Murphy, *Who sent Rudolf Hess?* London, Hutchinson, 1941, pp. 9-14.

On Hitler's Reichstag speech cf. Otto Strasser, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-7. See further on the Roehm Purge, *Weißbuch über die*

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Erschießungen des 30. Juni. Paris, Éditions du Carrefour, 1934 (list of victims, photographs, &c.). For accounts of life in Berlin at the time of the Purge cf. John T. Whitaker, *Fear came on Europe*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1937, pp. 164-80; Frederick T. Birchall, *The Storm Breaks*, London, Hale, 1938, pp. 174-90; Louis Gillet, "Choses vues à Berlin du 3 au 7 juillet", *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 8^{me} Période, xxii (15 Aug. 1934), pp. 873-87; Robert d'Harcourt, "Le Crépuscule des Idoles", *ibid.*, pp. 652-63—"Le III^e Reich a écrit une page de l'histoire de Byzance à ses plus sombres heures": the need for France of redoubled vigilance. See *Ambassador Dodd's Diary*, pp. 131-2; 137-9; on François Poncet's anger at the suggestion of his complicity in Roehm's "plot", see *ibid.*, pp. 137-8, 162, 169, 173; Goering's speech on 13 Nov. 1934, see p. 199, "We needed to have no indictments, proofs, or trials. We were killing enemies of the people"; "heads will simply be chopped off if men do not obey the inspired Hitler and submit to his decrees", and cf. pp. 142-3, 211 (von Fritsch). For the refusal of the Reichswehr to hand back to the SS. the files and records of the shooting after having obtained them for examination and a startling story of the defence of these documents against Himmler, see *ibid.*, pp. 241-2.

For the SA. and the Roehm Purge see John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Hindenburg, the Wooden Titan*, London, Macmillan, 1936, pp. 456-65, and for the background of the Purge see also Ernst Henri, *Hitler over Russia?* (translated by Michael Davidson), London, Dent, 1936, pp. 38-64.

Hindenburg's comment on the Roehm Purge (in a talk with Funk, National Socialist Press Chief, in 1934): "Wer Geschichte machen will, muß auch Blut fließen lassen können." Dieter von der Schulenburg, *Welt um Hindenburg*, Berlin, Buch- und Tiefdruck Gesellschaft, 1935, p. 195.

p. 341. *Religion.* In his speech after his election the Reichsbischof said that Hitler had written of the "German Christians": "Despite all attacks upon them history will one day bear witness that it was they who conceived, worked for, and in the end contributed to bring about one of the most decisive achievements in the religious life of our people" (*F.Z.*, 28 Sept. 1933).

It is stated by G. N. Shuster that when, in September 1934, messages had been sent to Hitler by von Epp, the Bavarian Statthalter, and by the Brown House in Munich advising him to

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curb Müller and Jaeger, on 21 Sept. 1934 Hitler issued a public reply to the memorandum submitted by the protesting confessional union in which he endorsed the policy of Jaeger (G. N. Shuster, *Like a Mighty Army*, New York, London, D. Appleton-Century Co., 1935, p. 141). I have no confirmation of this statement.

In his address to students delivered in Berlin on 7 Feb. 1934 Hitler said: "All really great ideas which have moved the world have turned men into fanatics. Religious conceptions could so fill whole periods with passionate devotion that all other factors in life sank far into the background. However regrettable for the moment this may appear to the tranquil *bourgeois* mind or to the observer of a period, yet only so, for the common life of men in society, are those foundations laid which may endure for centuries and without which the construction and maintenance of human communities on a large scale would be simply unthinkable. And this holds good for all revolutions of a truly *weltanschaulich* character" (*F.Z.*, 8 Feb. 1934).

In an interview granted by Hitler to the Reich Leader of the Students' League in 1935 Hitler is reported to have said: "We are not out against the hundred and one different kinds of Christianity, but against Christianity itself. All people who profess creeds are smugglers in foreign coin and traitors to the people. Even those Christians who really want to serve the people—and there are such—will have to be suppressed" (I have no German text for this and I am unable to trace on what authority this citation is attributed to Hitler. I quote from *Nazi Nuggets*, ed. Clara Leiser. London, Gollancz, 1939).

Hitler ended his speech at the Harvest Thanksgiving on 6 Oct. 1935 with a pledge and a prayer: "We wish to continue to do our duty, to go straight ahead, not to look to right and left as we have done in the past. We want to march through the distresses of this time, strong and armed, and never play the weakling. We want to do the right and to dread no one and then we would ask of the Almighty that in the coming year, too, He will bless our work, that He may once more give a rich harvest to our fields and to us all great successes. And in especial may He preserve to our people a right judgement, may He secure for our people domestic peace, and may He fill us one and all with the wisdom and the wit to do the right that our people may live and that Germany may never perish" (*F.Z.*, 8 Oct. 1935).

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To Sir Nevile Henderson in an interview (on 3 Mar. 1938) Hitler said that he would not brook any further interference by English Churchmen in the religious affairs of Germany. It was their meddling which had caused him to give orders for Niemöller to be put into a concentration camp after he had been set at liberty. If any English bishops attempted to come to Germany, they would be turned back at the frontier. He concluded with the statement that nowhere was religion freer than in Germany (Sir Nevile Henderson, *The Failure of a Mission. Berlin 1937-1939*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1940, pp. 73-4).

With the extract translated on pp. 394 sqq. *supra*, compare the speech delivered at the *Kulturtagung* of the Nuremberg *Parteitag* of 1934 (5 Sept.) when Hitler said: "Inwardness such as you contend was mirrored in Gothic art is ill adapted to an age of steel and iron, of glass and concrete, an age which glories in the beauty of woman and the strength of man, an age which holds its head high, whose spirit is a challenge. That which for a thousand years was held in fetters is now liberated to the salvation and the health of our own people and of the other peoples. The nobility of the human body no longer suffers violence; it is no longer thwarted. A new world of beauty is being born. Men should not be less grateful to God for all that He has created because they now once again see clearly before their eyes the glory and the eternal wisdom of His works." . . . In time the peoples and the art of the ancient world are far distant from us, but, "united with us in the community of the Indo-Germanic race, they are eternally near. The assertion that such a thought as this is un-Christian we reject with a laugh. For starting from the world of the classical civilization and proceeding through the Romanesque age and the Gothic period Christianity passed by way of the Renaissance, Barock and Rococo until it preaches in so-called 'modern' temples, creations of an art in which we National Socialists can see only a mockery of the beauty of God. And yet, so far as one can observe, Christianity has suffered no damage from these changes. No! there is no ground on which the claims made for these cultural museums can justify the attack upon the Reich of to-day. . . . The features of the spirit of the coming Reich will be the features of those who created it, not of those who neither grasp nor understand it" (*F.Z.*, 7 Sept. 1934).

p. 427. *Constitution: Plebiscites.* After Hindenburg's death

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Hitler wrote to the Minister of the Interior on 2 Aug. 1934: "It is my will that the constitutionally valid Cabinet resolution by which the powers of the former Reich President have been vested in me and hence in the office of the Reich Chancellor receive the explicit sanction of the German people. Firmly convinced that all sovereign power must emanate from the people and be confirmed by it in free and secret elections, I request you to submit immediately the Cabinet resolutions together with any necessary supplementary material to the German people for a free plebiscite" (cited from the paper by F. M. Marx on "State Propaganda in Germany", published in *Propaganda and Dictatorship*, ed. H. L. Childs, Princeton University Press, 1936, pp. 11-31, at p. 31).—Note that there is an English translation of Hindenburg's Testament in the book of John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Hindenburg, the Wooden Titan*, London, Macmillan, 1936, pp. 469-75, who regards the will (dated 11 May 1934) as a genuine document.

p. 429. *Hitler and Cromwell*: cf. Ernest Barker, *Oliver Cromwell and the English People*, Cambridge University Press, 1937, Epilogue: "The English Puritan Revolution and the German National Socialist Revolution," pp. 71-96; and cf. Hitler's statement to Colonel Etherton: "The statesman I admire as a type to live up to is Cromwell. What Germany needs now is a strong patriot of Cromwell's type to lead her out of the present dangers and difficulties to a new era of prosperity and peace." Interview with Colonel Etherton: *Sunday Express*, 12 Feb. 1933.

p. 462. *Leadership*. Hitler, addressing a meeting of National Socialist leaders in January 1933, said:

"Persistence, that is particularly the duty of the leader; especially in moments of crisis the leaders must incorporate in their own persons the conscience of the nation, of its past and its future." The will of the people must find a single expression. "A Movement can feel itself called to the greatest achievement only when it inscribes above its portal:

"'Comrade, fellow-countryman, when thou enterest here thou must fuse thy will with the wills of millions of others: then thou must lose thyself in this great will, thou must become a man and entrust thyself to a leader.'"

"I, too, can go wrong and make mistakes, but the decisive

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thing is who in the end has fewest mistakes to record. I have chosen this work, because never in my life could I choose anything else, never shall I choose anything else, because for me there can be no question that this is my life's work, that with it I rise or fall" (*V.B.*, 21 Jan. 1933).—For the choice of leaders (*Führer-Auslese*) see Hitler's speech in the Reichstag on 30 Jan. 1939, authorized English translation, pp. 15-19.

It may be noted that Goering in the Reichstag after the Roehm Purge said: "And if abroad it is believed to-day that chaos threatens Germany, the German people responds with the single cry: 'We all approve always of what our leader does'" (*F.Z.*, 15 July 1934). "The electorate is thus reduced to the role of the national echo" (F. M. Marx).

The Succession to the Leadership in the National Socialist State. The logic of the "Führerprinzip" would seem to point to the suggestion outlined in my note; I had thought that Hitler's appointment of a successor to himself in September 1939 was an exceptional war-time measure. But I was wrong: it is now clear that at least as early as January 1935 Hitler had determined to appoint his successor; by May 1935 two successors had already been appointed; see *Les Relations polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la Période 1933-1939*, Paris, Flammarion, 1940, pp. 47, 52. The new Constitution of the Reich, Goering said, will adopt such nomination as a permanent principle. In his speech in the Reichstag on 1 Sept. 1939 Hitler said that the order of succession to the office of Führer would be Goering, Hess, and after that the Senate would choose the bravest from its membership.

In an interview with Hitler on 5 Aug. 1934 Mr. Ward Price asked: "Is your combined office as Head of the State and Chancellor to be held for life?" Hitler's answer was: "It will last until the basis of this Government is removed by a national vote" (*Daily Mail*, 6 Aug. 1934).

p. 496. *Criticism.* Hitler in his open letter to von Papen wrote in October 1932 (*V.B.*, 22 Oct. 1932):

"It is never enough to test the past by contemplating its history: it is essential always to wage an offensive warfare on behalf of the knowledge gained from such contemplation; a living criticism of the present must be practised. At times this criticism, through adducing the experience taught by history, can intervene in the

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course of the development from moment to moment, can free that course from mistakes and thereby render it more favourable for a people."

"It is no cause for surprise that those who are responsible for a people's political life should vehemently oppose such criticism. It must be left to historical Byzantinism to stress the responsibility for successes: criticism has the task of bringing home the responsibility for errors, mistakes, or crimes. And in so doing criticism is not criticism for criticism's sake; it must contribute to forestall or make good mistakes, must bring crimes to the light of day in order to prevent their repetition; in a word it must transform an evil course into a better."

True, it may fail, "but in political life the recognition of this fact cannot free criticism from its duty to fight against acknowledged errors, its duty to lodge its historic protest against a wrong course."

"How shall a people realize the misgovernment of those responsible for government if those who know better do not openly protest while the abuses are being perpetrated? It is only the definite rejection of an historical mistake while it is in the course of inception or completion which creates the right to take a stand against those responsible for that mistake and to demand their removal."

Hitler's criticism of von Papen "is inspired only by a feeling of my duty, as leader of the greatest Movement in Germany, to enter my public historic protest at the moment when to keep silence any longer might later justify the charge that I had my share in responsibility or even my share in guilt".

p. 496. *The Press*: In an interview with Hitler (autumn 1932) Mr. Vernon Mackenzie asked: "When you become Chancellor of Germany, will you permit freedom of the Press?" Hitler answered: "Yes, when I become head of the German Government there will be absolute freedom of the Press." Asked what he meant by "absolute" freedom of the Press, Hitler replied: "I mean there will be complete freedom except for those who are enemies of the Fatherland" (Vernon Mackenzie, *Through Troubled Years*, London, Bles, 1938, pp. 55-6).

In a speech delivered in Munich on 24 Feb. 1933 Hitler said: "When I entered the Reich Chancery I found there an emergency decree directed against the Press. I have considerably mitigated

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its provisions. These gentlemen have now no ground for complaint when I turn their own decree against themselves" (*V.B.*, 25 Feb. 1933). There is a fuller report of Hitler's speech of 8 Feb. 1933 (see p. 498) in *V.B.*, 9 Feb. 1933. On 14 Feb. 1933 Hitler addressed the representatives of the National Socialist Press: he said that the hostile Press which was often quite irresponsible "is now beginning to feel what it means when the power of the State rests in the hands of those who do not share its international *Weltanschauung*". He said that he would oppose, as they deserved, those journalists who by anti-national agitation misused the freedom given them for their public activity or those who through a sense of solidarity with their colleagues suffered such elements to remain in their ranks or protected them (*V.B.*, 15 Feb. 1933). Hitler in an interview with the Berlin representative of the Associated Press said: "I shall not tolerate a Press the exclusive purpose of which is to destroy what we have undertaken to build up" (cited from the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, evening edition, 4 Apr. 1934, by F. M. Marx in *Propaganda and Dictatorship*, ed. H. L. Childs, Princeton University Press, 1936, p. 27). For the decrees issued by the President of the Press Chamber on 24 Apr. 1935 see *ibid.*, p. 28; for the decree of Hess on censorship (April 1934) see *ibid.*, p. 21; for the *Anordnung der Reichsschrifttumskammer über schädliches und unerwünschtes Schrifttum* of 25 Apr. 1935 see Werner Hoche, *Die Gesetzgebung des Kabinetts Hitler*, Heft 13 (Vahlen, Berlin, 1935), pp. 510-12. The motto of the German official news service is stated by F. M. Marx (*op. cit.*, p. 25) to be "Virtue is knowledge in the interest and for the benefit of the New Reich, Heil Hitler!"

Goebbels speaking to the editors of the German provincial Press in April 1933: "There shall be freedom of the Press, the only freedom we understand, the freedom of a hundred per cent. Germanism"; see Evelyn Wrench, *I loved Germany*, London, Michael Joseph, 1940, pp. 142-6. For an instance of Press control: W. L. Shirer, *Berlin Diary*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1941, p. 44.

See further the speech of Goebbels before the foreign Press on 7 April 1933, *Revolution der Deutschen* (Oldenburg, Stalling, 1933), pp. 165-72. For the application of the *Schriftleitergesetz* of 4 Oct. 1933 see the "*Verordnung über das Inkrafttreten und die Durchführung*" of the law (19 Dec. 1933): W. Hoche, *op. cit.*, Heft 5 (Berlin, Vahlen, 1934), pp. 808-15. For the decree of

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Goebbels of May 1934 see F. M. Marx, "Propaganda and Dictatorship", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May 1935, p. 218. For the German Press cf. R. W. Desmond, *The Press and World Affairs* (New York, London, D. Appleton Century Co., 1937), pp. 229-43 (with bibliographical references). For Hitler and the English Press see Sir Neville Henderson, *Failure of a Mission: Berlin 1937-1939* (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1940), p. 65. See further the Bibliographical Note on *Kultur*, *infra*.

p. 527. *Woman*. In October 1932 in Munich Hitler addressed the National Socialist *Frauenschaft* on Woman and the Family; he said: "The meaning of the family is to help in waging the battle of life, and to fulfil that task it must possess a common *Weltanschauung*. . . . We live to-day in a period of the shattering of that basis on which for many, many centuries it has been possible to found States. As a National Socialist I find my starting-point for the consideration of all questions in the people itself, the people as a racial conception to which capacities are given which no one can destroy and which cannot be denied. This starting-point provides a firm platform for all vital questions. . . . In political life one must make it possible for the capacities of the individual to have free play. I can count on a real authority in the State only if the people is convinced that those who govern are indeed intellectually the pick of the nation. And here, though at first only mediately, we can discern the true position of woman. I do not start from any abstract point of view; I start from a single principle: the people ought to be maintained and must continuously be maintained. The only important thing is that through the complete agreement of husband and wife a common life should be constituted. When the man ceases to be manly, when he surrenders something of his manliness to the woman or vice versa, then happiness is at an end. The same is true of a people. It is the high task of the National Socialist Women's Movement that it should consciously lead both sexes to an ever closer co-operation in their respective spheres. The greater the success in this task the more fully will appeasement be realized within the State, the more fully will our people be freed from distress and suffering. It is a mighty task which is thus placed in women's hands, its accomplishment cannot be reckoned in years and no single generation of women

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can attain to it, but I am certain that our Women's Movement will make its contribution to its accomplishment" (*F.Z.*, 5 Oct. 1932).

The only reference to the position of the unmarried woman under National Socialism which I have found in the utterances of Hitler occurs in an interview with Madame Titayna when Hitler said: "In any event a woman who does not marry—and we have many such in Germany, since we have not sufficient men—has the same right as a man to earn her livelihood" (*F.Z.*, 26–7 Jan. 1936).

p. 552. *The Army*. In a conversation with Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong (the editor of *Foreign Affairs*) on 27 Apr. 1933 Hitler said that "the Allies would have been more honest had they denied Germany even the 100,000 soldiers allowed by the Versailles Treaty, for they were useless as protection and simply gave Germany's neighbors an excuse to call her chauvinistic; that to allot her so inadequate a number was obviously a 'swindle'; that equality of armaments was a *sine qua non* of his policy; and that he doubted whether progressive disarmament of offensive weapons by Germany's neighbors and her own progressive rearmament, *pari passu*, with forts and other means of defense, could possibly close the gap quickly enough to satisfy German needs" (H. F. Armstrong, *Hitler's Reich: the First Phase*, New York, Macmillan, 1933, p. 27).

p. 608. *The German Song*. At the celebration of the memory of Horst Wessel held in January 1933 Hitler said: "When a people after crushing disasters struggles upwards to freedom from distress, calumny, and humiliation, then there arises the song of its longing. Thus it is that the mightiest Freedom-Movement of the Germans found its singer who could give expression to that which the simple man in our ranks felt in his heart. It does but correspond with the higher reason of Destiny that this singer, whose song is now the battle-song of millions, had to become the martyr of the Movement. So his death and his grave both proclaim the heroic National Socialist truth that the sacrifice of one is the symbol of the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of those who take their stand in the Movement." . . .

"Horst Wessel is not dead; his spirit remained in our midst. Daily, hourly, this spirit marches on, the spirit which in our ranks has been faith, loyalty, and conviction" (*V.B.*, 24 Jan. 1933).

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p. 721. *The Jews*. Early in 1933 Mussolini told Hitler that "the Nazi persecution of the Jews had misrepresented Fascist doctrine and had been a tactical error. 'You put all the Jews of the world against you,' he wrote to Hitler (as he told the writer in Rome on 16 May), 'and you put against you the Christians also'" (Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *Hitler's Reich: The First Phase*, New York, Macmillan, 1933, p. 28). With this cf. Evelyn Wrench, *I loved Germany*, London, Michael Joseph, 1940, p. 151 s.f. Hitler is reported to have said: "I should be sorry if no more Jews were to remain in Germany, for then our younger generation would have no opportunity to learn through personal experience the Jewish danger for the German nation" (I have no German text for this; I cite it from *Nazi Nuggets*, ed. Clara Leiser, London, Gollancz, 1939, p. 48, quoting the *Oberlausitzer Tagespost* for 26 Mar. 1936). Vernon Mackenzie in a conversation with Hitler asked whether something could not be done to better the lot of the Jews in Germany: this question brought the interview to an abrupt termination. "Hitler turned on his heel and stalked from the room" (Vernon Mackenzie, *Through Troubled Years*, London, Bles, 1938, p. 57).

For Hitler's passionate feeling against the Jews cf. *Ambassador Dodd's Diary*, London, Gollancz, 1941, p. 37, Professor Coar's report of an interview: Hitler talked wildly about destroying all Jews, insisting that no other nation had a right to protest and that Germany was showing the world how to rid itself of its greatest curse (cf. p. 45); pp. 100-1 Dodd's interview: Hitler broke in frequently with such expressions as "Damn the Jews" and insisted that if agitation continued in the outside world he would make an end of all Jews in Germany; pp. 107, 111-12 on Hitler's order (12 Mar. 1933) for the closing of Columbia House, where Jews had been tortured, and the order that warrants must be proved before anyone could be detained more than 24 hours on any charge; for the violent speech of Goebbels against the Jews on 12 May 1933 and its effect in America, pp. 113-15, 124; on 28 Aug. 1934 Dieckhoff "gladly" tells Dodd that the Foreign Office had at last persuaded Hitler to stop hostile treatment of the Jews (p. 167), but on 16 Aug. 1934 formal instructions under the name of Hess had been issued to the Party against the "wicked race" of the Jews: particulars of these instructions, *ibid.*; for Sir Eric Phipps and Hitler's fanatical hatred of the Jews, pp. 255-6. For Jews under National Socialism see further pp. 30, 33, 50,

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52, 64, 68, 69, 86, 90, 91-2, 98, 112-13, 136, 145, 155-6, 157, 179, 182, 192-3, 207-8, 219, 226, 228, 236, 238-9, 273-4, 287, 297, 310, 331, 386, 415-16.

But as against this evidence is to be set the report of a conversation given by M. Louis Gillet: When Helen of Sigmaringen at a dinner party vigorously attacked Hitler's treatment of the Jews he listened attentively and when she had had her say replied: "Yes, you are right." Il se tut et reprit à voix basse, malgré lui: "Vous avez raison, et pourtant, je ne pouvais pas, je ne peux pas faire autrement. C'est plus fort que moi. Il fallait d'abord songer à ce grand peuple, lui rendre son âme qu'il avait perdue, lui donner confiance en lui-même. Je ne veux aucun mal aux Juifs: ils ne m'ont rien fait, à moi! S'il ne tenait qu'à moi, ils seraient tous heureux dans leur pays, en Palestine. Je les y aiderais de bon cœur. Un jour peut-être, plus tard, quand nous serons sûrs de nous-mêmes, cela changera; je pourrai prendre des mesures moins sévères. Aujourd'hui, non, je n'y puis rien. Il faut que je durcisse mon cœur. Je dois faire des choses terribles, coûte que coûte, sans pitié, comme Torquemada" (Louis Gillet, *Rayons et Ombres d'Allemagne*, Paris, Flammarion, 1937, pp. 183-4). And with this compare Hitler's message to Miss Bergner (in a restaurant at Munich): Hitler's adjutant reported: "My Führer wishes you to know that he respects anyone who devotes himself to the arts. He does not allow anyone to disturb you." Otto Zarek, *German Odyssey*, London, Cape, 1941, p. 138.

p. 744. *Economics*. In an interview granted to the Associated Press by Hitler in Berchtesgaden in August 1932 he was asked whether the National Socialist Movement's opposition to the big industrial concerns meant that he wanted all large factories and businesses to be abolished. He replied: "I would not be so silly as to try to eliminate all large concerns. You cannot build railway engines in a blacksmith's shop nor ocean liners in a rowing-boat shed. You must remember, however, we live close to a country where Communism is exclusively preached and where an attempt is made to put it into effect. We also have millions of unemployed in our country."

"It would not do to have wealth and property concentrated in the hands of a few people or a few concerns. When this property is wisely distributed among millions of our people—that is when everybody has their share of the goods of the world—

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then we hope to supply the proper offset to the Communists' ideas."

"We want our middle class, which is becoming poorer and poorer and whose means of livelihood are cut off more and more by large business concerns, to be placed in a position where they can have their share in these goods" (*M.G.*, 20 Aug. 1932).

For Hitler's views on German economic policy in 1932 and the danger of a French invasion of Germany see H. R. Knickerbocker, *Germany—Fascist or Soviet?* London, John Lane, 1932, ch. xxii.

At the opening of the Motor Exhibition in Berlin on 11 Feb. 1933 Hitler said that "no longer were a man's decisions enslaved to a time-table; man's will can now employ an instrument of transport which continuously obeys his wishes" (cited in *Die Reden des Führers nach der Machtübernahme. Eine Bibliographie*, Berlin, Eher, 1939, p. 11). "For many years the character of our taxation laws has without doubt inflicted the gravest damage on our automobile construction. The height of the public impositions tends slowly to throttle traffic rather than to encourage it. Petty measures of supervision and control played their part in limiting the use of the new instrument of transport", while bureaucratic unreason had the like effect. Apart from those who were quite unteachable, men had come to recognize the value and significance of the motor-car, not only for transport, but for the motor-industry itself. To promote this most important branch of industry in the future the necessary measures can be briefly stated:

- (i) "The State representatives of the interests of motor-traffic must be separated from the framework of the present traffic administration.
- (ii) There must be a gradual alleviation of taxation.
- (iii) A large-scale plan of road construction must be undertaken and carried to completion.
- (iv) Motor-sports must be encouraged."

If previously it had often been sought to measure the height of a people's life by the number of kilometres reached by its railway-lines, in the future one will have to take as the standard of measurement the number of kilometres of roads adapted for motor traffic. This meant great tasks which must be included in the programme of German economic reconstruction. (This is a translation from the report of the speech given in *F.Z.*, 12 Feb.

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1933. I am not certain to what extent it reproduces Hitler's own words.)

For the beginnings of the National Socialist Labour Service (*Arbeitsdienst*) it may be of interest to quote what Hitler said to Mr. Vernon Bartlett in 1933: "How am I to give men jobs?" he asked. "I cannot create work for them in or near towns, because it would be absurd for the State to enter into competition with private enterprise. There are jobs to be done—marshes to be reclaimed, moorlands to be made cultivable, motor-roads to be built—but to do them I must move the men a long way from their homes. I cannot afford to pay them more than a few pence a day, and I cannot afford to have them running round the countryside getting into mischief. Often there is no local accommodation for them, and they have to live in huts. I must put them under discipline, and strict discipline as well. Their work is hard, but it is healthy. It gives them the sort of comradeship they or their elder brothers knew during the war. And above all, it does away with class distinctions and differences. It unites the people. It must be made compulsory, but is that militarism?" Vernon Bartlett, *Nazi Germany explained*, London, Gollancz, 1933, pp. 133-4.

Autarky. In 1934 Hitler said that it was foolish for countries to try to produce articles for which they were not suited by nature. He declared that it might end in the air of European States being poisoned by the fumes of factories manufacturing artificial cotton, while the air of cotton-growing countries was poisoned by the fumes of their decaying plantations. G. Ward Price, *Year of Reckoning*, London, Toronto, Melbourne, Sydney, Cassell, 1939, p. 353.

For the economic situation in Germany in 1939 see Hitler's speech in the Reichstag, 30 Jan. 1939: authorized English translation, pp. 20 sqq. Note in particular the passage on p. 23: "Those who can lie under a banana tree and eat the fruit as it falls into their hands have, of course, an easier struggle for existence than the German peasant who must exert himself throughout the whole year in order to cultivate his field. In this connexion we refuse to admit that a carefree international banana picker has any right to criticize the activities of the German peasant. If certain methods of our economic policy appear injurious to the rest of the world, it should recognize that a hatred on the part of the former victor States, which was irrational and

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purposeless from an economic point of view, was chiefly responsible for making these methods necessary."

p. 988. *Foreign Policy*. 1933. On 1 Jan. 1933 Hitler said: "In a country containing six million Communists, seven and a half million Socialists, and a further six millions more or less infected with pacifism, it would be better to drop all talk about rearmament and equality of rights. The combating of Germany's internal decay is a *sine qua non* of her reconstruction" (I have no German text for this; I cite from Vernon Bartlett, *Nazi Germany explained*, London, Gollancz, 1933, p. 103). At an interview in 1933 Hitler said to Mr. Vernon Bartlett: "Why will people abroad not realize that I have no time to worry about foreign politics? There is only one problem that occupies all my attention—how to reduce unemployment. For men must work" (*ibid.*, p. 133 and see p. 225).

1936. In January 1936 in a speech delivered on the third anniversary of the National Socialist victory in the Lippe-Detmold election of 1933 Hitler said: "We want no quarrel with anybody, but we must be strong enough so that nobody can attack us. The new aircraft hangars are symbols of Germany's rebirth and armed strength. We can go on our way peacefully because we are strong and can look into the future with pride, hope, and confidence" (*New York Times*, 16 Jan. 1936).

For Germany and the Franco-Russian Pact cf. *Ambassador Dodd's Diary* (London, Gollancz, 1941), pp. 240 (Germany would not oppose any peaceful treaty); 244, 313, 321 (von Neurath: Feb. 1936, the Franco-Russian plan not belligerent); 338-9 (von Bülow in Apr. 1936). For France and Germany in *Ambassador Dodd's Diary* cf. pp. 47-8, 96, 114-15, 122, 138, 170-1, 187, 255, 333.

1938. In an interview with Sir Nevile Henderson on 3 Mar. 1938 Hitler spoke of the danger to Germany of the Franco-Russian Treaty and of Czechoslovakia's adhesion to the Treaty. It was, he said, for that reason that Germany had to be so heavily armed and any limitation of armaments depended therefore on the U.S.S.R. The problem was rendered particularly difficult "by the fact that one could place as much confidence in the faith in treaties of a barbarous creature like the Soviet Union as in the comprehension of mathematical formulae by a savage. Any agreement with the U.S.S.R. was quite worthless and Russia

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should never have been allowed into Europe". It was impossible, he added, to have, for instance, any faith in any Soviet undertaking not to use poison gas (Sir Nevile Henderson, *The Failure of a Mission. Berlin 1937-1939*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1940, pp. 116-17).

Austria. When at Sir Nevile Henderson's interview with Hitler on 3 Mar. 1938 the latter spoke of a vote in Austria he was asked if he meant a plebiscite, Hitler's answer was that "the just interests of the German Austrians should be secured and an end made to oppression by a process of peaceful evolution". In other words, writes Sir Nevile Henderson, he begged the question with a vague reply. He did not intend, as he proved later, to tolerate a plebiscite unless it was held under his own direct auspices (Sir Nevile Henderson, op. cit., p. 117). For Austria in *Amabssador Dodd's Diary* the following references may be of service: pp. 42; 47; 84-5; 88; 178; 188; 211 (Mussolini and Austria); 238; 242 (von Bülow: "We could not stand an *Anschluß*"); 243 (von Bülow: "*Anschluß* would be a terrible thing for Germany"); 255; 267 (restoration of the Hapsburgs); 303 (Schmitt: "no interest in *Anschluß*"); 312-13; 327; 334 (Apr. 1936, Austrian members of Reichstag); 335 (Schuschnigg confers with Mussolini); 353 (Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden); 365; 391 (von Neurath's visit); 391-2 (Germany and Mussolini); 394 (von Neurath in Vienna); 407; 427.

p. 1005. *Morgenrot.* For the first presentation of this film cf. John Heygate, *These Germans*, London, Hutchinson, 1940, pp. 117-21.

p. 1018. *The Four-Power Pact.* See A. Zousmann, *Le Pacte à Quatre.* Thèse of the Faculté de Droit of the University of Paris, 1934; 5 Annexes of Documents; bibliography, pp. 201-5. Paris, Les Éditions internationales, 1934.

p. 1041. 17 May 1933. The *Friedensrede*: the Speech on Peace: a few quotations may be recalled: Fichte: "Promise peace that you may begin war with advantage" [cited by H. Fish Armstrong, *We or They* (London, Macmillan, 1937), pp. 66-7]. Constantin Hierl (Head of the National Socialist Labour Service): "There are two kinds of pacifism: true pacifism which springs from a weak and sickly nature or from blindness, but which is honourably

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meant; and sham pacifism. This last is a political weapon and can serve for preparing for war. By putting the opponent to sleep with the help of pacifist declarations it seeks to induce him to neglect his armaments. The soporific fumes which it spreads over the enemy are useful to hide our own armaments for war." *Grundlagen einer deutschen Wehrpolitik* (Nationalsozialistische Bibliothek, Nr. 12), Munich, Eher, p. 16. (I have borrowed Mr. Armstrong's translation of this passage.) Goebbels: "The only instrument with which one can conduct foreign policy is alone and exclusively the sword." *Der Angriff*, 28 May 1931. "Peace, too, must be protected and, like all other good things of this earth, it must be protected with the sword. He who wishes for peace, let him arm for war, and he who wishes for war, let him preach peace." *Der Angriff*, 12 Mar. 1928 or in the book with the same title (Munich, Eher, 1936), p. 172. . . . For the speech of 17 May and the peculiar individuality of States and peoples cf. Rudolf Nadolny, *Deutschland von drauen und unsere auenpolitische Verantwortung* (Deutsch-akademische Schriften, Heft 35), Berlin, Bernard & Graefe, 1934, pp. 12-20.

p. 1074. *Sippenforschung*. Cf. the *Familiengeschichtliche Bibliographie*, covering in a series of volumes the literature on the subject from 1900, issued by the Zentralstelle fr Deutsche Personen- und Familiengeschichte, Leipzig; and see the long series of *Mitteilungen* issued by the same Zenstralstelle.

p. 1076. The secret documents published in the *Petit Parisien* were derived from the Information Section of the Communist Party: "They were for the most part authentic": so Heinz Liepmann, *Fires Underground*, London, Harrap, 1935, p. 196.

p. 1087. *Germany's Withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference*. The surprise of Europe at Hitler's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference is itself surprising, for Hitler's policy for Germany had been set forth in a long open letter to von Papen published in the *Vlkischer Beobachter* of 22 Oct. 1932. In that letter Hitler said that it was a false hope to think that any injustice which had been imposed upon Germany could be made good by means of any Conference, and it was just as senseless to think that the Power which had disarmed Germany would ever itself seriously disarm unless under compulsion. Any German deputa-tion which imagined that France would voluntarily disarm should

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be immediately recalled, since it was composed of men not fit for their mission. "And the same is true of any consent by France to German rearmament, for the question in both cases is one of an alteration in Germany's favour of the present power-relation—and that France will not admit at any price, and France will be supported by her vassal States. Therefore, since the Disarmament Conference is inevitably doomed to failure, the only course for German diplomacy is to establish without question that the fact that there has not been disarmament is solely due to France. This is important, for only so can the legal validity of the Versailles Treaty be gradually broken down. For this purpose at this Disarmament Conference Germany should resolutely and obstinately have demanded the disarmament of France. This would necessarily have led to the isolation of France. In no circumstances should Germany have come before the world or before this Conference with its own programme of rearmament. For in the first place, to say the least, these Conferences are not in a position to decide this question: it is not in Lausanne or in Geneva that rearmament will come, but in the last resort in Germany, and it is not in Geneva that such a rearmament can count on the consent of the other nations."

"Even if Germany possesses a thousand times over the right to bring her armaments up to an equality with those of other nations, since here it is a question of an effective alteration of strength in the life of peoples, that consideration would never lead to an international ratification if that equality is not already an accomplished fact."

"And secondly France is thus given the opportunity to turn the discussion, which she wishes to avoid, of her own failure to disarm into the consideration of Germany's theoretical claim to rearm, which is for her all the more welcome. France thus in the end gains the possibility of maintaining that her present armament and her contemplated refusal to disarm are necessary through pointing to the contemplated rearmament of Germany asserted by France, although in fact Germany is not arming at all."

"And, further, it would certainly not have been necessary that the German delegation should have continued to play its part in the Genevan Disarmament comedy to the bitter end. It would have sufficed to demonstrate beyond a doubt the determination of France not to disarm and then to leave the Conference with the remark that thereby the Peace Treaty of Versailles had been

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violated by the signatory Powers and that Germany must therefore reserve her right, when the need arose, to draw the consequences which followed from that fact. And at the same time one could with the greatest vigour stress the fact that the Treaty itself, since it saw in German disarmament only a preface to general disarmament, could not in the long run recognize any differentiation between nations either in value or in rights. And that is for Germany only the more obvious since she is a member with equal rights in the League of Nations, and, apart from this, as a nation of 65 millions could from the first demand a treatment which should correspond with that fact."

"That Germany, through very unwise formulations of her demands for a military force and by her still more unwise tactics in fawning upon France has now actually in some degree created a united front of the signatory Powers against herself—that is the worst which could possibly have happened."

But the unwise thing of all was to couple naval demands with the demand for a land army: even if at this time one should believe that one could make a quite hopeless demand for an army 300,000 strong, the naval demands remain incomprehensible.

"Germany's peril is in the East. We cannot fight against France or England, and even if we were to build large ships, that would take four years. The forces of Russia or Poland do not demand such naval strength to counter the threat which they constitute, and if the demand were to be raised, London's consent should first have been secured. One should ask for corrections of the Treaty provisions to meet the peril in the East."

"From the standpoint of finance a battle squadron would cost 700 to 800 milliards of marks—a financial impossibility—while any such measure would bring France and England together again."

It is idle to talk of *Gleichberechtigung*, of equality of rights—it is a worthless phrase if equality of rights is not expressed in the restoration of Germany's capacity to defend herself. Germany must fight in order to prevent the maintenance, not to speak of the strengthening, of the French hegemony, and with that aim both England and Italy should sympathize. It is incomprehensible how anyone can think that better relations with France could be a substitute for that contact with England and Italy which is lacking and for their approval.

"In England they want no German-French war, but much less

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do they want a German-French military convention as the final point in a German-French understanding." Italy is the only country which not merely recognizes that it has interests which stand in opposition to France but also boldly and openly champions those interests. The German Government has failed to recognize the possibility of bringing Italy into a genuine friendship with Germany, von Papen has lost one chance after another: "the democracies regard Germany with distrust; those States which are not democracies regard her with aversion or with mixed feelings. France has no thought of disarmament; by a system of military agreements she has so assured her position that it is no great step to a complete French hegemony."

On Germany's withdrawal from the League cf. * * * "Après le coup de théâtre allemand", *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 8^{me} Période, xviii (15 Nov. 1933), pp. 241-56; Claude Eylan, "À Berlin. Semaine d'Élections, 3-12 Novembre", *Revue des Deux Mondes*, ibid. (1 Déc. 1933), pp. 653-67; Allan Nevins, *Current History*, xxxix (Dec. 1933), pp. 327-31; K. L. von Oertzen, *Deutschland ohne Sicherheit* (in the series "Das Neue Reich," herausgegeben von der Deutschen Akademie). Munich, Callwey, 1934. Thyssen said: "We compelled the German Government to withdraw from the League" (*Ambassador Dodd's Diary*, p. 64).

p. 1208. 16 Mar. 1935. *Conscription reintroduced in Germany*. The views of MacDonald (at this time British Prime Minister) on the question of armaments were expressed in the Parliamentary Paper Cmd. 4827 (4 Mar. 1935) issued over his initials, and see his speech in the House of Commons on 2 May 1935. For the British Government's Statement of 4 Mar. 1935, the French Government's decision announced on 5 Mar. 1935 to lengthen the period of military service, and the German law of 16 Mar. 1935 re-establishing compulsory military service, see *Survey of International Affairs 1935*, vol. i (London, Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 132-46. For the extraordinary session of the Council of the League of Nations, 15-17 Apr. 1935, and the adoption of a resolution of protest against the promulgation by the German Government of the Military Law of 16 Mar. 1935, see *Survey of International Affairs 1935*, vol. i (ibid.), pp. 161-9. On Hitler's speech in the Reichstag on 21 May 1935 see *Survey of International Affairs 1935*, vol. i, pp. 169-78, and cf. Heinrich Rogge, *Hitlers Friedenspolitik und das Völkerrecht*, Berlin,

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Schlieffen Verlag, 1935. See further *Documents on International Affairs 1935*, vol. i (London, Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 58 sqq. Cf. William L. Shirer, *Berlin Diary*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1941, pp. 32-7.

p. 1271. *The Franco-Russian Pact and Germany's repudiation of the Pact of Locarno*. For the Locarno Pact: ed. Fritz Berber, *Locarno. Eine Dokumentensammlung. Mit einer Einleitung des Botschafters von Ribbentrop*. Berlin, Junker & Dünhaupt, 1936; English translation: *Locarno. A Collection of Documents*. ed. F. J. Berber (issued under the auspices of the German Academy of Political Science, Berlin, and the Institute of International Affairs, Hamburg). London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, William Hodge, 1936.

For obligations under the Locarno Pact cf. Sisley Huddleston, *War unless* —, London, Gollancz, 1933, pp. 189-94.

p. 1302. *The Franco-Russian Pact: "Special Accords" and Collective Security: are they compatible?* For discussion see: Fritz Kraemer, *Das Verhältnis der französischen Bündnisverträge zum Völkerbundspakt und zum Pakt von Locarno. Eine juristisch-politische Studie* (= Frankfurter Abhandlungen zum modernen Völkerrecht, Heft 30). Leipzig, Universitäts-Verlag Noske, 1932. (This is for me at present inaccessible); Sisley Huddleston, *War unless* —, pp. 175-81—particular "defensive accords" and collective security through the League of Nations: they are incompatible; Le Baron Axel von Freytagh-Loringhoven, "Les Ententes régionales", *Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours*, 1936, ii—Tome 56 de la Collection—Paris, Recueil Sirey, pp. 859-677. Bibliography, pp. 673-6, supplementary to that published by Orù y Arregui in the same *Recueil*, 1935, iii, pp. 91 sqq.; *Politische Verträge. Eine Sammlung von Urkunden, herausgegeben von Viktor Bruns*. Band I, *Garantiepakete, Bündnisse, Abkommen über politische Zusammenarbeit, Nichtangriffs- und Neutralitätsverträge der Nachkriegszeit, bearbeitet von Georg von Gretschaninow*. Berlin, Heymann, 1936 (pp. lii, 637); A. Graf von Mandelsloh, "Politische Pakte und völkerrechtliche Ordnung", *25 Jahre Kaiser Wilhelm-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften*, Band iii, *Die Geisteswissenschaften* (Berlin, Springer, 1937), pp. 213-328. Bibliography, pp. 325-8 and see p. 213, n. 1; Paul Barandon, "Die Bündnisse Frankreichs und

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der Tschechoslowakei mit der Sowjetunion und das Ende des Pakts von Locarno", *Das System der politischen Staatsverträge seit 1918* in Handbuch des Völkerrechts, ed. G. A. Walz (after the death of Fritz Stier), Band iv, 2te Abteilung (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1937), pp. 229-33; Walter Wache, *System der Pakte. Die politischen Verträge der Nachkriegszeit*, Berlin, Volk und Reich Verlag, 1938, pp. 66 sqq., 148 sqq.; Arnold Wolfers, *Britain and France between Two Wars*, New York, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1940, "General Treaties and Special Accords", pp. 167-80.

For international contracts of guarantee (e.g. of neutrality, frontiers, &c.) see Otto Bussmann, *Der völkerrechtliche Garantievertrag insbesondere seit der Entstehung des Völkerbundes* (= Frankfurter Abhandlungen zum Kriegsverhütungsrecht, edd. F. Giese and K. Strupp, Heft 3). Leipzig, Noske, 1927; bibliography, pp. vii-x, and cf. Wilhelm Steinlein, *Der Begriff des nicht herausgeforderten Angriffs in Bündnisverträgen seit 1870 und insbesondere im Locarno-Vertrag* (in the same series, Heft 5). Leipzig, Noske, 1927.

For Hitler's speech on 7 Mar. 1936 cf. W. L. Shirer, *Berlin Diary*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1941, pp. 47-56.

Official Documents concerning Germany's repudiation of the Locarno Pact:

- (i) Miscellaneous No. 3 (1936). *Correspondence showing the course of certain Diplomatic Discussions directed towards securing An European Settlement: June 1934 to March 1936*. Cmd. 5143.

Eastern Pact Negotiations

A brief note may be of service on the interrelated questions of the Eastern Pact, the Air Pact, the Franco-Russian treaty and its relation to the Locarno Pact. Page references are to no. i *supra*.
27 June 1934. Eastern Pact as suggested by France (pp. 7-8).
11-12 July 1934. Anglo-French conversation in London.
French proposal amended: the obligations assumed by Russia and France were thereby made to apply not only in relation to France and Russia respectively but also in relation to Germany (pp. 7, 8, 80).
8 Sept. 1934. German Memorandum in criticism of the proposed Eastern Pact (pp. 9-14).

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- 5 Dec. 1934. Franco-Russian protocol signed at Geneva (pp. 14-15).
- 1-3 Feb. 1935. Anglo-French conversations in London. Italy, Germany, and Belgium to be asked to co-operate with England and France in an Air-assistance Pact against aggression (3 Feb., Joint Anglo-French Declaration, pp. 15-17).
- 14 Feb. 1935. Germany welcomes an Air Pact and suggests that Britain should enter into a direct exchange of views with the German Government on the subject (pp. 17-18).
- 26 Mar. 1935. Germany presents proposals for a pact (pp. 19-20).
- 25-6 Mar. 1935. Sir John Simon in Berlin. Interview with Hitler. Sir John Simon in his report of the conversations in Berlin given in his speech in the House of Commons on 9 Apr. 1935 said: Herr Hitler made it plain that Germany was not prepared to sign an Eastern Pact under which Germany would be bound to mutual assistance. In particular, Germany is not prepared to enter into a pact of mutual assistance between herself and Russia. On the other hand, Germany was stated to be in favour of a non-aggression pact between Powers interested in East European questions, together with provisions for consultation if aggression was threatened. Herr Hitler was not prepared in present conditions to contemplate the inclusion of Lithuania in any pact of non-aggression. The Germans also suggested that if, in spite of this pact of non-aggression and consultation, hostilities should break out between any two contracting Powers, the other contracting Powers should engage not to support the aggressor in any way. In another connexion, however, Herr Hitler dwelt on the difficulty of identifying the aggressor. Asked as to his view if some of the other parties to such a pact entered into an agreement of mutual assistance as amongst themselves, Herr Hitler stated that he considered this idea was dangerous and objectionable, as in his opinion it would tend to create especial interests in a group within the wider system.

As regards the idea of a Central European Pact, which was more particularly a topic of the Franco-Italian meeting at Rome, we understood in Berlin that the German Government did not reject the idea of such an arrangement on grounds of principle, but did not see its necessity; and saw

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great difficulty in defining "non-interference" in relation to Austria. Herr Hitler intimated, however, that if the other Governments who should wish to conclude a Central European Pact could agree upon a text, the German Government would consider it.

In regard to land armaments, Herr Hitler stated that Germany required 36 divisions, representing a maximum of 550,000 soldiers of all arms, including a division of the SS. and militarized police troops. He asserted that there were no para-military formations in Germany. Germany, he said, claimed to possess all types of arms possessed by other countries, and was not prepared to refrain from constructing certain types until other countries ceased to possess them. If other countries would abandon certain types, Germany, he said, would do the same. As regards naval armaments, Germany claimed with certain reserves 35 per cent. of British tonnage, and in the air parity between Great Britain, France and Germany, provided that the development of the Soviet Air Force was not such that revision of these figures would become necessary. If any general agreement as to arms limitation could be reached, Germany would be prepared to accept and work a system of permanent and automatic supervision, on the understanding that such supervision applied to all Powers equally. Herr Hitler said that the German Government favoured the suggestion contained in the London Communiqué of an Air Pact between the Locarno Powers.

On the subject of the League of Nations Herr Hitler referred to the assertion he had made in May 1933, that Germany would not continue to participate in the League of Nations if she was to remain what he described as a country of inferior right, and alleged, by way of example, that she was in a position of inferiority if she had no colonies (pp. 20-1). The result of the conversations was formulated by von Neurath on 12 Apr. 1935 as follows: "1. In the course of the Berlin conversations the Leader and Chancellor of the Reich informed the British delegation that the German Government was, to its regret, not in a position to announce its accession to the Eastern Pact in the proposed form. The German Government was, however, ready to give its consent to such a collective security pact if—

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"First, it were based on mutual and general obligations of non-aggression and arrangements for arbitration; and

"Secondly, in the case of a breach of the peace, a consultative procedure were provided for;

"Thirdly, German Government would be ready, while emphasising the difficulty of clearly defining an aggressor, to adhere to general measures for withholding support from such an aggressor."

"The German Government still stands by this offer to-day."

"2. The Leader and Chancellor of the Reich, in the course of these conversations, also stated that the German Government was not in a position to agree to a proposal for a pact which contained more or less automatic obligation for military assistance as between all or certain individual parties. The German Government saw in such a proposal not an element for the maintenance of peace, but rather an element of menace to peace. The German Government to-day still adheres to this view and to the attitude which must result from it."

"3. The German Government immediately after its accession to power expressed the wish to conclude pacts of non-aggression with the neighbouring States. It made this proposal without having full knowledge of existing bi- or multilateral military agreements between individual States and without any relation to them. As it has no aggressive intentions itself, it does not feel affected by real defensive agreements either. The German Government still holds this view to-day."

"Just as it is, therefore, unable to join any pact which contains such military engagements as an essential element of its contents, and therefore of its existence, so can agreements of this sort, which lie outside this pact, not deter the German Government on its side from concluding pacts of non-aggression on the basis set out above" (pp. 22-3). That is to say: "The German Government were prepared to enter into an Eastern Pact on the lines indicated by them notwithstanding the fact that some of the other parties might conclude arrangements for mutual assistance provided that such arrangements were embodied in absolutely separate documents. Germany did not wish to sign a document of

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- which other clauses contained provisions for mutual assistance" (p. 24).
- 2 May 1935. Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Agreement signed (pp. 26-9).
- 3 May 1935. Sir John Simon asks of the German Ambassador that his Government should formulate its conception of a multilateral Eastern Pact (p. 30): the Ambassador replies (10 May) that that was very difficult in view of the signing of the Franco-Russian Agreement which was shown by the protocol annexed thereto to be directed solely against Germany; that Agreement appeared to violate the Locarno Treaty (p. 31).
- 21 May 1935. Hitler's speech in the Reichstag: "The Thirteen Points."
- 25 May 1935. German Memorandum to France on the relation between the Franco-Russian Agreement and the Treaty of Locarno (pp. 36-9).
- 29 May 1935. German draft for an Air Pact handed to Sir John Simon (see pp. 39-40, 84, § 13).
- 31 May 1935. German comment on Hitler's speech of 21 May supplied orally to Sir Eric Phipps, British Ambassador in Berlin (pp. 40-1).
- 3 June 1935. Subject to some reservations France accepts the German proposals for an Eastern Pact (26 Mar. 1935, 12 Apr. 1935) as a basis for negotiations (pp. 41-2).
- 25 June 1935. French reply to German Memorandum of 25 May 1935 (pp. 42-5); England (5 July), Italy (15 July), Belgium (19 July) express their concurrence with the French reply (pp. 45-7).
- 1 Aug. 1935. The German Ambassador in London states that his Government cannot agree with the juridical point of view expressed in the French reply of 25 June (p. 53).
- 5 Aug. 1935. Aide-Mémoire presented by Britain to von Neurath protesting against the view that the signing of the Franco-Russian Agreement had invalidated von Neurath's undertaking (12 Apr. 1935) concerning the Eastern Pact, and against the restriction of the words "neighbouring States" used by Hitler in his speech of 21 May to States "contiguous to Germany" (pp. 53-5).
- 16 Sept. 1935. Von Neurath explains to Sir Eric Phipps that the references to Russia at the Nuremberg *Parteitag* were

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merely a reply to anti-German attacks at the Comintern Congress. Germany did not mean to attack anyone, not even Lithuania.

- 5 Dec. 1935. The French Ambassador reports that Hitler is unwilling to negotiate at all pending a settlement of the Abyssinian question.

- 13 Dec. 1935. Sir Eric Phipps has an interview with Hitler when Hitler expressed the strongest objection to the conclusion of any bilateral arrangements within the Air Pact, and no arguments could shake him. He then declared that the Franco-Soviet "military alliance" directed against Germany had rendered any Air Pact out of the question, for the bringing into the picture of Russia had completely upset the balance of power in Europe. He referred to Russia's enormous strength on land and in the air, and remarked that Berlin might easily in a few hours be reduced to a heap of ashes by a Russian air attack before the League or any other body had even begun to discuss the question of how to deal with it. When the German position was stated on 12 April 1935 he had not realized the full meaning of the Franco-Russian alliance. His main objection to that alliance, Sir Eric Phipps reported to Sir Samuel Hoare, is that each party reserves to itself the right to decide in the last resort who the eventual aggressor is. For instance, in the event of war between Russia and Poland, if Germany came to the latter's assistance, she would be dubbed the aggressor by France and treated as such. This even impaired the efficacy and value of the Treaty of Locarno (p. 62).

Later (14 Jan. 1936) von Neurath explained that at this interview Hitler only meant to say that the Franco-Russian Treaty had rendered any air *limitation* agreement impossible for the present: he was ready on principle to conclude an Air Pact between the Locarno Powers. The German Government was ready for any technical arrangements to be discussed round a table by all the Locarno Powers, even bilateral agreements could be so discussed, but these must not be discussed *à deux*. Von Neurath added that the moment seemed inopportune for such conversations *à cinq* owing to the Abyssinian War (p. 63). This interpretation was endorsed by Hitler (see letter of Sir Eric Phipps to Mr. Eden of 17 Jan. 1936, pp. 63-4).

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- 27 Feb. 1936. Ratification of Franco-Russian Pact.
28 Feb. 1936. Publication in the *Paris Midi* of Bertrand de Jouvenel's interview with Hitler.
2 Mar. 1936. François-Poncet has an interview with Hitler and asks whether the latter had any definite proposals to implement the sentiments expressed in his interview with Bertrand de Jouvenel. Hitler replied that the interview took place ten days before the ratification by the French Chamber of the Franco-Russian Treaty. That *fait accompli* had changed the whole situation. Under urgent pressure by François-Poncet Hitler consents to make proposals (pp. 71-2).
7 Mar. 1936. Occupation by German troops of the Rhineland demilitarized zone. German Memorandum stating that Germany regards herself as no longer bound by the Locarno Treaty.

[For Hitler's earlier clear distinction between the Treaty of Locarno, freely negotiated and freely signed, and the Treaty of Versailles, see the letter of Eden to Sir Eric Phipps, p. 75.]

- (ii) Germany No. 2 (1936). *Text of Proposals drawn up by the Representatives of Belgium, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Italy*. 19 March 1936. Cmd. 5134.
(iii) Miscellaneous No. 4 (1936). *Correspondence with the Belgian and French Ambassadors relating to (ii)*. 1 April 1936. Cmd. 5149.
(iv) Miscellaneous No. 6 (1936). *Correspondence with the German Government regarding the German Proposals for an European Settlement*. 24 March-6 May 1936. Cmd. 5175.

p. 1334. Speech of 30 Jan. 1937—the "Schuldbekenntnis" now "aufgehoben und für immer erledigt"; cf. Paul Barandon, *Das System der politischen Staatsverträge seit 1918* (= Handbuch des Völkerrechts, ed. G. A. Walz, Band iv, Abteilung ii, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1937, p. 10). I have not seen the article "Der Widerruf des Kriegsschuldbekenntnisses" in *Völkerbund und Völkerrecht* (Berlin), March 1937, at p. 725.

p. 1423. Mr. Ward Price's interview with Hitler: there is a fuller account of this interview in G. Ward Price, *Year of Reckon-*

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ing, London, Toronto, Melbourne, Sydney, Cassell, 1939, pp. 131-4. I cite the most significant addition to the report printed in the *Daily Mail*: There is one thing, Mr. Price said, that the whole world must be asking itself to-night, and that is—will the turn of Czechoslovakia come next?

"Was jetzt kommt ist eine Verdauungs-Pause", replied the Führer emphatically. "The next thing is a pause for digestion. If the Czech Government is wise, it will use that pause to approach me with some acceptable proposals about the Sudeten question. I am a realist, and I am not unreasonable. Look at the ten-year pact of non-aggression that I made with Poland! It is based on recognition of the fact that a country of thirty-one million inhabitants must necessarily have an outlet to the sea. It is hard for us that this should have to be by means of a corridor running through German territory, but we realize what it means for the Poles."

"There is a German minority in Poland, and a Polish minority in Germany. If the two countries were to quarrel, each would oppress the minority belonging to the other. It was far better for Poland and Germany to come to an agreement, and I hope the example of what has happened in Austria will convince all nations of the folly of oppressing national minorities under alien rule."

Herr Hitler paused for a moment.

"You had better not make any reference to Czechoslovakia in what you write," he said. "In the first place, it is sure to be distorted by the Czech Press and, in the second, it will give the world the impression that my mind is already occupied with Czechoslovakia, which is not the case."

p. 1423. The *Anschluß*: Hitler at St. Polten to Ward Price: "Have you ever seen anything like this? And if I had not come, there would have been bloodshed instead of cheering—tears instead of joy."

Hitler in Vienna: at the dinner in the Imperial Hotel: "Napoleon conquered most of Europe because his armies represented the ideas of the French Revolution. It was not so much his military skill as the appeal of the cause he represented that gave him victory. Remember how he first defeated the Prussians and then, within a few years, was himself overcome by the same people, because, in the meantime, the Prussians had acquired the conception of nationality."

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"In the same way, we have won Austria, not by force but because we represent a political conception that is irresistible. Great is the power of ideas. They will work for us in the future as they have in the past. Now comes a lull during which we shall reorganize Austria, but afterwards we shall go forward again in the strength of the same ideas which have given this country into our hands." G. Ward Price, *Year of Reckoning*, London, Toronto, Melbourne, Sydney, Cassell, 1939, pp. 140, 144-5.

p. 1459. *Hitler in Italy*: see Louis Gillet, "Hitler à Rome. Choses vues", *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 8^{me} Période, xlv (1938), pp. 669-83; G. Ward Price, *Year of Reckoning*, London, Cassell, 1939, pp. 183-200.

p. 1464. *German Relations with Switzerland*. Cf. René Pax, "La Suisse et les annexions allemandes", *Revue politique et parlementaire*, clxxvii (Nov. 1938), pp. 253-61.

p. 1465. *Admiral von Horthy's visit to Berlin*: cf. G. Ward Price, *Year of Reckoning*, London, Cassell, 1939, pp. 233-5.

p. 1500. Mr. Ward Price's interview with Hitler on 17 Sept. 1938. Of this interview there is a much fuller account in G. Ward Price, *Year of Reckoning*, pp. 279-85. An extract from that later account may be cited here:

Mr. Ward Price: Are you preparing to take action against the Czechs if they refuse to give the Sudetens the right of self-determination?

Hitler: "Of course."

Mr. Ward Price: And what would you do with the Czechs then?

Hitler: "If we have to march in, they are finished. If they make the necessary concessions to the Sudetens in time, they can carry on their own affairs as they like. If they are wise, they will see where their own interest lies. Italy, for instance, had always believed that the independence of Austria was of fundamental importance to her, but Mussolini realized that so unnatural a State could no longer continue, and that the friendship of a powerful nation like Germany was of greater value to him than the existence on his frontiers of a small internally divided country. By renouncing what had formerly

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been a basic principle of Italian foreign policy, he removed an obstacle between Italy and Germany. He thereby made it possible for them to become united in sincere friendship without injuring the interests of his own country." . . .

Mr. Ward Price: And Russia?

Hitler: "It is, of course, conceivable that Russia might stand behind Czechoslovakia, but I don't let that impress me. All these warlike preparations are madness, for no one in Germany thinks of war with France or England. The fact that I have nevertheless taken measures on such a huge scale is the best proof of my determination to stop Czech oppression of the Sudetens. . . . But Dr. Beneš is not a statesman; he is only a politician."

When Mr. Ward Price suggested that Germany wanted to get a foothold in Czechoslovakia only because she aimed at opening the way to the oilfields of Rumania and the crops of the Ukraine, Hitler grunted impatiently: "I wish such people would look at a map. I don't need oilfields. I can manufacture oil on a huge scale in Germany. Besides, with a population of eighty millions I shall have so much to do to organize them and provide them with decent living conditions, that it would be madness to try to add other peoples to Germany."

Mr. Ward Price suggested: Without annexing them, you might impose the principles of National Socialism upon them and establish Germany's political influence throughout Central Europe.

Hitler: "That idea that we want to inoculate the whole world with our principles is simply absurd. National Socialist principles have done so much for Germany that we have not the slightest desire to export them. They are a fundamental advantage to our national strength. It is not Germany's political influence, but her economic influence that I want to extend. I can't get goods by exercising political pressure. I have got to pay for them or find a basis for economic exchange with their producers."

The conversation then turned to economic policy: to Mr. Ward Price Hitler said: "The fundamental difference between your economic policy and ours is that in England you work on a basis of capital, whereas the basis of the German system is productive labour. I was bound to invent a new economic system because when I came to power, after inflation and the world slump,

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practically no capital existed in Germany. . . . The effectiveness of our new machinery can be judged by the results. As for your expectation of our collapse, I may say that the greatest economists in Germany have been foretelling it for the last six years, but they have given that up now because even experts cannot afford to go on being wrong for ever."

p. 1527. Tuesday, 27 Sept. 1938: Hitler to Sir Horace Wilson: "I understand the position perfectly. If we invade Czechoslovakia and France attacks us, Great Britain will attack us also. I may say that I am quite ready to face that contingency and I see no point in continuing these negotiations any further. I can only add that if, by 2 p.m. to-morrow, the Czech Government has not accepted my demands, I shall order general mobilization in Germany and proceed to take such measures as seem necessary." I quote from G. Ward Price, *Year of Reckoning*, pp. 307-8.

p. 1528. *The Munich Declaration*. I had thought that Hitler would not have signed a document written in English and that the German text of the Munich declaration was the original: I therefore translated that text. But I was wrong: Mr. Frank Ashton-Gwatkin of the Foreign Office writes to me: "The document signed by Hitler and Chamberlain at Munich on Sept. 30 1938 was drafted and signed in an English text which alone is authoritative. I enclose the text as it exists in the Foreign Office archives. The original document was sent to the Imperial War Museum early in 1940." I therefore append the original text:

"We, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting to-day and are agreed in recognising that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe."

"We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again."

"We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe.

(Sgd.) A. Hitler.

September 30 1938.

Neville Chamberlain."

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p. 1622. *The interpretation of the Munich Declaration: the Diplomatic Correspondence*, an official bulletin issued daily to the Press, claimed that by signing the Declaration Chamberlain had clearly given formal recognition to Germany's interests in Central Europe. British protests against the annexation of the Czech provinces were as if Germany had attempted to interfere in British imperial affairs. "It is not known that, since Munich, England has consulted Germany about the measures she has taken in Palestine or in other parts of the world where she claims to exercise influence" (cited by G. Ward Price, *Year of Reckoning*, pp. 12-13).

Winter 1938. King Carol and Prince Michael visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden: King Carol and his son light cigarettes without being asked to do so: "the pleasantness of Hitler's demeanour took a sudden change": "Will you answer me a question," he said. "What is it?" asked Carol. "Will you let the Russians come through Rumania?" "You have asked me one question," Carol said, "May I in turn ask you two?" Hitler signified assent. "Do you intend to support Codreanu, and do you intend to interfere with the German minority in Rumania?" Hitler answered, after a moment's hesitation, in a tone of the greatest possible reasonableness: "I have no desire to interfere with the internal government of your country, and I am not going to support Codreanu. Nevertheless, you must see the delicacy of my position. Codreanu made himself my follower and chief supporter in Rumania. You can understand that it is a matter of distress to me that he is in prison. I ask you to accept my assurance that I am not interested in his political activities, because of my irrevocable decision never to interfere in any way with your country. Therefore I would be very obliged if you would release Codreanu and the other leaders of the Iron Guard. . . . You will appreciate that I make this only as a request." After a silence: "You have not answered my question," said Hitler: "Do you intend to let the Russians come through?" "No," said Carol. Beverley Baxter, *Men, Martyrs, and Mountebanks*, London, Hutchinson (no date), pp. 107-8.

Spring 1939: Gafencu, Rumanian Foreign Minister, at Berchtesgaden: Hitler asked, "Why have you signed a defensive pact with England?" "Yes, why?" demanded Goering. "You know that she could do nothing to help you. You would be over-

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run and crushed before a single British soldier could go to your assistance." Gafencu: "That is probably true." Goering in anger: "Then why did you do it?" Gafencu: "The British guarantee to a small nation is useful when a war is over." Hitler later, when Goering had left the room, suddenly began one of his tirades against England and France, he shrieked of the horrors which they would suffer if they were mad enough to go to war. "There will not be a town or city in England or France that will not be bombed out of existence. There will be nothing left. They will be countries of the dead. The fools! They have no idea of the horrors that would come upon them." Then, all his vitality gone,— "And if we fight," he said, "whom do we fight for? . . . For Moscow" (with a hiss of hatred). Beverley Baxter, *Men, Martyrs, and Mountebanks*, pp. 110-11.

p. 1583. *Hitler's interview with Hacha and Chvalkovsky*: the accuracy of this report is questioned by Mr. Ward Price, *Year of Reckoning*, pp. 357-9.

Hitler after the German occupation of Prague: "When this is over, we shall be able to talk to the British on terms of complete equality. We ought to be able to reach an agreement with them." G. Ward Price, *Year of Reckoning*, p. 366. For Rosenberg's article—"the best I have ever read" (Hitler)—in answer to Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham (17 Mar. 1939), see *V.B.*, 23 Mar. 1939.

p. 1640. See the Report of the Special Munitions Committee of the Senate of which the Chairman was Senator Nye (the public hearing of witnesses began in September 1934: the report was issued in a series of parts in 1936): 74th Congress, 2nd Session, Report No. 944. Cf. the findings of the Committee, part vi, p. 3: "The development of the export of war commodities to the Allies resulted in a widespread expansion of almost all the lines of American business . . . as a result by 1916 there was created a tremendous industrial machine, heavily capitalized, paying high wages, and dependent upon the purchasing power of the Allies. The Committee is of the opinion that this situation, with its risk of business depression and panic in event of damage to the belligerents' ability to purchase, involved the administration so inextricably, it prevented the maintenance of a truly neutral

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course between the Allies and the Central Powers. Such a neutral course threatened to injure this export trade." See Raymond Leslie Buell, *Isolated America*, New York, London, Knopf, 1940, pp. 72-3.

Some Dicta

These *Addenda* may naturally include a few dicta collected from Hitler's speeches or from reported interviews:

From Hitler's early speeches:

"When we go into the last battle we would lift up our gaze to Him who guides all things and, as did a Prussian general before us, we would say 'Lord God, there is no need for Thee to help us, only do not help our enemies.'" *Hitler's Reden* (edition of 1933), p. 95.

"History will never be made through numbers." *Hitler's Reden* (edition of 1933), p. 95.

After the Great War "only glowing, ruthless, brutal fanaticism could have saved the situation". *Hitler's Reden* (edition of 1933), p. 98.

"An enemy like France one cannot pray to death; much less can one idle it to death." *Hitler's Reden* (edition of 1933), p. 98.

"Power is never identical with Right. Frederick the Great once clearly defined the relation of Power to Right: he said that Right was worthless if it were not defended through the sword's point. In other words: Right was always worthless if Power has not taken its position behind Right." *Hitler's Reden* (edition of 1933), p. 111.

"I adopt the standpoint that a bird must sing because it is a bird; and a man who is born for politics must be a politician, whether he be in freedom or in gaol, whether he sits upon a silken chair or must content himself with a hard bench; the destiny of his people will move him from early morning until far into the night." *Hitler's Reden* (edition of 1933), p. 119.

"The Jew conquers with lies and dies with the truth." *Hitler's Reden* (edition of 1933), p. 122.

"If the Jew thinks he can conquer, we want to prove to him that the German skull is stronger than his." *Hitler's Reden* (edition of 1933), p. 123.

"You say 'Honour is perhaps nothing'. Then you, too, are nothing." *Hitler's Reden* (edition of 1933), p. 125.

"The State is only the means to an end; the end is the maintenance of the race." *Hitler's Reden* (edition of 1933), p. 125.

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"We do not preach seats in Parliament: we proclaim a new *Weltanschauung*." *Hitler's Reden* (edition of 1933), p. 127.

"I must categorically declare that I decline to be modest in a matter where I know my capacity. If any one believes that he is called to any task, then he has not to let himself be driven thereto; he has the duty to do that to which he feels himself called." Speech at the trial in 1924.

"One cannot learn statesmanship; one must be born for it." Speech at the trial in 1924.

"As for myself I wish to be nothing more than the Drummer of the Third Reich." Speech at the trial in 1924.

From later speeches and interviews:

"I have only one thought, one will, that animates me day and night—to make Germany great, the greatest power on earth. And if you visualize a greater Germany side by side with Russia, I tell you that I can see a German Reich stretching from the North Sea to the Urals, but without a Stalin!" Cited from Kurt C. W. Ludecke, *I knew Hitler*, London, 1938, p. 423 (conversation in October 1932).

"I'll go the limit when the time comes, but not before." Cited from Kurt Ludecke, *I knew Hitler*, London, 1938, p. 423 (conversation in October 1932).

"I am tenacious and have strong nerves. If I had not, I would not be standing where I am." To American and English journalists, 2 Feb. 1933: *M.G.*, 3 Feb. 1933.

"Life can be born only out of freedom, and freedom can be won only by fighting for it." *V.B.*, 3 Mar. 1933.

"I am against Pacifism, for I am in favour of Power. For in Power lies Strength, and Strength is the eternal mother of Right, and Right is the very root of Life." *M.G.*, 16 Mar. 1933.

"The principle of discipline is the foundation of the Movement." Speech in Munich, 22 Apr. 1933: *V.B.*, 25 Apr. 1933.

"Only strength calls forth strength." *F.Z.*, 10 Sept. 1934.

"As *Führer*, I could not imagine for myself any more glorious or prouder task than to serve this people. They might offer me continents and I would rather choose to be the poorest citizen in this people." Speech of 1 May 1935: *V.B.*, 2 May 1935.

"One year of a good birth-rate does more for us than any war." Speech at Munich, 14 Mar. 1936: *M.G.*, 16 Mar. 1936.

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"I have not destroyed democracy: I have simplified it, in that I refused to recognize the authority of the 47 parties. I recognize only the authority of the German people itself. There lies the source of my strength." Speech at Frankfurt, 16 Mar. 1936: *V.B.*, 18 Mar. 1936.

"Man is a being with a soul: that means that material problems have to be brought into relation with the souls of the people." Speech in the Reichstag, 30 Jan. 1937.

"I have had three unusual friends in my life. In my youth it was Poverty which was my companion for many years. As the Great War came to a close there was profound Suffering—Suffering which seized upon me as I saw the collapse of our people and which determined for me my way. And since this 30th of January four years ago I have come to know my third friend, Care, Care caused me by the people and the Reich with whose leadership I had been entrusted. Since that day Care has never left my side, and now, I suppose, she will go with me to the end of life. But how could a man bear this weight of Care, if, in faith and confidence in his mission, he could not count on the approval of Him who stands above us all?" Speech in the Reichstag, 30 Jan. 1937: *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, v (1938), p. 55.

"I am one of those who believe in common sense." Talk with foreign newspaper correspondents, 12 Sept. 1937: *M.G.*, 13 Sept. 1937.

"I can at least say this of myself: I have never made a promise to the German people which I was not in a position to keep." Speech at the Harvest Festival on the Bückeberg, 3 Oct. 1937: *F.Z.*, 4 Oct. 1937.

"Une des élégantes de Berlin . . . qui passe pour être une des Égéries du Führer" at the first meeting with Hitler: "J'ai bredouillé une phrase où je disais: 'Herr Hitler, je suis bien heureuse de saluer le soldat inconnu.' Il m'a pris les deux mains et m'a regardée dans les yeux en disant lentement: 'Je vous remercie de vos paroles. Elles m'ont fait chaud au cœur, et souvent j'y ai tellement froid.'" Cited from Louis Gillet, *Rayons et Ombres d'Allemagne*. Paris, Flammarion, 1937, p. 181.

"The higher the standard of living and culture of a nation the greater will be its longing for peace. It is peace alone which can enable it to accomplish those things which make a high standard of living possible." Speech in the Reichstag, 20 Feb. 1938: authorized English translation, p. 42.

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"I can reckon myself as one of those who in history have not remained mere theorists. What I demanded and proclaimed in theory, that I have attained and accomplished." Speech in Frankfurt, 31 Mar. 1938: *F.Z.*, 2 Apr. 1938.

"With National Socialism there stands at the beginning the Deed—not Words." Speech at Salzburg: beginning of the Autobahn Salzburg–Vienna, 7 Apr. 1938: *F.Z.*, 8 Apr. 1938.

"When I lay in hospital almost blind, Germany's destiny became clear to me." Speech at Vienna, 9 Apr. 1938: *The Observer*, 10 Apr. 1938.

"The bases of my programme are blood, fire, and personality." Speech at Vienna, 9 Apr. 1938: cited from *The Observer*, 10 Apr. 1938.

"The unity of the nation did not fall into my lap like a ripe fruit. All I had was the power of my speech and my holy faith." Speech at Vienna, 9 Apr. 1938: *The Observer*, 10 Apr. 1938.

"No people is born in five years, in five years no State is completed. But we have laid the foundation-stone. Ours was the faith, ours is the will." Speech on May Day 1938: *F.Z.*, 2 May 1938.

"We are first of all men of action and so we shall always remain. Therefore we shall rejoice over every new task which comes our way." Speech at Stettin, 12 June 1938: *F.Z.*, 14 June 1938.

Sir Nevile Henderson once watched Hitler at a review remaining for four hours practically without intermission with his right arm stretched out at the National Socialist salute. Asked afterwards how it was done, Hitler replied, "Will-power". Sir Nevile Henderson, *The Failure of a Mission. Berlin, 1937–1939*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1940, p. 40.

"Without motors, aeroplanes, and loud-speakers we should never have conquered Germany." Cited by G. Zernatto, *Die Wahrheit über Oesterreich*, New York, 1938, p. 265.

From G. Ward Price, *I Know these Dictators*, London, Harrap, 1937:

"I always knew that I should be a great man, even in my poorest days, and I feel convinced that I shall live to finish my task" (pp. 26–7).

"If my relatives had deserved better conditions, they would have got on as I did." A remark attributed to Hitler (p. 45).

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Of the early days Hitler has said: "I thank those days for the fact that I grew hard and can be hard" (p. 46).

"Should the Jew with the help of his Marxist faith prevail over the peoples of this world, his crown will be the burial wreath of humanity and this planet will once more, as it did millions of years ago, drift through the ether, devoid of life. Eternal Nature ruthlessly avenges the transgressions of her laws. I believe, therefore, that I am acting to-day in the spirit of the Almighty Creator. In fighting the Jews I am defending the work of the Lord" (pp. 49-50).

"Majorities can never replace men. They represent not only stupidity but timidity, and just as a hundred bone-heads are incapable of wisdom, so a hundred cowards will never make a heroic resolve" (p. 50).

"It may take twenty or a hundred years to establish our ideas. It may be that those who now hold those ideas must all die before they prevail, but what does a man's life matter in the development of a nation or of humanity?" (p. 91).

"The people would rather be commanded than courted" (p. 109).

From Rosita Forbes, *These Men I Knew*. London, Hutchinson, no date:

"It is possible to have too much culture. So many of the more advertised writers put reason before instinct. That is wrong. We Nazis appeal to the emotions rather than to the intellect. There is a child in every grown-up person and to that child we appeal with music, flags, oratory, and all the other symbols which it understands. We have thought with our heads too long. Now we must feel with our hearts" (p. 14).

"It is the spirit of Germany which matters. If we eat grass to-day what does it signify so long as that spirit is reborn?" (p. 26).

"To get anything by force, you must be very strong indeed; to get anything without force you must be stronger still" (p. 39).

"War is not a matter of dying for your country. It means living year after year so that you may know how so to die" (p. 45).

II. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

A Bibliography is an individual affair: one must make one's own. But a starting-point may be of service, and it is such a starting-point which I have sought in this note to provide for the student of Hitler's speeches. The selection of works cited is admittedly arbitrary since (unless it is otherwise expressly stated) I have included only such books and articles as I have myself either read or consulted.

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particular: 34, 37-8, 45 (considers himself a German Messiah); 55-6 (interview); Hitler and the SA., 57; withdrawal from the League, 61-3 (cf. 64); Hitler another Luther, 69; and Munich University, 80-1; and *Gleichschaltung* of the German States: the opposition of Goering, 81; Hitler as Jesus Christ for the whole of Europe, 85; interview, 100-1; "a very great man" (Schacht), 176; as Redeemer of Germany, 181; as Napoleon, 234; "the one person who converses with God about his country's affairs", cf. Joan of Arc, 248; a sort of Jesus Christ, 275; "History is far better for me than politics which wears me out", 305, see also 228-9, 405-6; 101-3, 328.

For National Socialist laudations of Hitler cf. e.g. Hermann Goering, *Germany Reborn*, Elkin Mathews & Marrot, 1934, pp. 77-89; J. Goebbels, *Revolution der Deutschen*, Oldenburg, Stalling, 1933, pp. 221-30; R. Hess, *Reden*, Munich, Eher, 1938, pp. 52-63.

(iii) HITLER IN BAVARIA: DOWN TO 1924

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(a) *For the "Freikorps"*

Ernst H. Posse, *Die politischen Kampfbünde Deutschlands*. Berlin, Junker & Dünhaupt, 1930.—In the series "Fachschriften zur Politik und staatsbürgerlichen Erziehung", ed. Ernst v. Hippel; E. I. Gumbel, *Verschwörer. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Soziologie der deutschen nationalistischen Geheimbünde seit 1918*. Vienna, Malik-Verlag, 1934; Edgar von Schmidt-Pauli, *Geschichte der Freikorps 1918-1924. Nach amtlichen Quellen, Zeitberichten, Tagebüchern und persönlichen Mitteilungen hervorragender Freikorpsführer*. Stuttgart, Robert Lutz Nachfolger, Otto Schramm, 4te Auflage, mit 19 Bildern und 5 Karten, 1936.—Very useful list of known Freikorps with short accounts of each, pp. 353-64, and another list (names only) of "Freiwillige Formationen", pp. 365-9; bibliography, p. 370. A series of essays in *Deutscher Aufstand. Die Revolution des Nachkriegs*, ed. Curt Hotzel. Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1934; *Das Buch vom deutschen Freikorpskämpfer. Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Freikorpszeitschrift "Der Reiter gen Osten"*. Labes, [1938]; *Darstellungen aus den Nachkriegskämpfen deutscher Truppen und Freikorps. Im Auftrage des Reichskriegsministeriums bearbeitet und herausgegeben von der*

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(b) *For the political background*

Max Buchner, "Zur Haltung Bayerns am Vorabend der Revolution von 1918", in *Festgabe für Karl Alexander von Müller* (under the title *Staat und Volkstum*), Diessen vor München, Hubers Verlag, 1933, pp. 44-76; for the Soviet Republic of Bavaria see Ernst Toller, *I was a German. An Autobiography*, translated by Edward Crankshaw (London, John Lane, 1934), pp. 145 sqq. (authorized translation of *Eine Jugend in Deutschland*); Ambroise Got, *L'Allemagne après la débâcle. Impressions d'un attaché à la Mission militaire française à Berlin Mars-juillet 1919*. Strasbourg, Imprimerie Strasbourgeoise (no date [1920]); id., *La Terreur en Bavière*. Paris, Perrin, 1922.

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(iv) "MEIN KAMPF"

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(v) NATIONAL SOCIALISM UP TO THE ELECTION OF MARCH 1933

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(vi) THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST STATE

(a) *Its character*

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(b) *The Principle of Leadership ("Führertum")*

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(c) *Constitution*

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(d) Administration

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(e) *The Police: the Gestapo*

Reinhard Höhn, "Die Wandlung im Polizeirecht", *Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft*, i (1936), pp. 100-23. The Gestapo: Gesetz über die Errichtung eines Geheimen Staatspolizeiamts (26 Apr. 1933), W. Hoche, *Die Gesetzgebung des Kabinetts Hitler* (Berlin, Vahlen, 1933), Heft 2, pp. 216-17; and the *Erlaß* of the Minister des Innern of the same date, *ibid.*, pp. 217-22; extension of Gestapo's sphere of action: see the Prussian *Verordnung* of the

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same date, *ibid.*, p. 224: on 20 April 1934 Himmler was made head of the Gestapo in Prussia as well as in other States, and for Prussia see further the law of 10 Feb. 1936 and the *Ausführungsverordnung* of the same date, *ibid.*, Heft 18 (1936), pp. 77-81. By an *Erlaß* of 17 June 1936 Himmler was appointed "Chef der Deutschen Polizei im Reichsministerium des Innern", *ibid.*, Heft 19 (1936), pp. 34-5. The action of the Gestapo cannot be questioned by the Courts. See Walter Hamel, "Wesen und Rechtsgrundlagen der Polizei im nationalsozialistischen Staate" in ed. Hans Frank, *Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht*. Munich, Eher, 1937, pp. 381-98 (with bibliography)—a remarkable study: the police as "der irrationale, unbestimmte Teil der Staatshoheit"; Werner Best, "Die politische Polizei des Dritten Reiches", *ibid.*, pp. 417-30; H.-H. Lammers and Hans Pfundtner, *op. cit.* (see above), vol. ii, Lieferung 29, *Die Polizei*; Pierre Dehillote, *Gestapo. L'Organisation. Les Chefs. Les Agents. L'Action de la Gestapo à l'étranger*. Préface de Georges Suarez. Paris, Payot, 1940; O. C. Giles, *The Gestapo* (= Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 36), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1940.

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(vii) NATIONAL SOCIALISM 1933 TO SEPT. 1939

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(viii) THE THEORY OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM

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(ix) PROPAGANDA

"Propaganda is will to power and victorious only as the tool of an idea. When the idea is desecrated, the whole artful edifice collapses." Eugen Hadamovsky.

"A Party comes into office by propaganda and then cannot disavow it or stop it." Schacht, cited in *Ambassador Dodd's Diary*, p. 176.

"On ne dira jamais assez la prodigieuse perméabilité à l'absurde d'une foule allemande." R. d'Harcourt, "Psychologie hitlérienne", *Revue des deux Mondes*, 8^{me} Période, xxxii (Apr. 1936), p. 782.

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(x) THE "MODEL REVOLUTION": THE OPPRESSION

"Barmherzigkeit ist nicht unsere Sache, das ist Sache eines Höheren. Wir haben lediglich dafür zu sorgen, daß der Gerechtigkeit Genüge geschieht. Wir dürfen getrost noch so inhuman sein, wenn wir damit das deutsche Volk glücklich machen." Hitler

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(cited by Alexander Stein, *Adolf Hitler, Schüler der "Weisen von Zion"*, Karlsbad, "Graphia", 1936, p. 69).

"Köpfe werden in diesem Kampf rollen, entweder die unseren oder die anderen. Also, sorgen wir dafür, daß die anderen rollen." Hitler (cited by Alexander Stein, *Adolf Hitler, Schüler der "Weisen von Zion"*, Karlsbad, "Graphia," 1936, p. 69).

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von Bülow, wisest man in Foreign Office, 218; uncomfortable, 227; not a Nazi, 336; "dangerous and wicked war of Mussolini", 338; his death, 341.

Ernst of the SA., 39-40, 49.

Goering, 119-20; and a Reichswehr Putsch?, 122; 125; as successor to Hitler, 317.

Hanfständl, 366, 397.

Ley, 228.

von Neurath, 140; 177; afraid of Hitler, 207; 237; 423-4; always surrenders to Hitler, 429.

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(Apr. 1935), pp. 3-22 (German mentality always the same); H. Wickham Steed, "From Frederick the Great to Hitler: the Consistency of German Aims", *International Affairs*, xvii (1938), pp. 655-81; on the failings of Germany as shown in her history cf. *Deutsches Brevier. Politisches Lesebuch*, ed. Edgar Alexander, Zürich, Europa Verlag, 1938 (a collection of extracts in prose and verse), pp. 20-3, 83-129; Rudolf Olden, *Is Germany a Hopeless Case?* Translated by Edwyn Bevan. London, Allen & Unwin, 1940; Ernest Hambloch, *Germany Rampant*, London, Duckworth, 1939.—On the consistency and continuity of German character and outlook. Edgar Stern-Rubarth, *Exit Prussia. A Plan for Europe*. London, Duckworth, 1940.—Prussia, essentially Slav—and Germany. Cited here for the study of the fatal influence of Prussia over the essential Germany. Prussia must be separated from the true Germany. "Hitler the Arch-Prussian", pp. 26-61; a criticism of Ernest Hambloch's *Germany Rampant* (see *supra*): for the characteristics of Prussianism, cf. p. 109. John Heygate, *These Germans. An Estimate of their Character seen in Flashes from the Drama 1918-1939*. London, Hutchinson, 1940: see in particular pp. 145 sqq.; Ernst G. Preuss, *The Canker of Germany*. Translated by Norbert S. Maiman. London, Williams & Norgate, 1940.—Prussianism, German militarism, and National Socialism are but manifestations of the same mentality, but there have always been enough men of all classes in Germany willing and prepared to lead the people along reasonable paths if only they are given the chance and their policy granted sufficient support; Beverley Baxter, *Men, Martyrs, and Mountebanks*, London, Hutchinson, no date (?1940)—ch. iii, "The Two Germanys"; Hellmut von Rauschenplat and Hilda Monte, *How to conquer Hitler*, London, Jarrolds, 1940, ch. x, "The mental Make-up of the German People", by Hilda Monte, pp. 189-213; F. H. Heinemann, "The Unstable Mind of the German Nation", *The Hibbert Journal*, xxxviii (1940), pp. 217-29; A. L. Rowse, "What is Wrong with the Germans?" *The Political Quarterly*, xi (1940), pp. 16-29; F. Borkenau, *The Totalitarian Enemy* (London, Faber & Faber, 1940), ch. v, "Nazi Mentality and its Background"; W. W. Coole and M. F. Potter, *Thus spake Germany*. Foreword by Lord Vansittart. London, Routledge, 1941; Col. T. H. Minshall, *What to do with Germany*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1941, pp. 25-72; Carl Brinitzer and Bertha Grossbard, *German versus Hun*. Translated by Bernard Miall. London, Allen &

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THE SA.

See the bibliographical note on the SA. pp. 173-4 *supra*.

"Die SA. ist das Gewissen der nationalsozialistischen Revolution, das ist ihr tiefer Sinn zu dessen Verstehen nicht der Verstand, sondern das offene Herz, das tiefe wahre Erleben der Weg sind. Sie ist der bleibende Maßstab für das Schaffen im neuen Staat, ewig marschierend, ewig mahnend und treibend." Gunter d'Alquen in *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*, v (1934), p. 31.

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See bibliographical note on pp. 266 sqq. and cf. Hitler's speech in the Reichstag, 20 Feb. 1938 *supra*. For the much discussed problem of the relation of the Reich to the German *Länder* see W. Abegg (Secretary of State in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior), *Preußische Verwaltung und ihre Reform. Länder und Reich*. Berlin, Sieben-Stäbe Verlag, 1928; Christian König, *Die süddeutschen Staaten und das Problem der Reichsreform*. Dissertation of the Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät of the University of Rostock, 1929; Wilhelm E. Althaus, *Die föderalistischen Elemente in den Verfassungen des Deutschen Reiches vom 16. April 1871 und vom 11. August 1919*. Dissertation of the juristische Fakultät of the University of Erlangen, 1929; Karl Rieger, *Die Einwirkung der Reichsregierung auf die Behörden der Länder*. Dissertation of the Juristische Fakultät of the University of Würzburg, 1930; Gerhard Günther, *Das werdende Reich. Reichsgeschichte und Reichsreform*, Hamburg, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1932, pp. 167-79 (Die Verfassung von Weimar); pp. 180-4 (Reich und Länder); pp. 185-95 (Vorschläge zur Reichsreform); pp. 196-206 (Staat und Gesellschaft); for the "new federalism" of the Weimar Constitution: Rupert Emerson, *State and Sovereignty in Modern Germany*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1928, pp. 236-53; and for a defence of German Federalism: A. Grabowsky, "Das demokratische Regiment und die Gegenwart", *Zeitschrift für Politik*, xxii (1933), pp. 573-86. For the relations between the Reich and the Länder under the Weimar Republic see further Frederick F. Blatchly and Miriam E. Oatman, *The Government and Administration of Germany*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1928, pp. 6-30; Johannes Mattern, *Principles of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the German National Republic*, *ibid.*, 1928, pp. 157-357; Roger H. Wells, "Reichsreform and Prussian Verwaltungsreform in 1932", *American Political Science Review*, xxvii (1933), pp. 185-203, and for questions of foreign policy: Fritz Steffen, *Die Auswärtige Gewalt und der Reichspräsident* (= Internationalrechtliche Abhandlungen, ed. Herbert Kraus, Nr. 15), Berlin, 1933, pp. 27 sqq. For the action of the National Socialists: ed. Hans Frank, *Nationalsozialistisches Handbuch für Recht und Gesetzgebung*, 2te Auflage, Munich, Eher, 1935, pp. 323-35; Günther Henke, *Die Stellung der Reichsstatthalter*. Dissertation of the Rechts- und

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RELIGION

See the bibliographical note on Religion, pp. 341 sqq. *supra*.

"The Indians think that if the spirit in them is divine it behoves them to clear it of all shackles unworthy of divinity; of all partiality, of all ignorance, of all anxiety, division, or change. The Germans, on the contrary, think that if the spirit in them is divine, it lends its supreme sanction to all their desires, shares their ambitions, and ensures the fulfilment of their hopes." Santayana, *Egotism in German Philosophy*, London, Dent, 1939, p. 174.

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"Ce qui fait la force de l'Allemagne hitlérienne, c'est son âme religieuse, et ce qui produit le marasme de la France, c'est le dessèchement religieux qui sévit dans son peuple et chez les dirigeants de son peuple."

"Dieu n'a pas créé le monde pour en faire un Enfer. C'était encore le sujet de notre conversation ce matin avec Hitler."

"Si Hitler a une main qui salue . . . son autre main dans l'invisible ne cesse d'êtreindre fidèlement la main de Celui qui s'appelle Dieu."

"Les Nationaux-socialistes allemands sont l'apparition humaine d'un recommencement de l'œuvre de Dieu." A. de Chateaubriant, *La Gerbe des Forces*, Paris, Grasset, 1937, pp. 122, 168-70, 136, 161.

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At the Juristentag in Leipzig (2-4 Oct. 1933) Frick cited "ein älteres Wort von Hitler": "Recht ist was dem deutschen Volk nutzt, und Unrecht was ihm schadet"; 21 May 1933: vor der Reichstagung der Referendare: Frank: "Recht kann niemals sein was den Interessen des Volkes abträglich ist"; 27 June 1935: Tagung of the Akademie für deutsches Recht: Frank: "Recht ist was der Rasse und dem Volke dient"; Rosenberg, *Mythus*, p. 591: "Recht ist für uns einzig und allein, was der deutschen Ehre dient"; 13 Nov. 1934: Goering before the Academy of German Law: "Das Recht wurde aus dem Blut des Volkes geboren und nicht das Gesetz ist das Primäre oder Selbstzweck, sondern das Volk"; and in the Reichstag on 23 March 1933: "Die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz wird allen zugebilligt, die mit für die Nation eintreten und der Regierung ihre Unterstützung nicht versagen."

Goering before the Academy of German Law said that "falsche Milde" and "Humanität" were "Zerstörer der Rechtssicherheit" (cf. Alexander Stein, *Adolf Hitler, Schüler der "Weisen von Zion"*, Karlsbad "Graphia", 1936, p. 67).

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"Niemand als der Führer kann die letzte Entscheidung fällen, ob eine bestimmte Regelung gelten soll oder nicht. Ihm gegenüber bedarf es keiner Garantie für die Wahrung der Gerechtigkeit, da er kraft seines Führertums der 'Hüter der Verfassung' und d. h. hier: der ungeschriebenen konkreten Rechtsidee seines Volkes ist. Ein auf seinen Willen zurückgehendes Gesetz unterliegt daher keiner richterlichen Nachprüfung. Der Führer gehorcht nicht einer an ihn gerichteten Norm, sondern dem Lebensgesetz der Gemeinschaft, das in ihm Fleisch und Blut genommen hat." So Karl Lorenz, *Deutsche Rechtserneuerung und Rechtsphilosophie*.—Tübingen, Mohr, 1934; cf. *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, iv (1935), pp. 134-5. On the rights of the individual as against the action of the National Socialist State cf. Theodor Maunz, "Die Rechtmäßigkeit der Verwaltung", in ed. Hans Frank, *Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht*, Munich, Eher, 1937, pp. 51-66; Ulrich Scheuner, "Die Rechtsstellung der Persönlichkeit in der Gemeinschaft", *ibid.*, pp. 82-98, especially pp. 95-7;

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YOUTH

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"Youth is always right," Frank, *F.Z.*, 27 Oct. 1935.

Stresemann (shortly before his death) to Bruce Lockhart: "Now nothing remains except brute force. The future is in the hands of the new generation. And the youth of Germany, which we might have won for peace and the new Europe, we have lost" (*Guns or Butter*, London, Putnam, 1938, p. 316).

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See the bibliographical note on the Army, pp. 564-5 *supra*.

"L'Allemagne s'est ruinée pour acheter un revolver et on voudrait qu'elle ne s'en serve pas un jour?" Dr. Mataja (Vienna), cited *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 8^{me} Période, xxxii, p. 784.

Hitler: Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte No. 3, 1930: "It is impossible to build up an army and give it a sense of worth if the object of its existence is not the preparation for war. Armies for the preservation of peace do not exist; they exist only for the triumphant execution of war." Cited by H. Fish Armstrong, *We or They*, London, Macmillan, 1937, p. 67.

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KULTUR

See the bibliographical note on pp. 612 sqq. *supra*.

"Whoever now undertakes to base German faith on any kind of knowledge, i.e. the permanent and certain on the uncertain and fluctuating, conveys Liberalism in a camouflaged form into the Third Reich and becomes like vermin sapping the vital power of the Movement." E. Krieck, *Wissenschaft, Weltanschauung, Hochschulreform*, p. 42, cited in *Sociological Review*, xxxi (1939), p. 108.

A prominent National Socialist: "I do not mind freedom of thought in the least provided I can control what facts go into the mind—a logical mind must then draw the 'right' conclusions, the conclusions I want, and its workings need not be feared" (*The Year Book of Education*, London, Evans Brothers, 1939, p. 256).

For the meaning of the word "Kultur" down to 1917 and a note on the meaning of "Bildung" see Sir Philip Hartog, "Kultur as a Symbol in Peace and in War", *The Sociological Review*, xxx (1938), pp. 317-45.—A very interesting collection of passages from German writers; Kuno Francke, *German After-War Problems*, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1927, pp. 102 sqq. (German literature under the Republic).

For the hardships of the intellectual classes in the Post-War world cf. Lothrop Stoddard, *Social Classes in Post-War Europe*, New York, London, Scribner, 1925, pp. 117-42; for Nationalism

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For Jews and exclusion from the Kulturkammer see Wernert, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-6, 130-1, speech of Goebbels, *F.Z.*, 13 May 1934, and compare with this his speech on 15 Nov. 1935: "Die Reichskulturkammer ist heute judenrein", *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, iii (1937), p. 274.

Horst Dressler-Andress, *Die Reichsrundfunkkammer* (=Schriften der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik, Series ii, Der organisatorische Aufbau des Dritten Reiches, Heft 6). Berlin, Junker & Dünnhaupt, 1935; Heinz Ihler, *Die Reichsmusikkammer* (in the same series, Heft 7). 1935; Otto Graf zu Rantzau, *Das Reichsministerium für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung* (in the same series, Heft 38), 1939, and see *Deutsche Kultur im neuen Reich. Wesen, Aufgabe und Ziel der Reichskulturkammer. Unter Mitarbeit der Präsidenten und Präsidialratsmitglieder der Kammern herausgegeben von Ernst Adolf Dreyer*. Berlin, Schlieffen Verlag, 1934 (short papers, photographs); Hans Schmidt-Leonhardt, "Die Reichskulturkammer", in H.-H. Lammers and Hans Pfundtner, *Grundlagen, Aufbau und Wirtschaftsordnung des*

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For the veto on art criticism see the long report of a speech by Ministerialrat Berndt and the elucidation by Goebbels of his order imposing the veto: *F.Z.*, 30 Nov. 1936.—For the Party organization note:

16 Apr. 1934. Creation of the Parteiamtliche Prüfungskommission zum Schutze des nationalsozialistischen Schrifttums. E. Wernert, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-8; cf. *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, ii (1935), p. 328.

14 June 1934. Creation of the Nationalsozialistische Kultur-gemeinde with four bureaux—for Film, Theatre, Fine Arts, and Music. With 2,000 local groups.

Reichsstelle zur Förderung des deutschen Schrifttums with 40 principal readers centralizing the labour of 600 other readers: the works of some 6,000 writers are examined annually, and a monthly list of approved literature is published in three journals. Wernert, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

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The authoritative statement of the attitude of the Third Reich to "Wissenschaft" is to be found in the speeches of the Reichswissenschaftsminister Rust and of Ernst Kriek at the celebration of the 550th anniversary of the founding of the University of Heidelberg reproduced in *Das nationalsozialistische Deutschland und die Wissenschaft* (in the series "Schriften des Reichsinstituts für Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands"). Hamburg, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1936. Rust dismisses "Voraussetzungslosigkeit", "Wertfreiheit", and objectivity as false, and Kriek stated: "Wir erkennen und anerkennen keine Wahrheit um der Wahrheit, keine Wissenschaft um der Wissenschaft willen", p. 28. For N.S. criticism of "Wissenschaft" under the Liberal system see P. Ritterbusch, *Demokratie und Diktatur*. Berlin, Vienna, Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 1939, pp. 50 sqq. (cf. pp. 21-2).

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THE JEWS

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(v) TRAFFIC

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Hauser, *Hitler versus Germany* (see above), ch. x; Charles W. Domville-Fife, *This is Germany*, London, Seeley Service & Co., [1939?], pp. 106 sqq. (photographs).

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(vi) BANKS

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(viii) AUTARKY AND THE SECOND FOUR YEARS PLAN

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(ix) "GROSSRAUM" ECONOMICS

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(x) ECONOMICS AND LAW

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RACE (see p. 988 *supra*)

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For Hitler's racial theories see the criticism of Manuel Humbert in Hitler's "*Mein Kampf*": *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Paris, Pariser Tageblatt, 1936, pp. 95-203. — "Judengesetze," pp. 219-45. Gabriel Meresse, "Le Racisme de Wagner et d'Adolf Hitler", *Revue politique et parlementaire*, clxii (Jan. 1935), pp. 70-8. — The link to be found in the common passion for popular Nordic tradition;

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A. Lahaque, "Le Troisième Reich et la Politique indigène en Afrique", *Revue politique et parlementaire*, clxvii (June 1936), pp. 440-57.—The racial principle in National Socialist theories of colonial administration.

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FOREIGN POLICY

THE PEACE AFTER THE WAR OF 1914-1918. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

[It would be irrelevant in this place to cite works describing the course of the deliberations during the Peace Conference (see the bibliography in the book of Paul Birdsall cited *infra*) save where these usefully reflect the judgements of a later day, e.g. the books of Stegemann, Ziegler, Fabre-Luce cited *infra*.]

Students will naturally consult the *Survey of International Affairs* published annually by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House).

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EUROPE

The work of journalists is of the first importance for students of contemporary history: their accounts preserve the feeling—the *Stimmung*—of the moment which afterwards can be recovered only with extreme difficulty. I have therefore included in this note a reference to some of these surveys of the international struggles of our day. I have endeavoured to put together a list of books and articles which should faithfully represent the contemporary conflict of opinion.

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GERMANY

Goering to Ward Price three days after the occupation of Prague: "There was a time when it needed courage to pursue Germany's policy. It needed courage to resign from the League

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of Nations and to introduce compulsory service. The reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 required great courage, but since then our resources have developed so enormously that we can now afford to snap our fingers at any opposition." G. Ward Price, *Year of Reckoning*, London, Toronto, Melbourne, Sydney, Cassell, 1939, p. 14.

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For Hitler's "Peace Policy" in 1933 cf. his speech at Augsburg, 24 Oct. 1934: "Es wäre echte deutsche Staatsmannskunst, das übrige Europa vor vollendete deutsche Tatsachen zu stellen wie sie wahrhaftig im deutschen Interesse liegen, und nicht erst die Erlaubnis der anderen Völker einzuholen. Meinetwegen Friedensrede — aber nur solange es im deutschen Interesse liegt. Das ist die Lehre der deutschen Geschichte." Cited by Alexander Stein, *Adolf Hitler, Schüler der "Weisen von Zion"*, Karlsbad, Graphia, 1936, p. 87. In 1924 Hitler had written: "Im ewigen Kampfe ist die Menschheit groß geworden — im ewigen Frieden geht sie zugrunde." *Mein Kampf*, p. 149; and for the exploitation of "peace" as an instrument of national policy: Sisley Huddleston, *War unless* —, London, Gollancz, 1933, pp. 225-35.—On "a Pact to outlaw Peace".

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II. LIST OF NAMES OF AUTHORS

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In compiling this analysis of the translated passages I have sought to put into the hands of the student a key to the subject-matter of Hitler's Speeches. It is this object which can alone excuse the length of this Index.

N.S. in this index represents National Socialism, National Socialist, National Socialists—the context will, I hope, show the meaning in any particular entry.

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
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